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Volume XII Summer 1968 Number 2

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*A Quarterly Journal of World Affairs*

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Reflections on the Quarter . . . . . 371

Eastern Europe in Flux . . . . . *William R. Kintner and Wolfgang Klaiber* 391

The Case for a Loyal Opposition Under Communism: Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia . . *Barbara Jancar* 415

Fetishes of NATO and the Dollar . . . . *Horst Mendershausen* 441

NATO, NAFTA and the Smaller Allies . . . . *Nils Örvik* 455

The Origins of the MLF Concept, 1957-1960 . . *Thomas C. Wiegele* 465

American Foreign Policy and the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus . . . . . *T. W. Adams and Alvin J. Cottrell* 490

Strategic Projections and Policy Options in the Soviet-Cuban Relationship . . . . *Desmond P. Wilson, Jr.* 504

The Emergence of Biafra: Balkanization or Nation-Building? . . . . . *Ross K. Baker* 518

Moscow, Peking, and the Indian Political Scene After Nehru . . . . . *Bhabani Sen Gupta* 534

Korea's Involvement in Viet Nam . . . . *Princeton N. Lyman* 563

The Military's Ideological Challenge to Civilian Authority in Post-World War II France . . *Ronald J. Stupak* 582

Reviews:

Postwar British Defense Policy . . *Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.* 605
Bidault and the "Wind of History" . . *Amaury de Riencourt* 611
The Austrian Episode: A Lingering Enigma . . *Gerhard Mally* 613
The Diplomacy of Violence . . . . . *Curtin Winsor, Jr.* 617
Foreign Assistance Programs and Trade Policies . *Willard Barber* 620

Books Received . . . . . 626

Contributors to this Issue . . . . . 638




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# *Reflections on the Quarter*

## This Ambiguous Detente

ONE of the most perplexing aspects of contemporary international politics is the ambiguity of the Soviet-American détente. Throughout history, whenever two great powers have moved from a relationship of hostile rivalry toward one of more friendly cooperation, they have necessarily had to pass through a period of some few years in which observers were hard put to characterize the political situation. This was true, for example, of the relations between the United States and England in the 1890's, between France and England from the Fashoda Incident of 1898 to the Anglo-French entente of 1904, and between republican France and Tsarist autocracy during that same era of *renversement des alliances* that marked the turn of the century. Nations ordinarily require a "decent interval" to carry out a fundamental change in the direction of their foreign policies. Much rarer is the ability of two governments to shift or reverse course suddenly. This sometimes happens when two dictatorial regimes concoct a strategic surprise—as in the Tilsit Agreement of 1807 between Napoleon and the Tsar, and in the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939. But these diplomatic liaisons are usually fragile affairs; in the two instances cited, the partners were soon at war with each other.

The mere ambiguity of the early phases of détente need neither surprise nor alarm us. What is unprecedented in the present U.S.-Soviet relationship is the fact that the ambiguity of the détente is both profound and prolonged, and even seems—contrary to the previous experiences of Western diplomatic history—to become in some ways more pronounced with the passage of time. One would naively imagine that with the rapid improvement of modern technical communications, two nations which were serious in their intentions to shift emphasis from conflict to cooperation ought to be able to move more or less steadily toward the reduction and eventual elimination of ambiguity in their bilateral relationship. Indeed, a calm observer of the scene might be pardoned for thinking at times the uncharitable thought that Moscow is interested in the protraction of ambiguity as a matter of policy.

The tensions of the Soviet-American Cold War, arising out of serious cultural, ideological and political differences, have divided the world much more than did any previous rivalry between great powers in the West. Diametrically opposed conceptions of domestic social organization and of international order have become highly institutionalized. Quantum leaps in firepower and delivery speed that none but the two superpowers were able, economically



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and technologically, to exploit fully for military purposes made them "natural" geostrategic foes, compulsively suspicious of each other. Small wonder that the fertile imaginations of psychologically oriented analysts spoke ominously of "mirror images" and "self-fulfilling prophecies." No one with an ounce of sense doubted that the road to détente would be an arduous one.

Yet in spite of these strictures, there is reason for unease. Many analysts perceive that all is not well in Washington-Moscow relations. The détente, after all, is not a new phenomenon, as if it were a "summing up" of the Johnson Administration. It is almost as old as the post-Stalin era, which began fifteen years ago. The Geneva Summit Conference of 1955 was characterized as a harbinger of "détente." So was the visit of Premier Khrushchev to the United States in 1959, culminating in the Camp David meeting with President Eisenhower. So was the signing of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the installation of the Washington-Moscow "hot line" in 1963. In those earlier years, of course, the progress of détente was far from rectilinear. The Spirit of Geneva was dissipated by Hungary and the Suez crisis; the Spirit of Camp David dissolved in the U-2 incident; the arms control agreements of 1963 were preceded by the Vienna confrontation of President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev, by the building of the Berlin Wall, and by the Cuban missile crisis. Since 1964, arms control progress has been made notably in respect to the Outer Space Treaty and the Nonproliferation Treaty, but both have been clouded by the steadily mounting tensions of the Viet Nam war and the East-West polarization of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Outer Space Treaty was also marred by the Soviet development of a fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS), which appeared to many to constitute a violation.

It is important to remind ourselves that the developments the experts cite as possible incentives to détente have been in evidence now for more than ten years. The breakdown of the bipolar world, the dissolution of alliances, "polycentrism," the "death of isms," the waning of the Cold War, the end of the communist monolith—all these terms belong to the political parlance of the late 1950's as much as to that of the late 1960's. When Vice President Humphrey in July of this year said that the communist countries "no longer pose a monolithic threat" and that new world conditions "demand a shift from policies of confrontation and containment to policies of reconciliation and peaceful engagement," he could hardly be said to be striking a new note. Whether or not such optimism is more justified now than in the past is a question that still deserves debate, free of the old ideological preconceptions and emotional fixations. It is not a question to which the most cheerful answer should be taken for granted merely because it has been repeated so often in the public forum.

According to the more euphoric



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interpretation of the current international scene, George Kennan's policy of containment, formulated more than twenty years ago, has wrought its expected beneficent effects, at least as these are viewed from the windows through which the superpowers look across Europe. (Both George Kennan and Hans Morgenthau have contended in recent years that "containment" was never really intended to apply to Asia—a hypothesis which might deserve the label "revisionist," if one thinks of the assumptions underlying the U.S. policy response to aggression in Korea.) Few strategic analysts would deny that, thanks to NATO, containment has thus far worked in Europe. In Europe, equilibrium has been established; stable dividing lines have been drawn and respected; the conditions for a civil dialogue between Western and Eastern Europe have been created. Whether the favorable situation brought into being by a NATO strong and united can survive the weakening of that alliance is a very different matter.

Containment has produced significant changes inside the Soviet Union as well. With the growth of the Soviet economy, several Western observers see the USSR becoming a more satisfied status quo power, abandoning the ideology of international violent revolution in favor of a more traditional conception of Russian national interest.

Actually, the changes in the Soviet Union have not been so profound as to warrant the assumption that we are now dealing with a fundamentally different type of society. There has been some movement toward Libermanism within the framework of central planning. The methods of social control have become less crude and more subtle. But on the other hand, it is an exaggeration to suggest that the Soviets are "liberalizing" and opening toward a genuine pluralism. The USSR is still a one-party state. There are no organized interest groups capable of putting pressure upon the Communist Party with the exception of the military, and the kind of pressure exerted by the military is hardly likely to coincide with U.S. interests. Recent literary defectors have charged that there is nothing resembling freedom of expression in the Soviet Union. Visitors are still aware of a vaguely oppressive atmosphere which it is a relief to leave. Western observers are hopeful that if Soviet scientists learn how to give political direction to the power they undoubtedly possess in their society, they will produce some salutary effects, of which the essay by Soviet Academician Andrei D. Sakharov furnishes an interesting hint. But whether the audacious reflections of this physicist, which were circulated privately in the USSR and later published in the West, are at all typical, and whether he and they will manage to survive, are matters for conjecture.

The rise of Russian and Chinese nationalism, along with differences between those two countries in respect to economic development, nuclear weapons, population size and devotion to the cause of pro-



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moting world revolution—for many years these factors have been cited, litany-like, to explain the Sino-Soviet dispute, which was supposed to be a major consideration in the Soviets' desire to mend fences with the West. Curiously, less has been heard about the Sino-Soviet conflict during 1968, when the two communist titans have moved toward closer cooperation in ensuring the flow of military supplies to be used against American forces in Viet Nam. For the future, the Soviets will have ample reason to cast a worried eye toward China. But as the Viet Nam war moves toward a U.S. election-year climax, Moscow and Peking do not seem to be deeply or bitterly divided over the actual waging of the war, even though the latter is reported to be more adamantly opposed to the Paris negotiations. Meanwhile, the United States is inhibited by the constantly reiterated warning that it must do nothing in Asia that would drive the USSR and China into each other's arms. This advice may eventually prove sound —who can say?—but at present its cogency warrants close scrutiny, especially in view of their hand-in-glove relationship vis-à-vis Hanoi.

In Eastern Europe, there is undoubtedly a powerful desire on the part of the people for a greater degree of autonomy within the communist system, if they cannot achieve independence outside it. In recent years the Common Market has been exercising the pull that Khrushchev feared five years ago. While the Western countries are busy "building bridges," the Soviets have artificially stimulated the old fears of Germany in an effort to maintain the cohesiveness of their empire in Eastern Europe, which may now be in real danger of disintegrating. This thesis, however, has its limitations. Unlike France, which withdrew from the military command of the Western alliance, thereby weakening NATO both politically and militarily, neither Rumania nor Czechoslovakia has dared to tamper with the structure of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. It is premature, therefore, to speak of the dissolution of alliances east and west.

It would be foolish to deny that the Soviets are encountering genuine political troubles in Eastern Europe. Nationalism is on the rise, and the people would like to have done entirely with the Russians if they could, but the national communist parties are caught on the horns of a dilemma. They must placate popular desires both for national independence from Moscow and greater political liberalization at home, yet at the same time they realize that they may be forced to rely on Soviet power as the guarantor of their own survival if the political situation loosens up too rapidly. Furthermore, the Jews of Eastern Europe, whether communist or not, have been seriously disturbed by the Soviets' pro-Arab posture against Israel in recent years, and particularly since the Aqaba crisis which led to the June 1967 war. Given all the complex ingredients that make up the East European scene, it is not surprising that the Czech crisis of July-August appeared to



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contain both a strong dose of political reality insofar as popular sentiments were concerned and a certain amount of clever play-acting on the part of some communist leaderships. Although Moscow compared Prague 1968 with Budapest 1956, it was not clear that Dubcek's democratization program was as subversive of communist security as the Soviets made it out to be. In any event, not even the most sanguine of the détentists in the United States can doubt that the brutal Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia has placed an unpleasant strain on Soviet-U.S. amity.

Perhaps the most understandable motivation for the acceptance by the United States and the Soviet Union of a "limited adversary" relationship is their mutually vulnerable strategic situation in the nuclear-missile age. It is plausible to think that most top-ranking policymakers in both governments are determined to avoid general nuclear war. This does not necessarily mean that their expectations concerning the strategic-technological equation for the indefinite future are symmetrical. Probably there is a stronger incentive among Soviet leaders to try to *attain* strategic superiority than there is among most U.S. politicians to *retain* it. For the time being, however, the two superpowers seem interested not only in avoiding general war, but also in inhibiting the spread of nuclear weapons beyond the five nominal members of the United Nations Security Council which were invested with the veto privilege at San Francisco twenty-three years ago.

The United States and the Soviet Union have not been accorded universal praise for the conclusion of the treaty signed on July 1. Several states are either opposed to the treaty or reluctant to sign it at the present time. (These include France, China, India, Pakistan, Japan, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Sweden, Israel and the UAR.) Some of these countries, and others as well, are undoubtedly awaiting the outcome of the non-nuclear-weapon-states' conference, scheduled for Geneva in late August, before deciding whether to affix their signatures.

In their loneliness as powers set apart by their greatness, the United States and the Soviet Union have been seeking avenues of cooperation in various directions, some of them important only as symbols of détente momentum —e.g., the inauguration of direct jet air service between New York and Moscow, the signing of another cultural exchange agreement, the conclusion of an agreement on astronaut rescue and return, and the Soviet release of a civilian transport plane, carrying Viet Nam-bound U.S. soldiers, after it had been forced down over the Kuriles (perhaps for no other reason than to allow Premier Kosygin to make a "friendly gesture").

At the same time, the Soviets have been talking and acting tough in other sectors of the globe beyond the dimensions of détente. In the Middle East tinderbox they have already replaced the



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bulk of Egyptian and Syrian arms lost in the June 1967 war. They have been credited by some observers with having sought to moderate Nasser's position on Israel, but they have also called for arms control measures in the Middle East under conditions which, they must know, would be totally unacceptable to Israel. They have continued gradually to convert the Mediterranean into a two-superpower sea, seeking bases on Arab shores and subtly changing the political climate along NATO's southern flank. It is not at all certain that the United States could have prevented the emergence of a Soviet fleet in the waters where the U.S. Sixth Fleet once held full sway. But it must now be recognized that a new strategic situation has been created because—in contrast to the Continent, where a permanently stable dividing line exists—the military forces of the United States and the Soviet Union may henceforth have to live with "interpenetration" as a more or less normal condition. In another recurrence of Arab-Israeli hostilities, this could be highly dangerous. Hence the question is whether the world's two leading nuclear powers will find themselves under increasing pressure to cooperate for the purpose of controlling conflict and tensions within that region, or whether the Soviets are inching closer to a situation in which another Arab-Israeli round might well bring on a direct confrontation between the Soviet and American fleets.

For both the United States and the Soviet Union, the area of advanced weapons technology remains a crucial one. Military technology simply will not stand still. A growing number of U.S. strategic analysts, including some who were skeptical about missile defense a few years ago, now agree that Soviet military capabilities have been growing at a more rapid rate than our own in recent years. General Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has warned that "if present trends continue," the issue of U.S. survival will eventually be raised. As Carl Kaysen pointed out in the July issue of *Foreign Affairs,* the development of as many as ten warheads per missile could create a situation in which one side would have a first-strike capability against the other, "provided the accuracy of the independently aimed warheads permitted successful attacks on hard targets."

In the United States, ballistic missile defense and further development of offensive capabilities are being played off against each other by certain arms control advocates in a mutually canceling fashion. Some of the opponents of ABM deployment contend that such deployment is not necessary inasmuch as Soviet defenses can be saturated with multiple individually-targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRV's). At the same time, it has been suggested that the United States should hold back from the development and deployment of MIRV's on the grounds that they would diminish the stability of deterrence. This latter argument was often leveled against anti-missile missiles back in the



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early 1960's, but the Soviets do not appear to have paid much attention to such a self-restraining type of strategic analysis. There now exists the distinct possibility that the United States, in the interests of making progress in the next scheduled round of arms control talks with the Soviets, will move only slowly, or not at all, in the strengthening of both its offensive and its defensive strategic capabilities, while the Soviets will continue to strengthen their forces in both sectors during the conduct of an "exchange of views." This exchange might well be protracted, as the nonproliferation negotiations were for a period of three years.

There are many other facets to the ambiguous détente in addition to the ones discussed above. There is, for example, the whole question, now almost forgotten, of U.S.-Soviet space competition. The Soviets are now thought to be planning new exploits in space designed to recapture their post-Sputnik prestige, while American political leaders are losing interest in the post-Apollo program. Soviet conduct in the *Pueblo* affair, the latest East German squeeze on West Berlin, political support for guerrilla insurgency in the Western Hemisphere, and intensified military movements in Eastern Europe will bear careful monitoring.

Not every development of Soviet power is necessarily a disaster for the West. Some forms of growth are benign; some forms inhibit strength more than they enhance it; some forms can be counterbalanced, or neutralized, or diverted into desirable directions. We should not forget that the relationship between the two superpowers is a multivariate phenomenon which should not be oversimplified. Détente has its ambiguous aspects for both sides.

Still, there is cause for misgiving. We must ask ourselves whether the American people have grown tired of their responsibilities. After two decades of stiff international political competition and heavy expenditures for defense, foreign aid and space exploration; after a protracted and as yet indecisive war of attrition that has produced a major protest movement at home strong enough to persuade one of the most masterful politicians of the century that he ought to retire from the Presidency; after the slow boil of racial unrest has created a climate of revolution and fear in many cities of America—is it possible that the American people are now losing their sense of internationalism, not too long after the British did? No longer sure how great their achievement was in stabilizing Europe, would they now lapse back into isolationism rather than worry about a viable equilibrium in Asia? Are they about to abandon their earlier determination to maintain the kind of military-technological leadership on which the structure of deterrence has rested for more than two decades? If so, the American era in global history will have been a brilliant but brief one. Future historians will say that it was magnificently innovative, but also a costly, thankless task. It remains to be seen whether our rival's sense



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of world mission is wearing out as fast as our own sometimes appears to be.

## Nuclear Nonproliferation: Detente vs. Alliance Cohesion

ON July 1, President Johnson called the Nonproliferation Treaty "the most important international agreement since the beginning of the nuclear age." On the same day, the President advised the American people that another step toward arms control was now in the offing. He declared: "Agreement has been reached between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States to enter in the nearest future into discussions on the limitation and the reduction of both offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and systems of defense against ballistic missiles." He viewed the Nonproliferation Treaty as the forerunner of further agreements designed to promote détente with the Soviet Union.

In contrast to President Johnson's sanguine statements, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, informing the Supreme Soviet on June 27 of the successful negotiation of the treaty, called for the "liquidation of foreign military bases," denounced NATO as an obstacle to arms control and disarmament agreements, and singled out the German Federal Republic as the would-be disturber of peace in Central Europe, haven of "the spirit of the Cold War," and source of "threats to the peace." Also on June 27, Leonid Brezhnev inveighed against the "rotten, degrading, decaying society" of the United States, denounced American "political gangsterism" (without mentioning the myriad political murders committed in the Soviet Union), and called for a rising of the "working class" and the "Civil Rights Movement" against "monopolist America."

Gromyko devoted attention to the United States as a power allegedly humbled by defeat in Viet Nam and equated it with monopolist, capitalist imperialism, addressing himself only briefly to the treaty. Contrary to official U.S. assertions, he claimed that the Soviet Union took the initiative which "has led to the drafting of an agreement on a Treaty on Nuclear Non-Proliferation." Those parts of his statement which are not critical of the United States or its allies are concerned with a call for general and complete disarmament "under strict international control." Thus far, however, the Soviets have rejected U.S. proposals for effective control and verification made in the course of U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations over the past generation.

Despite these vituperative Soviet assertions, the Administration has apparently arrived at the conclusion that, over a wide range of issues, it is possible to reach agreement with the Soviet Union. The thesis of revisionism—that priority in U.S. foreign policy be given to bilaterally negotiated arms control and security agreements with the Soviet Union over the maintenance of the Atlantic Alliance—has won an ever increasing number of ad-



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herents among academic experts on international politics and opinion makers. Somehow, it is reasoned, agreements such as the Nonproliferation Treaty will contribute to the resolution of the basic political disputes of the Cold War, none of which has yet been settled. In setting as its primary foreign policy goal the attainment of a détente with the Soviet Union, the United States has apparently downgraded the importance of its allies, and the Atlantic Alliance in particular.

Indeed, William Foster, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency of the Department of State, declared the grave risk of alliance crisis worth taking in order to complete the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. In the July 1965 issue of *Foreign Affairs,* Foster wrote as follows: "A heavier cost could be the erosion of alliances resulting from the high degree of U.S.-Soviet cooperation which will be required if a nonproliferation program is to be successful. Within NATO, there could be concern that the détente would lead to a weakening of our commitment to Western Europe. The problem will be particularly acute in Germany where there will be the added concern that the amelioration of the East-West confrontation could lead to an increased acceptance of the status quo in Central Europe." Not surprisingly, Foster's estimate of the treaty's cost-effectiveness was received with incredulity and consternation by some of our European allies.

The Soviet Union has nothing to lose and much to gain by the treaty. The Soviets have assisted China in developing a nuclear arsenal, but they have never had the intention of giving nuclear weapons to any other communist state—because their strategic posture, especially their military presence in Eastern Europe, does not require such largesse, and their mistrust of the satellite peoples rules out nuclear weapons in potentially hostile hands.

The United States, by contrast, could well afford to place nuclear weapons, especially defensive nuclear weapons, in the hands of some of our allies and friends. Were we to do so we need not fear a nuclear surprise attack by, let us say, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Israel, the German Federal Republic or India. Of course, the United States never proposed to make such a distribution. Except for its collaboration with Britain dating back to World War II, it has shared its nuclear knowledge with no one. The United States did envisage, however, the possibility of a NATO nuclear force—the modest proposal for a multilateral force (MLF) tried awkwardly to translate this vision into operational reality—and, albeit vaguely, the creation of a European nuclear force. The original American draft of 1965 for the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty contained the following provisions:

"Each of the nuclear States Party to this Treaty undertakes . . . not to take any other action which would cause an increase in the total number of States and other organizations having independent



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power to use nuclear weapons [and] not to assist any non-nuclear state in the manufacture of nuclear weapons. . . .

"Each of the non-nuclear States Party to this Treaty undertakes not to manufacture nuclear weapons . . . not to take any other action which would cause an increase in the total number of States and other organizations having independent power to use nuclear weapons [and] not to seek or to receive assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons, or itself to grant such assistance."

Under these provisions the United States could have assisted a united Europe to build a joint nuclear force, for such a development would not increase the "total" number of nuclear weapons states. But the Soviet objection prevailed, and the clauses were dropped.

The present treaty does not allow for the creation of a European Defense Association or other intermediate steps leading to the creation of a European Federal State possessed of effective nuclear defense. According to press reports, the United States does not view the treaty as denying a united Europe the right—subject to transfer of all powers over foreign and defense policy to the European Federal State—to become a military nuclear power. But even if this interpretation were valid—and nothing in the present treaty says it is—a united Europe would be blocked from all interim solutions leading to the establishment of a full-fledged European Federal State. Assuming that a European Federal State could nevertheless be established, the United States would not be able to offer it support in developing a collective nuclear deterrent, for, according to Paragraph 3 of Article IX, only states "which had manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1st, 1967," are to be regarded as being nuclear weapon states. This provision closes the door to the future with considerable finality.

Since the present treaty does not differentiate between defensive and offensive nuclear weapons, the nonnuclear members of NATO will be unable to develop their own anti-ballistic missile systems. Should it become possible in the future to set up a purely defensive ABM system, it is highly doubtful whether, under the provisions of the treaty, these member states could acquire the needed technology. Some highly qualified experts believe such a system could be devised. If it can be made operational, it will be as essential to the defense of Western Europe as it would be to the defense of U.S. territory, for some 700 Soviet ballistic missiles are zeroed in on West European targets. Thus, the constraints of the treaty weigh heavily on the future of Western Europe—all the more heavily because no responsible Western statesman can now assert categorically that NATO can continue to guarantee the safety of Europe during the next twenty years as it has done during the past twenty years.

If anyone can be relied upon to understand the implications of the



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treaty for the security of Western Europe, it is surely the Soviets. More likely than not, Western Europe, during the last few years, has not been in danger of an all-out Soviet armed assault. With a few notable exceptions, the Soviets have always preferred piecemeal conquest to a risky all-out challenge. The Nonproliferation Treaty, because it hamstrings any European attempt at building a viable system of self-defense, supplies the Soviets with vast opportunities for exercising psychological pressures on individual European states, notably the German Federal Republic.

No one knows better than the Soviets that the German Federal Republic is the keystone of NATO's defense in Europe. To pry loose this keystone has been a principal objective of Soviet policy. In order to alienate the other Western democracies from Germany and the Germans from the West, Soviet propagandists have tirelessly resorted to the allegation that West Germany wants to develop its own nuclear force and, thus armed, re-fight the Second World War. The fact is that the Federal Republic has never voiced a desire for a national nuclear deterrent. West German public opinion has overwhelmingly endorsed the case for nuclear continence. Under the agreement with the Western European Union, which ratified its accession to NATO, West Germany renounced the production of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. The agreement provides for a system of on-site inspection far tighter than any system of inspection contemplated by arms control agreements concluded between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Although the United States, in earlier arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union, invariably insisted on effective inspection, Article III of the Nonproliferation Treaty represents a compromise with the Soviets, who originally insisted that the treaty require no provision for inspection. According to the first paragraph of Article III:

"Each non-nuclear weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statutes of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices."

The Soviets insisted that if the United States demanded inspection in the treaty, they would demand IAEA inspection for all nonnuclear weapon states. Their recent solicitude for the Vienna Agency is anomalous, in view of the fact that for many years they would have nothing to do with the Agency's safeguards system. The Soviets knew that by holding out for IAEA safeguards they would place the United States in an embarrassing position vis-à-vis its West European allies. Moreover,



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the attitude of the Soviet Union toward inspection is not in keeping with the long-standing Soviet fear, as expressed in propaganda, of the threat of renewed German militarism. Because of its alleged fear of the Federal Republic, the Soviet Union should have insisted upon a treaty with effective inspection procedures.

The final compromise on inspection in Article III says that parties to the treaty, either individually or in groups, "shall conclude agreements" with the Vienna Agency—negotiations to commence within 180 days from the treaty's entry into force and the agreements to enter into force no later than eighteen months after the start of negotiations. In effect, the signatories promise to reach agreements *after* signing the treaty that they cannot reach *before* signing. But if a satisfactory agreement cannot be reached, there is no rule of jurisprudence that can insure that the substance of such ex post facto agreements will conform to the expressed intention of the contracting parties. Thus, if the parties are unable to reach agreement at the end of the eighteen-month limit, legally they are free to fulfill the letter of the treaty while in effect producing a document with no legal meaning and providing no inspection. Only if negotiations with the IAEA are completed within two years after the Nonproliferation Treaty enters into force will Article III be a binding international obligation upon the parties to the treaty.

In the long run it will prove idle to hope that nuclear proliferation can be averted simply by a non-dissemination agreement among three of the existing nuclear powers. For one, Communist China would have to adhere to the treaty if it is to have any long-term validity. No international treaty is likely to endure unless strong sanctions inhibit its abrogation, or unless it rests on a broadly based international consensus. This consensus does not exist. The treaty can be abrogated in the future by nations that believe their own security requires the development of nuclear weapons. Whether or not the treaty can contribute to the lessening of East-West tensions anticipated by many of its proponents depends on the perceptions of the international environment held by Soviet decision-makers. Conceivably, the leaders of the Soviet Union have concluded that their interest lies in closer collaboration with the United States. But the Soviets have been engaged in a major effort to overtake the United States in the development and deployment of strategic capabilities. The future of U.S.-Soviet relations will hinge in no small measure on the decisions Soviet leaders make concerning the uses of their newly acquired weaponry —to underwrite policies designed to expand Soviet political influence or to bargain with the United States for the control of armaments.

## German Issues: NPD Gains, Student Riots, Berlin Mini-crisis

DURING the past several months three events of major signifi-



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cance have taken place in the Federal Republic of Germany. First, on April 28, the last state (*land*) election before the election of a new federal parliament in 1969 was held in Baden-Württenberg. Not the least important result of the contest was the strong showing made by the rightist National Democratic Party (NPD) which polled 9.8 per cent of the vote, surpassing its performance in other *land* elections and raising the prospect that the 1969 federal election might bring representatives of the NPD to the Bundestag. At the same time the showing of the Social Democrats (SPD) disappointed that party—in particular the Federal Republic's Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister Willy Brandt.

A number of factors may account for the election results. First, it is alleged that with the entrance of the SPD into the government in 1966, protest voters had little choice but to vote for either the FPD (Free Democratic Party) or the NPD. Under the leadership of Adolph von Thadden, the NPD has based its appeal on nationalism, advocating the restoration of Germany's borders and the freeing of West Germany from the "imperialist" soldiers of her NATO allies. A second explanation lies in the economic discontent found among such important groups as the farming community. Third, many voters may have wished to express dissatisfaction with the inability of the federal government to come to grips with the student demonstrations and riots that broke out in the West German cities during the Easter weekend.

Like their counterparts in France and Italy, German students had sought to dramatize their impatience with what they believed was the failure of the German political system to effect changes in education. Sparked by the shooting of Rudi Dutschke, the leader of the Berlin wing of the left-wing League of Socialist German Students (SDS) and chief ideologist of the student movement, the students initiated a wave of protests against the newspapers of publisher Axel Springer. They claimed that the Springer press, whose publications enjoy the largest circulation in Germany, had inflamed hatred against Dutschke and was therefore responsible for the attempted assassination. Moreover, the students apparently focused their ire on the Springer press because to them it symbolized a self-satisfied "establishment" and traditional authority. The students undoubtedly helped to set off a "backlash" in which the voters of Baden-Württenberg registered disapproval of the disruption of law and order in German society.

The German electoral trends have evoked anxiety abroad. Fears have arisen that the NPD showing reflects the fragility of German parliamentary democracy. Although some observers were quick to point to parallels between the methods used by the Nazi Party under the Weimar Republic and the present NPD, German government leaders, while expressing concern about the NPD showing, have emphasized those factors in present-day Germany which make unlikely a



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recurrence of the events that brought Hitler to power. Speaking before the Bundestag on April 30, Chancellor Kiesinger denied that the NPD gains represented a rebirth of Nazism, but he recognized that the party's successes might awaken in other countries the fear that "the old unholy spirit of aggressive nationalism" was alive again in Germany. He called on the major parties to act responsibly so as to strengthen international trust in the Federal Republic.

Although German leaders appear confident that the country's democratic structure is secure, the SPD is likely to reassess its position within the governing coalition before the April 1969 election. Following its poor showing in the state election, the rank and file membership of the Baden-Württenberg SPD approved a resolution calling on its leaders to withdraw from the coalition *land* government. Although SPD officials in the *land* government decided to ignore this resolution, it provides one indicator of dissension within the SPD regarding the partnership with the Christian Democratic Union.

As the 1969 election approaches, frictions within the Bonn government are likely to increase, particularly if the SPD leadership concludes that its electoral position will be weakened by continued participation in the Grand Coalition. It is the CDU rather than the SPD, in the estimation of many SPD members, that has derived the greatest benefit from the coalition. Willy Brandt and Herbert Wehner, generally regarded as the principal proponents of the SPD participation, are likely to face opposition from those within the SPD who call on the party to abandon its middle road and to become again a "left-wing people's party."

A second event of major importance to the Federal Republic was the passage by the Bundestag of controversial legislation to curb constitutional guarantees in times of national emergency. According to the laws, an emergency government could order the armed forces to assume police duties and control of transportation; make use of the federal border guard as military police; draft all males eighteen and over into "civil defense" units; assign members of the armed forces to civilian functions, and intercept mail and tap telephone lines. While government spokesmen contended that the law is needed to safeguard West German freedom in time of emergency, opponents recalled how Hitler legally suspended the Weimar Constitution in March 1933 and concentrated absolute political power in his own hands. Student groups, in particular, expressed fear that the laws might be used by an authoritarian government to destroy German democracy.

Despite these fears the bill was passed, and the United States, Britain and France agreed to surrender vestigial occupation rights. In addition to yielding to the Federal Republic their rights to tap telephones and inspect letters, the Allies will no longer be empowered to take control of the government of the Federal Republic in an ex-



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treme emergency. Thus, for the first time since 1945 the Federal Republic has full legal sovereignty.

The emergency law did not change the status of the three Western powers in West Berlin. Yet events in Berlin in June caused great international concern. On June 11, the German Democratic Republic announced its intention to impose new restrictions on West Berliners and citizens of the Federal Republic traveling over land between West Berlin and West Germany. The East German government earlier this year had barred government officials and members of the NPD from such travel and claimed that its new action was in retaliation for Bonn's passage of the emergency law.

Although it is difficult to determine the exact purposes behind the East German challenge, several explanations come to mind. It is possible, for example, to view the restrictions as part of a new political and psychological offensive to win recognition of East Germany as a sovereign state. Again, the move might be interpreted as an attempt to thwart Bonn's campaign for reconciliation with other East European communist countries — an effort marked by growing success in recent months. Or it might be yet another effort to isolate West Berlin from the Federal Republic. Finally, the East Germans may be trying to isolate the Bonn Republic from its Western allies. The restrictions did not impinge upon the access rights of the occupying powers.

In a period when the United States has given priority to the relaxation of tensions with the Soviet Union, the Johnson Administration was not prepared to respond forcefully to the latest East German encroachments. From the beginning of the crisis, the United States seemed reluctant to jeopardize its interest in reaching an accord on the Nonproliferation Treaty with the Soviets. In a joint three-power communiqué issued on June 12, the United States, France and Great Britain made clear the Soviet responsibility for guaranteeing free access to Berlin both for Allied personnel and West German citizens. Moreover, the statement warned that the actions were "inconsistent" with the goal of a relaxation of tensions in Europe. Secretary of State Dean Rusk journeyed to Bonn to assure the Germans of U.S. support. He announced that free access to Berlin was a "vital interest" to the Western powers and noted that Washington had made "the strongest representations" to the Soviets to remind them of their joint responsibility for Berlin. For the most part, however, Bonn was left to its own devices to find a solution regarding the new travel restrictions.

The Berlin crisis confronted West German political leaders with a dilemma. On the one hand, should Bonn not react forcefully enough—with the support of its NATO allies—it might encourage the East Germans to take additional steps to weaken the Federal Republic's ties to West Berlin. If, on the other hand, Bonn were to overreact, it might endanger its objective of promoting closer ties



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to East European countries. Little would be required to revive or strengthen in East European minds the specter of German revanchism.

On June 17, the Kiesinger Cabinet approved for submission to the Bundestag the Berlin Aid Bill whose purpose was to counteract the economic impact of the East German restrictions. The bill, expected to be passed before the summer adjournment of the Bundestag, would grant West Berliners tax reductions and other financial preferences for an unlimited period. On June 18, Foreign Minister Willy Brandt traveled to East Berlin where he met with the Soviet Ambassador to East Germany, Piotr Abrassimov. In answer to a journalist's question the next day, Brandt went so far as to assert that the travel restrictions did not pose a crisis situation. This interpretation was based on the fact that there had been no direct confrontation between the Soviet Union and the Western powers.

On June 20, Chancellor Kiesinger informed the Bundestag that "we will not let ourselves be provoked into adopting false, possibly anticipated measures as a result of the East Berlin measures. Our policy of détente and cooperation with the East European nations will be continued. As before, our offer to conclude agreements includes the other part of this country." Moreover, the Bonn government decided to apply only token countermeasures against travel by East German officials and certain other groups. The Allied Travel Board, composed of U.S., British and French officials, also began to restrict travel by East German government and party officials.

This most recent Berlin episode has served as a reminder to the West of the potential danger still existing in Europe. Whether or not the situation becomes more unstable depends, to a considerable degree, on East Germany. If, for example, the East Germans should try to extend the application of the restrictions and travel fees to Allied personnel or to air travel, the situation would worsen—perhaps leading to a direct confrontation between the Soviet Union and the three Western allies, thus thwarting assiduous efforts of the United States to reach a détente with the Soviet Union. If it is deemed necessary to take other retaliatory measures besides the token travel restrictions already enacted, trade between NATO countries and East Germany could be restricted or halted—a step likely to have an adverse impact upon the East German economy.

In any decision taken by the Allies, careful consideration must be paid to its likely impact on Bonn. In the event that the Federal Republic appears helpless against East German provocations, we may witness a further growth in voter support for the NPD in the wake of German alienation from the Western powers. If increasing numbers of Germans become convinced that the Western powers will do no more than make verbal protests to Moscow in support of West Germany's interests, they might become more susceptible to the nationalistic appeals of the NPD, which advocates Ger-



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man national solutions to major problems.

Thus far, the United States has appeared disinclined to support the Federal Republic at the risk of damaging relations with the Soviet Union. The implications of this set of priorities on Washington-Bonn relations and the Atlantic Alliance deserve the careful consideration of U.S. policymakers.

Already it appears that the Berlin situation has heightened apprehension in the Federal Republic regarding the signing of the Nonproliferation Treaty. Günther Diehl, Bonn's press and information chief, indicated on July 1 that a "whole series of problems" had to be resolved before West Germany could sign the treaty. He declared that Bonn would seek "full clarification of the intention of the nuclear powers," and expressed concern that the Nonproliferation Treaty could extend beyond the term of the NATO alliance—thus leaving the Federal Republic without adequate assurances regarding its security. Rainer Barzel, parliamentary leader of the CDU, in an interview with the newspaper *Welt am Sonntag,* questioned the wisdom of entering into a new treaty with a nation—i.e., the Soviet Union — presently engaged in breaching international law.

While this view expressed the opinion of many "hard-liners" within the CDU/CSU, other more moderate voices, especially among the SPD, urged caution, warning that too strong a reaction could endanger Bonn's long-range effort to improve relations with Eastern Europe. The Bonn government remains wary of being subjected to Soviet nuclear blackmail and has announced its intention to reserve a decision on signing the treaty until after a conference of nonnuclear states is convened in Geneva.

In sum, the East German provocation in Berlin has focused attention once again on the unresolved issue of Germany's role in Europe and the Atlantic Alliance, as well as on the U.S. problem of honoring commitments to allies during a period when an effort is being made to lessen tensions with the adversary power.

## The Italian Elections and Parliamentary Crisis

IN 1963 Italy embarked on a course known as the "Opening to the Left." In a reversal of its previous position, the Socialist Party under the leadership of Pietro Nenni decided to enter the Italian government as a coalition partner to the Christian Democratic and Republican parties. By this means the Socialists hoped to exert greater influence in governmental decisions concerning social and economic problems and to enhance their own political strength at the expense of the Italian Communist Party. The Christian Democrats, on their part, realized that only in partnership with the Socialists would they be able to enact reforms deemed necessary for continued Italian economic prosperity and social and political stability.

Yet, as the May 19-20, 1968 election and the subsequent Italian parliamentary crisis demonstrate, the original expectations of the two major coalition partners have



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not materialized. Several factors have contributed to the present crisis in Italian parliamentary life. First, the Christian Democratic Party, under the leadership of Premier Aldo Moro since December 1963, has experienced continual factional strife within its ranks. Indeed, the party is composed of diverse groups who share little, if any, consensus as to their party's goals. This situation, in turn, contributed to Moro's difficulties in providing forceful leadership in the "Opening to the Left." In addition to having to thwart repeated attempts from within his own party to unseat him, he apparently spent much of his time effecting compromises among the various factions so that the government might continue its precarious existence. In such an environment it is not surprising that the Center-Left coalition was constrained from enacting a legislative program that would have initiated changes in the social and economic structure of Italian society.

The May 1968 election results contributed to the Socialist Party's decision to reassess its policy. Many Italian politicians had predicted that the Communist Party and its ally, the Proletarian Socialists, would lose parliamentary strength. Instead, the two parties together won 2.2 million more votes and 34 more seats in the Chamber of Deputies than the communists had won in the 1963 election. The PCI won 8.5 million votes and 177 seats, an increase from 25.3 per cent to 26.9 per cent of the total vote, while the Proletarian Socialists won 1.4 million votes and 23 seats. Within the government coalition, the Christian Democrats increased their parliamentary representation slightly from 260 to 266 seats; the Republican Party also increased its representation from 6 to 9 seats. Nenni's United Socialist Party lost more than 250,000 votes in comparison to 1963 and 3 of its 94 seats.

From its poor election showing, the Socialist Party concluded that it was paying the price for the Center-Left's failure to act forcefully enough on promised reforms. When they could not secure adequate assurances from the Christian Democrats that a program of social and economic reforms would be enacted—thus helping them to win back votes—the Socialists decided not to rejoin the coalition. This decision brought to an end a period of over four years' cooperation between Nenni and Moro, forcing the latter's resignation from the premiership on June 5.

The increase of strength on the Left showed that the outward calm of the Italian social scene hid an undercurrent of discontent. In fact, many observers noted similarities between the Italian social unrest and that in France. Both countries have faced student protests against the political system. In Italy, students began demonstrations in February in support of a bill to reform the universities. Despite the fact that the bill had been ready for several years, Parliament adjourned in March without having acted on it. Italian student protests may have served, in part, as an example for the more recent



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and more violent wave of French student protests. In any case, student activism in both countries has disturbed Italian political leaders who fear the potential revolutionary implications of students' demands. Italian students, who until several months ago were among the more conservative elements of society, now seek reforms which at the least would alter significantly the Italian social structure.

Even the Communist Party, which in the past had encouraged student agitation against the government, has seen fit to dissociate itself from the wave of protests. On occasion the communists sought to soft-pedal student violence. In Genoa, for example, they prevented the students from demonstrating in front of the French Consulate. Giorgio Amendola, a member of the party's Steering Committee and Central Committee, decried the student movement for its "extremist infantilism" and "19th-century revolutionary barricade tactics." Amendola asserted: "All of the strategy of an advance to socialism to be realized through a development of mass economic and political struggle would be swept away in seeking a pitched battle launched, furthermore, at a choice moment for the class adversary." In part, the communist attitude in Italy might be explained by the inability of French communist leaders to control or exploit a confused situation. Moreover, the communists' espousal or promotion of the student movement might have resulted in the sacrifice of their long-term effort to convince the Italian electorate of the PCI's "respectability."

The political crisis resulting from Premier Moro's resignation was not ended until June 24 when Giovanni Leone, a Christian Democratic Senator and former Premier, informed President Giuseppe Saragat that he had formed a government. In reality, Leone heads a minority government since the nonparticipation of the Socialists prevents the formation of a government capable of winning a majority in the Parliament. It is perhaps ironic that the Socialist abandonment of the coalition has resulted in the very situation the electorate appeared to be protesting, namely, a weak and ineffective government. The Christian Democrats and Republicans are not likely to have a better chance now to legislate reforms in the university system, to revise archaic teaching methods and undemocratic structures, or to institute tax reforms, than they had when the Socialist Party was a member of the ruling coalition.

The Socialists have refused to reconsider their decision not to participate in the government until after their national congress in October. Before agreeing to rejoin the coalition they will no doubt demand concrete assurances that reforms will be enacted. In the meanwhile, Italian politics seem to be headed for a period of drift and uncertainty that may result in serious strains on Italian parliamentary democracy.



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# EASTERN EUROPE IN FLUX*

*by William R. Kintner and Wolfgang Klaiber*

THE dramatic confrontation during 1968 between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union has been only the latest, albeit most striking, manifestation of important political change throughout Eastern Europe. Political relationships within and among the states of the Soviet bloc[1] have changed rapidly in recent years, thereby altering the political contours of Europe. Ever since the popular upheavals of 1956, the political patterns of the countries that were formerly called "satellites" have become increasingly diversified, departing in varying degrees from the Soviet blueprint which once served as their model. Granted that in the social sciences the concept of "trends" is still a somewhat fuzzy one, this concept is nevertheless useful in identifying changes in Eastern Europe. Most analysts would now agree that the direction of movement in Eastern Europe has been away from a Stalinist rule based on terror toward a looser framework within which the interests of special economic and social groups could be asserted against incumbent doctrinaire leaderships.

The rate and dimension of this evolutionary trend have been by no means uniform. One can still speak of Stalinist rule in East Germany and Rumania—and to a lesser extent in Bulgaria—although the rulers of these three countries are searching for more effective ways to achieve the dual purpose of maintaining control and mobilizing the population to greater efforts in the pursuit of their chosen goals. The Polish regime, though steadily retrogressing from the liberal political atmosphere that characterized the "Polish October" of 1956, has never again been able to regain the degree of totalitarian control it once had over the population. Gomulka's leadership must continually face the challenge of the Church, the intellectuals and the students, as well as factions among his own entourage. In Hungary, the

*This article presents some of the findings of a recently completed three-year study on Eastern Europe. A full report on the findings will be made in the forthcoming Foreign Policy Research Institute book entitled *Polycentrism in Eastern Europe—Bridge or Barrier?*

[1]In this article we use the term "Soviet bloc" as a geographical expression, encompassing the countries active in the Warsaw Pact: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland and Rumania. These countries, still more or less tied to the Soviet Union, are the focus of this study.



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once subservient trade union leadership now claims to defend the interests of the workers as opposed to those of the state. The Hungarian legislature (though it still lacks political power) can suggest minor modifications to the legislative proposals of the regime.

The changes that have taken place in Eastern Europe reflect the ups and downs of two protracted struggles. The first is that of the party to gain and maintain control over the people. The second is the infighting within the party for leadership. In crisis situations such as the 1956 upheavals and the 1968 liberalization in Czechoslovakia, these two struggles are linked.

In Czechoslovakia, ethnic and intellectual ferment and widespread dissatisfaction with the poor performance of the economy brought about a startling change in leadership. On January 5, 1968, Antonin Novotny lost the top post in the Czechoslovak Communist Party that he had held since 1953. Ten weeks later he succumbed to mounting popular pressures and resigned as President. However, for the new leadership of Alexander Dubcek —indeed for communism in Czechoslovakia—the crisis was only beginning. The party's censors relaxed their vigilance and the press freely gave vent to the pent-up feelings of the people. Demands for a change came from within as well as outside party ranks. Liberal groups within the party raised demands for a re-evaluation of the party's role in government, government responsibility to the National Assembly, abolition of censorship, and independence of the judiciary. Other demands included freedom of speech and association, and a return to a multiparty system.

Domestic developments are carrying each of the East European countries on their individual paths, and the result is a growing diversity of political patterns in an area which, under Stalin, pursued a single path to communism. Diversity among the countries makes it difficult to speak about Eastern Europe in general terms: as in all efforts to generalize about geographic regions, what is true of one country seldom holds completely true for another.

The same principle applies to the evolving relationships of the East European communist parties and governments to the Soviet Union. Since Albania broke away from the Soviet bloc in 1961 and the Rumanian party-government established its right to dissent on issues affecting its national interests (between 1963 and 1964), Western reporters and analysts have, perhaps pre-



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maturely, proclaimed the demise of the "monolithic" bloc system and the emergence of independent states. Generalizations such as these are, to say the least, inaccurate, inasmuch as they leave out of consideration the united front maintained by the Soviet Union with Bulgaria, East Germany, Hungary, Poland and, until Novotny's recent ouster, Czechoslovakia.

The Soviet bloc's component countries (including the Soviet Union) have been susceptible to a variety of influences beyond the control of their party-governments. Stalin's demise paved the way for leadership changes not only in the Soviet Union, but also in several East European countries. The subsequent de-sacralization of Stalin's cult undermined rule by terror and forced communist leaders to find less oppressive methods of control. The 1956 popular upheavals in Hungary and Poland forced the Soviet leadership to grant the satellite leaderships greater domestic autonomy. The Sino-Soviet dispute undermined the leading position of the Soviet Union in the world communist movement. Because the Soviets were now forced to seek rather than command support from their allies, East European leaders gained more influence over the Soviet Union and thus increased their autonomy. The rising prosperity and technological advance in Western Europe also influenced the political development of the East European countries.

Meaningful statements about trends in Eastern Europe today must be based upon systematic analysis of the political evolution of these countries and of their changing relationships to the Soviet Union. For the past three years, the authors, aided by the research staff of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, have been engaged in just such an effort,[2] focused on the following issues:

(1) *Relationship of State to People.* Do the communist party-governments of Eastern Europe continue to manipulate their populations through coercive means? To what extent are non-party personnel being recruited into management roles? Have the rulers become more responsive to the wishes of the people and the demands of interest groups?

(2) *Relationships of East European States to the Soviet Union.* To what extent does the Soviet Union dominate intrabloc rela-

[2]The authors are indebted, for comments and suggestions made during the course of this effort, to J.F. Brown, M.K. Dziewanowski, Stanley Dziuban, William E. Griffith, Andrew Gyorgy, Curtis E. Harvey, George W. Hoffman, Lawrence B. Kraus, Kurt London, Philip Mosely, Michael S. Pap, Boris Pash, Stefan T. Possony, John Richardson, Jan Stransky, Robert Strausz-Hupé and J.K. Zawodny. They are further indebted to Brutus Coste and Edward Janosik for contributions to this study.



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tions and the internal affairs of East European countries? Are Soviet bloc countries becoming more or less dependent upon each other and upon the Soviet Union, politically, economically and militarily? If changes have occurred in the internal political process of these countries, how have these changes affected relationships among them and their relations with the Soviet Union?

(3) *Relations between East European States and the West.* To what extent have relations between East European states and the West improved? Has the improvement in these relations been contrary to the wishes of the Soviet Union? Have East-West European interactions tended to create ties of interdependence? Have these interactions influenced the conduct of relations between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and brought liberalizing influences to bear upon the domestic political process of the several communist systems?

## The Research Design

The major problem confronting us in the research project was, of course, to find out what kinds of measurements might enable us to answer such questions as those listed above. Identifying and measuring "trends" is a difficult task, and this is particularly true when one is dealing with subtle and intangible political changes that are essentially nonquantifiable. The first trend we sought to analyze, for example, pertained to the role of the communist party in the management of society. For the sake of precision, we broke this trend down into smaller components which we called *vectors*. The following vectors were chosen for the evaluation of the role of the communist party:

(1) Division of authority between party and government.
(2) Party control over the economy.
(3) Party control over social life.
(4) Party control over cultural activities.

One of the components of the first vector (division of authority between party and government) is the legislative power of the national assembly in the various countries. To establish the direction of change for this vector we chose the following indicators:

(a) Control by the party of the nominations to elective posts.
(b) Length and frequency of parliamentary sessions.
(c) Existence of question time.
(d) Cabinet responsibility to Parliament: extent to which governmental decisions are submitted for ratification.
(e) Nature of debate: whether critical of the government or of its domestic and foreign policies or of the legislation proposed.



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(f) Extent of newspaper space devoted to meetings of the national assembly: number of columns relative to the total number of columns in the major newspaper of the capital city.

(g) Extent of legislative initiative: can a national assembly initiate legislation?

To measure the other selected trends and their component vectors, we developed some 500 indicators. Each indicator was formulated in such a way that it could be expressed unidimensionally, giving the magnitude of a particular change as an increase or decrease in the relevant variable. The resulting research design was subsequently refined and the number of indicators reduced to what we considered to be the critical minimum number.

*The Data Collection*

For each indicator, efforts were made to collect available data from primary sources—published statistics, newspapers, documents, and broadcast monitors. Research on the indicators was conducted for Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland and Rumania. Each country was covered by a researcher familiar with its principal language.

Because of the multiplicity of information units and the limitations of time and resources, data collection for the indicators was concentrated, wherever possible, on the following base years:

1952—To record the situation in Eastern Europe at the end of the Stalin period.

1957—To record the situation in Eastern Europe during the aftermath of "de-Stalinization" and popular upheavals.

1962—To record changes in Eastern Europe at the height of Khrushchev's power.

1965—To appraise a phase in the Brezhnev-Kosygin era.

Where information for a particular indicator was readily available for intervening years, this was added to our data files. On the other hand, if information was not available for one of the base years but could be found for another year, the latter was substituted. From 1965 on, data collection has been a continuous process.

The purpose of the research design was to enable us to evaluate both continuity and change in Eastern Europe, and to furnish a basis for the observation of covariance and variable relationships with respect to intranational and international political processes within the Soviet state system. Not all the indicators formulated could be filled in with comparable information for all



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countries, but information for a sufficient number of indicators under each "trend" enabled us to make a comparative analysis of all six countries.

An effort to scan systematically the East European press and periodical literature available in the West supplemented research on indicators. This endeavor became particularly important for the period following the Twenty-second Soviet Party Congress of October 1961. As of 1962 the communist edifice built by Stalin showed unmistakable signs of erosion, and the Soviets and their East European partners were clearly looking for a more viable international communist system as well as for the means to strengthen its component national systems. Again we sought comparable information on pertinent variables for the six countries, focusing on changing ideological criteria and concepts, reform of the economic structure and other institutions of the system, as well as the evolution of interactions between party, state and people. A primary concern was to identify the extent to which the Soviet Union has influenced the political evolution of the East European communist systems, or, alternatively, the extent to which solutions to national problems have been instrumental in giving direction to this evolution. The influence of the West on East European development, when observed, was also included.

## Summary of Findings

### *Internal Developments*

Two basic periods can be delineated in the postwar political evolution of Eastern Europe, although the dividing line between them cannot be drawn with accuracy mainly because in both periods certain common elements prevailed. During the first period, lasting roughly until the beginning of the 1960's, the institutionalization and consolidation of control by indigenous communist parties over their nations was the paramount objective.[3] In the course of this process, relationships between rulers and ruled were based not on the consent of the governed, but on mass resignation in the absence of alternatives. Institutionalization and consolidation of political control over the country, accompanied by terror, wholesale expropriation and attendant

[3]By institutionalization we mean the establishment of organizations and institutions for the maintenance and exercise of hierarchically centralized control in the hands of a small elite group. By consolidation we mean the firm establishment, if not legitimization, of communist political power over all strata of society. Throughout this article, we shall refer to the first period as the "consolidation phase" and to the second as the "management phase."



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personal insecurity, hampered economic and social progress. During the first period, until the ruling elite felt itself to be securely established, the welfare and progress of each bloc country were subordinated to the primary goal—the consolidation of political control.

During the second period, which began when the East European communists had secured political power, the attention of the rulers shifted to the functional problems of managing the society. The problems facing communist leaders were aggravated by the excessively centralized structure of control. It eventually became possible for them to approach these problems more pragmatically and to adopt solutions that would have been considered ideologically unorthodox and hazardous to their positions before their control over society had been sufficiently consolidated. The impetus for the liberalizing and pragmatic trends of the 1960's is traceable to several important and interrelated events between 1961 and 1963, making these years a watershed in Eastern Europe's political evolution.

During the initial period, after the Soviet Union occupied Eastern Europe and imposed communist rule upon the peoples living there, the efforts of Moscow's satraps to institutionalize political control were tempered by caution. The new communist elites, who had for the most part spent the war years in the Soviet Union and had little, if any, actual experience in government, displayed an understandable measure of uncertainty as they sought to organize an effective control apparatus and recruit people to operate it. Until 1947, moreover, there was some concern in Moscow about the attitude of the major Western powers toward the communist takeover. Until the end of 1947, communist rule in Eastern Europe followed no uniform pattern. Terror was combined with attempts at cooperation with politically influential parties and groups. The Hungarian communists, for instance, held free elections in 1946 and lost; the Rumanian communists allowed King Carol to occupy his throne until December 1947; the Czechoslovak communists did not assume full control over the government until February 1948. From 1948 until Stalin's death in 1953, East European communists made rapid strides in establishing firm and all-pervasive control over their respective countries. They eliminated or neutralized all political opposition to their rule. At every level of government reliable communists or fellow travelers were installed. To maintain a facade of legitimacy, they permitted some of the political



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parties that had gained popularity before the war to exist. However, they confined these parties within national front organizations which they controlled, and they eliminated those leaders who were opposed to communist rule. The legislatures were retained—as rubber stamp bodies. Their representatives were selected by the communist party according to rigid criteria of reliability.

Within the span of a few years, the means of industrial production were, for the most part, nationalized.[4] Former owners and managers were treated as enemies of the working class, of which the communist parties claimed to be the sole representative. In place of the bourgeois elements the communist rulers installed a new cadre of managers selected more for political reliability than for managerial competence. Artisans and craftsmen were regimented into cooperatives controlled and managed by the state, or herded into factories to supplement the labor force. Production for profit was branded as "bourgeois" and outlawed.

The same rules applied to the "toiling peasantry," the class allies of the proletariat in communist ideology. The affinity of the European peasant to his land is traditional. A self-supporting peasant is not easily amenable to control by the state. So, as in the Soviet Union itself, East European peasants were forced to give up their land and contribute their labor to state-controlled cooperatives or collectives. This, perhaps the most difficult undertaking during the consolidation phase, imposed hardships on the peasantry: resistance to the imposition of communist control was strongest in the countryside. Collectivization was the last stage of the consolidation phase; in most East European countries it was not completed until 1961 and was, in fact, abandoned by Yugoslavia in 1953 and by Poland in 1956.

The communist rulers, once having gained effective control over their peoples, were now able to determine not only what was to be produced and marketed, but also who should work and in what capacity. The state was the one and only employer in the country.

The effort to consolidate control was extended to society at large. The ultimate goal toward which the communists claimed to be striving was a homogeneous society in which everyone would give according to his ability and receive according to his

[4]East Germany is an exception to this rule inasmuch as it proceeded much more gradually with the nationalization of its industries, and even today some 15 per cent of its national product originates in the private or semi-private sector.



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needs. They accordingly sought to eradicate the bourgeois mentality which holds the individual in higher regard than society at large. They attempted to create the "communist man" through the coercion, regimentation, persuasion and education of the masses. Throughout most of the consolidation phase the proletariat in whose interests the party presumed to act was proclaimed the ruling class. All other classes suffered severe discrimination before courts of law, in education, employment, obtaining social welfare benefits, and other state services.

Each communist party developed a cadre system of reliable *apparatchiks* with cells in every community and place of work to educate, control and watch the people. In the creation of mass organizations the communists placed emphasis on the young and sought to instill new values aimed at mobilizing the population toward the achievement of socialism. Mass rallies and evening lectures became standard methods of mass mobilization and education. Courses in Marxism-Leninism were compulsory at all schools, and the study of the Russian language was stressed.

Trade unions were put into the service of the state and placed under firm control. They became transmission belts of the state's commands to the workers. Theoretically, the relationship of the communist trade union to the worker cannot be the same as that in a capitalist system, for under communism the worker is no longer exploited but is working for himself. The primary function of the socialist trade union is to exhort the worker to greater efforts in his own ultimate behalf. Yet in practice, communist trade unions are instruments of state control over the worker in the factories.[5]

Religion came under severe communist attack in all East European countries. During the initial consolidation period wholesale arrests of priests decimated clerical ranks. Militant organizations of atheists made attendance at church a hazardous experience. Many churches and religious schools were closed or destroyed, and training for the priesthood was severely curtailed.

The creative intelligentsia was regimented into the service of the communist-ruled states. In the pursuit of their primary goal during the consolidation phase the communists, monopolizing the mass media, sought to saturate the people with their own ideas. Under communist auspices, unions were established for

[5]See "2,000 Words to Workers, Farmers, Civil Servants, Scientists, Artists and Everyone," a statement issued by a group of intellectuals of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, excerpted in the *New York Times*, July 21, 1968, p. E 13.



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creative writers, and the party imposed its own rules and criteria upon creative art. "Socialist realism," a school of art and writing developed in the Soviet Union under Stalin, was adopted as the most effective art form for the building of socialism. The writer and the artist were exhorted to produce works with a high doctrinal content in a style that could be easily understood by the masses. Conformity to the party's dictates brought lucrative rewards; nonconformity was punished by isolation from intellectual and artistic life, by penury, and even by imprisonment and execution.

There were, to be sure, variations from country to country, but the foregoing summary delineates the dominant features of communist rule in Eastern Europe during the consolidation phase.

By the time of Stalin's death the communist system had been institutionalized; the machinery had been established to force the people to submit to the commands of the communist rulers. But control and consolidation were by no means complete. Agriculture was still largely in private hands—and except for East Germany and Czechoslovakia the countries in Eastern Europe were all agrarian. Moreover, as the upheavals of Poland and Hungary showed in 1956, the communist system rested on coercion rather than on even a minimal measure of popular consent. Several more years of repressive rule were required to quell resistance and make the people more amenable to control. In 1956, the Polish regime made several tactical concessions to popular demands, but in succeeding years these were steadily whittled away as the astute Gomulka reconsolidated communist control.

But as the communists consolidated their political authority the inefficiency marking their management of economic enterprises became increasingly evident. The excessively centralized control apparatus of the system, combined with a lack of personal incentive, was largely responsible for the dismal performance of the East European economies during the 1950's. This situation contained a contradiction that could only be dangerous in communist eyes, for Europe as a whole was undergoing developmental changes, including the growth of media for the communication of ideas and images, which were bound to make more glaring the discrepancies between the standards of economic existence West and East. A social system founded upon an economic ideology that glorifies production and distribution suffers serious "cognitive dissonance" when confronted with evidence of its in-



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adequacy such as was becoming painfully abundant in the latter 1950's. The only comparison to be drawn by any intelligent observer was an invidious one: the system that, according to the ideology, was supposed to be on the verge of collapse was flourishing as never before in Western Europe; the system scientifically ordained to triumph was lagging miserably. The contradiction was so glaring as to pose risks to the political security of the communist regimes, and they were compelled to seek remedies for their economic malaise.

As the 1960's approached, the leaders of Eastern Europe, although they would not admit it publicly, could not but sense the danger to their positions inherent in the inadequacies of the communist system. There is no doubt that the system was incapable of fulfilling the rulers' promises of increased economic abundance on the road to communism. Nothing fails like failure. The shortage of consumer goods and services during the consolidation phase was notorious in all East European countries, although more so in some than in others. In the Polish and Hungarian upheavals of 1956, popular discontent with economic conditions was one of the paramount causal factors.

Thus the communist regimes, or factions within their ranks, became aware of the necessity for improvements in the system at roughly the same time that the popular spirit of resistance to communist rule ebbed. After the Hungarian revolution was crushed by Soviet tanks, the East European peoples resigned themselves to the system, having lost hope for liberation by revolution or Western intervention. With the waning of resistance there emerged between rulers and ruled a *modus vivendi* that reduced many of the extreme stresses characteristic of the consolidation phase. Not only was repression by police terror less justifiable, it was also less necessary.

As collectivization, begun while Stalin still ruled but retarded during the mid-1950's, was rushed to completion toward the end of the decade, the peasants were the last segment of society to feel the heavy hand of the communist state apparatus. Only Poland had abandoned collectivization in the wake of the 1956 upheavals; the rest of the Soviet bloc completed collectivization during, if not before, 1961. The price paid for the collectivization of agriculture, not only in human suffering but also in the decline of agricultural production, points once again to the communists' priority of achieving full control as against the adoption of measures to promote human welfare and progress. The latter was



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possible in the communist scheme of things only after the system had been securely established. Having jumped this last hurdle in control consolidation, the regimes could claim to have achieved one of the essential bases for socialism. Czechoslovakia proclaimed itself a Socialist Republic in 1960, the year it completed collectivization. Other bloc countries did not yet feel entitled to make this claim, presumably because they still lacked the material base of industrial development. Rumania, however, announced passage of this threshold at its Ninth Party Congress in June 1965. According to the criteria used by Czechoslovakia and Rumania the other countries in Eastern Europe were nearing the gates of socialism.

Once the communist regimes achieved control and security, their attention gradually shifted to the functional problems plaguing their systems, particularly those in the economic realm. No longer having to fear insurrection from politically active, dissident elements in their societies, they could examine more objectively the pressing problems facing their countries and experiment with more pragmatic solutions.[6]

*Factors in the Transition*

The impetus for change came from a number of factors which converged on the East European political scene at the beginning of the 1960's. Although the magnitude of importance of each of these factors is open to speculation, they all played some part in weakening the foundations of Stalinist orthodoxy. Taken together, they formed a veritable flood tide that the dikes of doctrinaire conservatism could not contain indefinitely. The most important of them are enumerated below:

(1) *The Decline in Economic Growth.* By the turn of the decade East European countries (with the exception of Rumania) were moving toward an impasse in economic development. Inefficient allocation of resources, planning based on political rather than economic criteria, and a rising domestic and international demand for quality rather than quantity products militated against continued economic development along Stalinist lines. In virtually all bloc countries huge quantities of poor quality goods were rotting in warehouses because they could not be sold. Through the 1950's, i.e., during the period of reconstruction, the demand had been for goods, any kind of goods rather than

[6]Dissident elements still existed, but their political activity was severely circumscribed and under close surveillance; hence, they were no longer a danger to the regimes.



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none. With greater abundance came a demand for quality, and the stock on hand, "on the shelves," could not be moved. Investment per unit value netted decreasing returns compared to the 1950's, partly because of poor management. Many industries had to be perpetually subsidized by the state, for otherwise they could not have survived. The fact that they were regarded as politically vital, regardless of their profitability, robbed management of any incentive to run them as efficiently as possible.

(2) *The Twenty-second CPSU Congress* (1961). The Twenty-second CPSU Congress gave impetus to change in Eastern Europe in a variety of ways, two of which are particularly relevant to this analysis:

(a) It issued a new Party Program outlining the road the Soviet Union would take in its attainment of full communism. That the projections made (e.g., communism was to be attained in twenty years) were probably over-optimistic is irrevelant; what is important is that the communist parties of Eastern Europe accepted the guidelines of this program for the development of communism in their own countries. Departing from past patterns, the program stressed economic rationalization as the key to future economic growth creating the abundance that would make the transition to communism possible. Economic improvement rather than social transformation achieved via state coercion became the prime builder of communism. "Correspondingly, the Soviet state was no longer described as a 'dictatorship of the proletariat' exercised by its vanguard, the Communist Party, but as a 'state of all the people' led by that party."[7]

(b) The Congress dealt the second, formal blow to the memory of Stalin; his body was removed from its place of honor in the mausoleum in Moscow's Red Square. The immediate effect of this desacralization on Eastern Europe was to undermine further the position of Stalinists still in power, thus making the local communist economic systems (copies of Stalin's Russia) more vulnerable to revisionism. Only the communist power structure of Rumania, partly because the country's rich natural resources made spectacular economic growth possible, remained impervious to the disruptive forces generated by the final defamation of Stalin in Moscow. In the other countries, support for the Stalinist economic model was seriously weakened.

[7]Richard Lowenthal, "The Prospects for Pluralistic Communism," in Milorad M. Drachkovitch, editor, *Marxism in the Modern World* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965), p. 231.



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Political and cultural effects on East European societies, as important as those in the economic sector, also issued from the posthumous denunciation of Stalin in 1961. In Czechoslovakia, it encouraged "the Revolt of the Slovak Writers" against the Stalinist rule of Antonin Novotny and against his purge of alleged deviationists in the Slovak Party in the first half of the 1950's. In Hungary and Bulgaria, it was the cue for purges of dogmatists within high party ranks. In all bloc countries the ground was prepared for the seeds of political change.

(3) *The Image of the West.* The postwar economic progress of Western Europe, its technology and ingenuity in mass production processes, and greater sophistication in management and efficiency, contrasted sharply with the backward economies to the East, including that of the USSR. The steadily rising standard of living of the West European peoples, far outpacing that of any East European country, was a source of embarrassment to the latter regimes and a source of popular pressure that the rulers could not ignore forever.

After Stalin's death, a gradual change in the policies of West European governments toward the East opened opportunities for East-West trade. In 1954, for instance, the governments of the COCOM countries jointly removed ninety items from their embargo list of strategic goods.[8] A further reduction occurred in 1958; since then the list has been reviewed periodically. The countries of Eastern Europe were in need of capital goods to raise labor productivity. But, in order to take advantage of the increasingly liberal trading policies of Western governments, they had to find means of obtaining the necessary foreign exchange. One obvious way was the sale of industrial and agricultural products to Western Europe. This in turn meant that the communists would have to raise the quality of their production to Western standards.

(4) *The Sino-Soviet Dispute.* The rift between Peking and Moscow affected the politics of Eastern Europe and the relationships among the Soviet bloc countries. It weakened the authority of the Soviet Union throughout the communist world, including, to some extent, Eastern Europe. More importantly, the dispute

[8] *A Background Study on East-West Trade,* prepared by the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress for the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 89th Congress, 1st Session (Washington: GPO, 1965), pp. 5, 41 ff. COCOM is the standard abbreviation for the Coordinating Committee of the Consultative Group of NATO, formed in 1950 to hammer out and maintain a unified policy regarding restrictions on exports to the Soviet bloc. All NATO governments (except Iceland) are members.



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crystallized the positions of the "dogmatists" on the Chinese side and the "revisionists" on the Soviet side in both external and domestic policies. The more vehement the debate, the more convinced each side became of the rightness of its basic arguments. Within the Soviet bloc, this doctrinal conflict hastened the shift from a dogmatic to a more pragmatic outlook: increasingly, public pronouncements stressed the need for the *creative* application of Marxism-Leninism to changing conditions.

(5) *"Libermanism."* On September 9, 1962 *Pravda,* the news and propaganda organ of the Soviet Communist Party, published an article by Yevsei Liberman.[9] The author, an obscure economist at Kharkov University, proposed the adoption of "profitability" (measured as a percentage of fixed and operating capital equipment) as the criterion of industrial performance in order to rid the Soviet economy of many of its shortcomings. Similar ideas had been vigorously advanced in 1956 and 1957 by a school of Polish economists led by Oskar Lange, but these had been rejected by the Polish leadership. The publication of Liberman's article in the authoritative *Pravda,* rather than in some less widely read economic journal, focused attention on his ideas. In an editorial postscript *Pravda* invited discussion of the Liberman proposals.

(6) *Interest Groups and Popular Pressures.* The existence of a variety of interest groups within the communist systems gained widespread recognition by Western analysts during the 1960's. To be sure, they had long known that competing factions existed within the party hierarchies of communist countries, but interest groups within other strata of society could not easily be identified. This was largely because communist societies had been shut off from the outside world, and also because there had been little prior opportunity, aside from the short-lived post-Stalin "thaw," for groups in Eastern Europe to articulate their interests publicly. There were, however, other less overt ways of interest articulation. Party leaders, for instance, were kept informed about the popular mood through a variety of control agencies, including the secret police and local party organs. Scientists and technicians were able to communicate with the various agencies of the ruling party *apparat* through party channels. The various communist-controlled mass organizations for youth, workers, professional groups, and the like, had "input" lines into the decision-

[9] "Enterprise Profits as Basis for Incentive Payments," translated in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* Vol. XIV, No. 36, pp. 13-15.



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making structure. But these channels of upward communication worked imperfectly: much of the information concerning the interests of these groups was screened and distorted in the relay process and adjusted to the dominant interests of controlling party functionaries. Nevertheless, the existence of group interests and popular pressures was a factor contributing to changing trends in the 1960's.

All of these factors can be summarized by the general proposition that the ability of an industrializing society to achieve its essential economic goals depends in large part on the conscientious and creative application of its administrators' energies and ingenuity. By the turn of the decade it had become increasingly apparent to various communist leaderships in Eastern Europe that the excessively centralized political structures (the boundaries of which encompassed the economic systems also) deprived people in positions of authority of the necessary incentive to apply their energies either conscientiously or creatively. This discovery is reflected in the planned reform of the economic structure that has preoccupied the East European party-governments since 1963. It is beyond our purpose to go into details of economic reform in all of the East European countries. Suffice it to say that, in general, the reformed systems have sought to grant greater autonomy from state control to the producing and trading enterprises; introduced some rational principles of economics (interest charges on capital, cost-price relationships, accounting principles, and the like); forced enterprises to sell what they produced; and elevated profits to the status of an indicator of success.

More to the point from our present perspective are the striking variations in political style attending economic reform in each of the countries. For example, East Germany's economic reform guidelines were proclaimed in July 1963 and experimentally enacted in 1964, accompanied by a proliferation of instructional output by the Socialist Unity Party's (SED's) propaganda machine. The Bulgarian regime, which also proclaimed its economic reform guidelines in 1963, permitted debate on the various underlying issues to be published in the press while experiments on the new economic model were conducted in an increasing number of enterprises. The Bulgarian debate produced some competing ideas regarding reform, calling for even greater enterprise autonomy and freedom to compete on the market.

Hungary and Czechoslovakia offer interesting contrasts in



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political style attending the solution of economic reform problems. In Hungary the reform debate was largely consensual—expressing, in all probability, the agreement arrived at in discourse between the leadership and experts (in economics and the sciences) behind closed doors.[10] The Hungarian regime, therefore, seems to have carefully avoided the risk of ferment among the population that the public articulation of competing ideas might have produced.

In Czechoslovakia, on the other hand, the public debate on economic reform was quite lively and perhaps even spontaneous. It occurred in a political environment already rife with cultural ferment and ethnic strife. The Czechoslovak regime tolerated divergent views in the press and the many periodicals issued in the country. The virtual stagnation of the economy (manifested in a negative growth rate in 1962) lent additional force to the ideas of the more liberal Czechoslovak economists. Calls for a free market economy were among the more audacious of the demands raised in the debate.

Both in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the debates spilled over into demands for a more meaningful role for trade unions and the national legislature. The Hungarian regime appeared to be somewhat sympathetic to these demands; the Czechoslovak regime made almost no effort toward accommodating them. Thus, during the second half of 1967, the role of the trade unions as defenders of the workers' interests was legitimized in Hungary's new labor code, and a new election law (premised on single-member constituencies rather than party-lists) paved the way toward a better representation of the people's views on various legislative issues proposed by the leadership. There were also some indications that the National Assembly might assume a more powerful legislative role as the party-government made less use of its powers to issue decrees and submitted more of its legislative proposals to this body.

In Czechoslovakia, during the second half of 1967, the regime attempted to repress intellectual ferment. The failure of this attempt, together with the continuing lack of progress in the economy as well as the widening Czech-Slovak cleavage, bared

[10]The Hungarian regime completed the formulation of its economic reform guidelines only in the beginning of 1965. Subsequently it was announced that 130 experts from various fields had been gathered into discussion groups to debate the issues. Throughout 1965 and 1966 the Hungarian press published many articles on the evolving new economic system, but competing ideas were notable for their absence, and quite often the public was informed of outstanding problems which were still to be solved—presumably in the discussion groups.



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the bankruptcy of the regime and sharpened the divisions between liberals and conservatives in the party leadership. In January 1968, Antonin Novotny "resigned" as leader of Czechoslovakia's ruling Communist Party and was replaced by Alexander Dubcek, the erstwhile chief of the Slovak Communist Party. In the wake of this leadership change, the popular mood made itself felt with almost revolutionary intensity (reminiscent of the eruption in Poland during the 1956 crisis), suggesting the analogy of the iceberg: the open signs of ferment and stress in communist systems are the visible part of a much larger mass of latent popular discontent.

In short, the communist political systems of Eastern Europe, in which nonrepresentative leaderships rule over unwilling populations, remain systems under stress. In the long run, coercion does not produce consensus. One may expect that, in the future, the several regimes will search for, and perhaps find, their own individual ways of conflict resolution and accommodation with the people under their rule. Failing this, they may, like the Czechoslovak regime, seek accommodation with the masses rather than face the threat of open rebellion.

*Evolving Relationships of East European Regimes to Moscow*

During the post-Stalin period, the relationships between Soviet and East European leaders have also changed; Khrushchev did not dominate the affairs of East European countries as imperiously as did Stalin. Under Khrushchev's rule greater emphasis was given to the equality of communist nations, even to the point where official pronouncements downgraded the role of the Soviet Union as the leading communist state.

Several factors have contributed to the progressive rise of Eastern Europe's countries to at least formal equality in state-to-state relations with the USSR. Khrushchev's recognition of national roads to communism was the precondition for Yugoslavia's rapprochement with Moscow. The upheavals in Poland and Hungary in 1956 can be regarded as a major turning point in Soviet-East European relations. These manifestations of anti-Soviet popular sentiment forced the Kremlin to re-evaluate Soviet methods of domination over the satellites. Soviet advisers were withdrawn and status of forces agreements, regulating the deployment of Soviet troops, were concluded. Finally, during the 1960's, the Sino-Soviet dispute provided the East European



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regimes with a measure of bargaining power, particularly when the Soviets sought political support in their arguments with the Chinese.

In the 1960's, the East European leaders no longer professed to be the completely obedient agents of the CPSU; to a greater or lesser degree, they became masters of their respective economic and political systems. Even though they still depend greatly on the Soviet Union for the political support needed to sustain their leadership positions, the communist elites have, to an increasing extent, begun to manage the domestic affairs of their states without Soviet interference. The ruling elites display greater competence in the management of politics and greater confidence in their abilities than they did a decade ago. At the same time, they can still exploit the threat of Soviet interference to restrain groups within their countries from attempting to force changes incompatible with their own interests. Yet this threat may not always be effective, as the ouster of Novotny proved in Czechoslovakia.

The roles played by the leaders have become more complex, for they must reconcile Soviet demands with the rising expectations among their own people. The CPSU remains the leading party of the Soviet bloc; it continues to make demands—political, economic and social—upon the bloc regimes. The USSR seeks conformity to Soviet foreign policy and to Soviet interpretations of communist ideology; support in the Warsaw Pact; cooperation in trade in the "international socialist division of labor" (COMECON); and a public display of friendship for the citadel of socialism on the part of the regimes and peoples of Eastern Europe.

For the most part, Soviet demands are met by the regimes, but no longer with the consistency that prevailed while Stalin ruled. The highest degree of conformity to Soviet policy is noticeable in the Warsaw Pact. In East European countries military and budgetary decisions are not affected by group pressures. During the 1960's, Pact members trained their forces in joint maneuvers with Soviet army and air forces. Between 1962 and 1966, East European force levels increased by approximately 100,000 men; only Rumania's forces declined.

In the public statements of East European leaders, there has been a notable decline in the sycophantic praise that once accompanied their frequent references to the Soviet Union. The governing elites have increasingly sought greater identification with



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their peoples in order to gain their respect—if not popular acceptance. Moreover, these countries have begun to return to precommunist national holidays and heroes. Variations in compliance with Soviet policy toward China indicate reluctance to give up whatever political bargaining leverage they have gained from the Sino-Soviet dispute. Furthermore, some conflicts of national economic interests are now publicly aired in the controlled press of East European countries before they are negotiated at the bargaining tables.

Increasingly, then, the interests of East European states, as interpreted by party leaders, have affected the international system of the Soviet bloc. These interests, moreover, are no longer determined solely by the political leaders; they are influenced, at least in part, by important groups such as the economists, the managers, and even the amorphous masses of people whose support the leaders are seeking to obtain.

Since 1963 Rumania has become noted for advancing her own national interests even when they conflicted with those of the Soviet Union and other bloc countries. Although she cannot be regarded as typical of the other East European countries, her recent performance has been a striking departure from the path of a once subservient satellite. Yet Rumania, despite the maverick role she has adopted, remains a bona fide member of the bloc and of its organizations, and, in military matters, continues to cooperate with the Soviet Union.[11] The same is true of Czechoslovakia, which, even if she wanted to, cannot break out of the Soviet sphere.

The politics of the Soviet bloc have become more flexible. Although the Kremlin still dominates the affairs of the other communist states in Europe, its domination is now less rigid than it was under Stalin. Procedures have been developed in the airing, if not the resolution, of grievances and for the dovetailing of national interests with bloc-wide policies. The rise of East European countries to a status of relative political equality with the Soviet Union has weakened the overt authority of the Kremlin over them. These changed relationships increase the prospects for mitigating or smothering conflicts of interest before they exert unbearable stress on the intrabloc system. In this sense, relations between the USSR and Eastern Europe are probably

[11]For instance, in August 1967 Rumanian forces joined contingents of the Soviet Army in Bulgaria for training exercises. See the *New York Times,* August 29, 1967, p. 3.



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on a firmer footing and are less likely to rupture than was the case with respect to Yugoslavia in 1948 and Albania in 1961.

*Relationships with the West*

The evolution of the communist systems of Eastern Europe is reflected in their relations with the West. During the first decade of communist rule, while the respective communist parties were in the process of establishing control, Western influences were shut out to the fullest possible extent. For a short time after 1956, Poland was relatively open to the West even at the popular level, but by 1958 she was again lowering her "iron curtain."

During the 1960's, all six countries opened their doors to a variety of contacts with the West. There were a number of reasons why the communist regimes sought to improve East-West relations. Among them were a need for Western technology to enable them to build new plants and raise labor productivity and the quality of manufactures; a need for foreign exchange for this purpose; a desire on the part of the regimes to show their peoples that communist systems can compete with the West and need not exist in self-imposed isolation; and pressures from within party ranks as well as from the population for such contacts. The importance of the various factors differed from country to country. Those regimes that allowed a high rate of tourism from the West, in particular Czechoslovakia and Hungary, were responding to popular demand within their countries. Western tourists were encouraged to visit countries in Eastern Europe so that they might spend hard currency there.

In the 1960's, in contrast to the 1950's when Moscow was openly critical of Poland's and Yugoslavia's relations with the West, the Soviet Union encouraged bloc countries to develop Western contacts. It is, of course, possible to hypothesize that the leaders of Eastern Europe exerted pressure on the Kremlin to promote better East-West relations. In view of Western Europe's readiness to supply needed goods, this seems a reasonable hypothesis, although little tangible evidence is available to support or refute it. If this was the case, it was a contributing rather than a primary influence on Soviet foreign policymaking. The Soviets had reasons of their own, many of them similar to those of the East Europeans, for cultivating better relations with the West.

During the 1960's the West, for its part, influenced in many ways the internal evolution of the East European countries as well as their relations with each other and the Soviet Union.



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The pressure exerted by Poland upon COMECON (and, by implication, upon the Soviet Union) to introduce convertible currency into the bloc trading system was due to the desire to buy from the West goods that were either not available or of inferior quality in the Soviet bloc. The introduction of gold (to the extent that gold is available) or convertible currencies into COMECON exchanges could significantly increase the trading options of member countries which are, at present, still largely confined to the Soviet bloc. Western influences can also be seen in the adoption of "capitalist methods" in the management of communist enterprises. Furthermore, particularly among the younger generation, Western art, music and literature have been more appealing than Marxist-Leninist indoctrination and the aesthetics of "socialist realism."

## Conclusion

The empire built by Stalin in Eastern Europe was founded on the absolute loyalty and obedience of the satellite communist parties to the Soviet Union. Stalin possessed sufficient political power to maintain the empire under monolithic control. Under Khrushchev the Stalinist foundations began to erode and had to be fortified with different materials making for cohesion. Among these was the idea of "national roads to communism," the recognition of national conditions and problems that required a somewhat different approach in each communist country.

The problems of communism that came to the surface after 1953 might well have arisen even if Stalin had continued to rule the satellite empire; most of them were rooted in the Stalinist system. But, under Stalin, these problems would, in all likelihood, have been approached differently with different results.

It is impossible to say how the Soviet bloc might have evolved had Stalin remained alive and in power. The fact remains that under Khrushchev some important changes were made which had far-reaching and perhaps unanticipated consequences for the Soviet Union and its East European allies. Khrushchev denounced and forswore Stalin's methods of rule, and, in doing so, liberated some of the social forces that Stalin had repressed by means of terror. He elevated material abundance to a salient position in the building of communism. He proclaimed peaceful coexistence and competition with the West and thus helped to raise the "iron curtain," admitting Western goods and ideas into the Soviet bloc. Perhaps Khrushchev was overly confident that



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communism could defeat capitalism on its own operational grounds; certainly, he did not anticipate or wish for the consequences of some of the changes he enacted, which now tend to undermine not only Soviet control over Eastern Europe, but also communist control in the various countries of the area. Whatever Khrushchev's intentions may have been, his policies changed the environment within which the political and social forces interact in Eastern Europe—sometimes, as in 1968 in Czechoslovakia, in a revolutionary manner.

Within this changed environment, Soviet policy for the bloc as a whole has had to take into account the national interests of the individual countries as perceived by their respective rulers. In Rumania's case, national interests have sometimes proved to be irreconcilable with those of the other bloc countries. The extent to which popular aspirations and group interests of the several peoples are reflected in the national interests advanced by the respective communist leaderships is less clear. Rumania's government ranks among the most repressive regimes in Eastern Europe—along with the East German government, which is still the most subservient to Soviet policy. Hungary's regime, one of the more cooperative of Soviet allies, is among the most liberal in the bloc. One must await the further unfolding of the political evolution of the Soviet bloc to delineate the relationship between domestic developments and intrabloc policy patterns.

The future course of this political evolution will depend very much on the political environment within and among the countries—and within the international system as a whole. At the time of writing the fundamental questions that led to the crisis in Czechoslovakia and between that country and its communist neighbors remain unresolved. Yet it seems clear that developments in Czechoslovakia will not lead immediately to a loss in the Communist Party's monopoly of power and that the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies will not tolerate such a "counter-revolutionary" transformation. Should the Soviets succeed in curbing forces striving for freedom in Czechoslovakia—i.e., in forcing a withdrawal of recent concessions and a return to a more orthodox style of communist rule—they might be able to tighten communist control in all of Eastern Europe, as well as strengthen their direct control over the individual regimes.

Among the indications that a general tightening of control may be high on the Soviet priority list is the continuing endeavor



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to "strengthen" the Warsaw Pact, perhaps through the establishment of a permanent political council—a supranational organ as adumbrated in Brezhnev's proposal of 1965, which led to a serious dispute with the Rumanian leadership during the first half of 1966. Significantly, the communiqué issuing from the summit conference of Warsaw Pact leaders in Dresden, East Germany, stressed the unanimously confirmed "determination . . . to carry out practical measures in the immediate future to consolidate the Warsaw Pact. . . ." Since Rumania had not been invited to this conference, it seems that the Soviets were prepared to push their bloc reconsolidation schemes even without her formal assent. Another indication of this trend can be seen in the Kremlin's efforts to restrict further the already limited scope of freedom in the creative and performing arts, and freedom of speech, inside the Soviet Union.[12] The Soviet leadership seems afraid that spontaneous forces within the neighboring bloc countries may have a feedback effect upon the USSR, generating pressures that can no longer be effectively kept in check by the control organs of party and state. The 1968 Soviet-Czechoslovakian confrontation provided a dramatic illustration of this fear and thus confirmed the trends we have identified.

The crux of the matter is that the survival of the Soviet East European bloc regimes depends on the Soviet capacity to handle nationalistic deviance in the bloc. Soviet capacity to do this, in turn, is affected by the Soviet conflict with Communist China on the one hand, and the Kremlin's desire to maintain a détente, whether tactical or real, with the West on the other. Because of the resultant disequilibrium of conflicting demands, the indigenous forces struggling for more independence in Eastern Europe challenge not only the continuation of Soviet management of the region, but the very existence of its communist regimes as well.

[12]See Harry Schwartz, *New York Times*, July 22, 1968.



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# THE CASE FOR A LOYAL OPPOSITION UNDER COMMUNISM: CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND YUGOSLAVIA*

*by Barbara Jancar*

IN Robert A. Dahl's sense of a group or groups opposing the way those controlling government conduct it,[1] opposition has always existed under communism. Historically, both within and without the party, it has lacked organization and has either been liquidated or in some other way totally suppressed. The logic of communist ideology and communist rule refused to permit its continued existence. In the West, the problem of opposition in the communist system has tended to be understood as opposition *to* communist rule as contrasted to opposition *under* communist rule. The distinction is important. The first approach suggests rejection of the system *in toto*; the second infers an acceptance of the system and a willingness to work within it for stated objectives and a renewal of the ruling personnel. While some research has been done in applying group theory to communist political behavior,[2] little or no thought has been directed toward the crucial question in the modification of communist totalitarian rule: the possibility of a loyal opposition within the system.[3]

This article develops from the premise that the 1960's have

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[1]Robert A. Dahl, *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 1 ff.

[2]Recent studies suggesting the validity of the group theory approach to communist political behavior include: Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Power: USA/USSR* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964); Roger Pethybridge, *A Key to Soviet Politics* (New York: Praeger, 1962); Robert C. Tucker, "The Conflict Model," *Problems of Communism,* November-December 1963, pp. 59-61; H. Gordon Skilling, "Interest Groups and Communist Politics," *World Politics,* April 1966, pp. 434-451; Skilling, *Government and Politics in Communist East Europe* (New York: Crowell, 1966); and Sidney I. Ploss, *Conflict and Decision-Making in Soviet Russia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965).

[3]The one study which requires mention in this connection is Ghita Ionescu's skillful treatment of political dissent and political checks upon the power of the party apparat in the European communist systems in *The Politics of the European Communist States* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967). However, while the author furnishes a thorough discussion of what he calls perennial opposition elements in these states, in his theoretical approach to the problem he makes a similar distinction, as do the students of Western political systems named in the text, be-



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given rise to a new constellation of domestic forces in the countries of the communist bloc, which urges posing the question whether a genuine, political opposition can exist in a communist state. Because there is an absence of published theoretical material on this subject, it has been necessary to work out a conceptual approach. The standard studies of Western political parties have been useful in delineating the scope of the problem.[4] Dahl's recent study, *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies,* was particularly suggestive. The terminology used in this article to refer to the various conditions of opposition is almost exclusively that developed by Dahl in the closing chapters of his book, where he elaborates a comparative framework of analysis.[5] All the studies, however, are deficient in the most important respect. They are predicated upon viewing the opposition as a legitimately organized political alternative (primarily, a political party), backed by the sanction of law, able to seek its goals and develop strategies through competitive confrontation with the ruling party or parties at the polls, in parliament, or by influencing public opinion through the channels of mass communication. The emerging pattern of opposition within the communist states differs sharply from its Western counterparts because a dominant one-party system prevails. Yet, although the myth of communist party unity for the sake of building socialism is still the official credo, the role of certain social and institutional groups in opposing and thereby modifying official policy possesses a similarity to the role of opposition parties in the West. Equally important, in seeking not only to influence government decisions, but to capture political power, the behavior of dissident factions goes beyond that of an interest group to embrace the ultimate in the determination of the conduct of government.

The case countries for the examination of the pattern of opposition under communism will be Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. The choice was deliberate. Perhaps nowhere in the communist world today does the cleavage between the so-called

tween Western regimes with their legitimate political opposition and oppositionless regimes, of which the European communist systems are one variant. Thus, his focus is on the direction the pluralism developing in these systems is taking in terms of providing an outlet for the inherent conflict between the power holders and society. The question of the convergence of dissent into patterns playing the *role* of political opposition is never broached per se.

[4]Reference is made especially to Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in a Modern State* (Second revised edition; New York: Barnes and Noble, 1964), and Sigmund Neumann, editor, *Modern Political Parties: Approaches to Comparative Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956).

[5]Dahl, *op. cit.,* pp. 332-386.



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liberal and conservative tendencies within the communist party seem so severe, and nowhere has the question of the introduction of a party system been as candidly raised in the press. Communists are challenging the traditional communist acceptance of the party's leading role in society. Moreover, Czechoslovakia appears at last to be embarking upon a course which Yugoslavia has long since taken. Thus, developments in Yugoslavia provide some indication of the kinds of difficulties the Czechs and Slovaks can expect to encounter.

At the risk of oversimplification, the treatment of the topic will focus on three propositions. The first is considered as a given, and is not under investigation here. The other two form the body of the article. (1) The deviation from the authoritarian structural pattern of a communist society has become so great in Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia that it has fundamentally altered the formerly hierarchical relationship between the party and non-party institutions, making it possible for various groups within the party to play an ongoing opposition role to the ruling party group.

(2) The two most important general conditions for the evolution and maintenance of an opposition within the communist system are (a) the interaction of specific subcultures, and (b) the differentiation of economic and social interests as a result of the decentralization of communist rule pursuant to the recent social and economic reforms. As regards (a), the subcultures may not necessarily be rival ethnic groups. In Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, however, tension between the dominant nationalities, the Czechs and Slovaks, and the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes,[6] is perhaps the central political fact today. Differentiation of economic and social interests refers to the emergence of discrete groups capable of influencing decision-making: the intellectuals, economists, economic managers, and workers.

(3) The crucial variables in explaining individual patterns of opposition are formal constitutional and party arrangements and party strategy. My use of the term party strategy, in place of political beliefs, rests on the fact that, as long as the communist

[6]By the end of 1966, the over 4,100,000 Slovaks represented 30.9 per cent of the total population of Czechoslovakia. (*Statisticka rocenka CSSR* [Prague: SNTL, 1966], p. 74.) Slovak representation in the party was 18.1 per cent. (From an unsigned article in *Zivot strany*, September 21, 1966.) According to the 1961 Yugoslav census, the population of Croatia was 4,160,000; Serbia, 7,642,000; Slovenia, 1,592,000. In 1966, Croats constituted 21.2 per cent of the party membership, Serbs 42.2 per cent, and the Slovenes 6.6 per cent. *Yugoslav Survey* (Belgrade), November 1967.



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party retains its monopoly of ideology, its strategy—in the sense of an orientation toward action—takes priority before the political beliefs of the country, which are not permitted independent articulation.

At the outset, it must be stressed that the term opposition as applied to the two countries refers to the active opposition within the communist party. As in other communist countries, active opposition has originated mainly from within the top echelons of the party hierarchy predicated upon relative degrees of support from the lower party ranks. The passive opposition identified with the population—disaffected workers, students, ethnic groups and other dissident elements—has existed right along. What is new is that, for the first time, a link has been formed between those segments of the population which have traditionally opposed the regime's policy and the groups within the party seeking to modify regime actions.

A further clarification is needed regarding the designation of the opposition. In Czechoslovakia, the liberal victory was won in January 1968. In Yugoslavia, it was achieved in 1964. Technically, therefore, the conservatives, or what has been termed in Yugoslavia "the conservative underground,"[7] now constitute the opposition in both countries. Prior to those dates, however, "the liberals" were in opposition and "the conservatives" were in power. Who controls official policymaking and who does not is not so important to my topic as the fact of opposition itself, how it arose, and why it seems to have acquired permanency. Attention will thus be centered on the *role* of opposition, rather than on a particular coalition of opposition forces.

The prior condition for the tolerance of divergence of opinion in each country was the limitation of the government's right to coerce.[8] The downgrading of terror provided the necessary stimulus for the opposition to become articulate and to mount its challenge to the official leadership. In Czechoslovakia, the first steps were taken in 1963, with open criticism of the arbitrary injustice of the Stalinist period and rehabilitation of the victims of the Stalinist trials of the 1950's. Greater emphasis on socialist legality, however, was not enough to modify substantially the behavior of the Secret Police. One of the first actions of the new First Secretary, Alexander Dubcek, was to work toward the

[7] *New York Times*, January 13, 1968.
[8] Dahl cites as the essential prerequisite for the toleration of an opposition the limitation of the coercive power of government. (Dahl, *op. cit.*, p. xii.)



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definitive subordination of the Secret Police to the government organs. In Yugoslavia, the initial move toward the modification of the police state was taken in 1951.[9] But it was not until 1966 that the Secret Police (UDB) was finally brought under government control with the dramatic ouster of the UDB's one-time head, Aleksander Rankovic, from his posts in the party and government,[10] the subsequent purging of the police organs, and the decentralization of the UDB power structure.

## The Dominant Subcultures

The tension between the dominant nationality groups in both Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia has its roots in the unresolved problems of the interwar period. Both states were artificially created after World War I, from territories inhabited by peoples with radically different experiences of imperial rule. In neither country did an all-national identity exist. In both countries, one of the chief problems was to create it. Nationality differences during the interwar period were exacerbated by different patterns of economic development,[11] and economic unity had to be forged from widely different economic orientations.

Cultural rivalries were the final factor in the stimulation of ethnic rivalry during the two world wars. The Czechs tended to consider themselves culturally superior to the Slovaks, while the Catholic Croats and the Slovenes, the most highly educated of the Yugoslav nationalities,[12] resented an identification with the orthodox Serbs. Cultural cleavage in Yugoslavia was further heightened by the differing previous national experiences of in-

[9]At the Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in 1951, a resolution was adopted demanding a strengthening of "socialist legality," and independence of the legal system generally. ("For the Further Strengthening of the Judiciary and Legality," *Komunist,* March-May 1951, as cited in George W. Hoffman and Fred Warner Neal, *Yugoslavia and the New Communism* [New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1962], p. 386.) The first liberalizing criminal code was adopted in 1951.

[10]Rankovic's fall came at the Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee of the League of Yugoslav Communists (LYC) at Brioni in July 1966.

[11]Bohemia and Moravia entered the new Czechoslovakian nation far more industrially advanced than agricultural Slovakia, and enjoyed economic precedence during the life of the First Republic. In the newly created Yugoslavia, the three dominant nationalities, the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, found themselves cut off from their former markets in the Balkans, Hungary and Austria, respectively. Moreover, what industry there was, was largely concentrated in the north.

[12]The discrepancy in illiteracy persisted under communist rule. In 1953, the percentage of illiterates among persons ten years of age and over was 2.3 in Slovenia, 16.2 in Croatia, 29.6 in Serbia proper, and 54.9 in the backward area of the Kosmet. Robert F. Byrnes, editor, *Yugoslavia* (New York: Praeger, 1957), p. 84.



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dependence. Serbia had been independent since 1878, while tiny Montenegro had enjoyed practical independence for over a hundred years.[13] By contrast, Croatia and Slovenia's hard schooling in constitutional issues under the Dual Monarchy made them unwilling to tolerate a new subjugation to the Serbs.

The centralist constitutional solution to ethnic diversity imposed by the nationality with the largest population in both countries (the Czechs and the Serbs) served to weaken any chance of attaining genuine national unity in the face of the centrifugal pulls exercised from outside on the nonruling nationalities by a Europe plunging headlong toward World War II. On the eve of Munich, Slovakia broke with Czechoslovakia and declared her independence. In the wake of the German invasion of Yugoslavia, Croatian Ustase elements attempted to proclaim a free and independent Croatia. Yugoslavia was partitioned. Croatia became an autonomous province under Italian supervision; Slovenia and Serbia came under German control. By 1942 Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia had ceased to exist.

This forced abbreviation of the independent existence of the two countries left the nationality problem to be resolved by the communists. The situation has been complicated in Czechoslovakia by the fact that the Slovak nation had its first taste of independence during the war. In addition, the Slovak Communist Party (CPS) had broken with the Czechoslovak Communist Party (CPCS) in 1939, and operated as an independent unit for the duration of the war. A particular source of tension was the fact that Czech communist activities compared unfavorably with the organized guerrilla effort of the Slovak communists, which ultimately led to the uprising of 1944.

The wartime CPS leaders agreed that union with the Czechs was inevitable after the war, but they saw this union in terms of federation.[14] From 1945 to 1948, during the period of reconstruction, the Slovaks were permitted a considerable degree of autonomy. But after the communist coup, they were progressively deprived of any independent rights, both constitutionally and politically. The Slovak Communist Party was reunited with the Czechoslovak Communist Party and brought under Czech

[13]Serbian independence was recognized at the Congress of Berlin in 1878; Turkey recognized Montenegrin independence in 1796.

[14]In 1963, articles by Slovak historians in the national and Slovak press argued persuasively that Klement Gottwald himself (one-time First Secretary of the CPCS and the first communist President of Czechoslovakia) favored a federal solution. See, for example, *Praca* (Bratislava), August 30, 1963.



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dominance in 1948. The 1950 trials of the so-called Slovak bourgeois nationalists ended temporarily any chance of Slovak nationalism regaining its former strength. Thus, Slovak complaints multiplied against the Czechs. Slovak communist grievances were the more intense because the CPS had once known revolutionary *élan* and a real degree of popular support. As Ladislav Mnacko so well describes in his book, *The Taste of Power,* Slovak communists remember the war and the period immediately following as a time of heroism and genuine national self-assertion under communist inspiration against the common enemy.

Similar to the Czech-Slovak confrontation, the Serbian and Croatian communists have been divided on the issue of centralism or federalism. At its founding in 1918, the Communist Party of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was under the leadership of the Serb, Sima Markovic. It was then definitely committed to centralism and secretly to the doctrine that Yugoslavia was a unitary nation. When the leadership of the party passed to the Croat, Tito, it denounced centralism in favor of federalism. However, before the communist takeover, the party had drawn its main support from peripheral areas and was relatively weak in Serbia. It was feared that if the capital were moved from Belgrade, the Serbs would be further alienated. But in Belgrade, the federal government came increasingly under Serbian influence whose centralist leanings served to spur the resentment of the other nationality groups. In the March 8, 1964 issue of the Belgrade weekly, *Nin,* the Croatian Party leader, Vladimir Bakaric, declared that the communists had sought to impose "Yugoslav integralism" such as had been tried in the interwar period.

The Eighth Party Congress of December 1964 failed to reconcile the antagonism between the Serbian and Croatian communists. Edvard Kardelj, the Slovene Party leader, prophetically declared that henceforth the fight between the Slovene and Croat communists, and the majority of the Serbian communists, was to be a fight for and against the transformation of the Yugoslav federation into a confederation of semi-independent states.[15] In the context of Serbo-Croat friction, the purge of Rankovic becomes the hard-won victory of the minority ethnic groups under Croatian instigation against the modern variant of the great Serbianism of the interwar period. The pardoning of Rankovic in

[15]Good accounts in English of Serbo-Croatian antagonism are Bogdan Raditsa, "Tito's Final Text," *The New Leader,* July 4, 1966, pp. 7-10; and Ilija Jukic, "Tito's Last Battle," *East Europe,* April 1967, pp. 2-11.



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December 1966 suggests that the Croatian victory was by no means a total one. Indeed, the celebrated language affair of March of the following year[16] may be seen as the product of the conflict between traditional nationalism urging the national communist parties toward extremism, and the uncertainty of the leadership of the national communist parties as to the consequences of acceding to national pressure. In this connection, perhaps Tito's greatest single achievement was his success in welding together a Yugoslav spirit to combat the German invader. He remains today the lone symbol of national unity.

At the present time, in both countries, antagonism between nationalities seems to be in the ascendant, a threat to the fragile existence of the two states. It constitutes a permanent condition for opposition, because national grievances within the party are linked with the legacy of ethnic friction inherited from the interwar period. In both cases, support for a nationality opposition within the party awakes a positive response from the corresponding articulate nationality groups in the population at large.

### The Differentiation of Social and Economic Interests

The principal political result of all economic reform in the communist countries has been the decentralization of what hitherto was for all intents and purposes a centralized, hierarchical power structure.[17] In both countries, the reforms effected the consolidation of opposition in three principal ways.

In the first place, the reforms intensified the opposition of the national minorities. While Bohemia had been industrialized under the former bourgeois regime, Slovakia's industrialization had taken place for the most part under communist direction. By comparison with the results in the Czech lands, the Slovak Party could justly be proud of its economic achievements. By 1965, Slovak industrial production had increased sevenfold over 1945 —Bohemia's had increased by only three-and-a-half times—and

[16]A group of nineteen Croatian intellectuals and professors published a declaration, accusing the federal government of favoring the Serbian side of the national language, Serbo-Croatian. Two days later, forty Serbian writers angrily replied. In the fracas which followed, seven people were ousted from the party; three Zagreb University professors were expelled, including the Chairman of the Croatian Writers' Union, Vlatko Pavletic. The text of the Croatian declaration may be found in *Telegram* (Zagreb), March 17, 1967; the Serbian reply was published in *Borba* (Belgrade), April 12, 1967.

[17]The Czechoslovak leadership formally inaugurated the New Economic Model (NEM) in January 1965. In July 1965, Tito announced the third and most radical of a series of reforms which started with the introduction of the workers' self-management system in 1950.



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comprised some 20.7 per cent of the total national industrial production.[18] Relative economic progress encouraged the Slovak leaders to press for more rapid industrialization. To succeed in this area, they demanded an end to what they called Prague's economic domination. During 1965 and 1966, the Slovak Party pressured for and won from Prague a greater share for Slovakia of the total national investment, and the assignment of priority to Slovak economic growth.[19] There is little question that Slovak resentment of Prague's economic policies toward Slovakia was a major factor in the coalescence of an opposition sufficient to engineer the fall of the First Secretary of the CPCS, Antonin Novotny. The Slovaks' essentially negative reaction to official party and government economic policies reinforced those elements in the Czech section of the CPCS that had been demanding a more thorough implementation of economic reform.

In Yugoslavia, there is an even more clear-cut polarization of economic interest along national lines due to the marked imbalance between the northern more advanced regions and the underdeveloped sections in the south.[20] The federal government has tried to rectify the situation by making the southern republics the foremost beneficiaries of federal and republican investment funds and subsidies. The more developed republics have naturally resented their forced participation in the industrialization of the backward areas of the country. In the spring of 1958, 800 Croatian economic specialists sent a memorandum to Bakaric, then head of the Croatian government, protesting what they termed the economic exploitation of Croatia by the federal government in Belgrade.[21]

Croatian resentment of Belgrade's economic policies intensified in the 1960's because of the country's mounting economic difficulties. Conflicts and divisions in the party over economic matters sharpened. The reformist wing was headed by Kardelj and

[18]See *Statisticka rocenka CSSR, 1966, op. cit.*, pp. 31, 195.

[19]See the section on domestic economic developments in the Congress' resolutions, published in *Rude pravo*, June 8, 1966. The development of the Slovak economy heads the list of economic priorities.

[20]In 1965, almost 78 per cent of all Yugoslav enterprises employing 78 per cent of the total labor force were located in Croatia, Slovenia and Serbia; approximately 41 per cent of the enterprises employing about 43 per cent of the labor force were in Croatia and Slovenia. In Serbia industry is located in Serbia proper and in the Vojvodina. There is little enterprise in the backward autonomous region of the Kosmet. Federal Institute for Statistics, *Statistical Pocket-book of Yugoslavia, 1967* (Beograd, February 1967), p. 58.

[21]By 1959, more than two-thirds of all investment was financed by funds from republic and local governments, and by enterprises. Hoffman and Neal, *op. cit.*, p. 248 ff.



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Bakaric; Rankovic was the leader of the conservatives. Each accused the other of increasing the country's economic problems.[22] With the victory of the liberals in 1964 at the Eighth Party Congress, reform was assured. The reforms have put Yugoslav enterprises on an essentially profit-making basis, and have given them more say in production decisions. It is expected that enterprises and the banking system will henceforth finance about 70 per cent of the total capital investment, compared with some 45 per cent in the past.[23] In addition, half of all investment funds are now returned by the component republics to the enterprises, rather than being distributed through Belgrade.[24] These changes naturally make the enterprises in the more developed republics reluctant to invest in unprofitable ventures. In particular, the resentment of the northern enterprises has been directed against Serbia's insistence on higher prices for her raw materials in order to finance her investments.[25]

From the conservative point of view, the drastic reduction of government subsidies to enterprises means that many of the plants in the most backward areas are being forced to close. In other words, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia are the hardest hit by the reforms, and have a strong basis from which to argue that the reform is to the advantage of Croatia and Slovenia only. Thus, the realities of the economic situation are helping to sharpen the antagonism born of traditional national rivalry.

A second consequence of economic reorganization in the two countries has been the differentiation of interest between the managerial and technological elites, including the cultural intelligentsia, on the one hand, and the party apparatchiks, both liberal and conservative, on the other. Reform demanded the replacement of undertrained administrative personnel by trained management cadres. In both countries, the absorption of these elites has been one of the most difficult tasks facing party leaders. Despite the entrance of managerial personnel into the Czechoslovak Party after the Tenth Party Congress in 1954, the percentage of engineers and technicians, according to official statistics in 1966, was only 17.3 per cent; scientific workers represented only .2 per cent. On the whole, 70.2 per cent of the

[22]Bakaric, in particular, linked Rankovic with the sabotage of economic reform. *New York Times,* July 5, 1966.
[23]For further details, see *Economic Survey of Europe in 1965: Part One* (New York: United Nations International Publications Service, 1966), p. 99 ff.
[24]"Tito, Rankovic, and All That," *Dissent,* September to October 1966, p. 470.
[25]*New York Times,* November 28, 1966.



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party had a basic education, as opposed to 5.9 per cent who had reached the university level. Although intelligentsia representation in the Central Committee was higher than in the party as a whole (22.9 per cent), and over 50 per cent of the membership had had a university education, the representation from state and party administration continued to predominate.[26] By adding to these statistics the fact of an aging party, the preponderant majority of whose members joined during the 1945-1947 period,[27] it becomes clear why the CPCS, with the possible exception of segments of the Slovak Party,[28] has so far been unable to provide the cadres needed to run a technological society.

A cleavage within the party between the state and party functionaries and the intelligentsia clearly exists. Another split between the younger and better qualified party members and the old Stalinist-trained bureaucrats has developed. A third division which is only becoming apparent is that between what might be called the liberal functionaries, such as Dubcek, and the reforming intelligentsia. Since 1963, the intelligentsia has managed to run its own press. With the abolition of effective censorship in 1968, the liberal intellectuals gained control of the major channels of mass communication. The press and television's drive for immediate democratization of national life has been in sharp contrast to Dubcek's cautious approach to the solution of his country's problems.[29]

The rift between the intellectuals and managerial cadres and the party apparatus has become well defined in Yugoslavia. Official statistics in 1966[30] placed the number of white-collar workers in the party at 20 per cent of the total membership. Illiteracy still exists among the rank and file.[31] Reports stress that most of the

[26]Unless otherwise indicated, the statistics for the composition of the Czechoslovak Party membership in 1966 come from the unsigned article in *Zivot strany, op. cit.* For data on the 1966 Central Committee, see Jiri Hendrych's report in *Rude pravo,* June 5, 1966.

[27]The age structure of the CPCS in 1966 breaks down as follows: under 26, 9.0 per cent; 25-35, 18.2 per cent; 35-45, 26.7; 45-60, 28.7; over 60, 17.4 per cent. In other words, the membership is aging without benefiting from renewal from the ranks of the younger generation.

[28]For example, while only a little more than 16 per cent of the Czechoslovak leadership in January 1968 had the equivalent of a university education, over 30 per cent of the Slovak leaders had gone on to higher education.

[29]Dubcek's statements that there will be democracy in Czechoslovakia but the party will remain in control give some indication of his approach to the welfare of his country. *New York Times,* April 2, 1968.

[30]Except where indicated, official statistics on the composition of the Yugoslav Party have been taken from *Yugoslav Survey, op. cit.*

[31]The *Washington Post* reported on April 11, 1965 that about 30 per cent of the LYC was illiterate. In view of the fact that official statistics from the 1961



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present membership joined the party between 1959 and 1962. Those who joined before 1940 now constitute only a small minority. In other words, the influx of new members cannot be taken to mean an influx of trained personnel. The gulf between the functionary and the intelligentsia of the League of Yugoslav Communists is further apparent from the fact that the core of the wartime party, the partisan heroes, have had to make way for highly educated technocrats in key managerial and government positions.[32] Finally, even more than in Czechoslovakia, the editorial staffs of the liberal intellectual magazines, such as *Gledista* and *Praxis,* have set themselves up against the bureaucrats and tend to regard themselves and to be regarded as embryonic opposition cadres.

In this connection, a significant exchange of articles appeared in the Yugoslav press last year, re-evaluating Djilas' theory of the new class. A Belgrade professor, Svetozar Stojanovic, published an article in *Praxis,*[33] in which he developed the thesis that the position of the working class in a socialist society is completely the opposite of what ideology says it is. The workers are more subjugated and exploited; they do not even possess those rights conquered by the working class in the bourgeois democratic system. Stojanovic would except Yugoslavia from the general pattern of degeneration of a socialist society into a new exploited class society. Nevertheless, he is convinced that the Yugoslav Party, as it is going at the present time, cannot contribute to the building of socialism because its theory and practice are based on outmoded nineteenth-century ideas.

In criticism of Stojanovic's views, Bakaric has argued that prior to the ouster of Rankovic a new bureaucratic class in Djilas' terms had indeed been developing. Since Rankovic's fall, however, the bureaucracy has been transformed into what he termed "our own bureaucracy." In Bakaric's view, the bureaucracy cannot become a new class because it does not possess any rights of ownership. It has only functions. As one of many strata of the population, it is performing the necessary function of the organization of authori-

Yugoslav census placed the percentage of the illiterate aged 10 years and over to the total population at 19.7 per cent, the *Washington Post's* figure seems exaggerated. *Statistical Pocket-book of Yugoslavia, 1967, op. cit.,* p. 24.

[32]By July 1967, two-thirds of the officials in top government positions in Yugoslavia had previously been employed in administration, business or science. From a report by Zdenko Antic from the Research Departments of Radio Free Europe, July 3, 1967.

[33]Svetozar Stojanovic, "The Myth of State Socialism," *Praxis* (Zagreb), January-April 1967.



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ty. Therefore, Bakaric asserts, the problem of bureaucracy versus self-management is false.[34]

Although he is a university-educated man, Bakaric, as a party functionary, cannot help representing the point of view of the liberal party apparat in terms of its vested interests. Stojanovic and other university professors attack what they term the ideological myths generated by the party, and accuse the party bureaucracy of having carefully cultivated these myths to rationalize their continuance in power. The professors thus support the managerial cadres in their demands for the deprofessionalization of politics and their rejection of the hypothesis that some day all of the working people will definitely decide all key issues concerning the country's development.[35]

The fundamental question that the intelligentsia poses is whether the Communist Party is really capable of maintaining its monopoly of power in a modern industrial society. The party functionary would like to answer the question in the affirmative; the intelligentsia argues in the negative. To allow the party apparat to retain undisputed control means to strengthen an unproductive class, which may resort to any means, including arms, to maintain its monopoly of power.[36] While violence may have been necessary at an earlier period, it has to be ruled out for the future. In other words, the managerial cadres must assume their rightful place in the direction of society. The party must step down.

The split between the managerial and technical elites and the liberal apparatchiks, which has developed since the 1965 reforms, cuts across nationality. Both Zagreb and Belgrade have their intellectual periodicals supporting more radical reform than that officially endorsed by the party. Afraid of the consequences of renouncing control, yet unable to endorse the conservative position, the liberal party functionaries have evidently tried to present a case in which they can retain the best of two worlds. Thus, what in 1964 appeared to be a virtually united liberal elite has now divided over the issue of who is to govern. Given the fluid developments in Czechoslovakia today, a similar situation may be anticipated there.

[34]Bakaric's speech was published in *Vjesnik* (Zagreb), November 5, 1967.

[35]See, for example, the article by Mihailo Markovic of Belgrade University in *Encyclopedia Moderna*. No. 2, January-February 1967, p. 15. Professor Markovic states that in 1952 119,000 were employed in the state and social (party) organizations. In 1964 there were 188,000 paid functionaries. "Why such an increase?," he asks. He sees the solution in the genuine democratization of the party through the abolition of all privilege.

[36]See Professor Ljubomir Tadic's article in *Encyclopedia Moderna, op. cit.*, p. 16.



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The liberal victory is too recent for the conflict between the technocrats and the party liberals to have become fully defined. But that such a conflict is underway is suggested by the persistence of debate over the degree to which the economy should be run by administrative or economic means.[37]

A final consequence of economic reform lies in the shifting patterns of alignments between the conservative party bureaucrats, liberal party functionaries, economic cadres, and blue-collar workers. Essentially, the reformers' appeal is not among the workers but among the higher echelons of the economic bureaucracy. In Czechoslovakia the workers have by no means unreservedly welcomed NEM. Growing worker dissatisfaction at the closing of inefficient enterprises has produced numerous "work stoppages." Strikes in protest of government and party directives have been officially reported.[38] Novotny called attention to the workers' unenthusiastic attitude toward reform in his speech to the Thirteenth Party Congress in 1966. After his ouster as First Secretary in January 1968 and up to his resignation as President of the Republic in March, he apparently tried to capitalize on worker unrest to gather support in a last-ditch stand to mobilize conservative opinion behind him in the party. Parallel abortive efforts to organize the factories in his support was additional evidence of an attempt to set up a conservative coalition.[39] The possibility of a conservative functionary-worker alliance cannot be lightly dismissed.[40]

In Yugoslavia the gulf between the interests of the blue-collar workers and the economic and technical elites seems to be widening. A split between blue-collar and white-collar workers was almost inevitable, precisely because the self-management system gives the blue-collar workers ownership of the factories and thus a share in their profits. The arrangement means that blue-collar workers are not on a full salary as are white-collar workers. The

[37]The State Planning Commission has been the advocate of a greater degree of centralized control of the economy. Ota Sik and the reformer economists have urged a new system of management, oriented toward faster growth through increased consumption and dependency upon market relationships.

[38]Radio Prague, January 10, 1967. In 1964 and 1965 a total of 1,300 production units with 33,000 employees were closed. *Rude pravo,* March 24, 1966.

[39]*New York Times,* March 11, 1968.

[40]The liberals are well aware of the danger. In an article in the renamed organ of the Czechoslovak Writers' Union, *Literarni listy,* Editor Ludvik Vaculik holds no illusions about the workers' antagonism to economic reform. In his view, an educational effort to modify their negative attitude is essential to the success of the reform. Ludvik Vaculik, "And What About the Workers?," *Literarni listy,* March 28, 1968.



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pressure for solvency and the need for investment capital produced by the 1965 reforms has forced the enterprises to allocate profits to investment funds rather than putting them into the workers' pockets. Thus, the man who in theory owns the enterprise at times brings home less than half his pay and seldom the whole of it. The white-collar worker can count on full pay every week. It is no wonder that blue-collar workers form the majority of those leaving the party.[41] The increasing number of strikes, which in 1965, by the government's own admission, amounted to 130,[42] is a significant measure of the degree of worker unrest. So intense has been the conflict between the blue-collar and the white-collar groups that the former head of the Yugoslav Trade Unions, Svetozar Vukmanovic-Tempo, has developed what he terms a two-line thesis of antagonism between the worker and management in a socialist society, and has called for the organization of the blue-collar workers into representative councils to pressure for redress of their grievances. What trade unions of Yugoslavia want to achieve, in Vukmanovic's opinion, is the full-fledged implementation of the workers' self-management system.[43] His theory is exemplary of two parallel lines of development in Yugoslavia today: the mobilization of the trade unions in support of the workers' councils, and the attempt by the liberal party functionaries to identify with the workers against management.

The decentralization of the economic structure in Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia has given rise to autonomous centers of both actual and potential political power, capable of mounting a permanent challenge to official policy. Out of the economic reforms in both countries there have emerged various competing social and economic interests which appeal to different segments of the party for action and to which party groups refer for support. At present, it is impossible to describe an ordered dualism or pluralism of interest in either country. A Croat-Slovene liberal functionary-intellectual-managerial alliance in Yugoslavia in 1964, and a Slovak variant of the same in Czechoslovakia in 1968, suggest the plausibility of other

[41]In 1966, 53.6 per cent of those leaving the party were workers.

[42]See the account of worker dissatisfaction, based on his personal tour of Yugoslavia, by George Bailey, "Titoism's Failure," *The Reporter,* January 1, 1967, pp. 16-20.

[43]*Vjesnik* (Zagreb), April 26, 1967. By contrast, the trade union leadership in Czechoslovakia has made no serious attempt to provide representation for worker interests, despite repeated reports on the radio of demands for real trade union independence and a revival of institutions similar to the workers' councils of 1945 to 1948.



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alternatives, such as a Serb- or Czech-conservative functionary-working class alliance, or a Serb- or Czech-liberal functionary-worker alliance.

## The Constitutional Variable

The constitutional variable is more important in a communist state in determining the pattern of opposition than it would at first appear to be, because it describes the legal relationship between the various subcultures, defines the legally permissible toleration of diversity of opinion, and provides a framework for the organizational structure of the party.

The 1960 Socialist Constitution of Czechoslovakia effectively completed the socialization of the governmental institutions started in the Constitution of 1948. Although an electoral law in 1964 somewhat modified the conservative constitutional regulations and electoral law of 1960, the liberalization of the electoral system as well as the delegation of any real authority to parliament are still to come.[44] Thus, from the standpoint of the operation of the opposition, the most significant aspect of the constitutional arrangements today is the anomaly of the existence of a quasi-autonomous national unit within a centralist state. The constitution nominally deprives the Slovaks of the last vestige of national rights by relegating Slovakia to mere provincial status. The fact remains, however, that the new Constitution, like the old, provides for a Slovak national administration, and by inference, a Slovak Party organization, over which Prague has little direct control.

Slovak pressure on both the party and government in Prague has been based on Slovak control of the policymaking organs in Slovakia. Paradoxically, Slovak participation in the centralist system is a major factor in explaining the present Slovak ascendancy. For the Slovak Party and national administration provided the only organized political vehicle which could serve as a basis for consolidating the challenge to Novotny's rule. Another factor in the Slovak achievement has been the solidarity between the Slovak economic and intellectual elites and the party apparatus. With their own national mass media, Slovak reformers could use their mass communications to disseminate liberal views. What is more

[44]Liberalizing electoral laws (Laws No. 113/1967 and No. 114/1967) have already been passed, and will be in effect for the elections to the National Committees, the National Assembly, and the Slovak National Council, scheduled to be held later this year.



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important, the Slovak Party leadership has supported the liberals in return for their cooperation.[45]

The existence of a constitutionally recognized national government and party organization has thus given a certain asymmetry to the pattern of opposition in Czechoslovakia. On the one hand, there is the solidly entrenched Slovak Party with all the force of law behind it; on the other, there are the diverse Czech groups demanding institutional backing. In this connection, one of the more remarkable developments has been the use by the Czechs of nonparty organizations as vehicles through which to press for reform. The most salient example of Czech liberal initiative has been the capture by the liberal writers of the leadership of the Czechoslovak Writers' Union and their use of the union as an organized pressure group. In a similar way, the Economic Institute of the Czechoslovak Academy of Science has provided the institutional base for the Czech economic reformers. Neither of these two institutions, however, has the same status of authority as that of the Slovak Communist Party. The problem is that, although in 1967 the CPS provided a temporary organizational form for the Czech liberals, it can in no way be considered to represent the total interests of the Czech liberals. In the last analysis, Slovak Party leaders must support Slovak interests and the Slovak Party, among whose membership is a sizeable conservative bureaucratic contingent.

The present Czechoslovak Constitution, therefore, necessarily puts one or the other nation at a disadvantage, since the Czechs have no national organization of their own. Dubcek can rule only with the support of the Czech liberals. Loss of that support would once again reduce the Slovak Party to a minority position. The Czechs cannot dominate until they resolve their internal differences, or Dubcek alienates the Czech liberals. A cross-national liberal coalition is out of the question because the Constitution, as an orthodox communist document, cannot admit political division. But for the liberals to prevail, they must organize

[45]A pertinent example of Slovak solidarity is the relationship between the Slovak intellectuals and the Slovak Party after the Fourth Congress of the Czechoslovak Writers' Union in June 1967, at which Slovak writers refused to become involved in the Czechoslovak writers' revolt against Novotny. Czech orthodox party leaders, such as Jiri Hendrych, attempted to crack down on the Czech writers, as they had tried in the past, by expelling from the party the leaders of the revolt and by taking the union's periodical, *Literarni noviny,* away from it. The Slovak Party leaders rewarded the Slovak writers' neutrality by allowing the Slovak Writers' Union to keep control of *Kulturny zivot,* and by supporting the writers in what appeared to be a *de facto* federalization of the Czechoslovak Writers' Union in the fall of 1967.



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politically. Hence, their increasing pressure for civil rights. A more equal constitutional solution may well be one of the most difficult tasks Dubcek will have to face.

Four aspects of the Yugoslav constitutional structure are significant in explaining the complex nature of the opposition in that country today. While federalism was adopted as the solution to the nationality problem in 1946, it is only recently that it has been put into practice on a major scale. The introduction of a federalist format created six republican governments and six republican parties. The institution of the self-management system started the process of decentralization. But it was not until the 1960's that constitutional and party reforms substantially modified the centralist administrative structure in favor of greater republican autonomy.[46]

By 1967 almost all important state and party institutions in Yugoslavia had been confederated. The focus of party power shifted from the federal to the republican executive committees. While the institutional organization of the country moved increasingly toward confederalization, the relative economic, cultural and population strengths of the constituent republics contributed further to the weakening of national unity and the alignment of the nationalities into two rival spheres of influence. If the Croats and Slovenes have fought for greater adherence to the Constitution and the rule of law, it is because constitutionalism benefits their national interests. Federalism made it possible for the two smaller nations to combine and prevail over the more numerous Serbs. On the other hand, because concentration on national rights has tended to separate rather than unite the nationalities, the increasing self-assertiveness of the participant ethnic groups threatens the very existence of the country. A case in point is the Serbian, Croatian and Slovenian challenge of the

[46]One of the most important recent measures directed toward greater republican autonomy was the six amendments to the Constitution passed in April 1967. Among other things, the amendments strengthened the power of the national minorities, while decentralizing the power hitherto concentrated in the Presidency. (For the text of the amendments, see *Vjesnik* (Zagreb), April 19, 1967.) The reorganization of the party was initiated in July 1966. The most significant changes were: (1) the downgrading of the Executive Committee to the status of a mere executive organ of a nominally strengthened Central Committee; (2) the institution of a Presidium with policy-recommending and deliberative functions; (3) the establishment of the office of President and the abolition of the posts of Secretary to the Central Committee; (4) the establishment of commissions attached to the Central Committee to study and recommend policies in specific areas, excluding that of party affairs; (5) the decentralization of power formerly in the Executive Committee; and (6) the separation of government and party functions.



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federal government's right to set republican tax limits in December 1967.[47] The absence of any firm agreement on the part of the component republics as to the scope of the federal government's power poses a serious problem for the future of the country.

The danger of the disintegration of national unity has no doubt been the major factor in Tito's recent moves to upgrade the role of the Yugoslav Army in the life of the country.[48] The army's 75,000 party members, representing 30 per cent of the membership of the armed forces, constitute the most solid and most cohesive group within the party since the demotion of the UDB in 1966. With the partisans forming the hard core, the army can be counted on to be staunchly conservative, loyal to Tito, and thus an effective counterforce to both liberal demands and the centrifugal pressures exercised by the republics.

A second constitutional factor in the pattern of the Yugoslav opposition has been the progressive liberalization of the electoral system, the most recent revision of which went into effect in February 1967, in time for the general elections of that year.[49] The latest legislation reduces the party's control over the elections and provides for more than one candidate to run, thus making a real campaign possible. The new law immediately showed up the weakness of the party liberals' position. In the 1967 elections, many of the candidates chosen by the party to run on a reform ticket failed to get elected, much to the party liberals' disappointment. Elected instead were old-guard revolutionaries and former partisans.[50] The reason for the increased number of conservatives in the post-election legislatures was that liberal strength was unorganized. The conservatives ran their candidates from their strongholds in the highly organized partisan associations. They also found support in the party's bureaucratic contingent,

[47]For the republics' position on the question, see *Borba,* December 30, 1967; *Politika* (Belgrade), January 11, 1968; *Vjesnik* (Zagreb), January 13, 1968.

[48]Evidences of Tito's efforts to strengthen the role of the army are to be found in the resolutions of the Central Committee of the LYC in July 1967, in which the army's party units are to play a more active role in the municipal and local organizations of the League, and in Tito's appointment of partisan wartime officer, Lt. Gen. Milos Sumonja, as Chief of Staff in August 1967. The text of the LYC CC resolutions was published in *Borba* on July 5, 1967. The announcement of the appointment of Lt. Gen. Sumonja was made in *Politika* (Belgrade), July 29, 1967.

[49]Electoral procedure under the 1967 amended law is well described in an article on the Yugoslav electoral system by Richard V. Burks and Slobodan Stankovic in the February-March 1967 issue of *Ost-Europa.*

[50]The liberal Croatian communist leader, Mika Tripalo, scored the new National Assembly as "slightly worse than the old," the result of "the demagogy of old Party figures." As reported to the *New York Times,* July 16, 1967.



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which has been estimated at 40 per cent of the membership. As in Czechoslovakia, the liberals had no organization except the party itself, whose control over the elections had been weakened by the liberal legislation.

Decline in the party's centralizing authority has brought to the fore a third development in Yugoslavia's constitutional structure: the possibility that the role of a second party might be played by the Socialist Alliance, the Yugoslav counterpart of the national fronts common to all East European communist countries. The question of the role of the Alliance under the new reforms has been examined widely in the press since 1966, and attempts have been made to invest it with real autonomy. Party leaders, however, insist on seeing the Alliance as a wider contact between the party and the population: a forum for the airing of public opinion, not an organization independent of the party.[51] Hence, the Sixth Congress of the Alliance, held in June 1966, upheld the principle of party control. Nevertheless, its new statutes made local centers more responsive to local opinion and decentralized the Alliance's organizational structure.[52] Potentially, therefore, if not actually, the Socialist Alliance stands as a possible institutional vehicle for the opposition.

Finally, the impact upon the opposition of the expanded authority of the republican and federal legislatures needs brief mention. One of the consequences of the change has been the emergence of the legislature as a site where the opposition can confront the government, and even bring it down. A dramatic example of this possibility was the resignation of the government of Slovenia over the question of the government's proposal to increase workers' contributions to social insurance. The resignation of the government was permissible under the constitution, but was the first occurrence of its kind in Yugoslavia.[53] The separation of the party and state organizations and the resulting lower representation of party professional apparatchiks in the federal and republican governments give further substance to legislative

[51]A symposium was held in Belgrade, January 10-13, 1965, on the subject of the Alliance. Eighty reports were heard. The official view is well represented by Mijalko Todorovic's comments over Radio Belgrade on January 25, 1968.

[52]The text of the resolution was published in *Borba,* June 12, 1966.

[53]The vote was forty-four against the government proposal, eleven for, and three abstaining. (Reported over Radio Zagreb on December 6, 1966.) News of the Slovenian government's resignation was broadcast over Radio Belgrade on December 7, 1966. It should be noted that the vote against the government was not the first such vote recorded in Yugoslavia or elsewhere in the bloc. Voting against the government has also taken place in Czechoslovakia. What is distinctive is the fact that the government *resigned* as a consequence.



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responsibility.[54] Freer elections, wider powers to the legally elected governing organs, and the resignation of governments upon defeat of their bills are significant steps toward the institutionalization of procedures guaranteeing the tolerance of "loyal" opposition.

The constitutional arrangements operative in a communist state are seen to be critical in determining the distinctiveness of the opposition, its tactics of operation, and the site of its challenge to the ruling group. Federalism in Yugoslavia has resulted in a pattern of opposing national units, confronting each other in the manner of separate governments. The resolution of differences and the formulation of policy on the federal level are consequently fraught with formal questions of principle and national rights. Constitutional and party reforms have reinforced the trend toward the polarization of national conflict around the two predominant subcultures. Freer elections within this context have taken conflict resolution outside the nucleus of the party into a broader arena. In addition, the more liberal constitution has made parliament and the polls effective sites from which to pressure for modification of official policy. In Czechoslovakia the centralist format combined with a less free electoral system and less real authority in parliament has so far kept the management of conflict within the bounds of the Communist Party. Since Slovakia is not a federated unit, Slovak and other pressures have been better exerted through informal bargaining and combining within the party itself. The total arrangement of the opposition thus tends to be more fluid, less structured, more one-sided, and less distinctly national than in Yugoslavia.

### Party Strategy

The final factor to be considered here as a determinant of the pattern of opposition in a communist country is the crucial matter of party strategy. In this, until recently, the two parties under consideration differed radically. Up to the fall of Novotny as First Secretary, the Czechoslovak Party officially followed a course which did not deflect far from the old Stalinist tactics. Novotny's response to the liberalization of the Soviet line was rigid and orthodox.[55] The consequence of the CPCS' official neo-orthodoxy

[54]In July 1967 only one-third of the officials in top positions in Yugoslavia were simultaneously party officials. Party functionary representation in the Federal Assembly was stronger than in the Federal Executive Committee. Zdenko Antic, *op. cit.*

[55]Nowhere is Novotny's orthodoxy more apparent than in the draft theses written for the Twelfth Congress of the CPCS, published in *Rude pravo,* Sep-



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was that pressure for change and the definition of a strategy of reform came from outside the leadership of the party. In Yugoslavia the situation was reversed. By insisting on a Yugoslav road to socialism, Tito chose the path of innovation and reform. In the face of the increasing bureaucratization of Yugoslavia, Djilas indicted the Soviet bureaucracy as the "new class" of the USSR—thus helping to push the LYC leadership toward a strategy to distinguish its course from that of the Soviets, which Yugoslav leaders considered to be a distortion of socialism.

The two different strategies had different impacts on the emergence and cohesion of the opposition. The Czechoslovak strategy prevented the various party factions for a long time from operating openly and reaching out for popular support. It took ten years for the Slovak communists to succeed in effecting the rehabilitation of the Slovak "bourgeois nationalists." The first call for freedom of speech was made at the Second Congress of the Czechoslovak Writers' Union in 1956. It was not until 1963 that the writers were able to state their grievances openly and to bargain with the regime for concessions. It took until 1967 for them to counter Novotny's policies with a liberal democratic program of their own.[56] Similarly, the economic reformers did not get a public hearing until 1963, although such discussion was long overdue. The fact that the official line was total party control over society and democratic centralism within the CPCS meant that, unless the opposition factions gained enough strength, they could not challenge that line. But until they could dissociate themselves from official party strategy, they could not hope for popular backing. It is no wonder the writers accused themselves of participating in "a perverted and perverting system."[57]

In this sense, the Slovaks were the best placed of all opposition factions. By 1963 a new generation of Slovak leaders had risen to power, untainted by direct association with the purges of the 1950's, the injustices of which had been firmly attributed to "the cult of personality." These younger leaders were able to use their influence without fear of recrimination and reprisal. In pressing for the rehabilitation of the "bourgeois nationalists," the new

tember 14, 1962, under the title "Prospects for the Further Development of Our Society."

[56]The most systematic program was Ludvik Vaculik's speech to the Fourth Congress of the Czechoslovak Writers' Union in June 1967, in which he developed the thesis that power works by its own laws, no matter what the social and economic base. The only way to limit it is through the implementation of a democratic system.

[57]Karel Kosik, *Kulturny zivot,* July 13, 1963.



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Slovak leadership was able to achieve an identification of its aims with those of the entire country. At the same time, it was able to engineer the fall from power of all the Slovak "Stalinists" still in top party and government posts, who had cooperated with Prague in the purges.[58] Feeling most injured by Stalinism, the Slovaks were ideally situated to become the initiators of the revisionist movement. When the Czech intellectuals supported them, the movement was transformed into an all-national opposition to the Prague bureaucracy. Slovak aims remained separate from the aims of the liberal economic reformers and the intellectuals. It was only when these strands of opposition converged to assume sufficient proportions so as to challenge the bonds of party discipline that Novotny's hold over the provincial and municipal party organizations finally broke. Dubcek's accession, however, was founded on orthodox party strategy. He was able to capitalize on the disarray within the Czech section, because he was the only other individual, besides Novotny, who had control of a major group of party secretaryships.

Thus, a party strategy oriented toward maintaining the status quo encouraged a factional, essentially plural opposition. In his failure to reach a satisfactory compromise, Novotny alienated the dissident Czech elements, who had no other recourse but to ally with the Slovaks. The result was an asymmetrical pluralistic opposition. In the last years of Novotny's rule, factionalism within the party was a fact deriving from the increasing differentiation of interests within society at large. It became obvious that the traditional communist modes of behavior were inadequate, but the conservative CPCS leadership refused to allow any public discussion of the presence of social conflict within the party.[59]

The accession of Dubcek demonstrated clearly that the character of party rule had fundamentally changed. The strategy of absolute control had been replaced by bargaining. Upholding the status quo had given way to fostering reform. Recent events indicate how risky the new strategy may be. Whereas a year or so ago the intellectuals were merely questioning the leading role of the party and tentatively calling for "an integrated opposition,"[60] today, the Social Democratic Party can publish a resolution calling

[58]The last of the old-guard Slovak Stalinists, Frantisek Zupka, was retired from the CPCS Presidium in June 1966.

[59]Jiri Hendrych, for example, insisted on party unity in the face of social and economic pluralism in his speech to the CPCS Central Committee Plenum in February 1967.

[60]See Julius Strinka's article in *Kulturny zivot*, November 25, 1965.



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for the virtual formation of a party system.[61] Caught between the rising flood of extreme liberalism threatening to burst the bonds of communism, the more moderate elements seeking reform within the communist framework, and the conservatives desiring a return to the *status quo ante,* Dubcek will be hard pressed to accommodate all interests within the Czech-Slovak antithesis, maintain party control over the direction of the country, and accomplish economic renewal. If the progressives become bolder, the moderates may look anxiously toward the secure familiarity of the conservative position.

A strategy of reform and accommodation has produced a definitive fragmentation of the liberal consensus in Yugoslavia. From 1950 to 1964 the reformers were not effectively in control of policy-making. But because reform was the official party strategy, they were able to pursue their goals more openly than was the case in Czechoslovakia. The question was not whether there should be reform, but what *kind* of reform was required. As in Czechoslovakia, however, the liberals had to develop a united front if they were to succeed. The dilemma of the reformers was that once they had captured political power, they became the official initiators of a change that, when underway, had to undermine their power position if it was to achieve its objective. The draft theses of the LYC, published in April 1967, are indicative of the degree to which the role of the party has already declined in Yugoslav life. Perhaps their most important clause is the assertion that the Yugoslav Communist Party is not a political party in the classical sense of the word and has no separate party interest.[62]

It is precisely the diminishing authority of the party in Yugoslavia that is a matter of great moment to intellectuals and party members at the present time. Party functionaries, no matter how liberal, are naturally concerned about the party's loss of control and are hesitant to adopt radical solutions. In 1966 the Macedonian communist leader, Krste Crvenkovski, came out in favor of a permanent "loyal opposition" and the end of democratic centralism within the party.[63] Today he can criticize traditional party behavior, but is silent regarding a solution to the demoralization he believes has come upon the membership.[64] The liberal apparatchiks cannot admit the possibility of a two-party or

[61]As reported in the *New York Times,* March 10, 1968.
[62]The text of the theses was published on April 27, 1967 in all major Yugoslav dailies.
[63]*Politika* (Belgrade), October 23, 1966.
[64]*Komunist,* December 14, 1967.



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multi-party system. To Todorovic, it is impossible to have two socialist parties in a communist country, one ruling and one an organized opposition. Since both are based on Marx's teaching, sooner or later the tolerance between the two would disappear. Only communist parties can build socialism.[65] The apparatchiks' immobilism regarding further redefinition of party strategy moves them away from the position of the liberal intellectuals in the direction of the conservative camp.

The liberal intellectuals themselves are sharply divided as to what party strategy should aim for. Views range from a no-party system through a two-party system, a multi-party system, something called socialist pluralism, to Djilas' call for a Western democratic-socialist order.[66] The central problem to all is whether it is possible for a communist country to implement a party system or a political faction system within the party, and yet remain communist. The conservatives answer in the negative. The liberal apparatchiks supported by Tito also say no.[67] Other liberal elements are divided as to what kind of system would have optimum effectiveness. A reformist strategy has thus enhanced division within the ruling government group and cohesion within the opposition.

## Conclusions

Several general conclusions are suggested by this survey of the pattern of opposition in Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.

(1) The autonomous functioning of an opposition in a communist system is relative to the degree of tension existing between the dominant subcultures and the degree of economic and political decentralization. The greater the degree of tension and decentralization, the more favorable are the conditions for the emergence and perpetuation of an opposition. In both countries, opposition did not become fully defined until both factors had converged.

[65]Todorovic, *op. cit.*

[66]Examples of the various views are too numerous to be given here. Suffice it to mention Steven Vracar's defense of the two-party system in his article "Party Monopoly and the Political Power of Social Groups," *Gledista,* August-September 1967; Belgrade Professor Svetozar Stojanovic's apology for a multi-party system in his report to the Korcula Summer School in August 1967, published in *Praxis* (Zagreb), September 1967, pp. 4-5; and party theoretician and Presidium member Milentije Popovic's development of the idea of a nonparty system in *Socijalizam,* November 1966, and *Komunist,* December 8, 1966. Djilas' views are summarized in the *Washington Post,* April 11, 1965.

[67]Tito, for example, rejected any reinterpretation of democratic centralism in his speech to the Albanian minority in Kosmet, in March 1967. *Borba,* March 30, 1967.



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(2) The alignment of economic and social interests with the dominant subcultures is not a one-to-one alignment. On the contrary, alliances tend to be fluid. The interaction between party and nonparty groups suggests the development of an informal type of constituency, meriting further study and analysis.

(3) Constitutional arrangements determine how the specific subcultures will confront each other in a formal pattern. Where the federal system prevailed, there was a greater distinctiveness of opposition along nationality lines. Where the centralist system was in force, asymmetry developed, with the sole national party organization acting as the lodestone for the dissident interests of the other nation.

(4) Constitutional arrangements also define the sites from which the opposition may challenge the ruling party group. The more liberal the constitution, the greater is the number of possible sites.

(5) Party strategy acts as an important determinant of the cohesion of the opposition. Where the strategy of democratic centralism and party control over society prevailed, the opposition tended to fragmentation, relative to dominant interest. Where a strategy of reform and greater tolerance of opinion reigned, the opposition was strengthened; the ruling group split on the basis of interests and objectives, thereby initiating a new cycle of division between the ruling moderates and the more radical liberals.

Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia today are test cases of whether an opposition can survive in a communist state. The conditions are favorable. The embryo is there. But in order for the groups now competing for political power and influence to resolve their differences in a peaceful and legitimately patterned manner, the leaderships in both countries must see their way to a revolutionary reappraisal of the theory and practice of communism itself.



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# FETISHES OF NATO AND THE DOLLAR*

*by Horst Mendershausen*

NO observer of international affairs today can miss the fact that relations between the United States and the most compatible, familiar part of its environment, Western Europe, are in trouble. The trouble is not specifically political or military (notably not a war over Western Europe), or specifically economic (there is no unemployment or galloping inflation), but combined trouble. The juncture of troubles in the political and economic realms is dangerous, because in combination they threaten to become total—not in the sense of total war, but in the sense of mutual incomprehension and a loss of civilization.

The processes that generate these troubles seem largely unchangeable at the moment. They may get worse before they take a turn for the better. But perhaps they can be better understood, and understanding may in time lead to correct policy. This article is not concerned with policy, but with intellectual positions influencing its evolution in time.

The trouble has many roots. One root feeding both NATO and dollar trouble is the state of mind with which they are being approached. I will call the state of mind "fetishism." There is a real thing we want from NATO and the dollar in the international realm. It escapes us. We are losing sight of it. We are fastening our minds on appearances or forms which we believe represent the real thing but which are not the real thing. The efforts to uphold these appearances and forms do not give us the real thing. They probably accelerate its loss.

## The Quaint Dream

The real thing—I am almost ashamed to name it, for it sounds so quaint—is the Atlantic Community. It is the convergence of state and economic interests, of states and economies, toward a commonwealth, with one central executive, one basic money, one common matrix of constitutional order, and no internal trade barriers. Many Europeans wanted it in the late 1940's; some Americans, too. Governments paid lip service to it. But they did

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not use their power to achieve it. The United States, in particular, having proven its strength so dramatically in the war which destroyed or weakened all other Western governments, did not feel compelled to press for an Atlantic Commonwealth, although it entangled itself deeply with Western Europe.

So, this Atlantic Community remained a dream. Instead we had the Atlantic camp, a combination of states with one sovereign state, the United States, in the position of leadership. But the workability of this combination depended on the dream. The dream of the Atlantic Commonwealth provided the fabric of confidence for the camp. The camp was felt to be right—notwithstanding losses of national sovereignty—because you could imagine that somehow or other the camp under the leader would realize the dream. This imagination was the fabric of confidence. Lose it, and you would lose confidence in the camp and its leadership, and therefore you would lose camp and leadership. Thereafter you would fall back into a world of quasi-national states, quasi-national economies, quasi-national socialism, all quite incompatible with either the technology of the twentieth century or the cultural ambitions of Western man. This is the kind of world that Edward Hallett Carr saw ahead in 1945, when he wrote his fine little book *Nationalism and After*. The realization of his somber vision was postponed by the camp experiment that began in 1947, with President Truman and Secretary of State Acheson in charge here.

The great divide between the ascendance and the decline of the Atlantic camp falls into the ten years between the Korean War and the Cuban missile crisis. Within that decade, there occurred triumphs and seminal failures of Atlantica: joint military operations (not mere planning) by the Atlantic allies, cooperation in European recovery, integrated NATO forces, convertible currencies; as well as the striving for European, not Atlantic, economic integration, nuclear separateness of the United States (anchored in the McMahon Act of 1946), the reconstitution of European sovereignties, the discovery of different strategic preferences, and the remarriage of national self-esteem to national state power under Gaullism.

As the dream proved unavailing, fetishism moved in. By fastening on and idolizing some Atlantic fetish, the Western political minds sought to preserve confidence in the common venture while its evolution to a commonwealth was aborting and the venture was therefore ceasing to be common.



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## FETISHES OF NATO AND THE DOLLAR

### NATO Fetishism

The principal fetishes of the Atlantic combination of states are the threat of Soviet armed aggression and the negotiated common military strategy needed to stem it. Am I turning history upside down? Was not the looming monolith of Stalin's empire, the militant communist priesthood in Moscow, the *raison d'être* for Atlantica? The shared perception of that threat was indeed the most important *motive* for the Atlantic construction. One part of the perceived threat was the vision of the Soviets shooting their way into Western Europe; the other part was the vision of an internal communist takeover in Europe. But the principal motive was not the same as the act, that is, the reciprocating acts of the Western states in 1948, 1951, and so on. The acts were valid in themselves. They improvised a political fabric for the transnational society of the West.

The improvisations of common defense and common money made sense for the West even without the belief in a Stalin poised to march his divisions to Bonn or a Thorez seizing the Elysée Palace. The belief propelled the reciprocating actions; but the actions (e.g., troop stationing in Europe, trade liberalization, the mutual listening and responding) transcended the motive and created new facts of life, the political fabric of Atlantica. The deterrent strategy against the perceived and cultivated threat of Soviet aggression was summed up in a simple idea, the threat of retaliation against the communist center by the full power of the United States. The strategy was not negotiated.

So threat perception and answering strategy were helpers of the Atlantic combination of states. How did they become its fetishes? By the combination revealing itself as a limited liability exercise, not an incipient commonwealth. Once domestic politics became again the sovereign domain of each state; once nuclear military force was marked as the preserve of one Western nation and not assigned to a common agency; once nuclear force was also acquired by the opponent; once the Atlantic states looked at this situation individually and sovereignly and not as territories of an Atlantic union—they perceived divergent military strategies or deterrence postures. The European continentals still preferred the most massive retaliation on the Soviet Union; the Americans now preferred some conventional or quasi-conventional military response in Western Europe. The Europeans did not want to have war on their territory; the Americans did not want to have war on



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theirs. Among states, not federal members of a union, the preferred strategies were individually valid and mutually irreconcilable.

It has been difficult for American defense thinkers and good European Atlanticists to understand the irreconcilability. When one *wishes* to reconcile, one may not plumb the irreconcilability in depth. For example, take the German preference for "forward defense." Americans took that to mean that the Germans wanted a posture of forces designed to defend a geographic line, a thing with lateral depth; and they assumed that the line was on this side of East Germany's western border. The Germans did not debate this interpretation the way the French debated differences in strategic views. But if one examines carefully the German ideas about that forward defense line, one finds that the West Germans' preferred line was not geographic but geometric, and not necessarily west of East Germany but perhaps east of Poland. So the American would design a conventional or quasi-conventional defense along the zonal border; and the German would ask, "Why don't you hang a bomb over the Russian's head, or at least over the Baltic Sea?" The Americans would refuse to do such a rash thing and point to the destructiveness of nuclear warfare. The Germans would swallow hard and endorse in principle "conventional forward defense" on their territory—better than to break with America over strategic formulas—but their hearts would not be in it, soon their money would not either, and their army would never really be up to the task. Deterrent strategy negotiated between defense ministers of sovereign states is apt to be nobody's strategy.

Yet NATO had to negotiate a common strategy, it was felt, and so the governments fought about it, getting more and more distrustful of each other along the way. The last military measure NATO took in December 1967 was to ratify the long-debated common strategy of "graduated response." From a parochial, national point of view one need not quarrel with it. One might only ask one's government: What would we *really* do if the bell rang? But a believer in Atlantica might call the ministers' product an exercise in fetishism. By agreeing on these words, one made it look as if something had been done to hold the policies of the United States, Great Britain, West Germany and the others together. (France, of course, is out.) But this is not true. The military policies are not coordinated by the negotiated phrases. If the actual policies of these states today converge on anything, it is on



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response conditioning: if (or since) you do less for me, I'll do less for you.

Among the principal American students of Atlantic affairs, Henry Kissinger foresaw most clearly the divisive effect of strategy negotiation and interstate diplomacy among the allied sovereigns. In his book, *The Necessity for Choice* (1960), he called for "some federal institutions" embracing the Atlantic Community and specifically for the institution of a NATO nuclear force. In his book, *The Troubled Partnership* (1965), he also called for an executive committee of the NATO Council and a common foreign policy. Kissinger looked in the right direction, but his advice was considered utopian—because it went too far. It did not go far enough! In order to have these commonalities you needed Atlantic federal union. Clarence Streit advocated that step earlier, but who would listen to him?

The threat of the Soviets shooting their way into Western Europe is a misconceived threat. Today no one believes in the Soviets' design to fight their way to the Atlantic, or even to Hamburg, against Americans or even against determined Europeans alone. Perhaps they want to roll their tanks on the Kurfürstendamm, but even that may be doubted. Yet to draw clear conclusions from this is regarded as most dangerous by governments on both sides of the Atlantic. So one had to construct a hypothetical intent to aggress, derived from capacity, in order to keep the states from declaring NATO defunct. This, I believe, is another fetish.

The real threat is the turning of Western Europe from a member of Atlantica into a fringe of Soviet Russia, more cooperative eastward than westward. A large-scale Finland? The Soviets did not occupy Finland. They had a base there and gave it up. Finland's leaders found it in their country's interest that nothing be done to disturb the Soviet Union. At one time that meant no alliance with the West but also no communists in the government. Today, under President Kekkonen, it means near-alliance with the Soviet Union and a popular front government. It also meant keeping men out of government who were *persona non grata* in Moscow, notably the anti-communist Social Democratic leader Vaino Tanner. But the Social Democrats changed heart in political exile, and one of their present leaders, Veino Leskinen, a former "Tannerite," who used to be number two on the Soviet blacklist, declared in 1966:

We have to change our attitude to the Soviet Union. Today, we do



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not fear any more the influence of the Soviet Union, we welcome it. It is in the interest of her own security that the Soviet Union is interested in the security of Scandinavia and it is here that our roads meet. We fought against each other and much bitterness piled up. Today, however, we can have free discussions with the Russians.

Today, Finland has a popular front government under a Social Democratic premier, with communists in charge of three minor ministries. Her foreign policy is pro-Soviet.

How could such a thing possibly happen in London or Paris or Bonn? It seems a more likely contingency to me than Soviet tanks on the Champs Elysées with commissars on top. And why? Because in dropping out of the Atlantic combination, the West European states may well find it in their interests that nothing be done to disturb the Soviet Union, and that Atlantic-minded men—they might then be called "cold warriors"—be kept out of office. And why should the states drop out of the Atlantic combination? Because it looks as if neither we nor they can make sense out of it. Not only do we irritate each other mightily when we talk about common military affairs, but we engage in single-handed military affairs. As far as nonmilitary business in Europe is concerned, the best thing we can do is to race each other on the road to Moscow, with all kinds of propositions and treaty drafts in our bags. The Western countries try to build individual and competing bridges to Moscow while sapping their mutual bridges. Some time one or the other may arrive at the new destination, perhaps under the leadership of a "national-socialist" (who need not wear a swastika on his shirt), but along the way they may get into deep trouble with each other.

Such a fundamental reorientation of Western nations appears absurd because it is incompatible with their internal political structures and elites, as we have known them in the past twenty years. But these structures and elites are not necessarily immune to a failure of the Atlantic Community. Indeed, national structure, leadership, and political values—especially in some of the countries—have been built upon the assumption that the Community would ultimately be realized. These structures are now the target of anti-establishment movements, which reject the national order partly because it is tied up with the Atlantic order, and which reject the latter because the policies of allies are now judged to be immoral or hostile to one's own interests or desires. A fundamental shift in the foreign policies of any NATO country is perhaps unlikely as long as the domestic disturbances, with their



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implications of anarchy and new versions of totalitarianism, do not gain the upper hand. But one can no longer take it for granted that fairly radical political reorientations will not occur, in one country or another, and one must allow for the possibility that foreign policies may indeed change drastically.

The real threat to Atlantic interests, I submit, is this political shift in the Western world which present trends are encouraging, not the marching Soviet divisions on which NATO has been trying to focus the fears of the Europeans, with little success. The partners in NATO have felt compelled to quarrel over common deterrent strategies because they do not know how to deal with the political shift. If lately this quarrel has been muted, it is not because valid common ground has been found but because the alliance appears to fare best when the partners do not focus on any joint activity.

It remains to be seen, of course, whether what I call the real threat will in fact be understood as an evil should it come to pass. Perhaps the political shift in Europe will be understood as a tolerable thing, or even a good thing, by Europeans, perhaps even by some Americans. Any calamity may look tolerable if held against a greater calamity. It is not impossible that the Western peoples will mix up their mutual affairs so badly that leaning on the Soviet Union will look to them like the lesser of two evils, at least at the start. How they would live with the Atlantic Ocean as a divide, instead of a link, is another matter.

## Dollar Trouble

Let me turn to dollar trouble—the trouble of Atlantica's money, perhaps the world's money, certainly the noncommunist world's money. The essential thing is the availability of a money of recognized usability, investability, and storability for the vast hither-and-yon of economic transactions among corporations, political units and individuals as producers, consumers and tourists, over a wide geographic area. If the Western nations want to transact together, entwine their complex, technicized production and transportation systems, earn and spend and save without fear of getting stuck with bad IOU's, they need such an international money.

Money does not manage itself, said Bagehot. It takes a central bank and a government. Atlantica needed a central bank, but it could not get a central bank because it could not get a government. (Just as it could not get a real chief of staff, only a



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SACEUR, because it had no government.) Out of the struggles over the Keynes and White plans in the war years came the International Monetary Fund, an institution that Fritz Machlup called a "money cloakroom," not a central bank. The cloakroom cannot create hats; it can only hand them around. A central bank can create money. The IMF can only hand around the currencies that the customers put in. That is something, but not banking.

The IMF was only the less important of the two improvisations by which international money was organized. The more important one was the acquisition by the American dollar of an international role, the key currency function. This was an informal matter, not sanctified by international treaty. It was as informal, and as real, as the leadership function acquired by the U.S. government in the Atlantic polity. The dollar became camp money; and, the Atlantic camp being the economic center of gravity of the world even more than the political one, the dollar became improvised world money.

How did the dollar assume the role of Atlantic money? By foreign traders, bankers, international corporations and central bankers seeking to earn it, use it and store it in reserves.

How could they actually get hold of it? Overall, only by way of United States balance of payments deficits. From 1951 to 1957, the U.S. balance of payments had a cumulative deficit of $6.5 billion. The outside world acquired dollars, technically called liquid dollar liabilities—7.1 billion of them. We supplied the liabilities, just as a banker supplies checking money to customers against the assets he holds in investments. Everyone thought that was a good thing—their acquisition and our deficit.

About 1958, it became apparent that improvisation is not firm enactment. The European currencies became convertible. Convertible into what? Into dollars—and into gold. Why gold? Here lay the divide between improvisation and firm enactment of Atlantic money. The dollar was one Atlantic country's managed money. Gold is a metal mined for profit in South Africa, the Soviet Union, and a few other places. Why should management of money be tied to esoteric metal mining? The historical answer, as per 1944, is that the U.S. government wanted it so. It was plagued by the fetishistic belief that a tie to gold, a fixed money-gold parity, was proof of the goodness of money. At home the hold of the fetish had almost been broken in the 1930's. Americans then learned, almost learned, that money can be good without being



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convertible into gold at a fixed rate, in fact without being convertible at the Federal Reserve at all. But for international purposes, we stuck to the fetish. From 1951 to 1957 foreigners did not make us pay for our fetishism. They acquired dollar liabilities from us, and no gold. Not because the dollar was "as good as gold," but because gold was not as good as the dollar as a transaction and reserve medium. However, we stood committed to sell gold to foreign central banks, and to buy it from them, at thirty-five dollars an ounce, on demand.

Beginning in 1958, ten years ago, foreigners started to take us up on it. The dollar, they felt, was just America's currency, especially useful to be sure, but also useful to draw on what America professed to the world was "real" money—gold. Why else had Americans insisted on, and committed themselves to, the gold peg for their dollar? From 1958 to 1960, the U.S. balance of payments deficit added up to a whopping $11.2 billion. This time, the outside world, meaning chiefly Europe, took only half of the deficit in liquid dollar liabilities and the other half in gold and other foreign exchange (IMF assets); that is, half in check money and half in the (U.S.) bank's assets. That was alarming to the banker, and he as well as the customers fell upon a fetishistic explanation of the trouble. The explanation: the U.S. balance of payments deficit was too big. The real sign of trouble, I submit, was that half of the deficit was financed by the gold flow of $5 billion. The gold flow did not stem directly from the size of the deficit: the United States could find itself losing plenty of gold even if its balance of payments came into surplus, because foreigners have plenty of dollars. The gold flow stemmed from the fact that the key currency had not been made into legitimate Atlantic currency. Those abroad who wanted to play safe rather than for profit asked for the metal that de Gaulle came to address in his panegyric of 1965 as "Yes, gold, which does not change in nature, . . . which has no nationality, which is considered, in all places and at all times, the immutable . . . value par excellence." (He officiated before the idol.)

When Kennedy came into office there was alarm about the balance of payments deficit, and our government and foreign governments began to tinker, not with the fetish, but with the flow of payments. An interest equalization tax discouraged some American investment in Europe and elsewhere. The Department of Defense became balance-of-payments conscious and began to



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pay out a good many extra budget dollars in avoidance of cheaper purchases abroad, that is "buying American," so as to avoid blame for the balance of payments deficit. The defense dollar, for many overseas purposes, was "devalued" by at least 50 per cent. European governments were prevailed upon to repay debts faster and to acquire special U.S. government obligations. In 1965 "voluntary restraint" on private foreign investments was added.

What was all this? It was a succession of efforts to twist and shape the flow of transactions in Atlantica so as to eliminate the American balance of payments deficit. As if the deficit was the real trouble, as if yesterday's good thing was really now a bad thing. In 1963 the Brookings report on the balance of payments outlook advised the President that success in eliminating the U.S. payments deficit would create a serious problem for the international economy, a "shortage of reserves." The essence of the problem would be that the improvised international banker would stop opening checking accounts for customers, and no substitute was in sight. Then the customers would beggar each other, chasing for gold. Therefore, if no substitute for the key role of the gold-pegged dollar could be found, Brookings recommended abandoning the peg to gold. The Brookings group counseled rightly not to give up worthwhile public objectives for the sake of maintaining the gold parity and ironing out the balance of payments deficit. It also forecast a lessening of the deficit for 1968, which may still prove right without giving rise to much joy.

From 1961 to 1966, in six years, the cumulative payments deficit (on the Department of Commerce liquidity definition as before) was only little larger than in the last three Eisenhower years, $12.8 as against $11.2 billion. The twisting of capital, defense and special transactions had some effect. But customers continued to take assets out of the bank, i.e., $4.7 billion of gold, besides liquid dollar liabilities of 8.3 billion.

Since the beginning of this period, in 1961, the central banks of the Atlantic countries, including France, have cooperated in the London gold pool and other arrangements designed to bolster the key currency system. But as gold conversions persisted, in part by the same central banks, cooperation became more strenuous. The Europeans became increasingly impatient with the U.S. balance of payments deficit, and Americans echoed their impatience. The deficit was now a public enemy in the eyes of foreign and domestic policymakers. Foreign observers noted, of course, that a special



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component in our deficit kept creeping up, an item for which they had a special lack of sympathy. This item represented the military expenditures in Asia and Africa, other than Japan, in the balance of payments: $500 million in 1964, $700 in 1965, $1,300 in 1966, and $1,800 million in 1967. Its increase reflected the visible contribution of the Viet Nam war to the balance of payments deficit. (The actual contribution of the investment in Viet Nam to the deficit is probably larger.) The noted item amounted to less than a fifth of our annual deficit in 1964, half of it in 1965, nearly all of it in 1966, and again half of it in 1967. To some customers of the U.S. bank this looked like a bad investment by the banker, one that might make it unwise to hold dollars. Demand on U.S. gold was sensitive to judgments of this sort. In 1967, France quietly dropped out of the gold pool (as she had done in 1966 with NATO, but with more noise), and the United States took over France's share in the pool, which increased our exposure to demands for gold.

In commercial policy, protectionism was still being resisted and there were the promises of the Kennedy Round; but the pressure to curtail the deficit could not help but put new steam into export pushing and import restricting efforts that were coming from various quarters. After all, the government had shown the way in its own business. And business appeals for help against foreign competition stand a better chance to be heard when they are in line with the patriotic duty to overcome a payments deficit. Under appeals to that respectable duty, not to the ugly word of protectionism, the long labors of the Kennedy Round negotiations were threatened with futility well before the negotiated tariff reductions were to go into effect.

In the last quarter of 1967, finally, the storm broke in international finance. A rush for gold brought down the British pound and bore down on the gold pool of the several central banks. Most of the gold drawn out of official reserves during that rush came out of Fort Knox, about one billion dollars' worth of it. We do not know where it all went; some to Paris and to Peking, into semiofficial hoards, sheiks' coffers, and Swiss strong boxes. The National City Bank estimated "private gold absorption" in all of 1967 at $2.5 billion, taking all of new production (about $1.5 billion) and $1 billion of official reserves, net, worldwide. President Johnson's answer was a call for more drastic restrictions on the usability of the dollar in international transactions, chiefly



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by private and corporate Americans, and for efforts to induce the holders of dollars to use them in some ways rather than others.

The monetary events of the first half of 1968 fall into two phases: first, a rapid deepening of the confidence crisis and, then, a tour de force of the monetary authorities. The confidence crisis deepened when the U.S. government, beset by the burdens of its costly engagement in Viet Nam and the more or less open repudiation by the people of this burden, grasped for devices to manipulate the international accounts without being able to make coherent policy. Meanwhile, speculation in the gold market ran wild. Some observers called the restrictive devices blows against de Gaulle, who had rationalized and was now encouraging the raids on the bank's assets. But de Gaulle welcomed the restrictions, because they seemed to prove that the illegitimate bank was closing down, and that America was trying to "put its house in order" like any small country is supposed to do when it has a balance of payments deficit. So Johnson's blow to de Gaulle was de Gaulle's triumph over Johnson. And like any small country that sees another country twist its balance of payments toward surplus, France suggested possible retaliation, presumably against American investments. Only a few months later, a spectacular political crisis in France came to reveal how brittle the foundation was on which de Gaulle had built his alternatives to Atlantic political and financial cooperation. Meanwhile, gold speculation and incoherent policy responses drove international finance in the West to the brink of disaster.

The tour de force consisted of the division of the gold market into a controlled segment, made up of the group of seven central banks which had rallied around the pegged price so as to maintain it in mutual transactions; and a segment in which price control by these banks was to cease and the price of the metal was to follow the play of supply and demand of speculation, industrial producers and users, and uncommitted monetary authorities. This operation of March 17 was supplemented on March 30 by a declaration of faith on the part of the central group in the capability of the IMF to create special drawing rights (SDR's). The SDR's were to provide supplementary reserves that might assist countries in payments difficulties, under certain conditions. Thus, the defenders of the pegged dollar encouraged hopes for some workable arrangement that might prove helpful to one country or another in future situations, assuming the participants



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would cooperate, and they took up positions behind the moat that now divided the gold market.

By this tour de force, the principal governments of the Free World, without France, momentarily stopped the wild gyrations of their monetary machinery. If Atlantica remained without an adequate money, the inadequacy at least seemed no longer so readily demonstrable. To their credit, the governments refused to balance the gold market by raising the political status and the price of gold and instead looked in the direction of some kind of international central banking. But they did not create a political basis for such central banking. It remains to be seen for how long the defensive moat of the divided market and the hope for succor from the SDR's can hold the disruptive forces in check. In June 1968, these forces seemed to be breaking through, not between a Common Market "gold bloc" and the deficit-troubled Anglo-Saxons, but between a France suddenly thrown into economic and political chaos and her Western partners inside and outside the Common Market. The fundamental task of establishing a monetary authority for Atlantica as part of an Atlantic governmental structure has not yet been recognized, let alone attacked, and this omission may claim its victims in places that only yesterday seemed serenely immune to trouble.

The tragedy of the confusing rush and of the palliatives is that the dollar has been the nearest thing to a reasonably well-managed money of the Free World, and the nations have no plausible substitute for it. Its weakness in that role is not measured by the balance of payments deficit of the United States. That is a fetish. Nor is its strength measured by the persistence with which the Treasury trades gold at $35 an ounce with foreign central banks. That commitment is another fetish. The strength of the dollar as an international currency is measured by its usability, investability, storability; its steady command over goods and services now and later. That usability, I am afraid, is being sacrificed to the fetishes. And why? Because Americans and Europeans cannot make Atlantica work. Indeed, by their financial and alliance implications, the attacks on the dollar as well as the methods of defending it may sap Atlantica. Thus dollar trouble joins NATO trouble, and one aggravates the other.

## Destiny or Agonizing Reappraisal?

One wonders whether the tragic course of Atlantica is ineluctable. Cannot the actors step out of the show and solve the



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problem? Cannot the false king of Denmark show remorse, hand his crown to Hamlet, and go to a monastery? Cannot our President sit down with de Gaulle and Kiesinger and Wilson and say, "Look, we are making a mess of what Truman and Churchill and Adenauer and Schuman started. Let us make an Atlantica, with a government, and a common defense, and a common money?" This could stave off the consummation of the tragedy; but political actors, like theatrical actors, play out their roles. They are not problem-solvers. Attempts to begin afresh, whether in NATO or in the money world, have become increasingly feeble.

More likely, the great will be at each other's throats in the days ahead, as their countries' interests seem to demand, and not resolve the common problem. Each statesman may paraphrase de Gaulle's New Year's message: "Our action outside . . . is aimed at attaining goals . . . that correspond to the interests of mankind, *because they are French.*" They may feel compelled to tell their peoples to stop doubting and to commit themselves to the realization of perhaps more costly and less rewarding dreams than Atlantica. To the Atlantic fetishes and their chauvinistic successors they may sacrifice more comforts and values: freedoms to trade, to invest, to travel, to communicate; uniform and predictable exchange rates; protection of property, liberty, and life. The people on their part may respond to the confusion of their governors by flouting law and authority and by turning the process of government into a brawl.

An alternative is imaginable. The nations might chuck the fetishes on the heap of wreckage they helped to make—the commissar on the Soviet tank in Paris, the negotiated strategy, the fear of the deficit, the gold peg—and refrain from replacing them with others that are even less helpful. They may face the question of what kind of life they really want in Atlantica, what kind of politics, what kind of economics, what the essential commitments are in the Atlantic region and worldwide. They may stop the blind rush of remedial policies until they know what improvement means.

The present course makes no sense. The alternative is impractical. If there is a third course, it should be found before the Atlantic becomes as wide as the Pacific, and both wider than the distance to the moon.



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# NATO, NAFTA AND THE SMALLER ALLIES

*by Nils Örvik*

IN December 1967 the NATO Council approved a special report by the Harmel group, a commission appointed in 1966 by the Council at the initiative of the Belgian Foreign Minister, Pierre Harmel, to study the future tasks of the alliance and its role in the development of peace. The report of the Harmel group indicated a determination to keep the alliance steadfastly together in the face of mounting problems. Events in the first six months of 1968 showed that neither the problems nor the alliance is likely to disappear very soon. We are going to live with our difficulties, and if solutions are not in sight, coexistence within NATO is still tolerable. But *how* the alliance will be affected by recent events is more than ever an open question. A mere declaration to persevere is no substitute for workable solutions.

The war in Viet Nam, the French withdrawal from NATO military commands, Britain's decision to drop its role east of Suez, and the internal upheavals, riots and demonstrations on both sides of the Atlantic have put the problems of NATO in a different perspective. We can see how these developments may affect the larger allies. The United States' long-established commitments in Europe may be weakened by increasing pressure to play a larger role in the Far and Middle East and—not the least—at home. West Germany's *Ostpolitik* and her more independent national course have added a new dimension to the persistent strains between French and Anglo-American relationships. The buildup of Soviet naval strength and other activities in the Mediterranean area, partly resulting from the British exit, have triggered a re-evaluation of NATO's status on the southern flank. Finally, all of the major NATO powers have been shaken by internal dissatisfaction and acts of violence which may initiate centrifugal tendencies in the direction of reviving forms of nationalism and neo-isolationism.

Will these developments affect the smaller allies in the same way as they affect the larger states of the alliance? The large-small distinction is based on the degree to which a country can credibly cover its own security needs at any given period of time. Are the problems of both large and small allies sufficiently similar to war-



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rant common solutions? Will the small allies draw closer to the larger partners or will they gradually disentangle themselves? Where, in effect, do the small allies fit in the alliance today, and what are their tasks?

Certain basic factors influence the role played by the small states in the alliance and their relations to the larger members. For a viable alliance system there must be (1) a community of interest as far as the goals of the alliance are concerned; (2) a reciprocity of contributions in carrying out these goals; and (3) unity of leadership. By examining how these conditions have been fulfilled since the alliance came into existence, we may obtain a better view of the position the small members hold today.

## I

When the alliance was first established, both large and small members had a common interest in avoiding the impact of Soviet expansionism. There were, to be sure, differences in the degree of intensity of the threat felt by each ally. Some looked on it as more immediate, others viewed it in longer-term perspective. There were also differences in the type of threat each country perceived from the Soviet side. The possibilities ranged from fear of direct military attack to Soviet-inspired coups and internal subversion through national communist parties. But whatever the differences in views over the intensity and type of threat posed by the Soviets, there was common agreement among the allies on the goal they wanted the organization to fulfill: to contain Soviet power and prevent it from spreading into Western Europe.

There was also general agreement among the allies in the early period on the means of attaining the goals of the alliance. That is, the needs of the large states could be fulfilled by the contributions of the small members, and vice versa. At that time, the needs of the small states were protection against the Soviet threat, which was attained by the mutual guarantee; economic aid, which included importation of military hardware and infrastructural installations and increased trade; and political and moral support from the great Western powers against the dangers of Soviet-backed internal subversion.

The basic need of the larger members of the alliance was territory, which any state, regardless of how poor and miserable it might be, could offer. Providing one's allies with some real estate was a role that could be played to the maximum, as Turkey did, or to a minimal degree, as the Scandinavian members chose to do.



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When the alliance came into existence, territory could, in all circumstances, fulfill some function. Where a small state's territory could not be put to active use for bases and installations, its sheer denial to the Soviet Union became an important asset.

A second area where the small states could achieve some reciprocity in their relations with the larger alliance members was to give political and moral support to their allies in international organizations. The voting blocs that backed the United States in the early 1950's had a solid core of small Western states. Given the relatively small membership of the United Nations at the time, the sturdy backing of small allies was a factor of considerable importance.

The leadership of the alliance in the early period was unified by the unquestionable military and political predominance of the United States. There was no doubt as to the purpose of the Western alliance. Until 1955-1956, the impending Soviet threat was not subject to discussion. And, as no other nation could fulfill the requirements for staving off the danger, the supreme leadership of the United States was a matter of course. Then, as now, the national interests of some NATO members were not always compatible with those of the United States. But the situation did not permit these differences to surface. There was no alternative to American leadership.

## II

If the basic requirements suggested for a workable alliance arrangement are applied to the situation in the West today, what can we say about the willingness and ability of the small as well as the large powers to fulfill their alliance roles? Do the members share a basic interest in the purposes of the alliance? Is there a reasonable reciprocity between the contributions of the small members and those of the larger ones? Can we find coherence in the leadership of NATO today despite the independent line taken by France and the divergent views on how policy decisions are to be made?

The Western allies still share a concern over the Soviet threat. But the perception of that threat today, compared to what it was fifteen years ago, raises doubts about whether it still provides a basis for a community of interests among the NATO members. The allies are aware of Soviet military capabilities and are also concerned about the increase and extent of Soviet power in the Middle and Far East. But viewed from Western Europe, the im-



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pact of the Soviet danger seems far less serious and immediate than the corresponding situation in the early 1950's. Today, few people fear a massive Soviet attack or internal takeovers by Moscow-inspired communist parties. The absence of these traditional dangers breeds general complacency in most quarters.

The threat that still remains has particular reference to the political inroads made by the Soviets in the wake of the détente. The general restlessness, tensions within NATO, confusion over the extension of the Common Market, and the anti-American-Viet Nam movement stem from various sources. They are not necessarily the products of Soviet initiative. But regardless of their origins, they serve aims toward which the Soviet Union has pressed for years in its West European policy.

There is little doubt that the political and economic erosion going on within the Western community is a real threat to each of the members of the alliance. But it is too subtle, too indirect and too vague to provide a platform for a common NATO policy. There are divergent interpretations and confusion as to *what* situation must be met, not to mention the lack of agreement on how to meet it. The type of threat confronting the West today does not arouse popular attention. People are tired of the Cold War. In the West, one would rather see more resources diverted for social welfare, modernizing educational systems and increasing the standard of living, and less for security enterprises. Thus, the original goal of containing a Soviet threat has reduced meaning for alliance members today.

The second requirement which we have cited for a viable alliance relationship is reciprocity. A reasonable reciprocity presupposes complementary needs and contributions between the large and small members. Does this situation exist today? The need of the small allies for a security guarantee has been greatly diminished because of the changed outlook on the urgency of the threat to Europe. Economically, the small NATO members no longer require the large capital investments they received in the immediate postwar period. The military aid programs are being closed out, and the trend seems to run on the whole toward accepting the status quo or even reduction in national defense programs.

Neither do the small members have a need any longer for Western political and moral support against infiltration or coups d'état on the Czech model of 1948. The political motivation of the late 1940's to prevent subversive activities by national communist parties was strengthened by alliance membership; but



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those who are concerned today about the activities of leftist factions do not see NATO as a political asset but rather as an embarrassment, an obstacle to a sweeping overall East-West settlement.

If the small allied states seem to have few needs that the alliance can fulfill at present, what about the needs of the larger allied states? To what extent do the larger NATO members still feel that they need the small members? What can the small allied countries contribute which the neutral states cannot offer as well? Would the alliance be greatly handicapped if all its small members went neutral?

As modern arms technology advances, territory—even in the forward areas—is losing much of its vital strategic importance. Denying it to Soviet control continues to be important, but the neutral countries in Western Europe have been just as effective as any aligned state in denying access to their territories. From the viewpoint of alliance leadership, the denial of territory by a neutral state has the additional advantage that it is not compensated by formal guarantees of assistance. In a case of emergency, this could be an asset to the great Western powers; they would retain a wider freedom of action, since they are not bound by pledges to defend nonaligned territory.

Further, the once meaningful small-power role of giving political support to the United States and Great Britain in the United Nations has been reduced. This is partly because of the increase in UN membership and also because of the general decline in prestige and influence of the United Nations.

For a time it was thought that the small allies might offer their services to the larger NATO powers as mediators. The role would have been that of a courier in matters where the great powers in both East and West preferred to remain in the background. But this potential role has not become important. A small neutral state might serve the same function and would, perhaps, even be preferred for carrying out delicate tasks of negotiation. It also seems that if the larger powers really "mean business"—as seen in the recent East-West approaches—they make the contacts themselves, with no intermediaries.

With respect to both a community of interest and reciprocal contributions, the original bases of the alliance are wearing thin. It is difficult to point to any area where the needs of the larger powers of NATO can be met more effectively today by a small ally than by a small neutral state. And, as the small allies perceive the



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situation, the needs the alliance once served have diminished sharply. Parallel to this trend is a changed attitude toward the alliance by the small members: the prestige of NATO membership, whatever value they may originally have attached to it, is considerably reduced. This is due in part to the appearance of other vital and viable organizations in Europe through which they may channel their economic and political interests. It is also due to developments within the Western alliance itself, particularly its embarrassment in the face of French rebuffs.

The many trials of the alliance raise the question whether it can recreate the unity of leadership required to adjust short-term needs to long-term goals. While the small NATO states were clearly under the direction and leadership of the United States during an earlier period, they are exposed today to a cross-pressure of conflicting demands for loyalty. When they were put to the test of the French threat of March 1966, they sided with the "friendly fourteen," rallying to the support of continued U.S. direction. But the Continental challenge cannot be ignored. If the tensions in the Far East continue and if an expanding Common Market develops into a viable European alternative for security as well as for economic purposes, it will be more difficult to maintain unified leadership for both the European and the Atlantic sides of the alliance.

## III

This analysis of the three basic conditions for maintaining a viable alliance relationship points to negative tendencies in all three areas. The negative aspects seem to outweigh positive trends—at least for the moment. But tendencies ought not to be mistaken for hard and fast decisions. The small states' military, political and economic needs for alliance membership may have greatly diminished, but few would maintain that the alliance has altogether outlived its usefulness. The 1969 negotiations on the future of the alliance are likely to show that all the smaller allies favor continued membership. NATO has become a comfortable backrest giving ample room for verbal adventurism with few, if any, risks attached. Why hand in one's membership card when no one is pressing to collect the fee?

An interesting question is whether the alliance can be "mothballed" for an indefinite period without losing its substance, usefulness and credibility. With the lines of distinction between small neutrals and small allies virtually wiped out, what



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would be the implications for the latter in a crisis situation? Could they rely on an automatic response by the larger allies, based on the long-standing patterns of mutual assistance?

The answer depends, in the final analysis, on the mutuality of national goals within the Western community. Can the goals set forth in the Harmel report—i.e., maintaining a military and political defense against aggression and external pressure, and working for a more stable political situation—(1) fulfill the perceived security needs of the member countries; (2) meet the expectations which the individual countries have of their alliance membership; and (3) give them an opportunity to make worthwhile contributions to the other members of the alliance? The Harmel report suggests that the alliance might undertake extended political activities, such as making a positive contribution to reducing tensions between East and West, but these cannot be a substitute for goals and tasks which are meaningful to the individual members.

The fifteen individual members of NATO face quite different problems of political, economic and military security. Within the military sphere, there has been a tendency to shift emphasis from concentration on the center—Berlin and Germany—to the flank areas. There are reasons to believe that the Soviet attempt to fill the vacuum left by Britain in the Mediterranean is based less on the results of the Arab-Israeli war than on long-term Soviet strategy. Will such Soviet moves evoke the same kind of response and common concern among the Western allies as the more direct and clear-cut Soviet threat to Central Europe in the early postwar period? In order to answer the question, we must redefine and analyze the nature of the threat to the West today. Until we learn how each country perceives the threat and thus arrive at an overall view of it, we will have difficulty in reaching agreement on the means for revitalizing the alliance.

## IV

The increasing divergence of interests among the allies calls for some action, even temporary measures, that can arrest the growing pace toward disunity and separatism. It is necessary for the Western world to find ways of combining the security aspects of the North Atlantic alliance with the economic and political purposes of the Common Market. This might give the European participants a sense of equality with their North American counterparts and at the same time assure the continued presence



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over Europe of the American strategic deterrent. Admittedly, this alternative remains a long-term prospect. So does the "all-European" alternative for mutual security, first suggested by the 1966 Warsaw Pact conference in Bucharest. Until the longer-term solutions can be worked out, what more practical, short-term possibilities for mutual cooperation might be explored within the framework of the alliance?

Any NATO policy stands little chance of success if it does not take as a point of departure the increasing independence of the EEC countries and the probable exclusion of Britain and the Scandinavian countries from the European Community for some time to come. The members of the Common Market, in spite of momentary setbacks and adjustments, are moving steadily toward greater independence as a group and interdependence among themselves. If the situation in the Mediterranean should deteriorate, dependence on U.S. military capabilities may become more pronounced; but it is not likely to alter the present trend toward an independent Europe. It seems probable that the Continental countries will extend their cooperation sooner or later to matters of joint security.

If Britain and the Scandinavian countries are kept outside the EEC for some time, their security needs and economic interests can be expected to differ from those of the Continental countries. Neither group, however, can afford any arrangement that does not include the support of the U.S. nuclear striking force. Thus, one might consider what many now view as a favorable development: a NATO reorganized on a regional basis. In terms of economics, the NATO area is already divided into regional units, and as we have noted above, the EEC is likely to pay increasing attention to security matters. Although the mixed composition of EFTA precludes it from a similar development, the NATO members that remain outside the EEC could merge economic and security goals on the basis of the recent proposals for a North Atlantic Free Trade Area (NAFTA).

The NAFTA alternative is based on suggestions for a free trade agreement initially between North America (the United States and Canada) and member countries of the EFTA organization (the United Kingdom, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Austria, Switzerland and Portugal). NAFTA is an open-ended free trade plan which envisions the eventual inclusion of other industrial countries or free trade organizations. Foremost among those men-



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tioned in this connection have been Japan, Australia and New Zealand.

The proposals for an extension of the European Free Trade Area to the North Atlantic have been under discussion for several years. The framework for an open-ended, Atlantic-based free trade arrangement was perhaps first outlined in a proposal by the non-official Canadian-American Committee. In December 1966, a group was established in Britain to study the implications of the proposal for that country. The group, whose project is called the Atlantic Trade Study, is an independent, nonpartisan organization that seeks to promote a broad exchange of views on the expansion of trade and its relation to the future development of the Atlantic Community.

A liberalization of trade in the North Sea-North Atlantic area would seem to offer substantial advantages to European participants, although the economic benefits to the North American members may be marginal. Viewed as a regional *economic* unit only, NAFTA would probably not get off the ground. The crucial point is whether the lack of substantial economic advantages for the United States in the initial phase might be offset by gains in the field of security.

If a more tightly coordinated and independent EEC took form in the near future, it might not lead to a disruption in relations with the United States, but it could precipitate serious differences between the two sides. On the other hand, the Anglo-Scandinavian countries, left to straddle a position on the sidelines of the Common Market with no organizational link to give them a sense of direction, could drift into an undeclared neutralist position while still retaining their formal membership in the alliance. With deficient economies and defense organizations, these countries could be converted from NATO strongholds to security risks. A development along such lines would not be to the advantage of Washington.

The North Sea and North Atlantic seaboards, with their warning facilities, are as significant for U.S. needs as for the national interests of Great Britain and Scandinavia. The growing naval forces of the Soviet Union and its mounting ambition to become the world's leading naval power make the security of the northern region essential to Western defense. Thus, it would be preferable for the United States to have even a peripheral platform—a "mini-NATO"—in Northern Europe than to risk detachment from this strategically important area altogether, as well as from the



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mainland of Europe. Such a security advantage might overcome the fact that economic gains from a NAFTA arrangement would be small.

On the European side, Britain and the Scandinavian countries would gain considerably from incorporation into such a joint enterprise. With close ties to North American research, production and capital facilities, they would obtain a sense of direction and identity which they have lacked for some time.

Regional cooperation at the present stage of development in intra-West relations holds many advantages. Military and economic planning concentrated in smaller areas makes it easier to identify the challenges and to prepare a defense against the most likely forms of attack. The closer the danger to home shores, the easier it is to obtain agreement on how to deal with it. Tight regional management would offer the smaller allies an opportunity to participate more actively in organizational activities. At the same time, it would help them to maintain close relations with their North American allies in a coordinated Western defense.

The NAFTA-EEC types of regional arrangements also seem to fit the pattern of increased contacts between East and West Europe. NATO in its present form is too unwieldy for carrying out negotiations with the East European countries. Bilateral approaches risk the development of conflicting aims and ambitions. Regional arrangements within NATO might provide a middle way, combining flexibility in negotiation and strength in maintaining collective purposes.

On the one hand, the North Atlantic alliance is still an essential pillar of the defense policies of the smaller and larger members. On the other hand, alliance members should not hesitate to break away from conventional organizational patterns and explore new approaches in order to meet the demands of a changing environment. Adaptability and imagination are needed if the smaller allies are to play a meaningful role in European politics of the future.



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# THE ORIGINS OF THE MLF CONCEPT, 1957-1960

*by Thomas C. Wiegele*

THE proposal for the Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF) was the centerpiece of U.S. diplomacy vis-à-vis the North Atlantic Treaty Organization during the years 1963 and 1964 at least.[1] In that period the MLF influenced virtually every aspect of economic, political and military relationships within NATO. At the highest levels in NATO governments, the press, and the scholarly community, the MLF became both the object of praise and the butt of ridicule on both sides of the Atlantic.

Indeed, it might be said that for a brief moment in history the U.S. plan for the MLF constituted virtually the entire substance of U.S. diplomacy within NATO. Such questions as the control and proliferation of nuclear weapons within the alliance, expenditures for limited and strategic war, East-West relationships, the technological imbalance between the United States and Western Europe, the future form of Atlantic political organization, the targeting of weapons systems, U.S. relations with Germany, France and Great Britain, the problems of political and military consultation within the alliance—all of these issues became part and parcel of the MLF dialogue.

The fleet project did not appear suddenly as a spontaneous U.S. policy initiative. Rather it issued from more than five years of discussion within NATO concerning two principal factors: (1) the security of America's European allies in the face of changing military technology, and (2) the political requirements of maintaining alliance cohesion against the centrifugal forces that beset all, but especially democratic, coalitions. The central technological fact that had to be taken into account was the emergence of long-range missile weaponry. The central political

[1]In its "final" form the U.S.-sponsored MLF proposal called for a cooperative NATO-assigned fleet of twenty-five surface ships armed with nuclear-tipped Polaris missiles and manned by crews of mixed nationality. A decision to launch the missiles of the fleet was to be made jointly by the United States and the other participants in the project. The most complete official statement dealing with the nature of the force can be found in Gerard C. Smith, "Problems of Foreign Policy in Connection with the Nuclear Defense of NATO," Department of State Press Release No. 178, April 22, 1964.



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fact was a growing concern among European elites over the question of nuclear control within the Atlantic Alliance, a concern which arose out of an uncertainty that the premier ally would under all circumstances risk its own cities to defend Europe against aggression. Such uncertainty spawned a desire for renewed assurances of the defense of Europe, and the latter in turn led to an increasing determination on the part of many U.S. policymakers to resist the proliferation of national nuclear forces as a solution to Europe's problems. It is against this dynamic environment of international military-political relationships that the origins of the MLF concept will be explored.

## The Jackson Suggestion

On May 27, 1957, Senator Henry Jackson (D., Wash.) delivered a speech in the United States Senate entitled "Ballistic Seapower—Fourth Dimension of Warfare." At the time, this was a startling and penetrating statement on nuclear weapons and their relationship to the problems confronting NATO. It is possible to say that with this speech Senator Jackson opened what was to become the MLF debate.[2]

Jackson, noting that the Soviets were rushing both intermediate and intercontinental ballistic missiles into production, criticized the Eisenhower Administration for proceeding too slowly with the development of American missiles. Arguing that the Polaris missile program should be accelerated, he said:

> I believe that we may now be neglecting one ballistic missile system which could give us a quantum jump upward in our military deterrent power. I refer to a possible future *Fourth Dimension of Warfare*—the intermediate-range ballistic missile fired from ocean launching platforms. I refer to a delivery system in which the IRBM with a hydrogen warhead could be launched against strategic targets from submerged or surfaced nuclear-propelled submarines.[3]

The Senator emphasized that land-based missiles, whether stationed in the United States or on the soil of America's NATO allies, would act like "strategic magnets." "These sites," he said, "would draw the fire of an aggressor's ballistic blow."[4] He pointed

[2]The text of Senator Jackson's speech is reprinted in his *Fact, Fiction and National Security* (New York: Macfadden-Bartell, 1964), pp. 54-66.

[3]*Ibid.*, p. 56. Jackson considered the long-range bomber as the first dimension of strategic warfare, the IRBM as the second, and the ICBM as the third. The submarine-launched missile was unique because it combined nuclear firepower with a nuclear-propelled launching platform.

[4]*Ibid.*, p. 60. "There are only two land areas in Europe suitable for basing missiles without running the risk of enormous civil casualties if they were ever



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out that the land-based missile site would draw an enemy's missiles toward a defender's cities, while, on the other hand, ocean-based platforms "would be strategic magnets drawing the enemy's missiles *away* from our [allies'] countries." The missile submarine, therefore, could be a "save-our-cities force."

Jackson emphasized that a fleet of Polaris missiles stationed on nuclear submarines would be virtually indestructible. He went on to point out, however, that there was an even more important reason for speeding sea-based missile development: "the ocean-based IRBM affects the very fundamentals of our relations with our allies."

He argued that

> a sea-based missile force should have an enormous appeal for our allies, especially in Europe. It could provide a maximum deterrent to Moscow with reduced danger to home territories. It would constitute a rational method of self-defense in the ballistic era.
>
> We and our NATO allies are now reviewing present strategy for the defense of Europe. Might not a water-based missile force go far to meet our common needs? Is it not possible that the bonds of the NATO Alliance could now be strengthened by a cooperative program to develop and support a sea-based missile force?[5]

While there is no evidence to suggest that the Senator's remarks had any direct influence on the Administration, this speech nevertheless forms one of the basic documents in the development of the MLF concept.

### The Control Issue

In the fall of 1957 a number of events brought the nuclear issue within NATO to a head. On October 4, the Soviets confirmed the successful launching of the first artificial space satellite. The strategic significance of this announcement was apparent to West European military thinkers: the Soviet Union had demonstrated a capacity to produce rockets large enough to transport nuclear warheads across the oceans. A little more than a month after the first Sputnik launch, a Belgian-Dutch report on NATO strategy stated bluntly that "the Continental members of NATO do not feel adequately protected by strategic nuclear weapons which are not available either to these individual nations or to the NATO

attacked: a small part of the French Alps and the Scottish Highlands." Alastair Buchan, *NATO in the 1960's: The Implications of Interdependence* (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 89.

[5]Jackson, *op. cit.*, pp. 64-65.



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community. . . ."[6] Thus, the Soviet Union, capable of a transatlantic missile launch, could threaten the heart of NATO's defense in North America. There were suggestions at this time that the United States should supply intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM's) to its European allies. The question of who would control the launching of those missiles arose immediately. For example, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was asked at his November 19, 1957 news conference whether he thought Europeans ought to have a veto over NATO's nuclear forces. The Secretary answered:

> No, I do not think this involves a veto on their part any more than an individual citizen has a veto over the action of the policeman on the beat. . . . I do not think any government can legally, constitutionally, give another government a veto over action which it might deem indispensable for its own national existence. So it's not a question of vetoes at all. It's a question of [Europe] having sufficient knowledge and understanding . . . of our thinking, of our planning. . . .[7]

## The 1957 NATO Heads of Government Meeting

The situation by the end of 1957 was one of confusion, not only with respect to what the Soviets were doing, but also in regard to the possible reorganization of NATO's defenses. It was known that the Soviets were emplacing intermediate-range missiles in Eastern Europe. What type of response should NATO or the individual members of NATO make to this challenge? So pressing was the need for an answer that, for the first (and only) time in the history of the alliance, the regular meeting of the North Atlantic Council was held at a heads-of-government level.

In his address to the Council meeting in Paris, President Eisenhower assured the members that the United States "would come at once and with all appropriate force to the assistance of any NATO Nation subjected to armed attack."[8] He pointed out that the association between members of the Atlantic Alliance was a "natural one." Nevertheless, Eisenhower declared:

> It is I think generally accepted that the mandate to consult must be

[6] *New York Times,* November 11, 1957, p. 1. The report was prepared by Albert Gilson, a member of the Belgian Parliament, and Lt. General Michael R.H. Calmeyer of the Netherlands.

[7] *Department of State Bulletin* (hereafter cited as *DSB*), December 9, 1957, p. 921. Dulles' answer probably reflected some of the problems with which he had dealt during 1957. NACNA, a proposal for a NATO nuclear planning group, as well as a plan for a joint NATO force had been brought to the Secretary's attention by State Department aides. Both were rejected by Dulles as too ambitious.

[8] *DSB,* January 6, 1958, p. 6.



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applied in accordance with a rule of reason. It is not necessarily the case that differences between two or three member states are always more readily resolved if debated around this [NATO] Council table. Sometimes more intimate and restricted negotiations and quicker responses will produce better results. . . . If reaction is delayed, the consequences could be serious.[9]

Thus he suggested that on certain issues the United States preferred to engage in consultation and collaboration on Atlantic problems outside the NATO framework. He hinted that it was necessary for the United States, as leader of the alliance, to take decisions more quickly than might be possible within the cumbersome routine of alliance consultation.

In his speech to the Council, Secretary of State Dulles called for "the prompt initiation" of a "[NATO] coordinate program of research, development, and production of a selected group of modern weapons systems, including intermediate range ballistic missiles." He added that "while we plan to maintain our [own] modern weapons production base in the United States, the United States would seek ways of supporting the weapons base in Europe," and remarked that "another ingredient of an effective NATO nuclear force should be a common body of knowledge about nuclear weapons and military doctrine for their employment. . . ."[10]

Taking into account the fact that Soviet missiles were being emplaced in Eastern Europe and targeted against the NATO nations of Western Europe, the conferees agreed to the following statement in their final communiqué:

> . . . NATO has decided to establish stocks of nuclear warheads, which will be readily available for the defense of the Alliance in case of need. In view of the present Soviet policies in the field of new weapons the Council has also decided that intermediate range ballistic missiles will have to be put at the disposal of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe.
>
> As regards defense production, we have decided, in view of the progress already made, to take further measures within NATO to promote the coordination of research, development and manufacture of modern weapons including intermediate range ballistic missiles.[11]

The Council went on to point out that "the best means of achieving coordinated production of advanced weapons" ought to be studied "as a matter of urgency."[12]

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 7.
[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 9-10.
[11] *NATO: Facts about the North Atlantic Treaty Organization* (Paris: NATO Information Service, 1962), pp. 282-283.
[12] *Ibid.*, p. 283.



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These discussions laid the groundwork for what was to become a bilateral, "two-key system" for the control of nuclear weapons on European soil.[13] It should be stressed that during this early period the question of the control of nuclear weapons was not immediately at issue. The primary concern of the alliance was to meet the threat posed by the installation of Soviet IRBM's in Eastern Europe. The European members of NATO placed a high priority on the stationing of nuclear weapons on the European continent. The Heads of Government meeting is significant because it heralded the introduction of U.S. nuclear weapons on European soil.

Thus, during 1957 the American position on nuclear weapons within the Atlantic Alliance had been clarified somewhat, and during the next eight years it would change very little in its broad outlines. At the heads-of-government Council session, the United States asserted that, first of all, it did not want to be too severely bound, if bound at all, by prior consultative arrangements for the use of strategic nuclear weapons in the event of an attack on the alliance; second, it would grant a working knowledge of IRBM's emplaced in Western Europe to its NATO partners; but third, the final decision to fire any missile would be in American hands; and fourth, it would continue to express publicly its firm commitment to the principle that "an attack upon one is an attack upon all."

Dulles was quite pleased with the American role and influence at this conference. In a speech on December 19, 1957 the Secretary boasted that an ideal unity of European and American interests and policy had been created at the meeting which he had just attended. He commented that "there have taken place conversations between the Heads of Government which, I think, have gone far to eliminate misapprehensions [and] misunderstandings which are at the root of seeming divergencies in our policies." As a result of this meeting, Dulles pointed out, "there is going to be increased unity—political, economic, military—a greatly increased pooling and coordination of our resources, greater consultation to assure greater unity of policy."[14]

After their return from the Paris meeting, Dulles and Eisenhower reported the results of their trip on television. Dulles declared that "It will be some little time before the intermediate

[13]For a concise explanation of the genesis and history of the bilateral nuclear arrangements between NATO countries, see Irving Heymont, "The NATO Nuclear Bilateral Forces," ORBIS, Winter 1966, pp. 1025-1041.

[14]Speech to France-Etats Unis Association and the French National Association for the Atlantic Community, Paris. *DSB,* January 13, 1958, pp. 53, 55.



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missiles can actually be put in place on the continent of Europe. And if in the meantime there should be a disarmament agreement, obviously that disarmament agreement would take priority."[15]

Thus the final feature of the American position on nuclear weapons within the Atlantic Alliance became clear, namely, that nuclear weapons arrangements within NATO at some future date might have to take second place to the signing of a disarmament agreement or, by inference, an arms control measure. It would be naive, however, to suggest that the Secretary of State seriously considered a disarmament agreement within the realm of possibility at this point in history.

Yet there was still another problem facing the alliance: the meeting of conventional force goals. Alastair Buchan, among others, has pointed out that, as conventional force levels decrease, the alliance becomes more and more dependent on nuclear defense. Concerning the months immediately following the Heads of Government meeting, Buchan commented that "no one really knows just what contingency NATO's military planning is now designed to meet. . . ."[16]

### The Aftermath of the Heads of Government Meeting

After the Heads of Government meeting there was speculation in Washington that the United States might have agreed to "too much" at Paris, that the Eisenhower Administration was too generous with the "sharing" of its nuclear secrets and might be encouraging the proliferation of nuclear weapons in Europe. For example, at his April 1, 1958 news conference, Secretary Dulles was asked if the United States was going to help the "development of fourth-country nuclear powers, beginning with France." Dulles responded that "the program [agreed to at the Heads of Government meeting] which we have, permits of sharing some of our nuclear knowledge with our allies, is not designed to, nor would it be used primarily to, expand the number of countries which have nuclear weapons."[17] The use of the word "primarily" may have indicated that, in Dulles' mind, some proliferation might take place as a result of the Paris decision. In response to the same question the Secretary of State pointed out "that the idea that we can stop

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 48.
[16] Alastair Buchan, "NATO: New Weapons and Old Strategies," *The Reporter*, May 29, 1958, p. 14.
[17] *DSB*, April 21, 1958, p. 643.



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that expansion [of nuclear weapons capabilities] by trying to keep our information secret is illusory." Dulles concluded with a type of argument that was to arise often in the future:

> I believe myself that a program which enables the United States with discrimination to share its knowledge is more apt to keep the development of nuclear weapons under control than a very futile effort, thinking that we can stop this movement by not sharing our knowledge.[18]

On April 17, 1958, Dulles appeared before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy for the purpose of seeking amendments to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 so that the commitments made by the United States at the NATO Heads of Government meeting could be implemented. One of the committee's chief concerns dealt with the problem of the control of these nuclear weapons. In his prepared statement Dulles assured the committee that "United States policy does not seek to spread nuclear weapons around the world beyond United States control."[19] He further remarked that

> in our [the Administration's] opinion, it is *not* necessary for the United States, in peacetime, to deliver to the national control of our NATO allies complete nuclear weapons or the nuclear components of these weapons, and we are not proposing that course. We *do* believe that it is necessary for the United States to maintain in Europe nuclear warheads deployed under United States custody in accordance with NATO defensive planning and subject to release, under Presidential authority, and use by the appropriate NATO Supreme Allied Commander in the event of hostilities.[20]

Dulles reiterated that, unless the United States could share its knowledge of nuclear weaponry more fully with its partners, "our NATO allies may either intensively seek to develop nuclear weapons capacity for themselves or move toward neutrality, or at least nonparticipation in what should be a common military effort." He anticipated that if the Atomic Energy Act amendments were enacted, America's NATO allies could "helpfully participate in planning a modern defense of their territories."[21] (The concept of planning was not mentioned in the clauses dealing with nuclear weapons in the communiqué of the Heads of Government meeting.) The Secretary of State also pointed out that the nuclear

[18] *Ibid.*

[19] *NATO Letter*, May 1958, p. 23.

[20] *DSB*, May 5, 1958, p. 740. (Emphasis in original.)

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 741. At this time "shared knowledge" meant, for the most part, how to handle nuclear weapons rather than the political control of strategic weapons systems.



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arrangements within NATO which were under consideration did have some arms control implications: if the Congress did not see fit to amend the Atomic Energy Act, "Soviet dominance over Western Europe would be largely achieved and little incentive would be left for the Soviet Union to limit its own armament."[22]

A few weeks after Dulles testified, the NATO Council held its regular spring meeting at the ministerial level in Copenhagen. The Council reviewed the international situation, but there was very little that could be done with regard to nuclear weapons arrangements until the U.S. Congress had acted on the Administration's request for amendments to the Atomic Energy Act. The bland communiqué issued at the conclusion of the meeting noted simply that "the Ministers confirmed the full agreement of their governments on the basic principles of the alliance, its goals and the methods of obtaining them."[23]

Dulles was confident that the Congress would act favorably on the Administration's request and that NATO's military problems were virtually solved. When asked in a television interview by a Canadian Broadcasting Corporation reporter about the status of the military relationships in NATO, he responded that "in the military sense I think we have pretty well coped with the situation."[24]

By the late spring of 1958 there was still some hesitation at the highest levels of the U.S. government about opening the nuclear door to Europeans, however slight the crack might be. In a joint letter to President Eisenhower recommending his approval of the proposed amendments to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy and Acting Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission W. F. Libby stated that "it is the considered opinion of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense that the performance of the proposed agreement will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security of the United States."[25]

The Atomic Energy Act was amended,[26] but not until the Administration had given its repeated assurances that the United States would not surrender the slightest measure of control over its nuclear weapons within the Atlantic Alliance.

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 742.
[23] *DSB*, May 26, 1958, p. 851.
[24] *DSB*, July 14, 1958, p. 65.
[25] *DSB*, July 28, 1958, p. 160.
[26] Public Law 85-479, 85th Congress, H. R. 12716, July 2, 1958.



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## De Gaulle's Directorate Proposal

At the 1957 NATO Heads of Government meeting President Eisenhower had admonished the conference that "the mandate to consult must be applied in accordance with the rule of reason," indicating a certain hesitation on the part of the United States for broad consultative arrangements. It is possible that President de Gaulle, when he presented his directorate proposal shortly after his return to office in 1958, may have applied this "rule of reason" to his consideration of NATO's problems as he saw them from Paris. Was it conceivable that, if the United States would not share control of her nuclear weapons with the fifteen members of NATO, she might be willing to share control with a more restricted group?

On September 17, 1958, de Gaulle addressed a personal letter accompanied by a memorandum to President Eisenhower and to Prime Minister Macmillan of Great Britain. This communication, which has become known as the "directorate proposal," contained three parts.[27] First, de Gaulle pointed out that because the United States, France and Britain had interests and responsibilities outside the NATO treaty area, it might be wise for the three powers to form a kind of tripartite board or directorate to deal with global policy and military strategy and to engage in consultations on a regular basis. Second, since France was a principal base for NATO operations, she should be able to speak with a louder voice, in fact an equal voice with the United States and Britain, concerning the possession and control of nuclear weapons. Third, de Gaulle asked for American and British support for French policies in Algeria and other French possessions in Africa.

When asked about de Gaulle's suggestions in a press conference, Dulles made the following response, which did not meet French objections to U.S. policy:

> There has been a good deal of informal discussion about them [the proposals], and there will be more discussions about them. The suggestions touch upon problems which we recognize to be problems. The world is so interconnected now that we all recognize that it's difficult to deal with these matters on a purely regional basis and that a threat of war anywhere is a threat of war everywhere and that defense everywhere is necessary for defense anywhere.

[27]This account is based on a description of the proposal in U.S. Department of State, "Statement Recording the History of General de Gaulle's Proposal of September 17, 1958 and the United States Response to It, Including the Text of Letter from President Eisenhower to General de Gaulle of October 20, 1958," August 11, 1966.



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Dulles also remarked that he did not "interpret the French proposal as a proposal to set up a sort of superdirectorate of the world."[28]

De Gaulle may have assumed that the foreign policies of the three powers generally coincided. If so, this was an unwarranted assumption. On the other hand, it was reported that the United States was prepared to engage in tripartite discussions provided they did not become institutionalized and there was full consultation with the other members of NATO.[29] Given the above two considerations, the sharing of nuclear control was simply out of the question. In commenting on the proposal, foreign diplomats in Paris were reported to have agreed that "the status of equality with the United States and Britain . . . is something to be achieved and not . . . asserted." One Western diplomat remarked that "Charles de Gaulle . . . is trying to play poker in a blue chip game with white chips."[30]

On October 20, 1958 in a letter to de Gaulle, Eisenhower rejected the French leader's directorate proposal in these words:

> As for the means for dealing with the problem which you propose, our present procedures for organizing the defense of the free world clearly require the willing cooperation of many other nations, both within and outside NATO. We cannot afford to adopt any system which would give to our other allies, or other free world countries, the impression that basic decisions affecting their own vital interests are being made without their participation.

The United States thus couched its rejection of de Gaulle's proposal in language calculated to appeal to the other allies despite its self-contradictory character; for the General was, after all, trying to make certain that basic decisions affecting the vital interests of France should not be taken without French participation. In the final analysis, it is clear that the United States had no desire to share its control of strategic nuclear weapons with France.

## The Unfolding of NATO's Requirements

The emplacement of Soviet missiles in Eastern Europe put growing pressure on NATO to find an appropriate response. Even

[28] *DSB,* November 24, 1958, p. 814.
[29] *New York Times,* June 21, 1959, IV, p. 5.
[30] *Ibid.* French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville stated before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Assembly on December 28, 1959 that de Gaulle's "memorandum of September 1958 . . . created something of a stir." Ambassade de France, New York, Service de Presse et d'Information, *Speeches and Press Conferences,* No. 147, December 30, 1959, p. 6.



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though the Fourth Annual NATO Parliamentarians' Conference took note of the increases in Soviet military power, it did not recommend "any change in the established political control of strategic nuclear weapons" within the alliance.[31]

The NATO Council discussed the problem of political consultation at its semiannual ministerial level meeting held in Paris from December 16 to 18, 1958. The communiqué issued at the conclusion of the conference noted that "there was general agreement that the existing machinery of NATO is well suited to the needs of the Alliance, and that flexible methods would produce better results than any codification of rules." Moreover, the Council pointed out that "problems [were] inevitably created by the widening of political consultation."[32] These clauses seemed to indicate a victory for the American position.

Shortly after his return from Paris, Secretary Dulles appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and reported that

> the United States has repeatedly made clear . . . that we regard our own military power as being a trust for the benefit of our free-world partnerships; that we are ready to make known to all the defensive purposes and circumstances under which that force might be used; and that we shall heed in this respect the advice and counsel of our partners just as we would expect them to heed our advice and counsel with respect to the international use of their force.[33]

While Dulles was opening the door somewhat to political consultation, he quickly added that the establishment of an international structure based on collective consultation "is not always easy, given the variety of national development and national viewpoints."[34]

By the spring of 1959 U.S. IRBM's were being deployed in Europe under the two-key system of control.[35] In addressing the spring meeting of the North Atlantic Council, which included tributes to the North Atlantic Treaty on its tenth anniversary, Foreign Minister Joseph M.A.H. Luns of the Netherlands, Honorary President of the Council, strongly emphasized that "achievements [of the alliance] are not yet equal to requirements." The communiqué of the meeting expressed no sense

[31] *NATO Letter,* December 1958, p. 15.
[32] *DSB,* January 5, 1959, p. 3.
[33] *DSB,* February 2, 1959, p. 153.
[34] *Ibid.*
[35] For an official report of this process, see President Eisenhower's message to Congress dealing with the Mutual Security Program, *DSB,* March 30, 1959, pp. 427-436.



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of urgency and declared simply that the "principle of interdependence must be further developed."[36]

On August 25, 1959, General Lauris Norstad began what must be described as a "campaign" to extend the nuclear authority of NATO. In a speech to the American Legion at Minneapolis, the General declared:

> The requirements of NATO in the nuclear field are responsive to the facts and circumstances of the hour. Knowledge refuses to be contained, ideas are in flux. Military requirements necessarily reflect changes—technical, tactical, and political. It may well be that policies may have to be adapted to new facts and circumstances; that the nuclear responsibilities on NATO authority will have to be broadened.[37]

Norstad doubtless was aware of the growing deployment of Soviet missiles in Eastern Europe and the western half of the Soviet Union. Presumably, extensive staff studies had been made for SHAPE concerning this deployment.

A report prepared by the Institute for Strategic Studies in London, comparing NATO and Soviet military strength, noted that Soviet ICBM's and IRBM's "have been in service since July, 1958." It went on to point out that

> the principal Soviet missile bases, about *one hundred* in number, are situated along the Baltic coast mainly in north-east Prussia around Koenigsberg, in the area between Lake Ladoga and the White Sea, in the Thuringian Forest in East Germany, southern Ukraine and the Carpathians. . . . The personnel operating the Soviet missiles have been organized into what is virtually a fourth arm of the services numbering about 200,000 men. . . .[38]

As an offset to these Soviet missiles, the report emphasized that there were then only "seven [NATO] IRBM bases in Europe [either] . . . in operation, under construction, or projected."[39] According to this report, this was hardly an effective counterforce.

Taking note of these shortcomings, the Fifth NATO Parliamentarians' Conference, meeting in Washington in November 1959, stressed that "in order that the [NATO] organization can fulfill its deterrent role, there must be no weaknesses anywhere. Inefficiency in any one field weakens the threat of retaliation. . . ."[40]

[36] *DSB*, April 20, 1959, pp. 549, 553.
[37] *NATO Letter*, September 1959, p. 12.
[38] Text of report, *NATO Letter*, December 1959, p. 24. (Emphasis added.)
[39] *Ibid.*, p. 25. There were four Thor bases in operation in the United Kingdom; two Jupiter bases under construction in Italy; and one Jupiter base projected for Turkey. Both the Jupiter and the Thor were liquid-fueled IRBM's on soft sites.
[40] U.S. Congress, Senate, Foreign Relations Committee, *Fifth NATO Parliamentarians' Conference*, 86th Congress, 2nd Session, 1960, p. 9.



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Again, in a speech to the Institute of World Affairs at the University of Southern California on December 6, 1959, General Norstad suggested a fundamental change in alliance policy: "For the Alliance to have continuing life and meaning, it needs an increasing authority. Action to pass to the Alliance greater control over atomic weapons and subjecting their use more directly to the collective will, if politically feasible, could be a great new step." The General added, however, that "it should not be assumed that even the creation of a multi-national atomic authority . . . would necessarily influence the desire of some nations to pursue their own independent quest for an atomic weapons capability."[41]

Eleven days after Norstad's speech, the communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting of the NATO Council "took cognizance of the fact that Soviet military strength continues to grow. . . . In view of this [growth] . . . the Ministers agreed that a determined effort is required to guarantee the necessary strength of the Alliance."[42]

Thus, by the end of 1959 and the early months of 1960 a growing number of leaders on both sides of the Atlantic had begun to consider concrete solutions for the critical decade of the 1960's.

## The Issue of Nuclear Submarines for Allies

In response to the U.S. offer at the 1957 Heads of Government meeting to make information available to those NATO allies which desired to build an atomic submarine, the Netherlands in 1960 requested such information, causing considerable debate within the Administration and the Congress.[43] As conceived by the Eisenhower Administration, the United States would cooperate with its NATO partners in the development and production of nuclear power plants for submarines and merchant ships. Under a more limited arrangement, however, the Netherlands was to receive from Washington only sufficient technical information to build a submarine hull and the nonnuclear components of the propulsion system.[44] The actual transfer of the information needed to produce the atomic reactor was to be deferred.

[41]*NATO Letter,* January 1960, p. 10. Even though it may be assumed that this remark referred to France, it nevertheless had validity for the Western alliance in general.
[42]*Ibid.,* p. 3.
[43]For a description of the U.S. offer, see the *Christian Science Monitor,* December 17, 1957, p. 1. For the Netherlands' request and Washington's reaction, see the *New York Times,* May 15, 1960, p. 27.
[44]*New York Times,* May 15, 1960, p. 27.



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The Administration apparently felt that this was a desirable arrangement since, at least in the initial stages of the program, no nuclear secrets would be disclosed. The Atomic Energy Commission, however, questioned the validity of this line of reasoning and warned that by transferring the highly classified information about hull and nonnuclear machinery design, the Administration might inadvertently reveal information about the vital nuclear portion of the underwater weapon. The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, equally fearful of compromising American secrets, held that if the Administration were allowed to implement the first step in what was in effect a two-stage program, it would be committed diplomatically to follow through by providing the nuclear reactor.[45]

In a conference on June 9, 1960 with John M. McCone, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Livingston T. Merchant, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, and General Herbert Loper, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Atomic Affairs, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy strongly protested the Administration's plans for supplying nuclear secrets to the Netherlands. The basis of the Committee's opposition to the Administration's proposal was the fear that the provision of atomic submarine secrets to any of the NATO nations would increase the likelihood that those secrets would fall into the hands of the Soviet Union, because of the less rigid security systems of some European countries. It was reported that the Committee was particularly fearful that an agreement with the Netherlands would inevitably lead to one with the French, and that security procedures in France were particularly weak.[46]

Thus, the Administration found itself caught between its commitment to the Netherlands and the firm opposition of the Joint Committee. The Committee's objections prevented the consummation of the arrangement. Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, remarked that "there is certainly more agreement on the necessity for [the] building up of our defenses today than there is [on] . . . the question which logically follows it, namely, how this is to be accomplished."[47]

### The Gates Proposal

In response to perceptions of threats posed by the growing

[45] *Ibid.*
[46] *New York Times*, June 10, 1960, p. 4.
[47] Statement before the Senate Appropriations Committee on July 3, 1960; reprinted in *DSB*, July 4, 1960, p. 26.



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arsenal of Soviet missiles, SACEUR had prepared a secret military plan known as MC-70. This plan provided "that European members of NATO would be equipped with enough IRBM's to overbalance the Soviet advantage in ICBM's." The number and the location of the sites for these IRBM's were to be determined by SACEUR, i.e., General Norstad.[48]

If this was the vision of NATO's military planners, it had to be translated into a concrete response. Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates proposed such a response at a NATO Defense Ministers meeting held in Paris on March 31 and April 1, 1960. Under the Gates proposal, an ultimate goal would be to install in Europe 300 solid-fuel Polaris-type IRBM's on rail, river and road sites. The missile force would be constantly moving in order to preserve its invulnerability to surprise attack. The force was to be distributed among NATO members; that is, each nation or group of NATO nations would contribute national contingents to man the missiles. The United States would supply warheads for the missiles which were to be built in Europe. While the force would be under the operational control of SACEUR, the President of the United States would have the sole authority to order the release of the missiles.

It was thought that, because of her strategic location, it would be necessary for France to deploy about 150 missiles of the contemplated force of 300. De Gaulle seized this opportunity to advance the establishment of a French national nuclear strike force. He argued that, while he might be prepared to accept NATO-controlled missiles on French territory, one-third of the 150 missiles should be turned over to French control. In effect, therefore, the United States would have to give France fifty Polaris missiles so that, in return, NATO could use French territory for the stationing of the remaining 100 missiles. De Gaulle further insisted that he had no need for U.S. nuclear warheads; France would develop her own warheads for the fifty missiles.

The Administration and General Norstad strongly opposed the French suggestion. Having SACEUR-controlled missiles on French territory was an integral part of the Gates proposal since, without missiles in France, the entire distribution of the Continent-based Polaris system would be adversely affected.

There are, however, conflicting interpretations concerning precisely what President de Gaulle wanted. On the one hand, it

[48]The following account of the U.S. plan and the French response is based on a *New York Times* report of June 25, 1960.



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was reported that he had demanded control over fifty missiles provided by the United States, and that the refusal of the United States to accede to his wishes prompted the General to reject the stationing of the remaining 100 missiles on French territory.

On the other hand, it was later reported that the United States, knowing of de Gaulle's desire to have a French national Polaris missile force, offered him fifty missiles on the condition that France would accept the remaining 100 under NATO control.[49] In support of this version, the report stated that Paul-Henri Spaak, then Secretary General of NATO, had called on de Gaulle on July 22, 1960 "with the knowledge but not the formal approval" of the United States, to ask the French President to accept the U.S. offer of the fifty missiles without warheads so that the United States could speed the military integration of NATO and at the same time modestly assist France in the establishment of her own nuclear strike force.[50] The facts of this situation are not known. Nevertheless, whether de Gaulle was offered missiles or whether he demanded them is perhaps of little consequence, for the proposal offered by the Secretary of Defense was never accepted by NATO.

Some European nations requested that, after the missiles for the force had been manufactured, the factories which had been set up for that purpose be allowed to continue producing missiles for national deterrent forces. When the United States found it impossible to accede to these requests, the Administration withdrew the Gates proposal from consideration. Yet, the Gates plan is of great interest, for it marked the first time that an American official had suggested the emplacement of IRBM's in the NATO land area. The Polaris was then in the stages of advanced testing by the United States Navy, and it was assumed that it would be typical of the kind of weapons system that might be used.

Another element worthy of note was the emphasis in the Gates proposal on the concept of constant mobility. While it can be assumed that the force was essentially conceived as a land force, since it was to be stationed for the most part on constantly moving railroad cars and a vehicle which would be able to travel along the roads of Europe, the proposal introduced a new concept into the official NATO planning of the Eisenhower Administration: the mobile water-based force (which would use European rivers) as a platform for European-based missile systems. It will be recalled

[49] *New York Times*, July 23, 1960, p. 1.
[50] *Ibid.*



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that the only person prior to Gates publicly to discuss water as an ideal medium for the deployment of a cooperative missile force was Senator Henry Jackson.

The objections of the USSR to the Gates proposal were soon forthcoming. In a note to the Department of State on July 19, 1960, the Soviets contended that the United States "intends to give Polaris rockets [to West Germany] for the rearmament of . . . the Bundeswehr."[51] They claimed that Polaris was "by no means a defense weapon," as evidenced by its range of "over 2,000 kilometers." "The United States," the note charged, "goes even further along the dangerous path of creating an active hot-bed of aggression in the heart of Europe."

In a July 20 press release the State Department announced in reply that "as long as the Soviet Union persists in introducing missiles of all kinds into its forces, NATO must continue to build up its defense strength, taking into account the most recent developments in weapons and techniques." The American note also stated that any action taken by the Atlantic Alliance to provide intermediate-range ballistic missiles for the defense of the treaty area "will be taken in accordance with agreed NATO defense plans and not by individual member governments acting outside the NATO framework."[52]

## Norstad's Twofold Suggestion

The Gates proposal, though ultimately withdrawn by the Administration, was an important milestone in the development of Atlantic nuclear relationships. To General Norstad, the proposal must have been particularly satisfying, for the problems to which Secretary of Defense Gates had addressed himself were the very problems Norstad had been discussing for the past three years. In spite of the fate of the Gates plan, Norstad continued to be a strong advocate of the broader sharing of nuclear control within the Atlantic Alliance. Again and again in his speeches, in referring to the ills of the alliance, he suggested that what NATO needed was a "dramatic new step." In a major address to the Sixth Annual NATO Parliamentarians' Conference held at NATO headquarters in November 1960, he pointed out that it was the modernization program of NATO's conventional forces "which first gave rise to discussions of the Polaris. . . ."[53] The Polaris

[51] *DSB*, August 29, 1960, p. 349.
[52] *Ibid.*, pp. 347-348.
[53] *NATO Letter*, January 1961, pp. 15-17.



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missile was considered to be a replacement for NATO aircraft which were becoming increasingly vulnerable to Soviet interdiction. Norstad noted that the modernization requirement was met "to a certain extent by the Jupiter weapons . . . which are now coming into service under NATO. . . ." However, leaning somewhat on the Gates proposal and at the same time anticipating the Herter plan, the General pointed out that "this capability [against Soviet missiles could] be improved by the introduction of extremely mobile [missile] units, some of which may operate from sea and some of which may operate from land." Such a force, he implied, could be targeted against the intermediate-range ballistic missiles stationed in Eastern Europe; however, it would not be a NATO strategic force designed to strike at the heartland of the Soviet Union.

But the Supreme Commander made still another suggestion: The control of nuclear weapons now held by national authorities should "be passed to the Alliance," and those weapons "be committed to NATO for the life of the Alliance in its present form." Lest he be misunderstood, Norstad emphasized that "when I speak of weapons, I am speaking not of the aircraft, or the missiles, or the guns which deliver the warheads, but I am speaking . . . of the nuclear components which now are retained in the strictest custody." This proposal for the assignment of some though not all of the members' nuclear weapons to the alliance, the General pointed out, would make NATO "the fourth atomic power," and "might very well satisfy the interests of others by meeting fully . . . [their] military requirements, . . . by assuring [them] an equal voice in the control of the particular pool of forces which could be established as essential to the direct defense of Europe."

As the fourth atomic power, Norstad contended, NATO would gain "continuing life," "meaning," "increasing authority" and "power." He stated that as a military man he was "in no position to insist on a particular, specific solution to what . . . [was] overwhelmingly a political problem." Nevertheless, he emphasized that "if politically feasible, action to pass to the Alliance greater control over atomic weapons and to subject their use more directly to the collective will could be a great and dramatic new step."

Thus, the General was recommending not a choice between two alternatives but rather a two-pronged approach to NATO's nuclear problems. First, he was proposing the creation of an IRBM force deployed on both land and sea which would be made



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available "as part of the weapons modernization programme"; and this force was to be assigned to SACEUR. Presumably, the use of this force would be at the discretion of SACEUR, with the approval of the President of the United States. Second, Norstad suggested still another force, to consist of "a basic pool of atomic weapons," which would be available as a strategic nuclear force and would give "to all nations of the Alliance an essentially equal voice in the control of these particular weapons."[54]

Taking into account that in the spring of 1960 Norstad had encountered a particularly hostile and suspicious Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, it is rather surprising that he would suggest such a broad program. What were his motives? It is conceivable that the General, cognizant of the important discussions taking place within the Administration prior to Secretary of State Christian Herter's trip to Europe to attend the ministerial meeting of the NATO Council later in 1960, "threw everything he had" into this speech in order to influence the Washington deliberations. And, if this was the case, it might be said that to some extent he was successful: the Secretary of State did indeed make an offer in Paris which Norstad could endorse.

It must be assumed that Norstad's twofold proposal was of his own making, and was, in all likelihood, an attempt to influence Administration policy. It was not, strictly speaking, an official proposal, but it was an important suggestion in the continuing development of the MLF concept, coming as it did from the principal military figure of the alliance.

## The Herter Suggestion

By the fall of 1960, studies were already underway to determine the new proposals the United States would make to its NATO partners.[55] Professor Robert R. Bowie, former Director of the Harvard Center of International Affairs, has stated:

> My original connection with this general idea of [a] collective force was in a report I made in 1960 to Mr. Herter. . . . NATO decided in 1960 they should have a program for a decade. Mr. Herter asked me in the summer of 1960, or spring of 1960 to prepare a report. I prepared a report dealing with all of the different tasks that it seemed to me the Atlantic nations would face over the next decade, including the problem of the developing countries, their own relations, relations with the Soviet Union, military strategies and so on. The nuclear proposal was merely

[54] *Ibid.*, p. 17.
[55] See Secretary of State Christian Herter's speech to the United Press International Conference of Editors and Publishers, *DSB*, September 26, 1960, p. 470.



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one, as I considered it, at least, small segment of a larger program designed to knit relations within the alliance on a basis that would lead toward organized Atlantic relations.[56]

The Bowie study presumably contained in broad outlines the main characteristics of what was to become the Herter suggestion for a cooperative nuclear force for NATO, which in turn strongly influenced the nature of the ultimate MLF proposal.

According to Cyrus Sulzberger, Herter adopted Norstad's ideas about making NATO a fourth atomic power and "shook [them] up in a cocktail with the thoughts of Robert Bowie. . . ."[57] It should also be borne in mind, however, that the Polaris submarine was recognized at the time of its inception to be a versatile weapons system. For example, James H. Smith, Jr., then Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air, noted that the underwater craft was thought to be

particularly well suited to an international force, not being attached to the soil of any particular sovereign. Here was a weapon that could be used by an alliance without directing reprisals against the bases in any one country.

Here was a weapon that could be moved toward or away from the target slowly and deliberately as the situation required. Its ability to survive would give its owners the opportunity of considered decisions; the quick draw was no longer necessary and thus stability internationally was enhanced.[58]

While it is true that "diplomacy with one's allies is essentially the art of adjusting and accommodating interests," it is no less true that "no partnership can endure without [the] process of compromise."[59] Yet the process of compromise is sometimes difficult. From 1957 to the autumn of 1960, despite numerous suggestions put forth to solve NATO's nuclear problems, no real progress was made and no compromises were brought about. Each proposed solution merely brought forth new problems for consideration.

In November 1960, Paul-Henri Spaak wrote that

in the military field everything is dominated at present by the question of whether or not we are capable within the Atlantic Alliance of formulating a common nuclear policy. In my opinion it is absolutely impossible to imagine any real or effective defense unless this problem is tackled and solved.[60]

[56]U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Nominations of Robert R. Bowie and U. Alexis Johnson,* 89th Congress, 2nd Session, 1966, p. 9.
[57]*New York Times,* February 22, 1961, p. 24.
[58]*Ibid.*
[59]Under Secretary of State Livingston Merchant in an address to the Minnesota World Affairs Center, Minneapolis, October 13, 1960. *DSB,* November 7, 1960, p. 710.
[60]Paul-Henri Spaak, "Boldness Is All," *NATO Letter,* January 1961, p. 3.



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An attempt to solve the problem was soon forthcoming. The results of the U.S. studies in the fall of 1960 were embodied in the suggestion made by Secretary of State Herter at the NATO Ministerial Meeting held in Paris from December 16 to 18 that year. The Secretary proposed what he termed a "new concept for [the] operation of medium-range ballistic missiles."[61]

The "new concept" called for a commitment by the United States to NATO of five submarines which would be armed with eighty Polaris missiles. For their share, the other members of the alliance would be expected to purchase from the United States one hundred more medium-range missiles. Herter subsequently explained that

> If our allies provided [the 100] additional missiles on a multilaterally manned, owned, and controlled basis, deployed either in submarines, in surface vessels, or on land, the United States would then combine its five submarines with the contribution made by our allies into a NATO deterrent force under NATO command. How the NATO command should be constituted was left for subsequent consideration.[62]

Thus, Herter in effect was proposing that, for their part, the Europeans could have a choice between a land or a sea force. Perhaps this was a subtle suggestion to the Europeans that they should explore the possibility of establishing a land-based deterrent. Herter apparently had not settled on the submarine as the exclusive platform for an IRBM alliance force.

It was envisaged that the U.S. contribution would be made before the end of 1963. Herter expressed a hope that the force would be a multinational effort. This was the first hint of the mixed-manned feature that was to become so controversial early in 1963.

Taking into consideration the vicissitudes of previous American proposals, the Secretary of State emphasized that his offer was subject to Congressional approval. The other crucial aspect of the proposal was that, before the United States contributed the five submarines, the members of NATO were to work out the method by which political control would be exercised over the force. Recognizing that designing a system of political control would be an extended and difficult task, the United States decided not to make its contribution until the issue was resolved. The Europeans presumably would not consider the purchase of 100 IRBM

[61] *New York Times,* December 17, 1960, p. 1.

[62] Christian A. Herter, *Toward an Atlantic Community* (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), pp. 41-42.



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missiles until they had devised a control system. The creation of the force, therefore, would depend on the prior solution of the control issue.

Herter warned his fellow conferees that the Administration was seriously concerned about America's unfavorable balance of payments position. While he intimated that the United States might consider it necessary to reduce her expenditures on behalf of NATO, he affirmed his belief that America's NATO partners would recognize that "any action that the United States might be obliged to take" was justified in view of the balance of payments problem.[63] Unless something was done to redress America's unfavorable balance, the Secretary threatened, it might be necessary to remove a portion of the U.S. troop units stationed in Western Europe.

In order to lend credence to the Secretary's position, the Department of Defense announced on December 17, the day after Herter made his proposal, that it had ordered overseas military units "to purchase only United States goods and services unless offers received abroad would undersell American concerns by at least 25 per cent." It was estimated that the outflow of dollars would be cut by $65 million a year.[64]

Herter, in making his offer of missiles and requesting that the Europeans purchase one hundred more missiles from the United States, made no mention of the nuclear warheads for the missiles. While he encouraged NATO to work out a system of political control for the force, it cannot be assumed that he was suggesting that NATO's collective authority be extended to include control over the nuclear warheads. In fact, given the vagueness of the suggestion, the opposite should be assumed. In all likelihood, the President of the United States, as in the Gates proposal, would have retained the authority, perhaps under a two- or multiple-key arrangement, to order the release of the missiles, thus insuring an American veto over the use of the system.

Herter's emphasis that the one hundred additional missiles could be purchased only in the United States, his underscoring of the deficit in the U.S. balance of payments, his threat to withdraw troops from Europe and cut military expenditures for the NATO area, and the Department of Defense order making it almost obligatory for American military units in Western Europe to purchase goods and services in the United States, all combined to

[63] *Ibid.*
[64] *New York Times,* December 18, 1960, pp. 1, 20.



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give the impression that the Herter offer was first and foremost a means to resolve American financial problems.

The Secretary's stipulation that his plan needed Congressional approval was a major understatement. Barely six months had passed since the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy had refused permission to the Administration to transfer nonnuclear information about Polaris submarines to the Netherlands, and only eight months since a member of that committee, Representative Chet Holifield (D., Calif.), had warned that the transfer of American nuclear weapons to NATO would cause the "greatest debate of our generation."[65]

Added to these circumstances, which made it doubtful that Europeans would enthusiastically embrace the Herter suggestion, was the fact that in November Senator John F. Kennedy had been elected President. With only a short period remaining until the inauguration of the new President, the Eisenhower Administration was not prepared to put forward new proposals.[66]

Even though Europe was "waiting for Kennedy," West Germany's Defense Minister, Franz Josef Strauss, urged his fellow defense ministers to "speed plans for allied control of the [suggested] Atlantic nuclear force."[67] In their communiqué on December 18, 1960, the ministers "expressed their determination to continue their efforts to improve the deterrent and defensive strength of the Alliance." It was for this purpose, they declared, that

> the United States Government [had] suggested the concept of a MRBM multilateral force for consideration by the Alliance. The Council took note of the United States' suggestion with great interest, and suggested [that] the permanent representatives . . . study the suggestion and related matters in detail.[68]

This was the first time that the term "multilateral force" was used in a public official statement of any kind. Such phrases as "cooperative nuclear effort," "Atlantic nuclear force," "NATO task force," "NATO brigade," "NATO fire brigade," "NATO nuclear force," "sea-based ballistic missile force," "NATO mobile force," "NATO, the fourth atomic power," and "multi-national

[65] *Congressional Record,* House, March 9, 1960, 86th Congress, 2nd Session, p. 5067.

[66] "A firm proposal could not be made [at the 1960 NATO Ministerial Meeting] since that meeting was held after election day and before the newly elected administration had taken over." Herter, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

[67] *New York Times,* December 18, 1960, p. 1.

[68] *DSB,* January 9, 1961, p. 40.



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force," each with its own particular emphasis, had previously formed the terminology of the Atlantic debate.[69]

The 1957 to 1960 period, therefore, ended exactly as it had begun. The United States, prior to initiating a dialogue with its alliance partners over the issue of nuclear sharing within NATO, had maintained rigid control over its own nuclear weapons; as the period drew to a close, precisely the same situation prevailed, even though in the meantime the idea of a NATO nuclear fleet had been launched. That idea, officially announced by Ambassadors Livingston Merchant and Thomas Finletter before the NATO Council in the spring of 1963, was to shake the foundations of the Atlantic Alliance.

[69]Properly speaking, MLF should have been designated MLNF, indicating that the various multilateral proposals were suggestions for the creation of a nuclear force.



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# AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN CYPRUS*

*by T. W. Adams and Alvin J. Cottrell*

ONE of the more persistent problems affecting NATO and the United States is that of Cyprus. In the crisis stage it has several times—particularly in 1964 and 1967—brought Turkey and Greece to the brink of open hostilities. Nothing could be more disastrous to the continuation of the North Atlantic Alliance, and thus to the objectives of U.S. foreign policy, than a war between two NATO members. Moreover, the Cyprus struggle puts the United States in a most delicate position, by virtue of the presence of the Sixth Fleet, as premier naval power in the Mediterranean. Any overt U.S. show of force would appear to favor one ally over the other; hence the United States has had to tread a careful diplomatic path in order to maintain her special relationship between the two member-states on NATO's southeastern flank. U.S. policy in this situation is perforce one of strict impartiality, open to backing any solution acceptable to the involved powers. As Irving Kristol aptly put it in the May 12, 1968 *New York Times:*

> The nations of Western Europe have far more at stake in avoiding a war between Greece and Turkey than we [the United States] do, and we certainly could not care less about Cyprus itself, where we have neither bases nor investments. . . . [But had] we decided to keep hands off [i.e., diplomatically, particularly in 1967], a Greco-Turkish war would have been inevitable and the entire Middle East would have been thrown into a bloody turmoil. . . .

There is little doubt that both Turkey and Greece have been restrained from going to war over Cyprus by their mutually advantageous membership in NATO and their singularly strong desire to remain allied with the United States. Nevertheless, should diplomacy or rationality fail to deter a future conflict, as appeared to be the case in November 1967, the United States could in all likelihood be forced to consider interposing elements of the Sixth Fleet between Turkey and Greece instead of continuing to do nothing in a military sense. The possibility of such a

*The authors have just published a more lengthy study which treats the Cyprus problem in depth: *Cyprus Between East and West* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968).



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decision was narrowly averted by the highly successful diplomacy of special Presidential envoy Cyrus Vance in preventing a Greco-Turkish war last year.

Many Greek Cypriotes had interpreted a somewhat bluntly formulated letter from President Johnson to Turkish Premier Inonu in 1964 to be an indication that the United States might employ force to prevent any Turkish landing on the island. The crux of the Johnson letter was that Turkey might not receive NATO help in the event of a Soviet attack if her threatened invasion of Cyprus were carried out. A literal interpretation of the wording does not necessarily imply U.S. military action, but an estimate leading to overconfidence and hence to miscalculation on the part of the Greek Cypriot government of Archbishop Makarios could be dangerous. Another rash Greek Cypriot military operation, such as that carried out by General Grivas in November 1967 against a Turkish village, which resulted in the death of over twenty Turkish Cypriotes, would require determined effort by the United States to avoid extreme measures favorable to either Turkey or Greece. The belief that the United States would deter Turkish action by force might conceivably have contributed to Grivas' precipitate strike.

Thus, the United States has been faced with a series of difficult choices. In 1964 the Marines of the Sixth Fleet might have been required to land in the Republic of Cyprus had the United States been compelled to take a bold step to halt the bloody violence between the island's Greeks and Turks. Fortunately the United Nations' hastily drawn up, though ultimately adequate, peacekeeping force prevented this necessity. An interdiction by the United States, such as a Sixth Fleet blockade of Cyprus against Turkey or a Marine landing on the island, would almost inevitably lead to Turkey's withdrawal from both NATO and CENTO. The defection of even a single ally from NATO would constitute a serious blow to the collective morale of the alliance. Whatever the value of CENTO—and it is widely criticized as having little political or military significance—Turkey's secession from the Middle Eastern pact might possibly lead to its dissolution. (It appears that Pakistan is waiting for just such an excuse to withdraw from membership in the pact.)

As to Cyprus itself, while the fashion nowadays is to dismiss the value of islands and other overseas military bases in the forward strategy of the West, what John C. Campbell wrote in 1960



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about its strategic importance in *Defense of the Middle East* remains at least partly valid:

> Cyprus retains some military value both to NATO strategy and to the Western position in the Middle East, which is vital to NATO. As to the former, it adds strength and flexibility by providing a base from which NATO operations in Turkey or elsewhere in the Mediterranean can be supported . . . and it could be useful, though not essential, to the Sixth Fleet. . . . Cyprus is one of the relatively few remaining bases in Western hands.

Whether what Campbell says is correct today from a military standpoint, it is still true that all such bases in critical areas have, as does Guantanamo in the Caribbean, a certain psychological value which at times surpasses their actual operational utility. And it should be added that it is most important to deny a base in the Levant to the Soviets, who have entered the Mediterranean as a naval power for the first time with the obvious intention of staying.

In stifling open conflict in Cyprus, which could cause repercussions in the mainlands and hence U.S. involvement, a considerable amount of credit must therefore be directed to the role of the United Nations. Since March 1964, the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) has done a truly remarkable job under trying circumstances. The most tangible reward for this "international fire brigade" has been thirteen consecutive extensions of its mandate, but the international community must share with the Greeks and Turks an overriding feeling of relief that UN troops are present on that turbulent island. Though the two warring sides would prefer to see the United Nations act more positively toward their divergent positions, neither could honestly want to see the UN force removed, as was done last spring in the Gaza Strip. The tension that demanded the UNFICYP landing in the first place is as extant now as ever, and Cypriot realists acknowledge that the "soldiers without enemies" in their light blue berets may be a common sight in the island for some time to come. While the assignment is apparently far from being completed, sufficient time has elapsed to allow an assessment of the UN's efforts to keep peace in this festering trouble spot.

## The Nature of Peacekeeping

The record of UNFICYP illustrates both the strength and weakness of the concept of peacekeeping. Its strength is substantiated by the fact that this multinational 5,000-man detachment



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has succeeded in reducing the temperature of the hostility between the Greek Cypriotes and Turkish Cypriotes and in restoring a relatively secure situation on the island. Its weakness is that the force itself can contribute little toward a final settlement. The primary objective of a peacekeeping operation is to prevent escalation of localized violence in order to pave the way for follow-on negotiations between the disputing factions—or, as it was stated in the case of Cyprus, to get the Greeks and Turks on the island to face one another across a bargaining table rather than through the sights of their rifles.

Cyprus maintains its newsworthiness because it continually calls attention to the fundamental political dilemma that confronts the UN in its role as the world's peacekeeper, namely, that sovereign governments still regard international peacekeeping forces with such skepticism and suspicion that they are seldom inclined to grant to the UN the degree of military initiative required for successful completion of the job at hand. Regardless of this fact of life, the United Nations has been effective in the peacekeeping field, as recent developments in the Indian subcontinent, as well as Cyprus, bear witness.

In Cyprus today, however, no amount of military initiative, even if permitted by its mandate, could empower UNFICYP to perform its task better. Current Cypriot history has shown that at the height of the 1955-1959 Emergency Period, British Colonial Governor Harding had decidedly more troops and faced no limits to his mandate during the Greek-led EOKA guerrilla fighting; yet this did not enable him to pacify the island. As is generally true, pacification came then not as the result of military action but from a political settlement painfully hammered out of negotiations.

All UN peacekeeping operations to date have been under the direct supervision of the Secretary-General, who issues instructions about their conduct on the basis of political and military realities which serve to refine the mandate as laid down by the pertinent Security Council resolutions. In Cyprus the operation is run jointly by a Special Representative of the Secretary-General, a Mexican diplomat, Bebiano Osorio-Tafall, and by the Commander of the United Nations Force, a Finn, retired Major General I. A. E. Martola. Both report to the Secretary-General on the conduct of the mission—"sometimes hour by hour"—and they receive the Secretary-General's instructions in a continuing process.



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The diplomatic value of an international peacekeeping operation, therefore, is that it provides impartial guarantees and protection to both sides over an extended period of time. Under such auspices a permanent settlement can reasonably be sought and sought again in an honorable and face-saving manner by the negotiators. However, when Greek directly confronts Turk, reason seldom prevails. To the frustration of the UN mediators (Galo Plaza of Ecuador disgustedly resigned in 1966), the old extreme demands for the ultimate disposition of Cyprus may not have died. Certain Greeks still want *enosis* (union) of the island with Greece, and many Turks want *taksim* (partition) between the two island communities. A top-secret dialogue between Athens and Ankara in 1966 and 1967 gave a ray of hope that these rigid positions might yield to compromise, but no final resolution emerged from the talks. (Perhaps Walter Lippmann, among others, drew the proper distinction when he differentiated between peacekeeping and peacemaking, acknowledging that the former belongs more to the military and the latter to the diplomats.)

On a related point, the UNFICYP experience serves to remind the world that crash preparations, made as these were on the brink of disaster, are not a sound foundation upon which to establish an international peacekeeping force. In no small measure, the case of Cyprus has demonstrated that traditional diplomacy is inadequate to prevent a future squabble between two smaller powers from being expanded into a challenge confounding the world's largest international organization. Until the time when such a preventive mechanism is effectively established, however, the UNFICYP—despite an unsteady budgetary foundation—must surely be considered the most effective example of UN peacekeeping thus far and a model on which to base future operations.

## Seeking Peace

Peacekeeping attempts in Cyprus began almost immediately after fighting started in December 1963, when the British, Greek and Turkish governments appealed to the two island communities for a cease-fire and offered their joint good offices to help reach a settlement. In addition, a Joint Peacekeeping Force under British command was proposed, and this the Cyprus government accepted on December 26. Initially, the British managed to organize a Political Liaison Committee made up of Greek and Turkish Cypriotes, the ambassadors to Cyprus from Turkey and Greece,



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and the British commander of the sovereign base areas. A lasting agreement for stabilizing the situation which came out of this committee was the establishment of the so-called Green Line, a neutral zone separating the two communities in the capital city of Nicosia. This buffer zone patrolled by the British proved to be a most effective step in saving lives after the first days of violence. Much the same operation was later taken over by the troops of the UN and has since functioned successfully.

The British, declaring that they could not "go on acting as policemen in Cyprus indefinitely," called a conference for January 1964 between the four involved parties. The London conference encountered difficulties immediately—in part because the Turkish Cypriot delegation refused to recognize the right of a representative of the "inoperative Government of Cyprus" to be there—and it was to end without an agreement being reached. Furthermore, the Soviet Union entered the controversy at that time, pointedly warning the NATO powers not to tamper with Cyprus.

Despite these distractions and threats, the United States and Britain, on January 31, 1964, produced a plan for a peacekeeping force of at least 10,000 men from NATO member-countries to be stationed on Cyprus for three months while a "disinterested European mediator" who was agreeable to all parties sought a political solution. At first, Washington and London felt that the Cyprus crisis could be more advantageously handled outside the United Nations, because this would automatically preclude any Soviet veto through the Security Council. Nevertheless, President Makarios rejected the plan, demanding instead some non-NATO participation and some "link" with the UN Security Council. The plan was so modified, only to meet another rejection by Makarios in February, even though it was acceptable to Greece and Turkey.

The Archbishop-President subsequently announced his intention of presenting the Cyprus issue to the Security Council. By this tactic Makarios apparently believed that he could, with Soviet and Afro-Asian support, obtain a resolution favoring the Greek Cypriot plea for "unfettered independence," which in essence would abrogate the Zurich-London agreements of 1960 and condemn outside interference in Cypriot affairs. To emphasize Cypriot determination to do away with "interference," two bombs were exploded in the United States Embassy, and American dependents were then evacuated from the island.



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On February 15, Great Britain called for a Security Council meeting on the Cyprus crisis, which had been steadily growing worse. The threat of a Turkish invasion and the Greek promise to meet this by force had reached the danger point before sufficient political agreement was reached to permit a UN response to the conflict. The security of the eastern flank of NATO hinged on the UN decision to act.

## The Operation of UNFICYP

On March 4, 1964 the Security Council unanimously approved a resolution for the establishment of a peacekeeping force and the appointment of a mediator for Cyprus. Makarios seemingly felt this amounted to a setting aside of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee which gave the right of intervention to Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom to preserve the constitutional form of government. The Turks, on the other hand, interpreted the UN resolution as a reaffirmation of all the Zurich-London treaties.

The authorizing resolution, which in some ways was even more vague than that given to the UN force in the Congo (ONUC), was perhaps an indication of the extent of political dissension inherent in the Security Council structure. Nevertheless, by March 13, the Secretary-General was able to inform the Security Council that the Cyprus force would be established without further delay. According to the resolution, the force would stay three months and would include 3,500 British troops then engaged in peacekeeping in Cyprus, a Canadian contingent of 1,150, one Finnish and one Swedish battalion of 700 men each, and an Irish battalion of 500. The United States promised airlift for some of the force, and voluntary financial contributions were pledged by a number of UN member-nations.

UNFICYP's function as defined in the Security Council resolution of March 4, 1964 is threefold: to prevent the recurrence of fighting; to contribute to the restoration and maintenance of law and order; and to contribute to a return to normal conditions. Of these, the third function is a crucially important aspect of the mandate since it makes it plain that UNFICYP is *not* merely for the purpose of maintaining the status quo obtaining at the end of the 1963-1964 hostilities.

In addition to being supported by voluntary funds, UNFICYP was to contain some unique features over its predecessor forces. Troops from one of the permanent members of the Security Council were employed for the first time; these were the existing



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British forces that had pioneered the peacekeeping operation. The decision to keep the British in that capacity may also have been due to a recognition of the extensive experience and logistical lines England had acquired in Cyprus during its eighty years of occupation. Another innovation was the stated importance, along with the peacekeeping function of restoring law and order, of the UN's role in helping to seek a political solution by means of an appointed mediator. The primary Security Council resolution was explicit on the point of designating such a neutral official charged with "promoting a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement of the problem confronting Cyprus." In practice the Secretary-General has scrupulously kept UNFICYP and the United Nations mediation effort as strictly separate operations so that developments in either field should not jeopardize the other.

The first small contingent of the United Nations force, consisting of Canadian troops and land transportation, was flown to Cyprus on March 16, 1964, and two weeks later the Canadians had received their first peacekeeping experience under fire. It was not until April 1, however, that the terms of reference under which the United Nations force would operate were published. The terms of reference stipulate, among other things, that:

> . . . the United Nations force will not supply help unless its commander decides that such help is "within the framework" of the Security Council resolution of March 4th establishing the force.
>
> On the other hand, Cyprus pledged herself to meet "in a spirit of cooperation" any requests submitted by the United Nations commander for help in carrying out the resolution.
>
> Although the Secretary-General has instructed the United Nations force not to shoot except in self-defense, he has also instructed it to interpose itself where necessary to stop fighting between Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

The restrictive wording of the guiding principles, while rendering the UN force somewhat ineffective at first, was based upon sound logic. A resort to the degree of armed force required to prevent a recurrence of fighting and bring about a cease-fire would undoubtedly result in loss of lives on both sides, Cypriot and UN. The Secretary-General hastened to remind the UNFICYP commander that he was there "to save lives" and that it would be incongruous, even a little insane, for that Force to set about killing Cypriots, whether Greek or Turkish, to prevent them killing each other. The major political consideration against the use of armed force in any peacekeeping operation of the world body is that it



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would commit the United Nations, if only temporarily, to one party's defense during the skirmish; this would threaten to destroy the force's usefulness as an impartial agency.

The point here is that a peacekeeping force, which by definition is *not* a fighting force and is precluded from becoming one, can do little to stop parties determined to fight it out. Only when the hostile parties are basically unwilling to push matters to a showdown (or when they realize that to do so would be dangerous because of international complications, which is the case in Cyprus), can a peacekeeping force be effective. Thus, UNFICYP was established on the basis of assurances from the Greeks and Turks in the island that they were willing to stop the fighting, and UNFICYP has encountered the most difficulties when the actions of the Cypriotes did not reflect this "willingness."

In practice, UNFICYP could do little without mutual consent of the warring factions. No roadblocks could be removed nor machine gun installations dismantled nor cease-fire agreements enforced unless both Greek and Turkish Cypriotes saw some particular advantage to these actions. Even "minimum force self-defense" was interpreted as one to ten shots only in response to deliberate fire on the UN troops. Advance warning had to be given in these cases, and no automatic weapons could be used except in extreme emergency. Little could be done by UNFICYP to prevent sniper firing across the Green Line in Nicosia, where Greeks and Turks were continually facing each other over a hundred-yard stretch of territory. As one wag put it in early 1964: "UNFICYP was there not to stop fighting, but merely to watch it!" In truth, moral pressure must necessarily be the first weapon of UNFICYP, but this might properly be expected of an agent of the United Nations.

## Evaluation of UNFICYP

As UNFICYP has become more firmly established, its officials, in endeavoring to fulfill the mandate, have managed to exert a great deal of influence, and even pressure in various ways, to secure the "consent" of the parties to measures designed to prevent a renewal of fighting. The Green Line, however, has become a serious bone of contention. The *de facto* Cyprus government is now opposed to the whole Green Line concept; it considers that such lines are suggestive of frontiers between sovereign states and lend themselves to the notion that the government's sovereignty does not extend throughout the island. Since UNFICYP merely



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inherited the military situation as it stood when the force became operational, and was not involved in arranging the Green Line, it has no position about the suitability of this approach. Despite the fact that the government prevented a list of about sixteen "strategic" articles (such as building supplies and spare auto parts) from being delivered to the Turkish Cypriot enclaves, the UN supervised the supplying of food, mail and other essentials to the surrounded Turks. In the beginning of 1968, Archbishop Makarios eased this economic blockade, but this was considered by most Turks to be merely a Greek ploy, and little of the *status quo ante* has changed in actuality.

In the force's four years of operation, a range of contingencies has had to be faced with equanimity and restraint: from commonplace arms smuggling, illegal troop buildups and breaking of cease-fires to the Turkish air attacks in August 1964 and the crisis of November 1967. With the assistance of a 170-man civilian police element (UNCIVPOL), all shootings and disputes are investigated thoroughly. The multinational force of 5,000, currently from nine countries, has served under two Indian generals and now a Finn, with amazing ease and *esprit de corps*. Many of the troops—especially the Scandinavians—have chosen to extend for a further period of duty, indicating that UNFICYP service may have individual rewards.

Since its arrival in Cyprus the force, according to the March 1968 Secretary-General's Report, has always tried to promote a process of "de-confrontation," that is, it has attempted to interpose its own forces in sensitive areas, to increase the distance between opposing armed elements, and to secure agreement for elimination of the checkpoints, road barriers, bunkers and other fortifications that constitute the instruments of confrontation. When it has not been successful in efforts in this direction, UNFICYP has had to do the next best thing by taking a particularly strong stand against any action that tends to intensify armed confrontation, such as the strengthening of existing forward positions or the establishment of any new position that might improve the military posture of either side in relation to the other. UNFICYP is sometimes criticized by one side or the other for this policy, which can only keep tension within tolerable limits but cannot eliminate it. Nevertheless, in spite of the Cypriot resistance to "de-confrontation," the policy is being consistently applied. Whenever the parties can be induced to cooperate—for example, when the Turks finally allowed all the island's land records to be micro-



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filmed by the UN—it has usually been a determining factor in restoring situations that have begun to deteriorate. The Political Liaison Committee still meets periodically on those matters of immediate importance.

From the point of view of the UNFICYP mandate proper, there has been a substantial improvement in keeping the peace. Yet the "peace" in Cyprus might better be described as an uneasy calm, capable of exploding even after a comparatively minor provocation. The Greek Cypriot National Guard and Turkish Cypriot *Mucahit* (Freedom Fighters) are now better than ever armed and organized militarily—they number an estimated 10,000 and 5,000, respectively. UNFICYP is thus the only buffer preventing an outbreak of full-scale war on the island, which could in turn easily escalate into a conflict of sweeping international proportions.

## Whither UNFICYP?

While UNFICYP keeps the lid on the Cyprus powder keg and furnishes the necessary time and climate for diplomatic negotiations, such as the inter-Cypriot discussion now going on in Nicosia, a grave problem of finances continually besets the operation. The Secretary-General, in his report of November 1965, first sounded the alarm that UNFICYP might be disbanded unless a deficit of $6.9 million could be made up through voluntary contributions. Currently, the financial situation remains bleak: the deficit is approximately $9 million. The direct costs to the UN of this one peacekeeping operation in the span of its existence from March 1964 through June 1968 were estimated to be $90 million, not counting the sizeable expenditures each of the countries serving in the force and some others have made without reimbursement. The United States, for instance, has directly contributed $34.1 million toward the total cost; the United Kingdom is next in support with an aggregate figure of $25.4 million; Canada follows with a contribution of some $9 million.

As U Thant has observed, there will be a continuing need and demand for UNFICYP, and the price for this type of preventive therapy in international relations is comparatively modest. Hopefully, the voluntary contributions will keep the force in operation, but there ought to be a warning in this financial crisis for the responsible leaders of the island and mainland Greeks and Turks. As befits any peacekeeping operation, UNFICYP cannot



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go on indefinitely, yet it can end successfully only when a permanent political settlement for Cyprus is somehow achieved.

The new Greek military junta reportedly has been willing to proffer concessions to Turkey which no other Greek government could have granted if it hoped to stay in power. For example, the conciliatory nature of the current rulers in Athens was evident when they acceded to what amounted to a clear Turkish ultimatum in December 1967. This resulted in the recall of all Greek Army "volunteers" in Cyprus, including the commander, General Grivas, as well as compensation for loss of Turkish life and property.

If the United Nations fails to contain potential violence in Cyprus while the Greeks and Turks are negotiating on the future of the island, another grave crisis could arise—especially for the United States. Any further Cypriot Greek offensive against the Turkish Cypriotes would surely cause Turkey to intervene in defense of her ethnic brothers. The relative quiescence of the conflict between the two communities during the past six months is due in no small measure to the presence of UNFICYP. This is significant because despite many other areas of Greco-Turkish disagreement the most likely cause of another confrontation between the mainland powers would be a local conflict in Cyprus.

The tragedy is that neither Greece nor Turkey wishes war, but they are under varying degrees of domestic pressure to protect the rights each of them perceives it has in the island. Last year's removal of General Grivas by the junta has been one meaningful development in the direction of less intercommunal strife. Also, the Greek military government, by imposing an authoritarian regime in Athens, has at least temporarily removed Cyprus as an issue that Makarios can exploit on the mainland. In addition, the resolution of the 1967 crisis in favor of Turkey improved U.S. relations with Ankara, which had become strained as a result of President Johnson's 1964 note, and appeased the clamor of Turkish militants. These changes in the situation appear for the time being to have lessened the possibility of a disruption of NATO's southeastern flank. Nevertheless, war has only been avoided; no permanent settlement of the dilemma that lies at the root of these recurring crises has been found.



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## Conclusion

In recent years Greeks and Turks have continually been brought to the brink of war over Cyprus. When Britain relinquished colonial rule and retreated to its two sovereign base areas on the island in 1960, it eliminated an obvious face-saving excuse (i.e., the presence of foreign power) which had served to inhibit the Greeks and Turks from asserting their claims and positions in Cyprus. After 1963 it was imperative that the vacuum left by the British be filled by another third force and, since neither the United States nor NATO was appropriate or acceptable for the role, this was done by UNFICYP. The UN force was the only available instrument with the requisite qualifications for such a task. As the Institute for Strategic Studies' *Survey for 1967* stated, "The relative absence of intercommunal strife in 1967 can be attributed in part to the efforts of the United Nations Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP) . . . which contrasted markedly with the UN's role in the Sinai Desert earlier in the year."

Thus, in view of current conditions, the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus seems to be the best means of assuring U.S. objectives in the area. Given the opposition to any kind of intervention generated both at home and abroad by the Vietnamese war, there is little likelihood that the United States will be inclined to intervene militarily in local situations in the future, even on the smallest scale. In the case of Cyprus, it can be of assistance diplomatically, as was so successfully demonstrated by the Vance mission. Also, up to a point, the United States can provide a deterrent to outside interference by the existence of the Sixth Fleet, but the Sixth Fleet no longer has the Mediterranean to itself now that the Soviets apparently intend to maintain a permanent presence in the area. Hence an acceptable military buffer on the island is still required, at least until President Makarios decides to provide satisfactory guarantees to the Turkish Cypriot minority and until intercommunal conflict can be contained or eliminated.

A principal objective of U.S. policy in Cyprus and in the Middle East as a whole, though not often stated, is to maintain some semblance of order as the states and territories in the area evolve from their previous metropolitan relationships. Throughout the region the rival claims that will have to be asserted, whether the principals wish to assert them or not, are a prime source of instability. This is particularly true in the case of Cyprus, where the



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British presence for so long prevented the injection of the issue into mainland Greek and Turkish politics. Now that the British domain is restricted to two sovereign bases—Akrotiri and Dhekelia—a third and more neutral military force is necessary.

One thing seems certain, namely, that the Soviets may seek to exploit or manage crises in the area to their own advantage. Hence it is important that such temptation be neutralized whenever it may occur. The need to do so is even greater given the growing danger of a direct confrontation between the Sixth Fleet and the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean.

In helping to damp the conflict in Cyprus UNFICYP has also helped to prevent the United States from making difficult political-military decisions regarding two of its allies' interests in that troubled island. The United Nations force has thus served as a vital and indispensable element of a successful U.S. policy in an area which, while within NATO's defense perimeter, is increasingly becoming a primary responsibility of the United States. For it is clear that open hostilities between Greece and Turkey would be critically detrimental to U.S.-Western interests on NATO's southeastern flank and that U.S. diplomacy alone may not be adequate to the task of preserving order in the eastern Mediterranean.



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# STRATEGIC PROJECTIONS AND POLICY OPTIONS IN THE SOVIET-CUBAN RELATIONSHIP

*by Desmond P. Wilson, Jr.*

ON February 13, 1960, Soviet First Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan signed a trade and aid agreement with Cuba's new revolutionary government. Since then, a series of political, economic and military understandings has linked the two states. Whether the Kremlin entered any or all of these agreements by design, or whether it stumbled into them as a result of circumstances, does not alter the fact that a great power has become committed to a small and vulnerable state. Even though the Soviet-Cuban relationship may not have the status of a formal alliance, there are a number of reasons why the Kremlin leadership may regard its involvement in Cuba as being particularly difficult and constraining.[1] It is the purpose of this article to explore how and under what conditions Moscow's ties to Cuba constrain Soviet behavior toward the United States and its allies.

The first part of the article will describe briefly those aspects of the contemporary environment that most fundamentally structure the Soviet involvement in Cuba. The second will develop a matrix containing the more likely outcomes or alternative futures in the Soviet-Cuban relationship. The third will explore each of the alternative futures for policy inferences and problems which the Kremlin is likely to face and which have implications for the United States. The basic argument is that Cuba presents the Soviet Union with a problem that can be handled in a limited number of alternative ways. The alternative chosen becomes an indicator about a far wider range of Soviet behavior.[2]

## The Conditions of Involvement

The dilemma of the Soviet Union with respect to Cuba en-

[1]The terms "involvement," "commitment," and "alliance" are used circumspectly since the precise nature and limits of the Soviet-Cuban agreements are unknown to the writer.

[2]For a discussion of projection methodologies, including the one used here, see Daniel Bell, "Twelve Modes of Prediction—A Preliminary Sorting of Approaches in the Social Sicences," *Daedalus,* Summer 1964.



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compasses a number of factors, three of which seem fundamental. The first is geography. Cuba's insularity and location some 6,000 nautical miles from its major protector and provisioner are obvious. What is not so obvious, perhaps, is what this condition implies. From the Kremlin's point of view, the island is indefensible. Put another way, the United States and the Organization of American States (OAS) can take against Cuba a range of conventional military actions to which Moscow could not hope to respond successfully and locally at any conventional levels of conflict. In effect, Cuba represents one global commitment that the USSR cannot defend locally. NATO faces similar situations in Europe. For example, West Berlin cannot be defended locally against a determined attack by the forces of the Warsaw Pact. Both West Berlin and Cuba are enclaves; both are militarily untenable. Their defense rests on the regional and global deterrent postures of the United States and the Soviet Union.

Surely the Soviets recognized their disadvantage in conventional strength at the time of the Cuban missile crisis, if not before. Many analysts of that particular crisis believe Premier Khrushchev hoped to succeed through secrecy and reliance on strategic nuclear power in deterring a possible U.S. reaction.[3] When the element of surprise was lost and the strategic bluff failed, Soviet weakness in the Western Hemisphere became obvious.[4]

While the Soviets' disadvantage in conventional power in the Western Hemisphere has been discussed at length in connection with the 1962 crisis, the effect of this disadvantage on their behavior in future crises does not appear to have received similar treatment.

The second factor in the Soviet dilemma is the policy of the United States and the OAS toward Soviet ties with Cuba. This policy has been shaped by the dramatic events that have occurred in and around the Caribbean since Fidel Castro came to power. These include the unsuccessful Bay of Pigs invasion, the Soviet attempt to convert Cuba into a base for the direct support of strategic offensive weapons, the Dominican crisis of 1965-1966,

[3]See, for example, Arnold L. Horelick and Myron Rush, *Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), and Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter, *Controlling the Risks in Cuba* (London: The Institute for Strategic Studies, 1965).

[4]President John F. Kennedy reportedly viewed the discrepancy in local, conventional power as being of major significance to the outcome of the crisis. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p. 841.



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and recurring endeavors by the Castro regime to spread militant revolution in Latin America.[5]

From these events, three tenets of U.S. and OAS policy have developed which are of particular relevance to this projection. The first is the economic and diplomatic isolation of Cuba within the Western Hemisphere. Put into effect in February 1962, it has the following aims, according to a former Department of State official: "We are committed to do everything we can to hamper the political and social and economic development and prosperity of the Castro regime in Cuba, to make it more costly to the Soviets and less successful, and to encourage the Cuban people to want to change their regime."[6] The embargo makes economic life difficult for Cuba and helps to keep the island almost totally dependent on the Soviet Union. Moscow's economic aid to Cuba was estimated at $370 million in 1966.[7]

Another tenet of current policy is to use force, if necessary, to oppose any threat from Cuba or from outside the Western Hemisphere against any Latin American state. This aspect of policy was demonstrated at the time of the Dominican crisis in 1965, when the United States and the OAS dispatched troops to Santo Domingo. President Johnson further clarified the issue in May 1965, when he said:

The American nations cannot, must not, and will not permit the establishment of another communist government in the Western Hemisphere. This was the unanimous view of all the American nations when in January 1962 they declared, and I quote: 'The principles of communism are incompatible with the principles of the Inter-American system.' This is what our beloved President John F. Kennedy meant when, less than

[5]The notion that the Soviet Union is not likely to provide significant support to Latin American wars of national liberation and, indeed, may want to avoid another "success" like Cuba is well developed by Herbert S. Dinerstein in his article, "Soviet Policy in Latin America," *American Political Science Review,* March 1967.

[6]Statement by former Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Edwin M. Martin, "Castro-Communist Subversion in the Western Hemisphere," U.S. Congress, *Hearings before the House Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs,* 88th Congress, 1st Session, 1963, p. 257.

[7]The $370 million figure for 1966 (over $1 million per day) is regarded as a net loss for the USSR and beyond the capability of Cuba to repay. It consists of Cuba's 1966 trade deficit and the subsidy on sugar which the USSR paid Cuba over the world market price. If average Soviet military assistance and the premium on sugar paid by other communist states are added, total communist aid to Cuba in 1966 was nearer $580 million, or $1.5 million on a daily average. These figures are derived from *Background Notes—Cuba,* Department of State Publication 8347 (December 1967), p. 5, and "International Communism in the Western Hemisphere," U.S. Congress, *Hearings before the House Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs,* 89th Congress, 1st Session, 1965, p. 7.



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a week before his death, he told us: 'We in this hemisphere must also use every resource at our command to prevent the establishment of another Cuba in this hemisphere. . . .'[8]

The third tenet of U.S. and OAS policy is to ban the introduction of offensive weapons into Cuba. While this aspect of policy has been well known since the 1962 missile crisis, it is potentially ambiguous. There are a number of technological systems, such as communications facilities, which are not offensive weapons but which, when emplaced in Cuba, may contribute to the overall offensive capabilities of the USSR.

In addition to geography and U.S. and OAS policy, the client nature of Cuba's economy bears on the Soviet dilemma. The island's dependent economy not only seems to cramp Fidel Castro's political style, but more importantly, it tends to restrict the regime's foreign alignments to one country—the USSR. Cuba has very little capability to influence international events. Castro can use the island as a base for propaganda efforts and can provide some limited support to Latin American insurgencies. However, it is difficult to see how any communist regime in Cuba could survive, without continuous Soviet aid, for more than a few months under the embargo conditions imposed by the OAS.

Albania, with one-seventh the population of Cuba and a more primitive economy, could and did turn to Communist China in June 1960. But Cuba's equally remote location and greater economic needs rule out economic reliance on the Chinese People's Republic so long as the embargo remains in effect.

Cuba's import shipping requirements alone appear beyond the capabilities of Communist China, even if Peking wanted to acquire a Caribbean ally. For example, in 1966 the island reportedly consumed petroleum and its derivative products at an average rate of nearly 100,000 barrels daily.[9] Although this is not an enormous use of petroleum products, the rate of consumption, combined with apparently limited capacity for storage and the great distance from Eurasian sources, probably requires the Soviets to keep twenty to twenty-eight tankers continually shuttling between the Black Sea and Havana on the "oil bridge."[10] This is roughly 10 per cent

[8] *Department of State Bulletin,* May 17, 1965, p. 746.

[9] *Washington Post,* January 3, 1968, p. A-1.

[10] For an estimate of Soviet tanker requirements to maintain Cuba, see Desmond P. Wilson, Jr., "Cuban-Soviet Relations: Conditions and Constraints," in Richard F. Staar, editor, *Aspects of Modern Communism* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1968).



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of the 232 tankers reported in the Soviet fleet as of Januray 1966.[11] A statement by an official of the Soviet Ministry of the Maritime Fleet indicated the magnitude of both tanker and dry-cargo shipping required. The official referred to Black Sea ports as the "gates to Cuba" and noted that there are times when up to twenty ships a day leave Soviet ports for the island.[12] Because of the island's heavy dependence on the Soviet Union, it would appear that Moscow can impose limits on Castro's behavior. The survival of the Castro regime and any future communist regime in Cuba will depend upon operating within these limits.[13]

But from Moscow's point of view the situation may not be a happy one. The Soviets have a difficult ally in the Western Hemisphere, which has pre-empted the label and some of the organizational structure of a communist government; whose great distance from Eurasia precludes any hope of an effective local defense against the forces of the United States; and whose cost to maintain cannot be regarded as trivial.

Moscow might hope to make the costs of maintaining Cuba more acceptable by realizing greater benefits from the island. However, the use of Cuba as a base in support of militant, revolutionary activities in Latin America does not appear promising. Indeed, current policy for the communist parties in the Western Hemisphere emphasizes more peaceful and overt, united-front activities rather than militant revolutionary undertakings. It would appear to be a sensible policy in view of the stated and demonstrated willingness of the United States and the OAS to deny success to communist insurgents, the poor showing in the recent past of guerrilla activities in Latin America, and the likely costs and defensive problems that Moscow would probably inherit if another pro-communist regime should come to power in the Western Hemisphere. Furthermore, any attempt to develop Cuba into a forward base which would significantly and manifestly

[11]As of January 1, 1966, the ocean-going Soviet tanker fleet was reported to consist of 232 vessels totaling 3.4 million DWT. U.S. Department of Commerce, Maritime Administration, *The Soviet Merchant Fleet* (Washington: GPO, 1967), p. 31.

[12]Radio Moscow in Spanish, October 14, 1967.

[13]There are a number of analyses covering Fidel Castro's relationship with the Soviet Union. For three recent studies, which view the Castro regime as economically dependent on the USSR and profess difficulty in seeing any alignment options for a Communist Cuba other than the USSR, see Daniel Tretiak, "Cuba and the Soviet Union: The Growing Accommodation, 1964-1965," ORBIS, Summer 1967: Andres Suarez, *Cuba: Castroism and Communism, 1959-1966* (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1967); and Bayless Manning, "An Overall Perspective," in John Plank, editor, *Cuba and the United States: Long-Range Perspectives* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1967).



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enhance the military power of the USSR would be likely to trigger a response from the United States similar to that in the 1962 missile crisis. Therefore, increasing Cuba's usefulness probably would have to be confined to whatever range of specific activities the Kremlin leaders perceive as falling below the response threshold of the United States.

Moscow might consider disengaging from its involvement in the Caribbean. But any significant reduction in its aid to the island becomes tantamount at some point to abandoning a dependent who probably could not survive—especially under the conditions of economic and diplomatic isolation. The fanfare that accompanied the Cuban revolution and the subsequent Soviet involvement with the Castro regime, including aid and trade agreements and an expanding history of shared experiences, is enough to make it difficult to disengage. Add to this the almost certain demise of the avowedly communist regime, and a planned withdrawal must become even more difficult to contemplate. Not only would the Kremlin leaders be foreclosing on whatever future benefits they see with respect to Cuba, but the Soviet Union's reliability as an ally would also be called in question. In short, withdrawal may have consequences that appear to equal or exceed the costs and risks of retention.

While it is not clear precisely what course will be followed with respect to Cuba, each of the alternatives—to withdraw, to make the relationship more permanent, or to continue at about present levels of involvement—has different implications for Soviet foreign policy.

## The Model

Five variables are used in projecting alternative outcomes. The first three have already been discussed. They develop the contemporary environment of the Soviet-Cuban relationship and are treated as parameters. That is, the geographic constraint on the extension of Soviet conventional power to the Caribbean, the current policy of the United States and the OAS, and the lack of foreign alignment options for Cuba, are assumed to continue. The remaining two variables define the "futures" or outcomes. They are the future Soviet foreign policy toward the United States and the Western alliance system, and the Soviet intention to retain or to withdraw from Cuba. Since neither of these is known, they are assumed to be known for the purposes of the projections.



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Soviet foreign policy toward the Western alliance system is reduced to the single attribute of militancy and then partitioned into two classes. Moscow's worldwide policies can become more militant than its manifest policies have been in the nearly six years since the missile crisis; alternatively, its policies can continue at about the same levels of militancy or lower.

Similarly, the Soviets can choose between retaining or withdrawing their commitments to Cuba. They could also fail to make a decision or be unable to decide. This would be tantamount to a decision to retain, although it probably would be a weakly held one. Obviously their actual decisions will depend on a great number of factors, some of which are unknowable. Others can be subjected to empirical research, such as Soviet objective costs incurred in maintaining Cuba and objective interests which might be served through retaining the involvement. An analysis of both of these is beyond the scope of this article. However, a better understanding of the costs and benefits might better clarify Soviet intentions.

Soviet foreign policy alternatives and Cuba retention or withdrawal intentions combine to yield a matrix with four outcomes. These are: (1) Soviet intentions to renew a hard-line policy toward the Western alliance system combined with the aim of retaining Cuba; (2) Soviet intentions to renew a hard-line policy toward the Western alliance system combined with the aim of withdrawing from Cuba; (3) Soviet continuation of a cautious, less militant policy toward the Western alliance system combined with the aim of retaining Cuba; and (4) Soviet continuation of a cautious, less militant policy toward the Western alliance system combined with the aim of withdrawing from Cuba.[14]

Ideally, these four alternative outcomes will provide a framework for more sharply focused thinking about a range of Soviet options, not only with respect to Cuba, but elsewhere. For example, if the Soviets intend to keep Cuba, exploiting whatever values they perceive in the relationship, then the island becomes a possible constraint on Soviet militancy elsewhere in the world. Put

[14]The four outcomes are developed to the limited extent necessary for an early treatment of some of the considerations affecting Soviet foreign policy as it directly confronts the Western alliance system. Not developed are the implications of the various outcomes for Castro and his regime; the apparently limited "catalytic" actions Castro might take to embroil the United States and the Soviet Union; the implications for the Soviet Union of an internal revolt to overthrow Castro or any follow-on communist regime in Cuba; party relationships between the Soviet Union and Cuba; and other aspects of Soviet and U.S. policy which bear on the overall problem.



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another way, the indefensibility of Cuba and a Kremlin decision to retain the island combine to create a "hostage effect." As a dependent and a responsibility of the Soviet Union in the Western Hemisphere, Cuba is a Soviet vulnerability that the United States can exploit in response to Soviet military initiatives elsewhere. Moscow's awareness of this fact may constrain it from pursuing a more militant policy. The magnitude or the operational significance of the "hostage effect" will depend on how the Soviet leaders assess Cuba in terms of the larger interests of the USSR. Clearly, a strong Soviet desire to keep its ties with Cuba would give the "hostage effect" greater importance than would a weakly held decision to keep the island. Nevertheless, so long as any manifest commitment exists, a constraint of some magnitude is a fact of life conditioning the planning and decision-making environment in Moscow.

There are historical analogies to the notion of a hostage. Canada served as the coupling or "linchpin" in amicable Anglo-American relations through much of the nineteenth century. With the growth of American power following the War of 1812, Britain's diminishing ability to defend Canada from a U.S. land attack became an important element conditioning the foreign policies of Canada, Britain and the United States. Canada's vulnerability is reported to have been instrumental in gaining more benevolent conduct from a superior British Navy toward the United States, in limiting British violation of the Monroe Doctrine, and in persuading the British to be cautious with respect to the American Civil War.[15]

It would be unwise to overdraw the extent or fit of the proposed analogy between contemporary Cuba and nineteenth-century Canada. The test will depend upon the future behavior of a number of actors other than the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, Moscow has demonstrated considerable responsibility with respect to Cuba since the missile crisis. The Soviets' involvement in the Caribbean may have contributed to their more cautious policy toward the United States since October 1962. While Cuba will not be the chief factor determining the Kremlin's future global foreign policy, its existence as a Soviet responsibility at least makes it difficult for the Kremlin to adopt policies that might seem aggressive to U.S. leaders. A brief development of the alternative futures should make the point clearer.

[15]Samuel Flagg Bemis, *A Short History of American Foreign Policy and Diplomacy* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1959), p. 527.



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## The Alternative Futures

The first postulated outcome, combining intentions to renew a hard-line policy toward the Western allies and a decision to retain Cuba, presents Soviet planners with some serious incompatibilities. Plans to initiate a diplomatic or military offensive in areas where Moscow would expect its conventional strength to prevail in a possible engagement with the United States and its allies would have to be taken against the backdrop of Cuba's vulnerability. Indeed, the more assured the Soviets would be of a local success—perhaps in Berlin—the more they would have to worry about contingent Western, out-of-area responses, one of which might involve Cuba.

Soviet advance planning would try to avoid the loss of Cuba. Possibilities along this line include completing an operation so quickly that a meaningful response by the allies, other than in the area of initial conflict, might be construed diplomatically as part of another crisis. By presenting the allies with a *fait accompli,* the Soviets might hope to keep their out-of-area vulnerabilities diplomatically separate from the initial crisis.[16] Presumably such a campaign would be accompanied by threats emphasizing the grave dangers inherent in any out-of-area reaction by the United States, whether against Cuba or not.

If the Kremlin expected a U.S. response to take the form of a blockade of the island rather than a direct military attack, then a supplementary tactic would consist of pre-stocking essential consumables to enable Cuba to withstand a siege. However, if Soviet planning went this far, then presumably it would include a further contingency for ending the blockade before Cuba's essential supplies were exhausted while still attaining objectives in the initial area conflict. Otherwise, under the assumptions of this outcome, there would be nothing to gain in initiating an offensive in the first place.

Although not likely, it is conceivable that through stockpiling, rapidly completed military action and diplomatic decoupling efforts—including threats and warnings against the dangers inherent in an out-of-area escalation—the Soviets might hope to realize

[16]For an interesting description of how the Soviets might combine a lightning-like military operation for a limited objective in northern Norway with diplomatic efforts to contain the conflict, see Nils Orvik, *Europe's Northern Cap and the Soviet Union* (Cambridge: Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, September 1963).



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gains in a direct confrontation with the United States and its allies and still retain Cuba.[17]

This scenario admittedly stretches credibility. But in doing so, it strengthens the point that Cuba may constrain Soviet military initiatives. Provided that the leaders in the Kremlin wish to avoid the loss of Cuba, for whatever reasons, they are not likely to initiate a military action against NATO forces.

A more logically compatible set of aims is the outcome which combines Soviet intentions to renew a hard-line foreign policy with a decision to withdraw from the Caribbean. Moscow's perceptions of Cuba's high costs and lack of promise as a forward base would be reinforced, under this outcome, by a desire to be free of the constraints that derive from having such a vulnerable dependency. Clearly, political and military planning for an offensive in areas of Soviet conventional strength would be greatly simplified if Moscow could be free of its distant entanglement before undertaking an initiative. However, Kremlin leaders might view a crisis situation as providing the opportunity for disengagement. Thus, a withdrawal could come about as a result of a calculated policy in which the "when" and the "how" had been well studied; or, it could result from a situation in which a weakly-held decision to retain Cuba gave way to the pressures of the moment.

Any disengagement tactics will involve costs for the Soviets. No doubt they would be charged with a further crass abandonment of what little spirit remains of proletarian internationalism. Account would have to be taken of the effect on Sino-Soviet relations, on other communist and noncommunist states that might look to the socialist homeland for assistance and protection, on communist party members throughout the world, and particularly on those party and nonparty revolutionaries in Latin America who aspire to control their respective governments. To attenuate the impact of disengagement Kremlin leaders might consider "losing" Cuba in a *quid pro quo* arrangement. For example, they might initiate a military offensive against some limited but important objective, possibly in the NATO region, anticipating that Cuba would be lost in the retaliation measures taken by the United States. The Soviets might then view Cuba's loss as a sop for the United States in a *de facto* exchange for some portion of whatever gains they had

[17]One of the assumptions that runs throughout this and the other projected futures is that the Soviet Union will not deliberately initiate a general nuclear war.



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made at the expense of NATO. In this way the loss of Cuba could be contrived to serve Soviet interests in Europe, and to mollify the allies of the USSR. Given the nuclear deterrent context of great power diplomacy, such a ploy might be extremely difficult for NATO to counter successfully.

Another logically compatible set of aims is contained in the projected outcome which appears to approximate most closely the present situation. This is the combination of a Soviet aim to retain Cuba and to continue a cautious foreign policy toward the Western allies. The Kremlin leaders might expect to hold on to Cuba with reasonably high confidence provided a number of constraints are accepted. First among these would be a policy of continuing to avoid initiating acts that could result in direct military confrontations between the Soviet Union and the United States. Second, with respect to Cuba itself, the Soviets would have to be content with using the island in limited ways so as not to provoke U.S. action to remove Moscow's presence in the Caribbean.

Although Kremlin leaders could never be certain about the response threshold of the United States, a range of potential uses of the island have been or can be identified which would help to justify a retention decision and yet would not be likely to precipitate a confrontation with the United States. There are a number of possibilities along this line that could be meaningful under various time frames and conceptions of Soviet interests.[18] For example, technological systems could be introduced which are much less provocative than land-based missiles but which would still serve both the military and political interests of the Soviet Union. Intelligence facilities and ground stations for communications and satellite-related activities are pertinent examples of technological systems that may be beneficial and of low risk.[19]

Higher risk and more significant military systems, such as submarines or surface ships, might be deployed to Cuba. Initially, intermittent and small-scale deployments could be made ambiguous and difficult for the United States to counter diplomatically, particularly if Soviet behavior elsewhere was amicable and cooperative on contentious East-West issues.

[18]For a more developed treatment of Soviet basing possibilities in Cuba, see Hanson W. Baldwin, "A Military Perspective," in Plank, editor, *op. cit.*, pp. 212-220.

[19]It has been reported that some benefits already are being derived from Cuba. These include a planned ground station for communication satellites and a facility for Cuban and Soviet fishing activities. *New York Times,* December 14, 1967, p. 26.



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There is also a class of long-run economic and political interests that could be served by land facilities in the Caribbean. Actual and potential uses of Cuba include an entrepôt; a rest and repair facility supporting Soviet shipping and trade throughout the Western Hemisphere; a base in support of the Soviet and Cuban fishing fleets; and perhaps, over time, a socialist economic and political model for other Latin American states.

Thus there are possible uses of Cuba that could make retention more attractive, that would justify better the costs incurred, and may still be at an acceptable level of risk in Moscow's relationships with Washington.

The last of the four postulated outcomes combines a cautious Soviet policy toward the Western allies with intentions to disengage from commitments to Cuba. The inability of the Kremlin to make the island serve Soviet interests and the high costs of maintaining a troublesome regime provide ample motives for disengaging. In addition, the Soviets might come to view Cuba as an impediment to more amicable relations with the United States.

Under this outcome one of Moscow's major problems would be how to withdraw without a serious loss of prestige. A communist regime in Cuba, cut off from Soviet aid, would be likely to collapse if the embargo remained in effect. This would make unilateral withdrawal difficult. The Soviet Union is not apt to behave in such an irresponsible manner. There is no readily apparent reason to believe that Moscow regards its commitments to a small state more lightly than does any other major power, even if it does come to view the original commitments as a mistake. A more plausible development under this outcome would consist of a phased disengagement in which Moscow would negotiate for the consecutive removal of the embargo. Unless the political and economic conditions in the hemisphere were such that a reasonably competent Cuban regime had at least a chance for political adaptation and survival, it is difficult to see how the Kremlin could withdraw.

## Conclusions

A number of conclusions are suggested by this particular way of looking at the Soviet-Cuban relationship. First, so long as the most significant threats posed by Cuba can be controlled by the United States and the OAS, it is not at all clear that Soviet involvement



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there is necessarily detrimental to U.S. worldwide interests. Any Soviet commitment to Cuba serves as a constraint of some magnitude on Soviet behavior. If Cuba is perceived as significant and worth retaining over the long run, for whatever reasons, then its "hostage effect" has the potential of conditioning a range of Soviet policy initiatives toward the United States and its allies. Under these conditions, it is conceivable that hostage Cuba could serve to bring about more amicable relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

However, the supposition of Cuba as a hostage, conditioning the behavior of the Soviet Union, will not be free of costs and risks for the United States. Every time the Soviets attempt to make Cuba serve their interests, a response problem will arise for Washington. Deciding whether and how to respond will consist of weighing the hostage value of Cuba as a constraint on Soviet worldwide behavior against the significance of the developing, specific, Soviet use of the island. The Soviets' caution with respect to what they put into Cuba and how they use the island in the future, coupled with a reasonably amicable foreign policy elsewhere in the world, could pose some very difficult, recurring problems for the United States and the OAS.

Another conclusion derives from the converse of the Soviet behavior supposed above. If Cuba is perceived by Kremlin leaders to have little or no promise, then a withdrawal—and particularly an abrupt withdrawal—may be indicative of something far more significant than the elimination of a bad investment and a political irritant. It may signal preparation for, or be accompanied by, a militant offensive in areas where the Soviets enjoy conventional strength and internal lines of communications, without the encumbrance of a Cuban albatross. For the Western Hemisphere states "to regain" Cuba under these conditions would be a policy success defined in very narrow terms.

Finally, the U.S.-OAS embargo on trade with Cuba may serve one quite different purpose from that intended. If one of the aims was to encourage the Soviets' withdrawal by making their involvement more costly, the embargo may in fact serve the opposite purpose of making withdrawal in any responsible fashion more difficult. The embargo makes client Cuba more economically dependent on the USSR. Consequently, it tends to clarify Soviet responsibility for the island and may increase whatever "hostage effect" derives from the Soviet-Cuban relationship. Thus, keeping the Soviets committed may be a worthwhile purpose of the em-



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bargo, at least until their intentions in Cuba and elsewhere in the world become clearer.

Cuba must represent a particularly difficult problem for the Kremlin leaders as they seek to determine the future course of their foreign policy. It is doubtful whether they realized in 1960 the nature of the entanglement that could arise from that distant Caribbean island. While the future of the Soviet-Cuban relationship remains unknown, the changes it will undergo are apt to be related to the larger policy intentions of the Soviet Union.



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# THE EMERGENCE OF BIAFRA: BALKANIZATION OR NATION-BUILDING?

*by Ross K. Baker*

THE Nigerian Civil War, by July 1968, was more than a year old, and the issue of Federal integrity or Eastern Region independence had not yet been settled. As in so many other wars, truth became the first victim. Myths, accusations and exhortations predominate as the verbal medium of exchange between and within the two warring parts of Nigeria. From Lagos, the Federal capital, come charges that the success of Eastern secession will mean the ultimate Balkanization of Africa; that the Ibo tribe which dominates the East is not representative of all Eastern peoples; and that in desperation the leader of the Ibos, Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu, has turned to the hated Portuguese, Rhodesians and South Africans for military assistance, thereby sullying his cause. From Umuahia, the Biafran seat of government, come defiant statements that there is no safety for Ibos or indeed all Easterners in the Nigerian Federation, that the massacres of Ibos which have occurred make coexistence within the Federation impossible.

Although the fighting began on July 6, 1967, the proximate cause dates back to the early morning of January 15, 1966, when five young Nigerian Army majors of Eastern origin kidnapped and killed Prime Minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, his Finance Minister, Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh, Chief Samuel L. Akintola, the Premier of the Western Region, and Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Premier of the Northern Region. On January 16, the Council of Ministers of the Federal government handed over the administration of the country to the Nigerian Army. The chairman of the new military government was Major-General Johnson T.U. Aguiye-Ironsi, who, like the majority of the young majors, was an Ibo tribesman of the Eastern Region. The Ibo officers who had kidnapped and killed Balewa and the others were jailed.

The military government under Ironsi lasted until July 29, 1966, when the Nigerian Army underwent its second agony. On that day Ironsi and a number of other Ibo officers were kidnapped and killed by Hausa officers from Northern Nigeria. Thus,



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between the January coup and the July coup, the communal warfare that was to continue to the present had already begun. In May 1966, widespread demonstrations had broken out in Northern and Western Nigeria against resident Ibos. By August, according to one report, 200,000 Ibos had been killed since the May disorders.[1]

The slaying of Ironsi and the other Ibo officers, following the January coup and slayings, started a process that inevitably culminated in civil war. These dramatic events, however, were only the immediate causes in the etiology of national disaster. For it is difficult to imagine how Nigeria, even without the coups, could have maintained its deceptive stability, let alone dynamic development over time.

## I

It has become commonplace now to ridicule the early sanguine prognostications of Nigeria's future. But in the early 1960's there was indeed a popular mystique which held that Nigeria, unlike the chaotic Congo and dictator-ridden Ghana, had a real chance for success as a democratic state—for it functioned under a competitive party system and parliamentary rule based on the heterogeneous (and presumably benign) ethnic structure and maintained by the adherence of the political elites to British norms of constitutionalism, moderation and fair play. While time has contradicted those who heralded Nigeria as a beacon of democracy and development, such opinions did have currency.

In 1961, for example, David E. Lilienthal drew the following parallel, which was representative of the type of thinking then current on Nigeria:

> Not unlike America, Nigeria is highly diverse—not only geographically but religiously (about half the population is Islamic; the balance is either Christian or has traditional West African religious beliefs), ethnically (there are 250 distinct tribal groups) and linguistically (scores of dialects are spoken). In addition, there are scores of tribal leaders whose secular or religious authority has ancient and deeply honored cultural foundation.[2]

He then called attention to the other parallels and analogies leading the reader to look upon Nigeria as a nascent United States,

[1]Lloyd Garrison, "Revolts Cripple Army in Nigeria," *New York Times*, August 9, 1966. Although this estimate is probably exaggerated, other estimates of 2,000-5,000 err to the modest side.

[2]David E. Lilienthal, "Why Nigeria is 'Different'," *New York Times Magazine*, June 11, 1961.



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but said that "the Northern Region [is] a section almost as different from the Western and Eastern Regions as New York is from Argentina or Morocco."[3]

Since Western observers knew little about developing Africa in those days, it was easy to make similes and draw parallels. Implicit in many assumptions was colonial America as a model of development. In accepting this model one was obliged to equate the relatively homogeneous post-1776 American population with the impermeable ethnic and regional groupings prevailing in most African societies. Only now have we come to realize that "the American experience in nation-building runs directly counter to the arguments of those who would form nations . . . out of various groups of peoples simply by gathering their leaders at one table to draft a binding constitution."[4]

This gathering together of leaders was a salient characteristic of Nigeria's creation. The federation was posited on the good will and common interest of ethnically-based politicians whose influence was usually coextensive only with their native region. Interregional political alliances did exist, but they were more characteristic of dynastic deals than of enduring, pragmatic associations. The federal configuration tied together leaders whose political ground rules were almost mutually exclusive—Akintola, the Sardauna of Sokoto, Azikiwe, Awolowo and Balewa. Jefferson and Hamilton in their most archetypal political stances could hardly have been more irreconcilable than the principal leaders of the Nigerian Federation in the six years of its ascendancy.

One is entitled to ask if the political activities in Nigeria from 1960 to 1966 even rose to the status of "nation-building." What sustained Nigeria for six years was a series of personal political bargains and contracts struck by the principal politicians of each region whose interests momentarily coincided or were harmonized in order to maintain the federation.

In a recent article, Guenther Roth pointed out that

> The foremost task of these [developing] states is the political integration of greatly disparate elements—ethnic, tribal, religious, linguistic, or even economic. Structurally, much of what is today called nation-building should perhaps be called, more precisely, empire building . . . . the problem of empire is the problem of establishing political order in the face of social and cultural heterogeneity. By contrast, nation-building finds

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] Richard L. Merritt, "Nation-Building in America: The Colonial Years," in Karl W. Deutsch and William J. Foltz, editors, *Nation Building* (New York: Atherton Press, 1966), p. 72.



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its historical matrix in the European nation-state, which aimed at the integration of a population with a common culture, especially a common language and common historical legacies shared by various strata. It is no accident that pluralist democracy has been successful on a large scale, only in fairly homogeneous countries.[5]

Nigeria, however, was not even empire building in the sense that Roth uses the term. Roth's concretization is the type of empire exemplified by the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary. To use this analogy in the Nigerian context would be to equate Balewa with, let us say, Franz Josef. This he was not. Conversely, it would imply that the Emperor was *primus inter pares* in association with a Czech and a Hungarian monarch, which he was not. Roth's incisive observations, of course, are meant to apply to the "party-states" of Africa, to use Aristide Zolberg's terminology, where there is a single or dominant nationalist ideology.[6] In Nigeria no single theory or strategy of national development emerged from the fragmented political culture to support the façade of union.

A good many of the misperceptions and sanguine prognostications about Nigeria undoubtedly arose from confusion between physical modernization and political development. There was an abundance of evidence that physical modernization and economic development had progressed well, but few indications that commensurate progress had been made in the political realm.[7]

What had evolved in Nigeria by the end of 1965 was not the building of a single empire but rather of three or possibly four smaller empires which functioned with only casual reference to the titular hegemony of the center. In addition to the fact that regional political power was coterminous with ethnic solidarity, a vast system of corruption permeated both the Federal government at Lagos and the local centers of power. The most blatant cor-

[5]Guenther Roth, "Personal Rulership, Patrimonialism and Empire Building in the New States," *World Politics,* January 1968, pp. 203-204.

[6]Aristide R. Zolberg, *Creating Political Order: The Party-States of West Africa* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966).

[7]The outstanding clarification of this sort of confusion is offered by Samuel Huntington in "Political Development and Political Decay," *World Politics,* April 1965, p. 386 ff. By almost any standard of political development currently applied, Nigeria was at a static or even retrograde stage. In Parsonian terms, there was only superficial or isolated movement from particularism to universalism. To use Deutsch's criteria, social mobilization, participation and communication were more supportive of regionalistic and particularistic political groupings than they were of the federation. See Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," *American Political Science Review,* September 1961, p. 493 ff.



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ruption afflicted the Western Region, where Chief Akintola indulged in overt election-rigging during the regional elections in October 1965. The elections were attended by riots, arson and murder. Prime Minister Balewa refused to quell the disturbances in the West, for in addition to being Federal Prime Minister he was also deputy leader of the Sardauna of Sokoto's Nigerian National Alliance (NNA), with which Chief Akintola was affiliated. The Sardauna was the principal political-religious leader of the conservative Moslem Northern Region. According to one observer, "Balewa's role as deputy leader of the Sardauna's NNA clashed with and took precedence over his duties as Federal Prime Minister. Next came his loyalty to Chief Samuel L. Akintola, his political ally in the Western Region. It is after these priorities that he placed his responsibilities to Nigeria."[8]

## II

Within this setting of executive paralysis and continuing violence the coup of January 15, 1966 took place. The coup was greeted by a feeling of relief. Foreign observers of widely differing viewpoints took a hopeful view of the developments. One source reported that

> The military government has managed to look very good during the first four weeks. It has held down the rather serious tensions within the Army which existed between the *putsch* leaders and their supporters, on the one hand, and the completely different military leaders who finally took over power . . . . the regime was able to restore law and order throughout the country quickly and without effort. In fact, Nigeria is today calmer and safer for the traveler than it was one year ago. The apparatus of the military government was mobilized with admirable speed. . . . The regions, whose disproportionately great power had been the cause of much friction, inadequacy, and duplication of effort still exist—but without ministers and members of parliament.[9]

From another source came similar approbation, tempered with warnings.

> When the military came to power seven months ago, great hopes were put upon them for curing the nation of its ills. However, in fighting for the unity of the nation and remedying the situation, the Ironsi government could not help but infringe upon the positions of the old privileged groups, particularly the rich tribal leaders. In recovering from the first

[8]Gally Brown-Peterside, "Why Balewa Died," *Africa Report*, March 1966, p. 17.
[9]"Effects of the Military Takeover in Nigeria," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, February 16, 1966, Section II, p. 2.



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blows, the old political groupings which had been in power before the coup began immediately to prepare for revenge.[10]

Ironsi had quickly realized that the time for drastic measures was at hand. When he took power he began to alter political and administrative structures in a manner not designed to spare the sensitivities of the old political factions. On January 21, 1966, he announced that Nigeria would be governed by two groups, a Supreme Military Council (SMC) and a Federal Executive Council. These groups would draw up a new constitution. At the end of January, Lt. Colonel Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, Military Governor of Eastern Nigeria (one of four appointed by Ironsi after the coup), announced forthcoming decrees to halt bribery and corruption. His Western Region counterpart, Lt. Colonel Fajuyi ordered a water system for Ondo and Ife to be put into immediate operation. Akintola had ordered this project halted because of the political disloyalty of the people. Fajuyi also removed criminal jurisdiction from the traditional courts which had been used for political reprisal by local leaders.[11]

Then followed the Draconian measures of May 29 that were Ironsi's undoing. On that day he published Decrees 33 and 34, the former calling for the elimination of all political parties and the latter abolishing the federal structure of the country and replacing it with a unitary structure. The leaders of the Northern Region resolved not to let this challenge go unanswered. They met at Kaduna and demanded that Ironsi repeal his decree abrogating the federal structure. This threat coincided with the first of a series of riots against Easterners (principally Ibos) who were perceived by the Northerners to be the sole power behind Ironsi.

Since Ironsi was an Ibo, the coup of January 15 could be viewed as an Ibo affair. The kidnappings and assassinations of that period were carried out by Ibos largely against non-Ibos. The three premiers killed were all non-Ibo, and the five majors who did the killing were Ibo. They were detained but not put to death by Ironsi when he took over from them. Many Ibo politicians, moreover, were as corrupt as the non-Ibos who had been killed, but no Ibo blood was shed. As that group which was most

[10]V. Korovikov, "Nigerian Rotation," *Pravda,* August 20, 1966, p. 3. This favorable Soviet assessment of the Ironsi government is ironic in light of subsequent Soviet support for the Federal government against the Eastern Region, which in many ways is the political and ethnic heir to the Ironsi regime.

[11]"Military Regime," *New Africa,* March/April 1966, p. 17.



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economically and culturally favored in Nigeria, the Ibos were normally regarded as aggressive and domineering by their less fortunate compatriots. Although the Ibos were not the main beneficiary of British culture, they were quick to learn, diligent and adaptable, and overcame by self-help the subordinate status to which they were relegated by the British. They ranged far and wide over Nigeria, filling jobs for which few other Nigerians were qualified. They drove locomotives in the North, taught in the university in the West, engaged in retail trade in the Mid-West. They were, in a way, the human currency of Nigeria's economic development.

It was upon this group of Ibos, far from their native East, that the blow fell in May 1966. For as the Ibos had profited by their own initiative from the period of British colonialism, the Hausas and Fulanis of the North had profited politically, due to the British system of "indirect rule" instituted by Lord Lugard. The British used traditional rulers, especially in the North, as the surrogates for the colonial government and as political middlemen through whom they could rule. This system was much more prevalent in the North than in other areas less remote from Lagos.

The savagery of the attacks on his fellow-tribesmen forced Ironsi to back down and modify his forthright desire to recast Nigeria in a unitary mold. "He explained to the north that only certain civil servants will be appointed from the central government, which unification is to be regarded only as a matter of administrative convenience."[12] He retreated further by saying that, "The Supreme Military Council wishes to reassure the entire nation that this decree was designed to meet the demands of military government under a unified command and to enable it to carry out its day-to-day administration. It has in no way affected the territorial divisions of the country . . . the final decision . . . will be a matter for the constituent assembly and the referendum."[13]

But Ironsi's weakness was now manifest, and as he began to lose control of the political situation in the face of Northern hostility, his control over the army also began to slip. Although the army had posed as the one force capable of unifying Nigeria by virtue of its alleged "detribalizing" effort, events soon demonstrated that it merely mirrored the ethnic fragmentation of the country.

[12]John Hatch, "Nigerian Brinkmanship," *The New Statesman,* June 17, 1966, p. 869.

[13]Quoted in *West Africa,* June 18, 1966, p. 696.



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The belief that the nationalistic, bureaucratic, hierarchical military with its universalist values was a solvent of tribal antagonism dissolved, as fantasies do.

## III

On July 29, 1966, Moslem Hausa soldiers from the North mutinied at Ikeja, Abeokuta and Ibadan in the Western Region, and at Kaduna in the Northern Region. A number of Ibo officers were killed. Ironsi, who was in Ibadan on the day of the uprising, was seized and later killed by the mutineers. Lagos was in turmoil. The Chief of the Defense Staff, Brigadier B. A. O. Ogundipe, now in nominal command of the army, tried to suppress the mutiny and failed. When he sent the Army Chief of Staff, Lt. Colonel Yakubu Gowon, a northerner, to the rebels to negotiate with them, Gowon went over to the side of the rebels, became the candidate of the rebellious faction in Western Nigeria, and was elevated by the rebels to succeed Ironsi. Severe fighting continued during the last days of July as Ibo soldiers resisted the coup, but by August 1 the grasp of Gowon's faction in the garrisons of the West and North was virtually complete.

On August 1, Gowon announced that he had taken over the government and was in full control. During the previous weekend, a cease-fire had been negotiated between the units led by Gowon's group and the forces loyal to the Ironsi government, led by the Military Governor of the Eastern Region, Lt. Colonel Ojukwu. Ojukwu announced that the terms of the cease-fire called for the re-establishment of regions and return to their native regions by all Nigerians living elsewhere in the country.

At this time Gowon requested all regional governors to come to Lagos to discuss Nigeria's problems. Ojukwu, from his headquarters in Enugu, refused to appear in Lagos until he could be assured of safety for himself and his party, for the depredations against the Ibos were continuing in the North and West and the army seemed incapable, in some cases unwilling, to halt them. In the Hausa areas of the North, especially, the local constabulary and army units not only stood by while Ibos were killed by civilians but in some cases participated in the murders. Many Ibos, realizing that their continued residence in the North was at their own peril, began an exodus to the East. In the Eastern Region, Hausa soldiers of the First Battalion at Enugu were cordoned off in their barracks to prevent infiltration by the enraged Ibos and to



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prevent the Hausa soldiers from attacking Colonel Ojukwu's headquarters.

On September 12, 1966, the antagonists finally met at Lagos to assess the chances for continued unity. In his opening address Gowon warned that the dissolution of Nigeria would be tantamount to political and economic suicide. Ojukwu also called for national unity, but only in the context of a loose association in which regions would be virtually sovereign except for a common infrastructure of railroads, airlines and telecommunications. Although he was the heir of Ironsi, Ojukwu realized that the ground rules had been altered by the communal warfare and that only substantial local autonomy could offer sufficient protection to the beleaguered Ibos. Ironsi's unitary scheme was no longer workable.

On September 16 the Lagos conference agreed that the country would split into four politically independent regions with loose economic ties. This appeared to satisfy the "big three" tribal groups—Yoruba, Ibo and Hausa—but was opposed by the smaller tribes who saw in this scheme a tripartite hegemony in which they would be submerged. Much of the objection came from the smaller tribes in the East who feared submergence in the dominant Ibo group. To mollify these tribes, Colonel Ojukwu promised to divide the Eastern Region into twelve administrative units, but said that such arrangements would be purely an internal matter for the East and not subject to alteration or ratification by Lagos. Both the North and East preferred the creation of a central authority to administer railroad, postal, telegraphic and telephone services. Each region, according to the plan, would have its own army and police forces.[14]

Although there appeared to be a fairly high level of agreement on the plan for a loose union, the idea was unacceptable to Gowon, who, under pressure from Northern officers, opposed any plan to split the army. Ojukwu pointed out that a *de facto* Eastern army already existed due to the repatriation of all Ibo soldiers to the Eastern Region. Even as the conference deteriorated into disagreement, the killing continued and streams of Ibo refugees flooded the roads from the North into their native East. Almost two million Ibos made the trek. In Kano, and Zaria, and Kaduna, the riots degenerated into pogroms, and the pogroms into localized genocide. The "Ibo hunters" who roamed the streets of

[14]Donald H. Louchheim, "Nigeria Agrees to Split Into Four Regions," *Washington Post,* September 17, 1966, p. A 1.



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Northern cities were frequently joined by soldiers. In retaliation twenty-five northerners were reportedly killed at Port Harcourt in the East. The polarization of Nigeria's politics, population and emotions now seemed complete.

The situation at the end of 1966 was summed up by one observer as follows:

> Ojukwu's position was . . . that since the "illegal" Northern counter-coup last July . . . not only was no one recognized as Head of the Federal Military Government and Supreme Commander but also that it was impossible for Easterners and Northerners to serve together again in one unified army. . . . The solution he put forward as best for the country as a whole was a confederation of four virtually sovereign states . . . with headquarters in a neutralized Lagos.
>
> The solution put forward by Gowon . . . in a definitive broadcast on 30 November . . . advocated a strong federation based very much on the lines of the 1963 Constitution. Both the Federal/Regional division of powers and the constitutional provision guaranteeing to the several Regional Governments the allocation of certain Federal revenues, particularly those from oil which is mainly produced in the East, were to be retained . . .[and] a reorganization of the country into between eight and fourteen states of roughly equal size.[15]

## IV

On January 4 and 5, 1967, the Supreme Military Council (SMC), composed of Gowon, Ojukwu and other regional military governors, met at Aburi near Accra, Ghana, at the invitation of Lt.-General J. A. Ankrah, Chairman of Ghana's National Liberation Council, to attempt a reconciliation. Ankrah tried to keep the proceedings on a friendly level, and the conference was generally free of rancorous rhetoric. Gowon said at the conclusion of the meetings, "Nigeria will definitely remain united." Ojukwu called the conference "a very big success."[16] Yet despite the apparent good will thus engendered, the crucial issue of whether Nigeria would be a four-region confederation with a weak government at Lagos as Ojukwu wanted, or a pre-1966 federation with a strong central government as Gowon wanted, was never really solved.

On the question of who was to wield authority over legislative and executive functions, the publicly stated views of Gowon and Ojukwu demonstrated that no meeting of the minds existed after Aburi. Gowon, at his press conference of January 26, 1967, stated that Nigeria would return to the constitutional configuration ex-

[15]F.A. Baptiste, "Constitutional Conflict in Nigeria: Aburi and After," *The World Today*, July 1967, pp. 301-302.
[16]*New York Times*, January 7, 1967, p. 8.



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isting before the January 1966 coup; the regional divisions established by Ironsi's Decree 34 would be suspended; the SMC would deal with all matters of national importance, no regional governor would have veto power over SMC decisions, and the concurrence of the Head of the Federal Military Government and the Commander-in-Chief of the Army who was chairman of the SMC would be required for decisions. He held that the agreement of three of the four governors backed up by the agreement of the chairman of the SMC would be binding. Ojukwu felt that the chairman should have no special powers and that decisions should be reached only after agreement by all four governors. To the men around Gowon this arrangement threatened to precipitate governmental paralysis. To Ojukwu, it was the only means to prevent the East from being outvoted and destroyed.[17]

Gowon seemed inclined to go along with the looser form of association and the concept of the consensual executive. Under pressure from Northern officers, however, he apparently had second thoughts on the matter of how much power the central government would have. The Aburi recommendations were never implemented. Ojukwu considered this a manifestation of bad faith. In late February he issued an ultimatum saying that unless the decisions were implemented the East would take appropriate steps on its own. This statement was read in Lagos as a threat of secession, which surely it was.

On March 13, Ojukwu announced that unless the Aburi recommendations were enacted by March 31, he would enforce them unilaterally in the East. On March 17, Lagos issued a constitutional decree according considerable independence to each region but retaining for the Federal government the power to assume control in any region if it should declare a state of emergency or if it violated the constitution. The concession was not sufficient for Ojukwu, and on the date that his ultimatum expired he ordered all revenues that would normally go to the Federal treasury remitted instead to the Eastern government treasury. On April 4, Lagos retaliated by curtailing all air flights into the East and freezing the currency reserves of the region.

A series of concessions was made by Gowon in May to forestall the secession of the Eastern Region, a course of action being openly discussed in the Eastern capital of Enugu. On May 20, he ac-

[17]The one version of the Aburi conference available to me is the one published by the Eastern government, *The Verbatim Report of the Proceedings of the Supreme Military Council Meeting* (Enugu: n.p., n.d.).



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cepted the recommendations of a civilian reconciliation commission to the effect that Northern soldiers be withdrawn from all regions to which they were not native and stationed only in the North. He agreed to lift the economic sanctions against the East imposed in April. He was unwilling, however, to agree to the loose federation that he and Ojukwu had apparently settled on at Aburi.

The last-minute compromise did not work, and at midnight on May 30, 1967, Colonel Ojukwu formally seceded from the Nigerian Federation, proclaiming the breakaway state the Republic of Biafra.

The reaction of the Federal government was immediate. A land and sea blockade was announced, telecommunications links were severed, and the reserves were called up. Gowon declared that Federal forces would be in the secessionist capital of Enugu in forty-eight hours. The Biafrans made no exaggerated claims, but vowed to fight to maintain their independence.

The first military engagement was initiated on July 6, 1967, when Federal forces attacked northeast of Enugu, but the progress of the war has been sporadic. It has been characterized by an intermittent series of sharp engagements with long periods of static warfare in between. Neither army is capable, at this point, of the type of sustained, large-scale campaign required to defeat its adversary completely. As Hugh Hanning has pointed out, "Nigeria's [army] was a model *internal security* army. But it was never intended to act as a conventional war machine. . . . Thus it was inevitable, and some observers predicted as much, that without external assistance, the war against Biafra would go very slowly. . . ."[18]

The war has indeed gone slowly, but it has been no less bloody than a war with continuous engagement. Federal forces pressed hard during July. Then on August 9 a lightning offensive by Biafran forces seized Benin, the capital of the Mid-West state, and set up a short-lived independent republic under Eastern tutelage. By October, the Eastern forces had been pushed out of the Mid-West. The rebel capital of Enugu was occupied by Federal forces on October 4, and Calabar, a principal Eastern city, fell on October 16, 1967. The rebel capital was moved to Aba and subsequently to

[18]Hugh Hanning, "Nigeria: A Lesson of the Arms Race," *The World Today*, November 1967, pp. 467-468. It is significant to note, however, that Federal Nigerian forces have mounted division-sized actions, although their success has not been notable.



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Umuahia. Yet Biafra, pressed in on all sides, continued to remain a viable state. Only recently, since the fall of its last major airport, Port Harcourt, in May 1968, has the prognosis for its future changed. Now famine stalks both sides of the battlelines, and Biafra's beleaguered population is in dire need of food and medical supplies. From a military standpoint, there are petroleum and coal stocks sufficient for three years. Arms and ammunition, which had come into Port Harcourt by air on a regular basis from Lisbon via the Portuguese island of Fernando Po, now must come in by more circuitous routes. Although help from a colonial power such as Portugal is distasteful to Ojukwu, he does not apologize for utilizing these sources. He points to the use of South African and Egyptian mercenary pilots by Lagos as proof that he is no more guilty of violating Pan-African anti-colonial myths in obtaining outside help than is Gowon.

It is upon outside factors, principally world public opinion, that Biafra has been relying. Mounting an impressive public relations campaign that has stressed the past and present wrongs done to Ibos, Biafra has managed to win recognition from the Ivory Coast, Gabon, Tanzania and Zambia. It has brought an end to deliveries of Belgian military supplies to the Federal forces and has brought France to the verge of endorsing Biafran independence.

The crucial fact, however, is that Biafra has looked more like a *nation* than most states in Africa. The ethnically homogeneous population has been mobilized behind Ojukwu. In a short space of time an impressive set of Biafran myths and symbols has been created, and these have been recognized and adhered to by the population. With a population greater than that of Ghana and an extraordinarily high degree of technical talent, Biafra has the potential, depending on the outcome of the war, to develop into a sophisticated, progressive African state. Even non-Ibo Easterners have given a high degree of support to Biafra. Federal troops occupying Eastern towns have tended to treat Ibo and non-Ibo Easterners alike.

## V

To understand how a hastily-built state of fourteen million formed around the nucleus of one tribe could hold out for a year against a state of forty million, one must understand that the one tribe—the Ibo—is one of the most remarkable ethnic groupings in tropical Africa. Until the 1930's the Ibos were the "hewers of wood and carriers of water" for the culturally-privileged Yorubas



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of the West and the politically-privileged Hausas and Fulanis of the North. As of 1931 only one Ibo, Sir Francis Ibiam, had attained a college degree.

> When Dr. Ibiam arrived in Lagos, the best-known and most important Ibo was a £72 [$164.24] *per annum* third class clerk.
>
> The poor Ibos had to go from one Yoruba doctor to another begging for help and [*sic*] get "a notable" to preside at the reception planned for Dr. Ibiam. . . . It was this painful experience that decided the Ibos to form a union—the Ibo Union—which was later to become the most feared organization in Nigeria.[19]

The Ibo Union has as its goal the educational and vocational betterment of the Ibo peoples. While the Yorubas and the Northerners were content simply to maintain their privileged position, the Ibos initiated massive self-help programs, purchased land, established schools, and did without the amenities of modern life in order to establish themselves firmly in the economic and educational elite structure of Nigeria. With a relentless, single-minded compulsion based on strong ties of kinship, ironclad cohesion and self-sacrifice, they emerged at the time of independence as the equals, if not the superiors, of their more complacent compatriots.

The modern Ibo is an amalgam of a strong traditional orientation based on primordial ties; a querulous and obstinate temperament derived, perhaps, from the Irish Catholic missionaries whose schools dot the East; a commitment to national survival springing from habitual self-comparison with the Jews; and a devotion to modern technology and education. Despite the presence of minority tribes, Biafra is his. Its statehood is the embodiment of his drive for self-esteem and identity and he will not relinquish it easily. This makes the Ibo Biafra's main natural resource and the principal reason for its ability to survive.

From a disorganized and demoralized force of 9,000 men at the start of the civil war, Biafra's armed forces now number in the neighborhood of 50,000 regulars and militia. Such weapons as have entered Biafra came in through the land and sea blockade of the Federal forces, yet they reached the hands of the soldiers through a makeshift transportation system built upon private cars, "mammy wagons," and human transport. The Biafran farmer responded to the deficiency in imported foodstuffs by drastically increasing his production of yams and cassavas—yet his effort has fallen far

[19]Sam Uba, "Why Are the Ibos Hated So Deeply?," *Dacca Morning News* (Dacca, Pakistan), reprinted in *Atlas*, March 1968, p. 44.



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short of Biafran needs. Protein deficiency diseases have become widespread and thousands of cases of kwashiorkor (a childhood disease caused by lack of proteins) have been reported.

Aside from rising to the challenge of material deprivation, Biafrans have responded to their encirclement with a determination and spirit reminiscent of the Jews of the Warsaw Ghetto and the Loyalist defenders of Madrid. This is sustained by the communications media. "Even the regional television network is broadcasting—mostly reruns of old American films interspersed with news programs, which often open with recitations of Irish revolutionary poetry and close with 'We Shall Overcome.' "[20] Yet they are increasingly on the defensive against a larger and better-equipped force. Onitsha, an important strategic and commercial town on the east bank of the Niger River, fell to Federal forces on March 22, 1968 after a siege of five months. The repeated Federal attempts to take the town from a base in Asaba on the west bank were thwarted and it became necessary to attack from Nsukka and Enugu in the northeast. The town had been destroyed by almost constant bombardment. Degema in the Niger delta has also fallen, and, most recently, Port Harcourt. It may well be that, in the fullness of time, all of Biafra's principal cities will be occupied by Federal forces, but this will hardly constitute an effective conquest of Biafra. In the opinion of Major Michael Hoare, who is no stranger to African battlefields:

> The terrain was abominable and the battle must be for the road, Burma fashion. There could be no question of outflanking movements through the bush without months of training. I felt that the attitude of the local population toward the invading enemy would finally be the decisive factor in the military problem. Would civilians organize an effective guerilla [*sic*] in the rear of the enemy's advance? Would they harry his long line of communications? On the face of it it hardly seemed probable, but a people fighting for their lives might summon up an unknown strength to survive.[21]

## VI

A conventional battlefield victory may not buy peace for Nigeria, and the leaders in Lagos must ask themselves whether they are prepared to engage in a protracted counterinsurgency effort that will detract from national reconstruction. It is difficult to

[20]Lloyd Garrison, "Biafra vs. Nigeria: The Other Dirty Little War," *New York Times Magazine,* March 31, 1968, p. 44.

[21]Michael Hoare, "No Place for Mercenaries," *Africa Report,* February 1968, pp. 44-45.



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believe that Ibo resistance will decrease in the face of Federal advances and the attendant depredations against Ibos. Some form of Biafran autonomy arranged through mediation could save Lagos from the costly task of subduing one-quarter of Nigeria's population and garrisoning one-quarter of her original territory. To this end, the various international organizations that have already tried their hand at Nigerian peacemaking—e.g., the Organization of African Unity and the Commonwealth Secretariat—or even some *ad hoc* group, might be useful in preventing a hard-line approach by Lagos that could lead to a depletion of Nigeria's resources, a breakup of the Federation, a "final solution" to the Ibo problem or, in the extreme, all three.

If a conciliatory trend prevails and some measure of Eastern autonomy emerges, or if Biafra can hold out beyond Nigeria's ability to persevere, there will undoubtedly be the complaint that the floodgates of Balkanization have been opened. Even if Biafra is crushed, the Ibos subdued and the East brought back into the Federation, Biafra will be pointed to as Balkanization *manqué.*

The issue of particularism is one that generates strong feelings among African leaders; almost every African state has a disgruntled, secession-minded region. Ethiopia has Eritrea, the Congo has Katanga, Sudan has Azania. None of these states would welcome a precedent in the form of an independent Biafra or a largely-autonomous East Nigeria. The fears of some leaders confronted with this problem are real, but it would be incorrect to assume that every ethnic group in Africa would be willing or would have the capacity to establish its own state. Not even the most numerous ethnic groups could convert their traditional areas into economically or politically viable states.

A more pointed refutation of the Balkanization argument, however, is that Africans cannot simultaneously condemn arbitrarily-drawn borders imposed on them by the Europeans and also insist upon maintaining state frontiers as they now exist. It is the right of Africans to change the boundaries rather than to attempt the onerous task of nation-building with cumbersome land masses and hopelessly heterogeneous populations. As the situation stands now, Nigeria is as likely to disintegrate in the long run as Biafra is to collapse in the short run. Particularism is not pluralism, and it seems far better to have compact, viable states than sprawling empires that are incapable of governance and vulnerable to protracted internal strife.



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# MOSCOW, PEKING, AND THE INDIAN POLITICAL SCENE AFTER NEHRU

*by Bhabani Sen Gupta*

A COMPARATIVE study of Soviet and Chinese perspectives on India in the second half of the 1960's will demonstrate that the two great communist powers hold widely different views of their Asian neighbor. The Chinese are hostile to Indian leadership, if not to the Indian state. They occupy large chunks of territory in the Himalayas which India regards as its own; support irredentist movements in Kashmir, Nagaland and the Mizo areas of Assam; question India's special treaty relationship with Bhutan and Sikkim. Moreover, China is friendly with Pakistan, with which India fought a major war in 1965 over the still unresolved problem of Kashmir. Whether or not there exists a mutual defense understanding between China and Pakistan,[1] Chinese leaders have publicly, though unilaterally, pledged support for Pakistan in the event of "another aggression." The Chinese strategic view of India is that it is a major base in an "anti-China alliance," fabricated jointly by the United States and the Soviet Union.[2] With the recent projection of the Maoist revolutionary line to India, the Chinese have adopted a posture of extreme hostility to their southern neighbor.

The Soviet Union, by contrast, is the longest-standing friend of independent India, deeply committed to its economic development and its ability to defend itself. Toward either end, the Soviets have made, and continue to make, substantial contributions. They have given India valuable political support on such vital issues as Kashmir, Goa and the border dispute with

[1]On November 26, 1962, Z.A. Bhutto, Pakistan's Foreign Minister, told the National Assembly in Karachi: "It has been reported that the Central People's Government of China has offered a non-aggression pact to Pakistan. This offer cannot be regarded as inconsistent with our alliances with the West." Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, *Foreign Policy of Pakistan* (Karachi: Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 1964), pp. 30-31.

[2]"Asia, not Europe, is now the focal point for U.S. aggression. . . . Confrontation with China, instead of the Soviet Union, is the military strategy Washington now subscribes to. . . . As part of this strategy, a U.S.-dominated anti-China front is being patched up." ("The Shift in U.S. Global Strategy," *Peking Review,* February 11, 1966.) "The policy of the new leaders of the CPSU is to unite with U.S. imperialists and the reactionaries of various countries in forging a counter-revolutionary ring of encirclement against China." Commentator, in *Red Flag,* reproduced in *Peking Review,* February 18, 1966.



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China. Since the 1950's a major Soviet motivation has been to keep India out of the pale of American power, and for the last decade and more, India's friendship has become essential to Moscow for balancing Chinese power in Asia.[3] Soviet friendship enables India to keep what remains of its once-high prestige in the Afro-Asian community; India is nonaligned largely because Moscow still recognizes it to be so.[4]

Moscow's relationship with India is complex and exposed to numerous stresses and strains largely because of the ideological propulsion of Soviet policies. As the leader of the larger faction of the international communist movement, which claims a scientific insight into the anti-colonial and industrial revolution of our time, Moscow cannot allow its excellent relationship with India to *appear* to be governed primarily by pragmatic considerations; it must be justified on ideological grounds. (Both the ideological and geopolitical aspects of Moscow's relations with India are under strong attack from Peking and from the stronger of the two Indian communist parties.) The basic contradiction in Moscow's Indian policy is that while *ideologically* it has been obliged to retreat considerably from the position adopted in the 1950's, *geopolitically* it is under compulsion to maintain good relations. Moscow has to reconcile its negative ideological assessment of India's internal situation with the national interests of the Soviet Union which require positive steps to cultivate Indian friendship.

An interesting illustration of this dilemma is provided by Kosygin's visit to New Delhi in January 1967, when he stood by the side of Indira Gandhi to watch India's Republic Day parade. The visit had been preceded by Soviet criticism of the dismissal of the communist-dominated coalition government in West Bengal—the sharpest ideological attack by the Soviet Union against India over a twelve-year period. This dichotomy in the Soviet position sometimes places the pro-Moscow Indian Communist Party in a delicate and difficult situation. The old question whether the interests of Indian communism coincide with the

[3]A confidential letter sent by the CPSU to all the parties in the socialist camp toward the end of January 1963 throws much light on Soviet strategy in India. See David Floyd, *Mao Against Khrushchev: A Short History of the Sino-Soviet Conflict* (New York: Praeger, 1964), pp. 366-367.

[4]India admits that it is not nonaligned with regard to China; among the nonaligned neighbors of China, India alone gets military aid from the United States and Britain. "Unlike Burma or Nepal, we are *not* nonaligned in the Sino-Soviet conflict and all our policies must be guided by that consideration." Sisir Gupta, "Living with Problems," *Seminar* (New Delhi), April 1966, p. 25.



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national interests of Moscow or Peking is today a major issue for both factions of the Indian communist movement.

The Soviet Union and China have been involved in an ideological and geopolitical competition over India openly since 1959, and, behind the scenes, probably since 1950-1951. They have accused one another of pushing India into the bosom of the "imperialists" led by the United States. Two major assumptions seem to guide Peking: that the "un-Marxist-Leninist" India policy formulated by Khrushchev at the Twentieth CPSU Congress will prove to be a failure in operation; and that greater American involvement in Indian defense and economic development will deepen the social contradictions in India and thus accelerate the ripening of a revolutionary situation. Peking has, by its own action, sought to help both desired developments.

The CPSU was quite candid in its privately circulated assessment of the major effects of the Sino-Indian border war of 1962: "Thus years of hard striving for Indian friendship and Indian neutrality went for nothing. Not only that—and let us be straight—today the capitalists are supplying arms to India because Chinese aggression forced them to do so."[5] China sought to minimize Soviet influence in India by pushing Delhi into Western arms. By bringing the Kashmir dispute back to life, China was able to demonstrate even in 1962 that it was a power to reckon with in the affairs of South Asia.[6] India's failure to arrive at a satisfactory settlement of the Kashmir issue and her defeat in the border war with China paved the way for the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965 in which Peking played an ominous role. Although one offshoot of the war was an increase in Soviet influence on the subcontinent, symbolized by Tashkent, China had forced Moscow to alter its stand on Pakistan and to recognize it as a country pursuing an independent foreign policy, thereby weakening Soviet support for India's stand on Kashmir.[7] Furthermore, she helped to impose on Moscow the unenviable task of maintaining peace between India and Pakistan and of balancing its policies toward

[5]Floyd, *op. cit.*, p. 366.

[6]The view that the Sino-Indian conflict enabled Pakistan to force India to revive the Kashmir dispute was taken by Mr. Bhutto in his speech to the Pakistan National Assembly on December 4, 1962. See Bhutto, *op. cit.*, pp. 57-58.

[7]Indian press reports have often suggested continued Soviet pressure on New Delhi to reach a bilateral agreement with Pakistan on the Kashmir issue. "What seems to be causing the Government of India even greater concern [than possible Soviet military aid to Pakistan] is the insistent Soviet pressure that we compose our differences with Pakistan—implying, plainly enough, that we should be prepared for a reconsideration of our stand on Kashmir." *Economic and Political Weekly* (Bombay), November 11, 1967, p. 1966.



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them. China expects a loosening of Soviet influence on India as a result of the construction of a friendly Soviet presence in Pakistan. This would be to the good, for the basic concern of the Chinese in South Asia is not and has not been Pakistan, but rather India.

One great virtue of nonalignment was that it gave India considerable immunity from the external power influences operating in South Asia since 1962. Of these powers, the Soviet Union and Communist China are likely to affect India the most in the coming decade. For, in spite of the massive economic aid the United States has given India since the mid-1950's, the American defense commitment to India is still minimal. Of British military presence in Asia nothing will be left in the 1970's. If the Viet Nam war breeds in the United States a general wariness of Asian involvement, South Asia (and perhaps Southeast Asia also) will be exposed to a direct confrontation between Soviet and Chinese power. It is not unlikely that India will be one of the first countries to be affected by this confrontation. This possibility lends additional importance to an objective analysis of Moscow's and Peking's South Asian policies.

## II

The Twentieth Party Congress' ideological euphoria about India was short-lived. Doubts about its correctness began to be expressed by a minority in 1957-1958; by the early 1960's, the voice of dissent became louder. The official academic community in the Soviet Union continued to defend the Twentieth Congress stance for some time longer, but after the death of Nehru the ideological retreat became pronounced in Soviet academic circles.

Clear indication of a new Soviet look at India came in November 1964 when the *World Marxist Review* printed an article[8] by G. Adhikari, a former General Secretary of the Indian Communist Party. Adhikari, who when he wrote the article was a member of the Politbureau of the CPI (the pro-Soviet party following the split), stated that India, under Congress rule, had taken the capitalist road. Worse, it had encouraged the growth of monopoly capital, which was now in a position to "impel the Government towards pro-imperialist and anti-democratic policies." In effect, he admitted that the Twentieth and Twenty-first Party Congresses had been in error about the course Indian

[8]G. Adhikari, "The Problem of the Non-capitalist Path of Development of India and the State of National Democracy," *World Marxist Review*, November 1964, pp. 34-40.



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social development would take in response to economic and technological aid provided by the Soviet bloc. "In the present situation in India," he wrote,

> we have, on the one hand, a bourgeois government pursuing in general *some* democracy, but at the same time using anti-democratic methods, developing capitalism and facilitating the growth of reaction, and, on the other hand, we have the rise of an extremely reactionary trend which is seeking to subvert the national policies and the democracy that exists.

Adhikari did not regard India's state capitalism as a strong enough factor to determine the future direction of the Indian economy; on the contrary, he conceded that the "reactionary" forces in the ruling Congress Party were getting stronger and the "progressive" forces weaker. On the crucial question of the peaceful or non-peaceful path of the Indian revolution, he was ambivalent:

> Everything will depend on whether the force of peaceful mass struggle, isolating the ruling classes, compels them to surrender or they hit back with their armed might at one stage or another. The proletariat and its party must never lose sight of this possibility [of the ruling circles using armed force] and it should be prepared for it. Given such a basic preparation, a switch-over to non-peaceful methods, when required, should not be difficult.

During the short tenure of the prime ministership of Lal Bahadur Shastri the Soviets appeared to be keeping a close watch on the Indian situation. Their primary concern was to prevent the right wing from dominating the Congress Party and the Indian government. Thus, when at the beginning of January 1965 there was speculation in the Indian press about the return of Morarji Desai to the Central Cabinet, *New Times* published an article on the assassination of Gandhi in 1948, the sole purpose of which appeared to be to advise Shastri to keep Desai out. Desai was described in the article as the Finance Minister in Nehru's Cabinet "who had done everything he could to defeat Nehru's socialistic policies."[9] In reviewing the Jaipur session of the Congress in August 1965, *New Times* noted the ruling party's inability to come to grips with major problems, and remarked: "How long the Congress will be able to maintain its influence unless tangible steps are taken to realise the promises of earlier years is a question that now squarely faces its leaders."[10]

[9]I. Andronov, "How Gandhi was Murdered: A Tale of Treachery," *New Times,* January 19, 1965. Andronov had this to say about Morarji Desai, "In a Government pledged to socialism, he became the hope of the vested interests and the inspiration for Right-wing reaction."

[10]V. Yakunin, "Problems of India's Congress Party," *New Times,* March 2, 1966.



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Shastri's sudden death at Tashkent brought Kosygin to New Delhi for the funeral. Indian newspapers reported that his talks were partly intended to explore who would be the next prime minister and what would be his or her broad domestic and foreign policies. That Moscow was primarily interested in keeping the rightist forces in the Congress out of a commanding position in the Indian government became evident when, in February 1966, *New Times* hailed Mrs. Gandhi's election as leader of the Congress Party in Parliament and Desai's defeat, which was ascribed to his "unpopularity as spokesman for the Indian big bourgeoisie and foreign capital."[11] Indira Gandhi, in contrast, represented "that group in the Congress which has consistently striven towards social and economic renewal."

This hopeful stance was, however, short-lived, for soon thereafter *New Times* noted India's increasing dependence on U.S. aid, and "the growing strength of the capitalist monopolies with their close foreign ties," and offered a piece of advice: ". . . it is not enough to adopt good resolutions, they have to be backed by purposeful action by the Congress and Government."[12] Moscow took an increasingly dim view of India as unrest spread over vast segments of the people throughout 1966. In October the Soviets found the draft fourth Five Year Plan inadequate to avoid "increased dependence on the imperialist West" and to provide for "the needs of the masses of the people."[13] As the year approached its end, India had entered an "exceptionally complex political situation," with the Right "making more and more determined efforts to influence its policies."[14]

A sharper and more candid ideological formulation on India came after the general elections. There was now no praise for Indira Gandhi; her Cabinet was "a coalition of the ruling party's centrist and rightist elements."[15] A major development in the Indian elections was the ousting of the Congress from power in nine states, and Moscow categorized these non-Congress coalitions into four classes: the leftist-dominated governments in Kerala and Bengal; the rightist-leftist coalitions in Punjab, Bihar, and Uttar Pradesh; the rightist coalitions in Hariana, Orissa, and Madhya

[11]G. Drambyants, "India's New Prime Minister," *New Times,* February 2, 1966.
[12]P. Nikolsky, "Nehru's Party without Nehru," *New Times,* August 11, 1966.
[13]A. Vladin, "The Indian Economy," *New Times,* October 9, 1966.
[14]Y. Gotlober and Y. Shtykanov, "Towards Election Time in India," *New Times,* September 21, 1966.
[15]A. Usvanov, "The New Indian Cabinet," *New Times,* March 29, 1967.



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Pradesh; and Madras, "a class by itself," with a government formed by the "local democratic party, DMK."[16]

A more penetrating analysis of the socio-economic alignments in India brought about by the elections appeared in the April 1967 issue of *International Affairs*.[17] In this article, M. Savelyev found a radical shift within the system of Indian big business and in the Indian monopolies; these had seriously extended their control over vital sectors of the Indian economy. Large-scale alignments had occurred between the Indian national bourgeoisie and Western monopoly capital; jointly, they were putting pressure on the government to abandon its progressive domestic and foreign policies. Monopoly interests had wrested major concessions from the government and had massively entered fields hitherto reserved for state capitalism, including vital defense industries, and Indian monopoly had accepted the domination of imperialist monopoly capital. These combined forces of reaction had already to a large extent undermined state capitalism; in certain fields state capitalism had even strengthened the importance of the private monopolies. Indian monopoly bourgeoisie with the support of the West had launched an open campaign for power. Big business actually chose the election candidates for the Congress Party and was trying to reorganize it in a radical way. "Given the present balance of forces in the Indian National Congress, is not the election victory a triumph for big monopoly capital?"

If Savelyev's question was posed to Soviet policymakers, he also made it clear that the adverse trend in India had been known to Soviet "scientists" for a long time.[18] If Moscow gave no evidence of having formulated a clear answer to the question, it was ap-

[16]Y. Gotlober and Y. Shtykanov, "Indian Political Scene," *New Times*, November 29, 1967. The timing of this article is interesting; it was published *after* the West Bengal leftist coalition ministry was dismissed by the Governor on November 21, 1967. The news of the dismissal was carried in a box along with the article.

Also of interest is the Soviet assessment of the role of the various non-Congress state coalitions. While the Chinese had dismissed the West Bengal and Kerala governments as parts of the landlord capitalist Indian state apparatus, the Soviets commented: "It is still too early to pass any final judgment on the activities of the state governments, in which the Communists are represented. These governments, in particular those in Kerala and West Bengal, are encountering great difficulties. Nevertheless, despite their limited possibilities, they have outlined progressive measures and already carried out some."

[17]M. Savelyev, "Monopoly Drive in India," *International Affairs*, April 1967, pp. 35-40.

[18]"It cannot be said that scientists have been unaware of these economic, social and political processes in India. More is now being said about them in view of the increased political activity of the Indian monopoly bourgeoisie and, consequently, of imminent clashes in Indian society and potential departures from the established neutral course in foreign policy."



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parently because of the compelling necessity to maintain friendly relations with the Indian government. References to India were therefore muted in the published report of an academic appraisal of developments in the Third World held in Moscow at the beginning of 1967. In the twenty-page report there is, however, a categorical admission that "in India the national bourgeoisie and the landowners are in power" and that "capitalist relations are developing apace."[19]

The pace of events in India compelled Moscow to adopt a sharper ideological line before 1967 was out. The dismissal of the Bengal United Front government opened the way for a further realignment of political forces in India, and Moscow saw in this development the possibility of the Congress going still farther to the Right. In a broadcast to India on November 29, Moscow Radio said that the country's "progressive gains, its independence and its foreign policy are threatened"; there was a call to the Indian people for resistance. What was at stake was much more than a communist-dominated government in Bengal:

> If the reactionaries are allowed to use the fruits of their intrigues in West Bengal, tomorrow they will encroach upon the coalition governments of Kerala, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. There is no guarantee that they will not try to take over at the Centre and dangerous symptoms are already present. . . . The hand of reaction raised above India's future must be stopped.

Moscow Radio broadcasts not only supported the mass struggles in Calcutta against the dismissal of the coalition government, but actually urged the Indian people to fight in defense of their Constitution.[20]

Moscow was aware that the CPI was taking a leading role in the West Bengal agitation and that the target of the agitation was the central government on whose order the Governor had dismissed the United Front government. In all Soviet comment on the In-

[19]"Immediate Problems of the National-Liberation Movement," *International Affairs,* May 1967, pp. 51-78. For the reference to India see V.L. Tyagunenko, "Capitalist and non-Capitalist Development," pp. 56-57.

An editorial note at the end of the summary suggested a serious, continuing debate in the Soviet Union on the question of the national liberation movement. "It goes without saying that some of our conceptions which took shape in the stormy period of the national liberation movement are now undergoing certain changes. . . . There may be some differences of standpoint on the problems facing the developing countries, and these at the present stage have been given more attention. This is because the liberation revolutions, having entered a new stage, confront scientists and Marxist science as a whole with entirely new problems whose solutions demand a great deal of time and effort."

[20]Moscow Radio, Peace and Progress in English to Asia, 1130 GMT, November 29, 1967.



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dian situation, however, criticism of the Indian government was carefully omitted; for the dismissal of the United Front government, only the big business moguls and landlords of West Bengal were held responsible.[21] Interestingly, even while Moscow Radio was criticizing the action of the West Bengal Governor and warning the Indian people that their democratic Constitution was in danger, a Soviet delegation was negotiating a new trade agreement in New Delhi, and soon thereafter it was announced that Kosygin would be paying an official visit to India. This visit ironically coincided with the fall of the United Front government in Bihar following the defection of a small faction, which was then allowed to form a new government with the support of the Congress Party.

Moscow hinted broadly that it attached great importance to the Kosygin visit. In January, Soviet criticism of political events in India was muted. First Deputy Chairman Kirill Mazurov praised India's foreign policy at an embassy reception in Moscow and promised continued economic aid.[22] *New Times* in an editorial said that Soviet-Indian friendship had passed the "acid test of time"; the Soviets were "vitally interested in that India firmly stands on its feet economically, and makes progress in solving its social problems."[23] A Moscow Radio broadcast was somewhat more communicative about the purpose of the visit: India, it said, had passed through a difficult year, and was facing numerous problems.

> The forces of reaction sought to use the difficulties to sway the country from the traditional path of non-alignment and planned progress. The struggle is assuming varied forms, and, in this contest, the vast masses of Indian people and forces of democratic progress value even more every step that strengthens Soviet-Indian friendship.[24]

Kosygin reportedly decided on the visit quite suddenly at a time when the Indian Embassy in Moscow had almost despaired of getting the Soviet Prime Minister to make the trip in response to an invitation made a year before. Indira Gandhi was said to have agreed to the visit without consulting her Cabinet, and when Kosygin asked for two long private talks with the Indian Prime Minister, there were rumblings of protest from individual Cabinet

[21]". . . feudal elements and monopolists who had opposed progressive changes being brought about by the leftist united front had a big hand in the dismissal of the Mukherji government." Moscow in Hindi to India, 1130 GMT, December 4, 1967.

[22]Moscow Radio, TASS International Service in English, 1810 GMT, January 26, 1968.

[23]*Ibid.*, 2030 GMT, January 24, 1968.

[24]Moscow in English to South Asia, 1600 GMT, January 23, 1968.



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ministers as well as in the Congress Parliamentary Party. Perhaps to assuage ill feeling, Kosygin also met with Morarji Desai separately.[25] His talks with Indira Gandhi covered the whole gamut of subjects ranging from economic affairs to foreign relations. The communiqué issued at the end of the talks indicated that the Soviet Union was still ready to go a long way to help India restore her economic health and remain steadfast in her foreign policy. Much of the discussion was said to have related to China, Pakistan, and the role of the Indian communist movement. Kosygin reportedly reassured Mrs. Gandhi that he expected no Chinese invasion of India; he was doubtful "whether the present Chinese regime would even last long."[26] The communiqué made it clear that Kosygin expected India and Pakistan to "exert all their efforts in order to bring about a further normalisation of their relations and for the creation of an atmosphere conducive to the solution of the outstanding problems through bilateral contacts." In conversations with Indian leaders he pointed out that it was only with Pakistan that the Chinese had not spoiled their relations; the reason for this, he said, was that the two countries had common interests against India.[27] The visit resulted in agreement to hold consultations between Moscow and New Delhi at different levels and at regular intervals on economic as well as political matters.

Moscow apparently chose a crucial moment in India's political life to intervene strongly with the Congress government to keep Soviet-Indian friendship and collaboration in business. The backdrop to this Soviet effort, which one leading Indian commentator compared in significance to the Khrushchev-Bulganin tour of India in 1955,[28] was provided by the deepening political crisis in India, a serious intensification of the war in Viet Nam, and the proposed British military withdrawal from Asia by 1971. Kosygin's primary concern in India appears to have been to ensure the continuity of the country's middle-of-the-road domestic policy and foreign policy of nonalignment, and, in the subcontinent, a durable peace. The *Times of India* reported that Kosygin asked Indian leaders whether India could fill the power vacuum in South Asia following the British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf area. While Soviet diplomacy was said to be trying to pre-empt the

[25]Dilip Mukherji, "New Turn in Indo-Soviet Relationship," *The Statesman* (Calcutta), February 2, 1968.
[26]*The Statesman* (New Delhi), January 30, 1968.
[27]Mukherji, *op. cit.;* Mukherji also reported Tito's concurrence with this view.
[28]*Ibid.*



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emergence of a U.S.-backed regional alliance in South Asia and the Near East, Kosygin was credited with the view that there could be no stability in South Asia without a "modus vivendi in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent."[29]

The Chinese viewed the Kosygin visit as clearly an anti-China move in South Asia. "Commentator," writing in *People's Daily* on February 5, described the visit as a "new step by the Soviet revisionist renegade clique to step up the aid it gives India against China, and, acting in co-ordination with US imperialism, to expand the US war of aggression in Vietnam and actively peddle the 'peace talks' fraud." Noting that the visit was made when India's "political-economic crisis" was "steadily" deepening, and "the people's struggle against starvation and tyranny" was developing "day by day," "Commentator" asserted that the Soviet Premier's purpose was "to boost the morale of the reactionary Congress Government in the hope of keeping this tossing ship afloat in the raging revolutionary torrent so that the Indian reactionaries can continue to serve as a tool in the joint US-Soviet opposition to China."[30]

## III

The Chinese seem to have regarded the death of Nehru and the ouster of Khrushchev as signs that relations with India might be improved. Between June 1964, when Shastri became India's Prime Minister, and early the next year, Peking Radio played down its anti-Indian propaganda; there were few references to India's internal difficulties and the threatening food crisis. In a significant gesture, Peking chose the occasion of the second nonaligned summit conference (Cairo) in October 1964 to make its last offer (to date) to settle the border question by negotiations.[31] The importance of the offer is enhanced by the fact that Shastri attempted, though without much success, to play an anti-China role at Cairo. In a statement issued at Peking on October 9, the Chinese government declared its readiness to start negotiations "at any time and at any place" with India, "with the Colombo proposals as the basis." Either side could raise any issues it thought "necessary." For Peking the border situation had "on the whole

[29] *Times of India* (Bombay), February 4, 1968.

[30] "What Kosygin was up to in India," *People's Daily*, February 5, 1968, in *Peking Review*, February 9, 1968, p. 10.

[31] For the text of the Chinese government statement, see *Peking Review*, October 16, 1964, pp. 6-7.



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eased"; it did not "feel threatened by India" in spite of the fact that India had received "large quantities of foreign aid."

Even the lack of a positive Indian response to the October 9 offer did not provoke Chinese anger. Chou En-lai, in his report to the first session of the Third National People's Congress in Peking, in December 1964, reiterated China's desire to settle the border question peacefully, and added, "but if India is determined not to have negotiations, no matter; we can wait."[32]

What China was then waiting for was not a change of outlook in New Delhi but a change of outlook in Moscow. The Chinese were dismayed when it was not forthcoming. Attacks on India were resumed in January and February 1965 when New Delhi supported several peace moves in Viet Nam and offered one on its own which Peking thought was Soviet-inspired. It was Shastri's Moscow visit in May that persuaded the Chinese leaders to believe that he was following the "Nehru line" much as the new Soviet leaders were following the old "Khrushchevian revisionist line." In *People's Daily,* Shastri was described as a "rare anti-China cavalier as well as Washington's pet"; the Soviets were taken to task for "applauding" Shastri's "slanders" against China, and the conclusion became "clear" that "the Soviet leaders and the Indian reactionaries are bedfellows in opposing China."[33]

The fear of a USSR-Indian "alliance" to contain China led Peking to fortify its friendship with Pakistan. China supported Pakistan during the Indo-Pakistani "little war" in the Rann of Kutch in May: the first Chinese intervention in a conflict between the two partners of the subcontinent.[34] This was followed by a much more serious intervention during the Indo-Pakistan war in September—evidently the result of much serious thought in Peking and secret diplomacy with Pakistan. The Chinese action seemed designed to keep the subcontinent sharply divided and to prevent Pakistan from entering the "anti-China alliance." To achieve this end, Peking took several anti-India moves. It championed the Kashmiri people's "right to national self-determination"; threatened to intervene militarily in Sikkim during the crucial

[32]"Premier Chou En-lai Reports on the Work of the Government," *Peking Review,* January 1, 1965, p. 19.
[33]*Peking Review,* May 28, 1965.
[34]The Chinese view, put out in a Hsinhua report, was that the war was the result of an Indian attempt to "occupy the disputed territory by force"; it smacked of India's "policy of armed expansion," of "bullying its neighbours" with the massive arms aid it was getting from the United States and the USSR. Pakistan and China were both victims of Indian aggression. *Peking Review,* May 14, 1965.



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stage of the Indo-Pakistan war; mounted a virulent propaganda campaign, after the cease-fire, against the Tashkent accord; offered economic and military aid to Pakistan, despite the latter's unwillingness to denounce her alliance with the United States and desire to promote friendly relations with Moscow. In November 1965 the Chinese brought up the Indo-Pakistan war as one of the major issues dividing them from the new Soviet leaders.[35] And during their visit to Pakistan in February 1966 Liu Shao-chi and Chen-yi gave categorical assurances of Chinese support and assistance in case of further Indian "aggression" against Pakistan.[36]

Peking appeared to be making a fresh ideological appraisal of the Indian internal situation at the beginning of 1966—from the perspective of China's geopolitical interest in the subcontinent and her assessment of the place occupied by India in an anti-China alliance supposedly sponsored by Moscow and Washington. Economic and political weakening of India by inciting discontent and protest movements against the Indian government seemed, in the early months of 1966, to be the major objective of Peking propaganda. A propaganda offensive along these lines had to be justified by a revolutionary interpretation of Indian realities. Thus in February, Peking Radio began to speak of a "determined revolt" of the Indian masses against the policies of the Congress leadership. In March the radio reported "frequent peasant struggles in the countryside" against the landlords and the government, and demonstrations throughout the country in which "two million people" had taken part.

It was only after the official launching of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in August 1966 that Peking developed a clear and completely independent ideological line for India. The general guideline was provided by the communiqué formulated at the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the CCP and issued on August 12: The world was now in a "new era of revolution"; all political forces were undergoing a "process of great upheaval, great division and great reorganization."[37]

Peking's propagandists and ideologues began to formulate the theme of a mighty national revolutionary upsurge in India com-

[35]"Refutation of the New Leaders of the CPSU on 'United Action'," by the editorial departments of *People's Daily* and *Red Flag*, in *Peking Review*, November 12, 1965, p. 14.

[36]*Peking Review*, April 1, 1966, pp. 5-7.

[37]For the text of the communiqué, see *Peking Review*, August 19, 1966, pp. 4-8.



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prising broad sections of the Indian people—students, government employees, traders and businessmen, workers and peasants, the intelligentsia, national minorities, and the rank and file of almost all political parties, ranging from the extreme Right to the extreme Left. Until August 1966 it had been the "struggle of the Indian people against persecution and for subsistence." With the launching of the Cultural Revolution, however, it became a different kind of struggle, because of its nationwide dimensions, and because people had begun to use "violence to deal with the armed suppression by Government authorities."[38]

When, in the autumn, unrest spread among Indian students, Peking spied the first sparks of a revolutionary fire.

> In India, a students' movement of unprecedented scale against the reactionary Congress Government has swept through major cities in the North like a tempest and is rapidly spreading southward to other cities.[39]
>
> Excellent is the situation of the Indian people's struggle since the beginning of this year. The struggle is spreading to the whole country on an unprecedented scale, in which more than ten million people have taken part. It is evident that the struggle is extending its scope from the field of economics to that of politics. The surging waves of the Indian people's struggle show that the various political forces of India are undergoing a great political upheaval, a great division and a great reorganization.[40]

The Maoist strategy of the broadest possible united front against the "reactionary Indian authorities," big landlords and big capitalists, now began to unfold rapidly through daily Peking Radio broadcasts to India. In October the Indian people had "resorted to revolutionary violence" and had begun to see through the smokescreen of the doctrine of nonviolence, with which "narcotic" the ruling classes sought to "split and dissolve [their] revolutionary struggle."[41] In November, "Indian peasants in various districts. . . have begun to stand up and fight for their survival," and the students' movement was transformed into a "united struggle of all strata of the Indian people."[42] In December, "Government employees throughout the country are rising in rebellion."[43] A month later, the Nagas and the Mizos

[38]Peking Radio, evening English transmission to India, October 8, 1966.

[39]Evening Hindi and English transmission to India, November 16, 1966.

[40]A news commentary during the late evening transmission to India, October 10, 1966. For an ideological attack on Indian nonviolence, see *Peking Review,* October 14, 1966, p. 34.

[41]Late evening transmission to India, November 14-15, 1966.

[42]Evening transmission to India, December 10, 1966.

[43]Evening transmission to India, December 24, 1966.



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were conducting their armed struggle for "national self-determination" and "national salvation."[44]

At the beginning of 1967 Peking found the Indian situation even riper for a Maoist-type revolution. The "storm" of the Indian mass struggle was now "making a violent assault on the rule of the Indian reactionaries"; workers had emerged as its "main force," and it was "spreading to the villages," which was "highly significant." The biggest gain was that the "broad masses" had realized that the "root cause of their impoverishment" was the "reactionary rule of the Congress Government which represents the interests of the big bourgeoisie and the big landlords." However, the Indian struggle would be a long and protracted one, with many "difficulties and twists and turns" to be overcome.[45]

The February elections, in Chinese eyes, only further sharpened Indian class contradictions and made the classes increasingly antagonistic to one another. It brought to the center a government "more reactionary than ever" and "still more subservient to US imperialism and Soviet revisionism"; but its great significance was that in several states it broke the "monopoly of local power" of the Congress Party and made it "ineffective in the face of people's resistance."[46] However, it was entirely mistaken to think that the non-Congress governments were in any way progressive and that substantial advances in the interests of the people could be achieved peacefully, through the parliamentary method. The formation of non-Congress governments in several states merely indicated the "decay and decline of the Congress party." Those who had assumed power in the non-Congress states were "from top to bottom" the "local feudal-comprador forces" and, therefore, "no different" from the Congress governments; "the reactionary role of the political regime has not changed in the least." Only in two states, Kerala and Bengal, were the communists partners in

[44]It is interesting to trace the ideological and geopolitical evaluation in Peking of the tribal rebellion on the eastern frontier of India. Throughout 1966 the Nagas and the Mizos were waging only an "armed struggle" against the Indian government, without any specific goals being mentioned. In January 1967 it was the "heroic armed struggle" of the Mizos and the "armed struggle" of the Nagas against the "reactionary Congress Government's genocidal policy towards them." A little later, the Mizos were fighting for "national salvation." Also, at the beginning of 1967 Peking Radio began to quote Pakistani newspapers to report on the armed struggle of the Nagas and Mizos, thus fostering Indian suspicion of Pakistan's active support for them, and indirectly urging Pakistan to undertake such support. Indian newspapers have reported the presence of Chinese personnel in the hostile Naga areas. See *Times of India* (Bombay), February 4, 1968.

[45]"India: Anti-Tyranny Struggle Rocks Reactionary Rule," *Peking Review,* February 24, 1967, p. 29.

[46]"After the Indian Elections: A Still More Reactionary Government," *Peking Review,* March 24, 1967, pp. 29-30.



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coalitions; but even these two governments were "component parts of the state apparatus of India's big landlords and big bourgeoisie." Under the direct control of the central government, "they are completely unable to either introduce any reforms in substance or shake the foundation of the capitalist and feudal relations of production." The elections had left India "littered with dry faggots," but there were dangerous possibilities of the rising revolution being betrayed, and the greatest danger came from the revisionists in the Indian communist movement, certainly not confined to the Dange "clique."[47]

Peking ideologues therefore intervened in June 1967 to lay to rest the myth of "peaceful transition" to socialism via the parliamentary way. They warned the CPI (M) ("pro-Peking" or "Marxist" breakaway Communist Party of India) to pay no heed to the revisionist conspiracy to unite the two CPI's; it must abandon the idea that the Indian revolution could be advanced by contesting elections and entering governments under the direct control of the center. The two left-coalition governments in Kerala and Bengal were merely being used by the central government to put down the people's movement and to contain the coming revolution. The Indian people had only one task to perform: to wage "relentless armed struggle" in order to "overthrow" the government and "forcibly seize power."

By the time this call came from Peking in the form of an article in *People's Daily* written by a "Red Guard" (the contents of the article were repeatedly broadcast to India in various transmissions beginning on June 10), peasants at Naxalbari and two adjoining villages in the Darjeeling district of north Bengal had risen in revolt, furnishing Peking the signal it had long been waiting for. Peking depicted Naxalbari as a "Red district" encircled by a "White regime"; it had "raised the Red flag" and was the "prelude to a violent revolution by hundreds of millions of people throughout India." Naxalbari was the result of the militant action of the "revolutionaries" of the Indian Communist Party who had "deserted the united front government" in West Bengal because "it served as a tool of the Indian reactionaries."[48]

*People's Daily* now laid down the Maoist line for India in clear, unmistakable terms. The Indian revolution "must take the road of relying on the peasants, establishing base areas in the countryside,

[47] "Dange's Plot to Sabotage Indian People's Revolution Will Surely Fail," *Peking Review*, June 9, 1967, p. 34.
[48] "The Darjeeling Peasant Armed Struggle," *Peking Review*, July 14, 1967, p. 25.



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persisting in protracted armed struggle and using the countryside to encircle and finally capture the cities."[49] The city-orientation of Indian communist strategy must be given up and the peasants made "the invincible force of the Indian revolution"; the proletariat must therefore integrate with the peasants. Since the reactionary forces were "temporarily stronger than the revolutionary forces," communists must use the "whole set of the flexible strategy and tactics of people's war" and "persevere in protracted armed struggle." This armed struggle must begin in the countryside "where the reactionary rule is weak" and where "the revolutionaries can maneuvre freely." It mattered little if the beginning was small and if the peasants had to fight at first with bows and arrows; as long as the communists adhered to the Maoist line and relied on the peasants, "it is entirely possible for them to advance from one revolutionary rural base to another in the huge backward rural areas and build a people's army of a new type." There will, of course, be "twists and turns" and "difficulties," but eventually the communists will be able to develop "from isolated areas into a vast expanse."[50] And as if to drive the point home, the Chinese began to see "dozens of Naxalbaris" appearing "in all parts of the Indian countryside."[51]

To help them enhance their strength, the Chinese set about telling the Naxalbari revolutionaries how to conduct their struggle. They must "adhere to mobile and flexible guerrilla tactics" in order to avoid the mopping up operations of the police and to break out of "encirclements."

> So long as these revolutionary forces are good at employing the tactics of "the enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue . . .," they will be able to gather strength and exhaust the enemy's effectives. . . . To gain a firm footing and to stick to long-term armed struggle, the revolutionary peasant forces must set up and expand their base areas in the countryside.[52]

Reports published in the Chinese press, when broadcast over the radio, took on the aspect of programmatic instructions.

> They [the peasants of Naxalbari] have started to set up their own regime and organize peasant societies. The rebel peasants occupied by force the land of the landlords, the plantation holders and the reactionary gov-

[49] *Ibid.*, p. 24.

[50] Commentator, "Let the Red Flag of Naxalbari Fly Still Higher," *People's Daily*, August 3, 1967, in *Peking Review*, August 11, 1967, p. 21.

[51] "Dozens of Naxalbari," *Peking Review*, July 28, 1967, p. 31.

[52] Commentator, "Historical Lessons of Telengana Uprising," *People's Daily*, August 3, 1967, in *Peking Review*, August 11, 1967, p. 23.



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ernment. They ploughed the land, drove away the plantation holders, seized grain, guns and ammunition from the homes of the big landlords, collected money and grain from the landlords and eliminated hoarding and speculation. They established people's courts to put on trial and punish the stubborn local police and their accomplices. They move about in armed bands, and women are also seen marching ahead of these bands. The rebel peasants guarding their hamlets with bows and arrows have made many successful ambushes against the reactionary troops and police.[53]

As might have been expected, the Chinese invoked the Telengana uprising of the late 1940's as the correct road for the Indian peasant revolution; they linked Naxalbari with Telengana and implied that Naxalbari possessed some vital qualities needed for a protracted armed struggle that Telengana had lacked. Naxalbari was the "rekindling" of the "torch of armed revolution once lit by the peasants of Telengana"; "that red torch lights the road to victory for the Indian revolution."[54] Naxalbari had the strategic advantage that Telengana lacked: it is "only four miles from Nepal, 30 miles from Sikkim, 14 miles from East Pakistan and 60 miles from China's Tibet."[55] The implication clearly was that an expanded armed revolutionary base could in certain circumstances be fed from a rear base and a sanctuary; the Chinese probably had in mind an argument advanced by some of the leaders of the CPI in 1951 justifying the termination of the armed struggle in Telengana because it did not have such a rear base.[56]

In Chinese calculations the threat to Naxalbari came not so much from the Indian "reactionaries" as from the revisionists in the communist movement who had betrayed the Telengana uprising and who were about to betray Naxalbari too. They had to be mercilessly exposed. Peking therefore mounted a vehement attack on the "revisionist" leadership of the CPI (M)—first, the Chief Minister of Kerala, E.M.S. Namboodiripad, with whom it had many old scores to settle, and later, after the dismissal of the West Bengal United Front government, men like Jyoti Basu who had been deputy chief minister in that government, and Harekrishna Konar, its minister for land revenue. Namboodiripad and his colleagues were "faithfully adhering to the reactionary and traitorous policies of the Congress-ruled Central Government"; they had

[53]Peking Radio transmission to India, July 10, 1967. Compare this with relevant paragraphs in "The Darjeeling Peasant Armed Struggle," *op. cit.*, p. 24.

[54]"The Darjeeling Peasant Armed Struggle," *op. cit.*, p. 22.

[55]"The Darjeeling District," *Peking Review*, July 14, 1967, p. 25.

[56]See John H. Kautsky, *Moscow and the Communist Party of India* (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1956), Chapter 3.



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"babbled much about the 'parliamentary road' and 'peaceful transition,'" but actually they "stand firm against the peasant armed struggle"; worse, "they hanker after high office. . . and seek to have themselves elected." There were "many facts to show that the Kerala state Government which enforces the fascist rule of the central government is part of the state machine operating in the interests of the landlords and the bureaucratic-comprador bourgeoisie": Namboodiripad acts as "an apologist and protector of the international agents of US imperialism."[57]

When, at the beginning of 1968, Peking ideologues summed up Indian developments during the preceding year, they came to four broad conclusions. The first was that an Indian revolution had become an important factor for the triumph of Maoism in Asia, for "India occupies an extremely important strategic position in the world proletariat revolution." The second conclusion was that 1967 had been a "turning point" for India not merely because of the outbreak of a Maoist-type "revolution" in Naxalbari, or because "the Naxalbari-type of peasants' land struggles have developed in 50 places in eight states and areas under the direct control of the Central Government," but also because "the struggle between the two lines and the two roads" which had existed in the Indian Communist Party for a long time was "intensified" and carried a step further. Third, the CPI (M) was following a wrong strategy. Ignoring its protests, the Chinese sharpened their attack on Indian "revisionists"; 1967, they said, had shown that the parliamentary road followed by "Namboodiripad, Jyoti Basu and other Indian revisionists" was "further exposed and went up in smoke." Finally, Peking denounced the entire political strategy of the CPI (M) and put forward its own:

> . . . to spread among the people Mao Tse-tung's thought, the acme of Marxism-Leninism in the present era; to carry further the struggle against the old and new types of revisionism; to make a specific analysis of India's objective conditions in accordance with the brilliant thought of Mao Tse-tung; to formulate the programme and tactics of the Indian revolution on this basis; and to give impetus to the peasant revolutionary struggle and develop Naxalbari-type movements.[58]

## IV

The Soviet Union and China thus view the Indian scene

[57] "Indian Revisionists in Kerala: Serving the Reactionaries," *Peking Review*, September 8, 1967, p. 39. Also, "Indian Revisionists are Quacks," *Peking Review*, September 22, 1967, p. 18.

[58] "Historic Turning Point in the Indian Revolution," *Peking Review*, January 12, 1968, pp. 21-23.



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through totally different lenses; each tries to influence the course of Indian events to suit its ideological and power interests in South Asia. Moscow and Peking, fountainheads of the two rival streams of international communism, try to make use of their respective ideological followers in India to implement policies that emanate from the dictates of their own power and ideological requirements and ambitions in the region. However, as we shall presently see, the extreme caution of Soviet policy and the extreme adventurism of Chinese policy have, in effect, alienated each of the two Indian communist parties from its respective fountainhead.

The Chinese Communist Party, operating from a position of weakness, is at least ideologically consistent; it can claim that it is taking the long-range view of the Indian situation. What Peking now wants is that leaders of the Indian communist movement make an "objective" study of Indian conditions in the light of Mao Tse-tung's thought and apply Maoism to foment revolution. The Chinese know that they have few customers in India even among the Left communists; they, however, expect the Indian social crisis and political instability to deepen in the 1970's. Guided by their own experience, Chinese ideologues want the Indian communists to make the best of their regional strength without waiting for the expansion of their organization and leadership all over India. Peking encourages the irredentist movements along India's northern and eastern frontier, and wants Indian communists to consolidate and develop a united front with national minorities, such as the Nagas, as the communists seem to have done in Burma.[59] What gives the present Chinese policy for India a sinister dimension is that, in the event of chronic political instability in India leading to some kind of an internal collapse, or in the event of a major war, China may find herself in a position to nurse a revolutionary base within Indian territory or even father an irredentist "Indian People's Government."

The Soviet position is much more complex and ambivalent. National interests and ideology pull Moscow's India policy in opposite directions; so far, ideology has been made subservient to power and national interest. It is intriguing to speculate why Khrushchev selected India as one of the newly liberated countries which would experiment with his thesis of noncapitalist growth. As Soviet indologists have recently pointed out, India in 1947 had already had a certain amount of capitalist growth and was by 1957

[59] "Burmese People's Armed Struggle—A Red Flag for the People's Revolution," *Peking Review,* January 12, 1968, pp. 17-20.



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under "capitalist-landlord" rule.[60] Perhaps Khrushchev found it necessary to accept Nehru's socialism as potentially noncapitalist because this was his own way of establishing a massive Soviet presence in India. Perhaps one of the main motivations of Khrushchev's India policy was to wean India away from her friendship with China, which was strong in the mid-1950's.

What is noteworthy is that for such a sudden transformation of Moscow's India policy, Khrushchev did not consider it necessary to consult the CCP or the CPI; in fact, the Twentieth Congress line for India and its immediate ideological formulations took the CPI by surprise.[61] The latter was still pursuing what Kautsky terms the "peaceful neo-Maoist line" transmitted to it by Moscow through the British Communist Party.[62] The CPI General Secretary, Ajoy Ghosh, had to protest in the party weekly when a Soviet indologist, Modeste Rubenstein, in two articles in *New Times* in the summer of 1956, anticipated success of Indian "socialism" solely by virtue of Nehru's leadership, with Indian communism having almost no role to play in it.[63] In subsequent projections of the Twentieth and Twenty-first CPSU Congress line on India, Soviet spokesmen leaned almost entirely on the leadership of Nehru and on Soviet-camp economic collaboration for the success of the Indian "non-capitalist experiment."[64] The election victory of the CPI in Kerala in 1957 gave an unexpected boost to the new Soviet line, but as the Kerala communist government was threatened by a mass anti-communist "liberation" movement, Moscow, for a brief while, reverted to "mass struggle" tactics for the CPI.[65] How-

[60]See, for example, V.L. Tyagunenko's article in the May 1967 issue of *International Affairs,* p. 56.

[61]It should be noted that Khrushchev also made a unilateral change of what had hitherto been a similar Sino-Soviet policy toward Kashmir, namely, that it was a historical dispute between India and Pakistan which the two should settle between themselves without getting involved in "imperialist" intrigues. The Chinese pointed out during the Indo-Pakistan war that it was Moscow and not Peking which had taken sides in the dispute.

[62]Kautsky, *op. cit.,* pp. 130-148.

[63]Modeste Rubenstein, "The Possibilities of Non-Capitalist Development for the Under-developed Countries," *New Times,* July 5, 1956, pp. 3-6, and August 2, 1956, pp. 6-9.

[64]For references to some of these spokesmen, see Harry Gelman, "Communist Policy and India: Sino-Soviet Battleground," in A. Doak Barnett, editor, *Communist Strategies in Asia* (New York: Praeger, 1963), pp. 101-140.

[65]The Soviet press ignored the events in Kerala except for a brief article by "Observer" in an obscure technical journal, the main purpose of which was to advise the communist government in Kerala not to resign. In December 1958 *World Marxist Review* printed an article by Pavel Yudin, Soviet Ambassador to China, which advocated mass action from below to keep pressuring the Nehru government not to abandon its progressive policies. See Harry Gelman, *op. cit.,* p. 109.



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ever, the CPI was obliged to abandon its peaceful neo-Maoist Palghat political line for the new Twentieth Congress political line at its Amritsar Congress in 1958 even while the fate of the communist regime in Kerala was uncertain.[66] In 1959 the Kerala communist regime was dismissed, but this little crisis in the Indian communist house was drowned in the much larger crisis in Sino-Indian relations over the Tibetan rebellion. Soviet sympathy for India became evident from the very beginning of the Tibetan crisis.

Thus, Moscow would seem to have consistently used the Indian communist movement for the advancement of its state relations with India. In 1961 the Congress Party was able to inflict a crushing defeat on the CPI in mid-term elections in Andhra Pradesh, hitherto a communist stronghold, by circulating millions of copies of a *Pravda* editorial praising the domestic and foreign policy achievements of the Nehru government. The only argument that can be found in defense of the Soviet ideological position is that since the CPI was a weak and internally divided party, it was wiser for Moscow to cultivate the Congress Party as long as it possessed what the Soviets regarded as progressive elements. Nevertheless, the consequence of Soviet policy was to weaken, not strengthen, the CPI, which, in its enthusiasm for the parliamentary line of peaceful transition, abandoned organizational work among the peasantry.

## V

In contrast to Moscow's behavior, Peking did not consider it necessary to ask for a change in CPI strategy. Even at the height of the Sino-Indian *panch sheel* agreement over Tibet, the CPI was still wedded to the peaceful neo-Maoist line; the Chinese evidently did not regard a change in that line necessary or even desirable. In other words, the CCP maintained a more or less consistent ideological outlook on the Congress Party and the Nehru government and distinguished between state relations and the functioning of the Indian communist movement. Between 1959 and 1962 Peking found that one of the results of the Twentieth Party Congress line on the CPI was that it had made Indian communists more nationalist than red: the CPI condemned the Chinese use of force along the border in 1959 and, even more unequivocally, the Chinese invasion of India in 1962. The Sino-Soviet conflict which,

[66]See Kautsky, *op. cit.*, the concluding chapter.



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as the Chinese have said, came out into the open for the first time when Moscow adopted a neutral stance on the Sino-Indian border dispute in 1959 and regretted the use of force by China,[67] split the Indian communist movement into two in 1964. But the breakaway party, the CPI (Marxist), was never as close to Peking as the Chinese desired.

After Peking had welcomed the birth of the CPI (M), it reminded its leaders, by quoting from the party's own resolution, that its foundation was only the "end of the first stage of the struggle against the bourgeois-reformist policies" of the pro-Moscow CPI.[68] The CPI (M) leaders not only did not embark on a second stage, but they caused the Chinese to question their Marxist-Leninist bona fides. During the Indo-Pakistan war, the party politbureau condemned the Chinese intervention in Sikkim and the three-day "ultimatum" served by Peking on the Indian government.[69] The CPI (M) did not accept the Chinese interpretation of the Kashmir problem, nor did it recognize that the Nagas and the Mizos were fighting for "national liberation," or that Pakistan was a progressive anti-imperialist country. In spite of all this, the CPI (M) was termed "pro-Peking" because it supported much of the Chinese line for international communism and most of Peking's charges against the Soviet leadership.

The CPI (M) election strategy was a compromise between the parliamentary and anti-parliamentary elements in the leadership. It refused to form a single united front of all Left parties, including the CPI, except on the basis of recognition of its dominant position in the partnership, and said that it would use the parliamentary system for the purpose of revolution. When the election results made it possible for the non-Congress leftist parties in West Bengal and Kerala to form governments, the CPI (M) reversed its line and entered both coalitions as the dominant partner. Namboodiripad became chief minister of Kerala while Jyoti Basu was made West Bengal's deputy chief minister.

It was this reversal of strategy and return to the parliamentary method which apparently made the CPI (M) leadership (or a part of it) lose favor with Peking. Evidently Peking Radio's attacks on the CPI (M) leadership and the Chinese interpretation of the Naxalbari incident took the leaders of the party by surprise. The

[67] "The truth is that the international differences among the fraternal parties were first brought into the open . . . in September 1959—on September 9 . . . to be exact." *People's Daily*, February 27, 1963.
[68] *Peking Review*, January 22, 1965, p. 17.
[69] *People's Democracy* (Calcutta), September 18, 1965, p. 1.



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CPI (M) politbureau, however, realized from the beginning that Peking was setting forth the Maoist line for India. Naxalbari was a mere symbol. On July 2, 1967, the politbureau issued a statement declaring that the "entire assessment" of Peking Radio of the Naxalbari struggle was "at complete variance with that made by our Party."[70] The politbureau realized that Peking had attacked every facet of its strategy and tactics.

Interestingly, the Peking political line was echoed not by the "revolutionaries" leading the struggle of the Naxalbari peasants but by a dissident group within the CPI (M) operating mostly in Calcutta.[71] The politbureau dismissed these "Left adventurists" who, it now came to be admitted, had been operating for "more than a year" as a "party within our Party."[72] The conflict between the CPI (M) and Peking now became clearly a conflict between the "peaceful and parliamentary road" and the "road of Maoist revolution." By elevating the Naxalbari rebellion to a revolutionary armed peasant struggle, Peking was aiming at the dissolution of the West Bengal coalition ministry. A relatively small group of Maoists in Calcutta began to articulate the Peking line, and this obliged the editor of *People's Democracy,* B.T. Ranadive, and a member of the politbureau, M. Basavapunniah, to attack them in the columns of the party weekly.

The articles by Ranadive and Basavapunniah revealed two major aspects of CPI (M) thinking. First, the parliamentary way obviously had a strong appeal for the party, for Basavapunniah took pains to argue that the CPI (M) had not opted for armed revolution. He even went on to suggest that those in the Naxalbari group within the party were "agent-provocateurs" planted by the "ruling party" at "different levels" of its organization. He repudiated the charge that the CPI (M) was an "anti-national agent of China."[73]

The second aspect of the party's thinking, brought out by Ranadive, was an open confession of its numerical and organizational weaknesses, of the superior strength of the bourgeoisie, and of the party's plan to use the parliamentary way to increase its influence. Ranadive argued that the Indian national bourgeoisie element was much stronger than the forces ready to line up with the proletariat; wide sections of the masses were still under the in-

[70] *The Statesman* (New Delhi), July 3, 1967.
[71] Pannalal Das Gupta, "What is the Naxalbari Path?," *Mainstream* (New Delhi), July 8, 1967, pp. 9-11.
[72] *People's Democracy,* July 16, 1967.
[73] *Ibid.,* July 2, 1967, p. 11.



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fluence of "parties not hostile to the State." A revolutionary party like the CPI (M) had to make a realistic assessment of the strength of its opponents and of its own strength and could not indulge in "summary revolution." It was because of the weakness of the communist movement in India that "partial" and "auxiliary" struggles still had revolutionary possibilities; they could offer "immediate recruiting ground for drawing the masses into the revolutionary struggle." The CPI (M) had not become a parliamentary party ("Who has ever talked of power through elections?"), but it had adopted the correct strategy of contesting the elections and joining the Left coalitions in West Bengal and Kerala. The objective of this strategy was "isolation of the main party of the bourgeoisie, advancement of the ideology of the Party and releasing the people and the working class from the grip of bourgeoisie ideology and increasing people's confidence in themselves as against the bourgeois-landlord Government led by the big bourgeoisie." The very fact that the "ruling Congress gentry" saw the main danger to its hegemony arising from the Left coalition governments was evidence of their revolutionary potential. The Left coalition ministries must function parallel to "constant pressure of the mass movement from below"; the "strategic position of the ministry" could be used to "deliver a blow at the vested interests." Ranadive claimed that in West Bengal "the struggle around the ministry has become the symbol of the class struggle among contending forces."

The situation in India was not ripe for armed peasant struggle. No genuine revolutionary peasant movement was possible "without overcoming the present weaknesses of the peasant movement. . . ."[74] In a more candid confession, Basavapunniah wrote:

> We are not oblivious of the fact that ours is a society with a predominantly petty-bourgeois class composition, that it is still politically backward with an extremely low level of class consciousness, that the proletarian and semi-proletarian element is weak in the composition of the Party, that Marxist-Leninist education is far from satisfactory and that it will have to travel yet a long and difficult path before it becomes a mass revolutionary proletariat party capable of fulfilling its historic role.[75]

This certainly was not the ethos of a party ready to build up armed revolutionary peasant bases in the Indian countryside. If the dismissal of the West Bengal ministry proved the correctness of

[74]Ranadive's articles appeared in *People's Democracy* between July and November 1967. For references to the points made here, see the issues dated July 16, pp. 5, 9, and August 13, pp. 3, 12.

[75]*People's Democracy,* July 23, 1967, p. 3.



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the Chinese warning, there was no evidence at the beginning of 1968 that the CPI (M) was coming nearer to the Peking line. On the contrary, it was determined to defend the ministry in Kerala in spite of the fact that it had done little to show that it was led by communists.[76] Meanwhile about a hundred communists expelled from the CPI (M) announced their decision to set up a third communist party, but there was no indication from Peking that these were the real "revolutionaries." The Chinese were evidently banking on the rank and file of the CPI (M) to rebel against the strategy of the leadership at the party's forthcoming congress. There are strong indications at present, however, that the CPI (M) will come out of the congress with a more clearly non-Maoist line.

The CPI (M) released in September 1967 a number of resolutions adopted by its Central Committee in the previous month at Madurai; these demonstrated clearly the dichotomy between its pro-Peking international stance and anti-Peking national stance. The party adopted a great deal of the Chinese line on the international communist movement, but fell short of regarding the CPSU leadership as an ally and accomplice of U.S. "imperialism."[77] Unlike the CCP, it sent a warm message of greetings to the CPSU on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution to which two of its leaders, Namboodiripad and Basu, had been invited in their individual capacity and had declined because it implied nonrecognition of their party.[78] Moscow, however, has not closed its doors on the CPI (M), which it describes as the "rival Communist Party" in India, and Moscow's advice to the CPI since 1964 has been to try to restore unity to the Indian communist movement.

The most significant resolution adopted at Madurai was the one which showed the wide range of differences between the CCP and the CPI (M) on the Indian situation, covering not merely the present class contradictions in India but also the entire Nehru period. The Chinese assessment of the Indian situation was "highly exaggerated and extremely subjective"; virtually negated the CPI (M) premise that India was going through "a deepening economic crisis and the initial stages of a political crisis"; and reduced the Indian state to a "puppet government, led by

[76]See A.K. Gopalan's statement, *Times of India* (Bombay), February 6, 1968.

[77]For an exposition of the CPI(M) attitude toward the CPSU, see the politbureau statement in *People's Democracy,* November 5, 1967, pp. 1, 6-7.

[78]*People's Democracy,* October 15, 1967, p. 1.



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bureaucratic capitalism, run by them principally in the interests of imperialism. . . ." The resolution questioned China's preference of Pakistan to India. It admitted that the Indian government had "a wider social base when compared to most of its counterparts in several countries," and "does not face the imminent danger of class revolution at home"; therefore, it had no need to play the role of a puppet, stooge or lackey of imperialism.

> Our own experience teaches that the Congress party still holds considerable political influence among the people, that several bourgeois-landlord reactionary parties still command a certain mass following, that the character of many petty-bourgeois parties and groups still is not exposed to any appreciable extent, and that the proletariat and its revolutionary party are far from properly organized and built. In the face of such reality it would be a grave error to exaggerate this aspect of sharpening class contradictions to the point of suggesting that class revolution on the part of the masses has already become [so] immediate and acute and menacing to the bourgeoisie as to make its capitulation to imperialism final and irrevocable.

The resolution upheld the party's own political line and protested the CCP's "gross interference" in the internal affairs of a fraternal communist party in violation of the principles it had championed in its own quarrel with the CPSU. The CCP was accused of trying to "dictate to and impose on" the CPI (M) its own political line "which they [the Chinese] had worked out for our country and our party."[79] As we have already noted, the Chinese paid no heed to this protest and went ahead projecting the Maoist line to India.

## VI

While this open outbreak of differences between the CPI (M) and the CCP gladdened the hearts of the CPI, the latter was facing its own, though still unadmitted, problem of reconciling the demands of the Indian revolution with the requirements of the Soviet Union's India policy. The crux of this issue is the CPI's attitude toward the Congress Party and the Congress government at the center. Almost all Soviet writings on India during the last two years clearly indicate that what Moscow fears most is a coalition between the right wing of the Congress Party and the rightist parties like the Swatantra and the Jan Sangh. The most undesirable trend in Indian politics, according to Soviet analysts, is that the Congress Party is being progressively transformed into a rightist party by the combined forces of the big bourgeoisie, the

[79]Supplement to *People's Democracy*, September 10, 1967.



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big monopolies and the landlords.[80] We have already noted that the Soviets regard the present Congress Party at the center as representing the centrist and rightist elements in the Congress; Savelyev in his article in *International Affairs* made pointed reference to the virtual elimination of the Left from the Congress. Yet what Moscow has left unclear so far is whether, or to what extent, the CPI should fight against the Congress regime in New Delhi, with which the Soviets have excellent state relations. The complete omission in the Soviet press of reports of the 1966 CPI demonstration in New Delhi demanding the resignation of the Indira Gandhi government as well as of the CPI's efforts in the summer of 1967 to bring about a non-Congress coalition government at the center would suggest that Moscow prefers the Congress to hold power in New Delhi and hopes to avoid a coalition in which the right wing of the Congress, the Swatantra and the Jan Sangh would predominate.[81] Hence, Moscow has carefully avoided attacking the central government even though it strongly criticized the dismissal of the communist-dominated coalition in West Bengal. Since the CPI, however, has to function under the pressure of events in India and of the rival communist party, it is compelled to struggle against the Congress government.

Of some interest is the difference between Moscow's assessment of the Jan Sangh Party and the CPI's attitude toward it. Moscow has consistently regarded the Jan Sangh as a right-wing reactionary party, presumably because of its uncompromising hostility toward Pakistan and its strong opposition to any compromise on Kashmir.[82] The CPI, however, has taken the view that the Jan Sangh has a certain progressive content; it has joined coalitions

[80]In an article in *New Times,* November 29, 1967, Y. Gotlober and Y. Shtykanov said that the strategy of the Swatantra and the Jan Sangh, both representing the "extreme Right," is to form a "united party of reaction." A "new element has . . . emerged—the aim now is not to confine the reactionary front of the Swatantra-Jan Sangh duet, but to expand it to take in all the Right-wing defectors from the Congress as well as the Right element in the leadership of the ruling party itself." (p. 10.)

[81]For the CPI attitude toward the Congress government at the center, note the following in a *New Age* (New Delhi) editorial, dated July 23, 1967: "The capitalist planning stands irredeemably repudiated by life itself. We must by all means break the discredited path and this is impossible without replacing, at the policy making level, the present Congress Government at the Centre by a democratic coalition."

[82]*New Times* terms the Jan Sangh the "reactionary Hindu-religions party" which preaches "Indian dominant-nation chauvinism and intolerance of religious minorities. . . . What its leaders want is for India to increase her army and to produce the atom bomb. The Jan Sangh's position was strengthened a good deal by the conflict with Pakistan and the chauvinistic sentiment which accompanied it." September 21, 1966, p. 16.



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with it in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, and has even welcomed the replacement of the Congress government in Madhya Pradesh by a coalition of the Jan Sangh and breakaway feudalist elements from the Congress Party.[83] On numerous occasions the CPI has been highly critical of the foreign policy of the Indian government, which Moscow continues to regard as progressive. There is no evidence that the CPI regards Pakistan as a progressive country or that it supports a settlement of the Kashmir issue on the basis of plebiscite or the territory's transfer to Pakistan.

Thus there is a paradoxical situation in India in which each communist party accepts almost entirely the international line of its "fountainhead" in Peking or Moscow, and yet strongly disagrees with it on the Indian internal situation. The CPI (M) disagreement with Peking is of course much deeper than the CPI's differences with Moscow. A second paradoxical situation is that while the rivalry between the two communist parties has split almost every communist front organization including the trade union, peasant and student movements,[84] the two parties are apparently working together in the struggle against the Congress bid to recapture power in the states where it lost its absolute majority in last year's election.[85]

Whether this united struggle will lead to reunion of the two CPI's is difficult to say; the odds are against it, if only because most of the differences are personal and long-standing. Among the many unpredictable factors that are likely to influence the future course of the Indian communist movement is the eventual outcome of the present Congress bid to form coalitions in the states with like-minded parties and elements. If this process leads to coalitions between the Congress and the two rightist parties in several states, its impact is bound to be felt at the national level sooner or later. Thus, Moscow's worst fears about Indian politics may come true, and, if this happens, it will be interesting to see whether the Soviets finally abandon ideology totally for the sake of national interests in maintaining friendly relations with India.

[83]See editorial in *New Age*, August 22, 1967.

[84]The process of splitting these fronts was accelerated during the coalition partnership of the two CPI's in West Bengal, where communist influence on the working class and students is perhaps the strongest in India.

[85]"The two Communist Parties with all their ideological differences and divergences in political perspective have never before experienced such close unity in action: the point of nearest proximity is now reached since the Communists split into two parties three years ago. The Naxalbari fringe is very much in isolation with their anti-front stand." N.C., "Fiasco of a Gamble," *Mainstream*, December 30, 1967, p. 16.



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# KOREA'S INVOLVEMENT IN VIET NAM

*by Princeton N. Lyman*

IN July 1964 the Government of South Viet Nam sent a request to South Korea for civil assistance in its war effort. The Korean government responded with the dispatch of a 130-man field surgery team and a small self-defense instruction team. Over the next three years, this small involvement expanded into a major combat role. In January 1965, Korea agreed to a request for a noncombatant military engineering and construction unit of 2,000 men. Five months later, South Viet Nam asked for Korean combat troops. In 1965 and again in 1966, Korea dispatched full divisions of combat troops and augmented these in 1967 to bring its present military strength in South Viet Nam to about 47,000 men. Korea's military assistance to the Saigon government is thus second only to the United States', and far more than that of any other contributing ally.

For Korea, the decision to send troops to Viet Nam was a historic one. It was the first time in modern history that an independent Korea had sent troops outside its own borders. Moreover, as events in early 1968 would dramatize, the country was risking possible reprisals and even the threat of war from North Korea. In making this decision, the government was guided by several motives.

First, the Koreans felt under obligation to repay in Viet Nam the contingents of foreign troops that had come to South Korea during the Korean War. This feeling was noticeably strong in the initial debates on military assistance to South Viet Nam. There was understandable pride and satisfaction in Korea's being able at last to discharge this debt. The fact that the United States was the main outside contributor in Viet Nam and was strongly urging Korea's involvement made the analogy with the Korean War all the more appropriate.[1] Although the importance of this motivation declined as other reasons began to assume prominence in considering additional increments, in the basic decision to become militarily involved, it was a significant factor.

A second motive was to strengthen the alliance with the United States and improve Korea's position in that alliance. There were several aspects to this line of thinking. Some desires were directed

[1]See *Korea Annual 1967* (Seoul: Hapdong News Agency), pp. 63, 94-95.



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to specific issues in the U.S.-Korean security relationship. For example, hope rose that Seoul might be able to obtain a long-sought change in the mutual security treaty, namely, a NATO-type clause which would bind the United States to respond automatically in case of aggression.[2] There was even greater concern with forestalling a transfer to Viet Nam of one or both of the two U.S. divisions stationed in Korea.[3] A more intangible objective was to strengthen relations and confidence between the two countries overall, giving Korea more assurance of U.S. response to any crises in Korea and greater receptivity to its views on Asian policy.[4]

A third inducement, which grew in importance with each additional commitment, was Korean interest in potential financial benefits from the Viet Nam war. Popular reaction on this matter varied, from high hopes of hundreds of millions of dollars of earnings to strong denunciations in the press and some political circles of crass commercialism on the part of the government in considering the dispatch of Korean troops.[5] Nevertheless, the general feeling was that what the Koreans called "triangular cooperation between the United States, Vietnam, and Korea" was a natural and logical extension of the U.S.-Korean alliance, and particularly of the Korean decision actively to support U.S. policy in Viet Nam.[6] Feelings on this score were all the stronger because of a long-held belief that Japan, Korea's colonial ruler, had received a major boost in its postwar economic recovery from benefits derived from the Korean War. Nothing angered the Koreans more, after their first commitment, than to see Japan, which was not an active supporter of U.S. policy in Viet Nam, continue to receive U.S. contracts that might have been shifted to Korea.[7]

The fourth motive was that by coming to the aid of Viet Nam Korea would gain international prestige. There was some conflict in this regard, because the Koreans were keenly aware that involvement in what was in many countries an unpopular war would undoubtedly inhibit Korea's recent attempt to step up its diplomatic initiative with neutral nations in Asia, Africa and

[2]See editorials, *Chosun Ilbo,* March 10, 1966, and *Taehan Ilbo,* March 15, 1966. All references to Korean-language newspapers are taken from the daily *Press Translations: Korea* (Seoul: North Asias Press).

[3]*Chosun Ilbo,* June 29, 1965.

[4]See particularly the reaction to President Park's visit to Washington, *Tonga Ilbo,* May 20, 1965.

[5]*Tonga Ilbo,* July 3 and August 2, 1965.

[6]*Chosun Ilbo,* June 30, 1965.

[7]At one such report, an Assemblyman exclaimed, "Are they going to make us shed blood in Vietnam and let Japan make money instead?" *Tonga Ilbo,* July 13, 1965. See also *Hankuk Ilbo,* March 16, 1967.



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Latin America.[8] On the other hand, while those diplomatic efforts remained somewhat scattered and still without great results, the assistance to Viet Nam opened up an immediate way for a traditionally isolationist Korea to enter the international stage and demonstrate its power. In 1966 and 1967 the government emphasized specifically the prestige attending its involvement in Viet Nam and pointed to the opportunity this afforded for a diplomatic "advance to South-East Asia."[9]

The fifth principal incentive lay in the feeling that the security of South Viet Nam, as a fellow anti-communist country, was related to the security of South Korea. Even though this was counterbalanced by fears that Korea's own border defense was being weakened by the transfer of troops to Viet Nam, and that a "second front" of the Viet Nam war might be opened in Korea as a consequence of such involvement,[10] there was nevertheless a security implication which had considerable influence on Korean thinking. It derived from the belief that Viet Nam might become a critical test of the continuing U.S. resolve to play a major defense role in Asia, upon which South Korea's security depended. The Koreans also saw in the multilateral defense effort developing in Viet Nam an opportunity to strengthen relations among the anti-communist nations in Asia, from which a new, more comprehensive mutual security treaty among those nations and the United States might eventuate.[11] This would help to preserve U.S. commitment and involvement in the area. Security in this sense was a prime consideration in the Korean decision and has been a major influence on Korean attitudes toward the settlement of the war.

## II

These several motivations were debated throughout 1965 and 1966 as each new level of Korean commitment was acted upon. The first debate took place in early 1965 over the dispatch of what was called the "Dove" unit of 2,000 noncombatant soldiers. Opposition in the Assembly focused mainly on the lack of efforts by the Vietnamese to prosecute the war themselves and to create a politically stable situation. Opposition members also argued that it was the beginning of what could be a major Korean in-

[8] *Taegu Ilbo,* June 29, 1965; *Sina Ilbo,* July 1, 1965.
[9] Government radio broadcast, quoted in *Maeil Sinmun,* March 5, 1966. See also "Farewell 1966" (editorial) in the semi-governmental *Seoul Sinmun,* December 30, 1966.
[10] *Chosun Ilbo,* June 29, 1965; *Tonga Ilbo,* March 16, 1966.
[11] *Chosun Ilbo,* July 29, 1965.



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volvement in the Viet Nam conflict. Nevertheless, the debate lasted only a couple of weeks. The resolution in favor was passed by a substantial majority, the opposition members not voting unanimously against it.[12]

Significantly, in this first dispatch of a large military unit there were no protracted negotiations with the United States. In later commitments, attention would focus almost exclusively on issues between Seoul and Washington. Indeed, all the specific objectives and compensations that Korea hoped to gain from its involvement in Viet Nam—except for the prestigious position to be won in Southeast Asian diplomacy—depended on the United States. It was indicative of the early strong feelings of obligation from the Korean War, and Korea's attitude toward its alliance with the United States, that the first sizeable military unit was sent without much attention to these issues.

But the most critical decision concerned the dispatch of combat troops. This not only required much larger numbers of men; it changed the nature of the Korean involvement. However, the proposal for the first combat division in 1965 was made during a debate of much more direct national significance, i.e., over the normalization of relations with Japan. The opposition parties in Korea had united to wage a "do-or-die" struggle against the government's proposed treaty with Japan, and the adamancy of the opposition on this question left it little choice but to decide that it would formally oppose the dispatch of combat troops as well.[13] But its preoccupation with the emotionally-charged Japanese issue, over which it was prepared to resign from the Assembly, made the Viet Nam decision, on which popular feelings were not so aroused, a largely secondary matter. In the end, the consent bill on Viet Nam was voted while opposition members were boycotting the Assembly over the Japanese settlement.

Opposition arguments put forth against sending combat troops abroad were not without weight, however, for they added to displeasure that was developing within the government's own ranks subsequent to the dispatch of the Dove unit. Several old and irritating issues in U.S.-Korean relations were thus raised for resolution: (1) the wording of the mutual security treaty; (2) the U.S. Military Assistance Program (MAP) "transfer"—a plan for transferring annually some military assist-

[12]*Korea Annual 1965,* p. 65; *ibid., 1966,* p. 10.

[13]See statement of party leaders and vote on "Dove" unit reinforcement, *Chosun Ilbo,* March 28, 1965, and *Tonga Ilbo,* June 19, 1965.



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ance items from the United States to the Korean budget—which had long been obdurately opposed and was particularly unpopular in 1965 because Korea was facing a large and overdue military pay raise for which U.S. assistance was being sought; (3) modernization of the Korean forces—a long-standing issue centering on both the level and types of military assistance being provided to Korea; and (4) the degree of "economic cooperation" that the United States would render, i.e., the degree to which the United States would direct its Viet Nam military procurement and economic aid expenditures to Korea wherever possible. Significantly, the burden of the debate on these issues was carried by people close to the government rather than by the opposition. Influential government party members in the Assembly, while supporting the basic idea of dispatching combat troops to Viet Nam, argued strenuously that the dispatch should not take place unless there were U.S. concessions on the four points above.[14]

The intensity of these arguments affected (and to some degree reflected) the government's attitude toward the dispatch of troops and finally led to an agreement between the United States and Korea concerning some of the points raised. The schedule of items to be transferred from the U.S. Military Assistance Program to the Korean budget in 1966 was suspended as the U.S. contribution to the cost of a military pay raise. The United States also agreed to equip fully Korea's three ready reserve divisions as an offsetting security measure for the dispatch of one combat division from the Korean line to Viet Nam. Thus reassured, the Assembly moved ahead and approved the dispatch of troops. In many respects, however, this first debate on combat troops was more internal to the government than national. National attention was focused on the Korea-Japan issue. As one newspaper commented, noting how the Viet Nam decision had been overshadowed by the question of the Korea-Japan settlement, "No one seems to regard it as an issue of reality."[15]

## III

The next debate over Korean involvement was much more intense and widespread. Throughout January 1966 discussions had been going on between Korea and the United States and between both countries and the South Vietnamese government

[14]Cha Chi-Chol, an influential government party member of the Defense Committee, had long advocated this position. The whole committee eventually adopted it. "Troop Dispatch Controversy" (editorial), *Kyonghyang Sinmun,* July 26, 1965.
[15]*Chosun Ilbo,* July 29, 1965.



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about a possible increase in Korean forces.[16] In February an official request was received from the Vietnamese government for a second combat division. Generally, there was a feeling of inevitability—even among the opposition—about the final response.[17] Korea had already made the basic decision to become involved in Viet Nam, and there was no real disagreement with the general aims of the war. There was also pressure from the Korean military commander in Viet Nam for augmentation of his forces which was difficult to resist. Korean forces in Viet Nam had been assigned to the Qui Nhon region and were seeking to gain full, even autonomous, control over the area under their military jurisdiction. Following this determined "clear and hold" strategy, the Korean commander was earnestly backing the South Vietnamese request for more troops—part of which would be a reinforcement for the first division.[18] As a result, the debate centered more on the conditions to be negotiated with the United States than on other issues.

The conditions desired this time were more complicated and difficult. Korea felt the need to replace a second combat division for Viet Nam with a new one in the line in Korea, for which the United States would have to cover equipment and other costs. Second, and perhaps politically most important, there was a feeling that Korea had still failed to obtain from its involvement so far a fair share of economic benefits—such as those going to Japan—and should therefore pin Washington down to specific commitments in this regard. Third, a campaign had begun to build up in the press and elsewhere, in many cases with the obvious support of the government, to secure from the United States better treatment of Korean troops in Viet Nam, e.g., by instituting combat pay, increasing the existing overseas allowance, and increasing death and disability allowances.[19] These issues had wide appeal. Korean troops, even with a special overseas allowance financed by the United States, were being paid much less than American troops in Viet Nam. While that was acceptable, within limits, there was a false belief prevalent in Korea that the Koreans were also receiving less than Vietnamese soldiers.[20]

Finally, frequent references were made to the fact that

[16] *New York Times,* February 24, 1966; *Korea Annual 1967,* pp. 13-14.

[17] *Chungang Ilbo,* March 17, 1966. See also *Maeil Sinmun,* March 5, 1966.

[18] *Seoul Sinmun,* March 19, 1966; *Kyonghyang Sinmun,* March 2, 1966.

[19] See editorials in *Chosun Ilbo,* August 25, 1965; *Pusan Ilbo,* December 22, 1965; *Seoul Sinmun,* January 18, 1966; *Maeil Sinmun,* February 5, 1966.

[20] *Maeil Sinmun,* February 5, 1966.



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American troops in Viet Nam were fighting with the new M-16 rifle and other modern equipment, while Korean forces were not.[21] This was an extension of long-felt resentment over the inferiority of the equipment Korean forces received under the U.S. MAP compared to that carried by the U.S. troops in Korea. But as applied in Viet Nam, these differences had a more pronounced and emotional impact.

All these issues assumed greater importance with the realization that the second combat division would likely represent the last major increment in the Korean military contribution to the Vietnamese cause and thus provided the last good opportunity for Korea to obtain concessions on any or all of these points from the United States. Also, the Korean elections were only a year away, and Viet Nam—with especial reference to the negotiating stance of the government—was potentially a major issue in the campaign. For all these reasons, the negotiations proved difficult and sometimes tense.

By early March, however, they had been brought to a satisfactory close. The United States had earlier agreed that any further Korean contribution in Viet Nam beyond those of 1965 would come at no cost to the Korean economy.[22] The March agreement now made a similar provision with regard to the second division, and for additional military and economic benefits. Specifically, the United States agreed (1) to reimburse the Korean government for the net additional expenses related to the dispatch of a second division and its replacement in Korea; (2) to accelerate modernization of Korean forces in Korea over the coming two years; (3) to improve Korean counterinfiltration systems and equipment; and (4) to provide, as economic benefits, a slight increase in the AID program loan for that year, a continuation of the MAP transfer suspension for as long as substantial Korean forces remained in Viet Nam, and more specific opportunities for Korea to participate in U.S. procurement overseas. Arrangements were also made to increase several of the benefits for Korean soldiers in Viet Nam.[23]

[21] *Seoul Sinmun,* January 18, 1966; *Kangwon Ilbo,* February 9, 1966.

[22] Washington had from the beginning provided the equipment for all the Korean forces in Viet Nam and certain allowances, in line with the fact that Korea received all its own military equipment from the United States and was a major recipient of U.S. economic assistance. But Korea had paid all additional internal costs related to training and deployment of the Dove unit and the first combat division sent in 1965, and continued to do so even after the March 1966 agreement. Korea also continued paying the basic salaries of all its troops in Viet Nam.

[23] See release of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, printed in *Korea Times,* March 8, 1966, and *Korea Annual 1967,* p. 9.



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The March 1966 agreement, known in Korea as the "fourteen points," was the source of some argument over the next year as the Koreans looked warily to its fulfillment. Almost immediately an argument sprang up over just how the United States would reimburse Korea for the net additional expenditures related to the new dispatch. In following months uncertainties continued, as evidenced in concern over the speed of military assistance deliveries, the level of economic benefits that could be realized by Korea in light of subsequent U.S. balance of payments and other restrictions, the decision of the United States in March 1967 to approve the sale of AR-15 rifles to Singapore when Korean troops in Viet Nam still had only the M-1, and similar irritants.[24] Yet while there were a number of specific issues over which it continued to have differences with Washington, the government seemed generally satisfied with the agreements and their aftermath. Without question, relations with the United States improved. Negotiations on a Status of Forces Agreement, which had been stalled for thirteen years, were finally concluded in the fall of 1966, undeniably influenced—on the U.S. side particularly—by the new atmosphere. In October 1966 President Johnson visited Korea, received an enthusiastic welcome, and further cemented his personal relationship with President Park. At the highest level, the Koreans felt that their assistance to Viet Nam had gained for them a large degree of respect from the United States, rather than mere regard for their dependent status, assured entrée into Washington circles, and more direct communication with the President of the United States.

## IV

It was precisely for this reason that the events of early 1968—the attempted assassination of President Park and North Korea's seizure of the *U.S.S. Pueblo*—dealt such a blow to the South Koreans. There were many facets to the disagreements between South Korea and the United States following in the wake of these events. American readiness to undertake secret negotiations with North Korea over the *Pueblo* incident, while pursuing the relatively routine path of protest at Panmunjom over the assassination attempt, appeared as unduly mild and selfish U.S. responses, insensitive to Korean needs.[25] The most disturbing

[24] *Sina Ilbo,* March 7, 1967; *Seoul Sinmun,* March 8, 1967; *Tonga Ilbo,* June 3, 1967, and *Chosun Ilbo,* September 3, 1967. For discussion of these particulars during the Prime Minister's visit to Washington, see *Korea Times,* March 17, 1967.

[25] *New York Times,* January 29, 1968, p. 1, and March 10, 1968, p. 4.



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aspect, however, was that the crisis seemed to deny the very gains in long-range security that the Seoul government thought it had obtained from its involvement in Viet Nam. The possibility that deployment of both U.S. and South Korean resources to Viet Nam might have helped to provoke the incidents was a worrisome concern,[26] but much more disquieting was renewed uncertainty, in light of Washington's response to the crisis, over the American commitment in Korea. Although Korea had not been able to secure an amendment of the basic security treaty, officials had argued in the Assembly that the contribution to Viet Nam would in itself secure American commitment to Korean defense and increase Korea's voice in America's Asian policy. Now, to South Korea, the commitment appeared no more, if no less, certain than before.[27]

The incidents did not produce a permanent crisis in U.S.-Korean relations or any change in Korean policy with regard to Viet Nam. The subsequent U.S. offer of $100 million of additional military aid was looked upon diffidently, and, in almost unprecedented fashion in Korea, the special U.S. representative in the crisis, Cyrus Vance, received a cool reception in Seoul.[28] Even though the government rejected the idea of withdrawing its troops from Viet Nam, it allowed the matter to drift as a bargaining point in the hope of securing a more favorable U.S. response.[29] But in the end, both government and opposition leaders maintained their stand in favor of strong military prosecution of the Viet Nam war.[30] The crisis did, however, point up a long-range problem of Korean foreign policy as it reflects the U.S. relationship, a problem that had been inherent in Korea's commitment in Viet Nam and her policy toward that war.

Korean policy toward the Viet Nam war has emphasized three points: (1) a sustained and unremitting military offensive with the objective of putting such pressure on the communists that they come to the conference table largely in the position of a defeated enemy; (2) avoidance of any premature peace negotiations that would lead to a *de facto* surrender or to a type of stalemate that could once again erupt into war; and (3) solidarity of allied opin-

[26] *Ibid.*, March 24, 1968.
[27] *Chonnam Ilbo*, March 15, 1966; *Korea Annual 1966*, pp. 78-79.
[28] *Korea Times*, February 10 and 13, 1968.
[29] *New York Times*, February 3, 1968, p. 4.
[30] See statements of party leaders, *Korea Times*, April 8, 12, 13 and 18, 1968. There was even rumor of more Korean troops for Viet Nam later on. *Ibid.*, March 15, 1968.



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ion on the war with all countries active in Viet Nam participating in reaching any final settlement.[31] Korean anxiety over these points was demonstrated as early as February 1966 when Vice President Humphrey visited Korea. At a time when U.S. envoys were visiting countries around the world to re-emphasize the genuineness of the U.S. interest in peace, the Vice President found that he had rather to assure the Koreans that the United States was not lacking in its determination to prosecute the war and that the recent peace overtures did not mean the United States would settle for a communist advantage in Viet Nam for the sake of peace.

These strong "hawkish" views had their grounding in the Koreans' own experience with communist aggression. In some of the early statements on Viet Nam, one sensed almost a vicarious refighting of the Korean War—a desire to break in Viet Nam the stalemate that had so long frustrated the Koreans at home. But while this was perhaps an emotional reaction, the Koreans also saw great relevancies to their own experience. They felt genuinely that a compromise settlement in Viet Nam would produce no more—and probably less—lasting peace and security than Korea could point to along its own DMZ. Furthermore, they were quick to see in Viet Nam—as they have been in most Far East crises involving the United States—a test of, and perhaps a chance to define more clearly, the American commitment to anti-communism generally in Asia, upon which nearly all Korean policies turn.

Their attitudes toward the holding of either war or peace discussions reflect these concerns. Because they are anxious to ensure an adequate hearing for their views in allied councils, they voiced considerable resentment (with pride also an issue) at being excluded from the Honolulu meeting of 1966 and the Guam meeting of 1967 between U.S. and South Vietnamese representatives.[32] Korea was meanwhile an active promoter of the first

[31]See statement of President Park at Manila, reported in *Tonga Ilbo,* October 24, 1966, and editorial in *Seoul Sinmun,* April 20, 1967. Editorials have generally supported this position, e.g., *Kyonghyang Sinmun,* November 22, 1966; *Hankuk Ilbo,* March 21, 1967; *Taejon Ilbo,* March 22, 1967; *Chungang Ilbo,* April 27, 1967, and *Taehan Ilbo,* April 27, 1967. A few dissenting voices, particularly from the provinces, have been consistently more skeptical of the war aims and the chances of military victory, hence less averse to early negotiations. See editorials of the *Yongnam Ilbo* (Taegu), February 2 and March 27, 1965; *Maeil Sinmun* (Taegu), August 4, 1965 and March 17, 1966; and *Taegu Ilbo,* March 22, 1966.

[32]*Tonga Ilbo,* October 18, 1966; *Kyonghyang Sinmun,* March 17, 1967. Korea has generally argued its case for inclusion in such talks on the basis of giving voice to all contributing allies. But there is also some feeling, not yet too outspoken, that Korea is a major contributor distinct from the others. For some pointed references in this regard, see Brigadier General (Ret.) Mun Hui-Sok, "War in Vietnam and Collective Security in Asia," *Koreana Quarterly,* Autumn 1966, pp. 25-34.



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"troop-contributor" nations' conference in Manila in 1966. Forums like this last one have not only provided Seoul with a favorable atmosphere in which to press its view of the war, but have also revived Korean hopes for some kind of alliance, or at least a long-term association, of the anti-communist nations in Asia and the Pacific which, free from NATO influence, would become the main vehicle for influencing U.S. policy in Asia. In the same vein, Seoul opposed a reconvening of the Geneva Conference as the means for negotiating peace.[33] The Koreans felt that in that setting, largely of major powers and with strong European representation, the United States might be inclined to settle for less in Viet Nam, and Asia, than its smaller Asian allies like South Korea have been urging upon it. "When whales fight," goes a Korean proverb, "shrimps get crushed."

In one sense, therefore, Korea's position on the war flows naturally from its traditional security and foreign policy framework. Diplomatically, militarily and ideologically, South Korea has sided almost exclusively with the United States since 1948. Its security is almost totally dependent on the United States and U.S. willingness to continue a large military commitment to the Far East and specifically to the defense of the Korean Peninsula. That the Koreans have been insecure about this relationship is an understatement. Constant reassurances of U.S. willingness to continue the commitment to Korean defense have been sought since 1948, and more particularly since 1953. The continuing desire to strengthen the mutual security treaty is one example. As pointed out earlier, deep concern over the possibility of a U.S. decision to withdraw one or both of its divisions stationed in Korea was one of the major factors prompting Korea to send some of its own forces to Viet Nam. These U.S. troops, stationed on the invasion route from North Korea to Seoul, are considered proof of U.S. determination to join with Korea in defense of any further aggression from the North.

But the Koreans' outlook on foreign policy is not static. Their Viet Nam experience coincides with a changing pattern in Korea's foreign relations and will undoubtedly have great influence on those changes. The traditional line of postwar diplomacy had already begun to change following the military coup of 1961, when a new leadership began to examine what it felt was a too exclusive tie-up with the United States and a too narrow concentration on anti-communism. These old policies had been overtaken by events: the breakup of the bipolar world, the

[33] *Tonga Ilbo*, October 18, 1966.



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developing Korean-Japanese relationship, and progress by the South Koreans in resolving their postwar economic and internal political problems which thus provided new opportunities for diplomatic forays abroad.[34] Yet, while various initiatives have been evident in recent years, undertaking new departures in diplomacy has generally proved to be difficult. This had to be done with unquestioned assurance of the U.S. defense arrangements that still underlay Korean security. Moreover, because of its psychological importance, it had to be done in such a way that the Koreans would not be rebuffed on the international scene. Finally, uneasiness about such ventures demanded fairly conclusive evidence that new departures were in fact warranted and perhaps imperative in advance of loosening the surer, more familiar bonds of security.

The recent attitude toward the UN debate on the Korean question, which has taken place every year since the Korean War, is a good example of this dilemma. The Koreans now realize that the United Nations cannot conduct an election throughout both North and South Korea as the basis for reunification, as called for in the annual UN resolution. They know, moreover, that with the changing composition of UN membership, an affirmative vote on the traditional type of resolution is harder to come by each year. But until the success of an acceptable alternative is assured, they are reluctant to give up the clear symbol of international legitimacy vis-à-vis North Korea that the UN resolution provides.[35]

In this context, the Viet Nam experience probably represents a major watershed in Korean foreign policy development. The active support of U.S. policy in Viet Nam, following traditional lines of postwar diplomacy, was seen as securing Korea's relationship with the United States more firmly than at any time since the present Korean government came to power in 1961. If U.S. determination and military power could achieve the approximation of a clear-cut victory, traditional lines of diplomacy and security policy could be preserved for a while longer, with even greater security for Korea. The search for alternatives would not be so urgent. This hope undoubtedly guided the thinking of many, and helps to explain Korea's position toward the prosecution of the war. But as the war continues and the Paris talks between the United States and North Viet Nam drag on, the Koreans have begun to see the improbability of the dramatic and

[34] *Korea Annual 1965*, pp. 129-131.
[35] For a review of UN policy in 1965, see *Korea Annual 1966*, pp. 72-73



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unambiguous victory over the communists for which they have been calling. This recognition could well cause disturbances in Korean politics, and perhaps some serious reaction from the military committed to Viet Nam. But the outcome may also provide the shock value—the rationalization—for relinquishing some of the older concepts of security to which the nation has clung in spite of changing circumstances, and give added impetus to policy desires that have been evident at least since 1961: for new forms of international recognition, new initiatives in diplomacy on a broad front, and—with U.S. support still secure—less than total dependence on the United States for Korea's international position. To some Korean leaders who have long felt the desire for a more independent and nationalistic content in Korean foreign policy, this result of the Viet Nam experience, if not foreseen at the beginning of Korea's involvement, may become one of its most important ramifications.

## V

Domestically, in spite of the deep popular concern expressed over each commitment of troops, and the problems raised concerning Korea's foreign policy and security, Viet Nam has not developed into a lasting major issue.

In the early debates, the opposition parties found it difficult to oppose Korean involvement because of the patriotic feelings associated with it and the rather strong sense of "moral obligation" felt by Koreans toward the Free World. As mentioned earlier, their stand against the commitment of combat troops was taken in connection with their disapproval of the government's policy toward Japan. In 1966, they opposed the commitment of the second combat division, gaining a reasonable amount of popular sympathy if not support.[36] After this, however, opposition policy vacillated. In late 1966, Madame Pak Sun-Chon, the leader of the main opposition party, traveled to Viet Nam and there reportedly made a statement accepting the Korean involvement.[37] Her rival for opposition leadership, Yun Po-Sun, responded immediately that he was still opposed to the war in Viet Nam and opposed to the Korean troop commitment. In 1966 and again in 1967, Yun went further, charging that the Korean government had "sub-contracted" Korea into the war and was fighting essen-

[36]Editorials of *Taehan Ilbo,* June 28, 1965; *Hankuk Ilbo,* March 2, 1966; *Sina Ilbo,* March 12, 1966; *Chungang Ilbo,* March 17, 1966.

[37]For conflicting versions of her remarks, see *Chungang Ilbo,* November 21, 1966.



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tially a mercenary operation at the cost of Korean blood.[38] This comment almost led to his arrest.

And yet by the time of the election campaign in the spring of 1967, the Viet Nam question had largely been laid aside. The opposition, once again united in a single party, agreed, despite earlier statements, to accept the existing troop involvement as a decision "taken in consultation with foreign governments."[39] And Yun Po-Sun—now presidential candidate of the united opposition party—confined his campaign remarks to the need for improving the treatment of Korean troops in Viet Nam and bringing them home as soon as possible. The only point that became important during the campaign concerned further troop commitments; significantly, the government felt compelled to deny that any were under consideration. The official opposition party platform made no mention of the troop issue at all.[40]

By 1967 the issue had died because no strong popular opposition, either to U.S. policy in Viet Nam or to Korean involvement, had developed. While uneasiness had indeed existed at the time Korea became involved in the war—and was revived with each new step of involvement—it had afterward been overcome by patriotism, pride in Korea's playing an international role, the prospect of financial gain, and the seemingly natural compatibility of the Korean position on the war with Korea's own international position. Once the troops had been committed, the press and the public had generally become patriotic and sometimes bellicose supporters of Korean efforts and the military prosecution of the war. Some papers which had earlier voiced great concern over the involvement later became enthusiastic supporters of the move and of a vigorous military policy.[41] Among the countries visited by President Johnson on his Far East trip in the fall of 1966, Korea alone had no popular demonstration opposing U.S. policy in Viet Nam. This was an accurate reflection of the popular mood.

Contributing to this mood has been pride in and prestige derived from the accomplishments of the Korean forces. Korean military performance has been described by Korean papers as "brilliant," "glorious," "amazing," "a wonder to the world."[42] There has been particular satisfaction in the belief that Koreans

[38]*Korea Times,* January 24, 1967.
[39]*Sina Ilbo,* March 30, 1967.
[40]Copy, translated, obtained from American Embassy, Seoul.
[41]Compare the editorial in *Taehan Ilbo,* July 26, 1965, with those of April 22 and 27, 1967.
[42]*Seoul Sinmun,* January 18, 1966; *Chonnam Ilbo,* March 10, 1967; *Taehan Ilbo,* April 22, 1967.



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are better received in Viet Nam than the Americans, and that in both military and civic action roles it has been a case of "teaching the teacher."[43] The government, moreover, has taken great pains to make sure that the families of soldiers are well cared for in their absence. Casualty reports are rarely published. Among the troops, there is the anticipation of earning several times the salary possible at home.

In addition, civilian opportunities in Viet Nam are attractive. Over 12,000 Korean technicians work in Viet Nam for U.S. firms or government programs. In 1966 remittances to Korea from these civilians and the soldiers accounted for $23 million in net foreign exchange earnings. In 1967, this figure more than doubled.[44] As one observer returning to Korea after a long absence noted, Viet Nam became Korea's El Dorado—a place Koreans could go to earn their fortune or seek adventure.

The crisis and tension of early 1968, when the danger of the war spreading in Asia became more imminent, changed this atmosphere somewhat. Korean public opinion is probably more receptive than before to a peace short of Viet Cong surrender, which would reduce tension or at least permit redeployment of U.S. and Korean forces back to Korea. Moreover, a new domestic issue has arisen from the crisis. The government has proposed a nationwide arming of reservists to cope with the North Korean threat. Opposition Assemblymen have voiced fears that such a program would be a step toward creating an internal political army and totalitarianism.[45] For a nation just emerging from a gradual transition from military to civilian rule, the matter is a serious one. But these developments have not all been laid at the door of Korea's involvement in Viet Nam. Korean commentators have tended to view the North Korean provocations, which have been increasing in scope and violence since 1966, more as a part of long-range designs against South Korea than as specific retaliation for the involvement in Viet Nam.[46] As pointed out earlier, even op-

[43] *Chosun Ilbo,* March 27, 1965; *Hankuk Ilbo,* March 28, 1968; *Taehan Ilbo,* April 22, 1967. Korea had sent hand-picked, crack troops to Viet Nam; they were well disciplined and highly motivated. Other reports on the Koreans' fierceness in reprisals on Viet Cong villages and desire for full control of their regions suggested a less enthusiastic reception by the Vietnamese people and officials than generally reported in Korea.

[44] United States Operations Mission to Korea, *Report of Procurement in Korea for the Vietnam Effort* (mimeo., February 7, 1967; *New York Times,* January 19, 1968, p. 6.

[45] See *New York Times,* February 29, 1968, p. 5; *Korea Times,* March 21, 1968.

[46] *Korea Times,* March 2, 1968. For different Korean as well as U.S. interpretations of North Korean motives over this period, see *New York Times,* April 14, 1967, p. 5; January 29, 1968, p. 1; and Flora Lewis, "Seoul Feels a Cold Wind from the North," *New York Times Magazine,* February 18, 1968.



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position leaders have continued to oppose any change in U.S. prosecution of the war or too great a compromise (e.g., a coalition government in Viet Nam) for peace. Indeed, the crisis has intensified the more virulent strain of anti-communism in Korea. Though a few may lay these events at the end of a chain leading from the Viet Nam commitment, and their number could grow if the domestic dispute over the Korean response should go deeper, attention in the main is still on conditions within Korea.

## VI

For Korea, then, the decision to become militarily involved in Viet Nam produced five major effects:

First, it enabled Korea to enter the international scene and play a role there of some prestige and power. The undertaking in Viet Nam has served as the steppingstone to new and independent diplomatic initiatives in Southeast Asia and in wider regional programs, such as the nine-nation Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC) which Korea itself founded in 1966. Greater activity in interstate affairs will likely ensue from this beginning.

Second, notwithstanding the dispute following the *Pueblo* incident, it has strengthened Korea's relations with the United States. It has thus laid a more secure basis for Korean foreign policy development even if the Viet Nam outcome fails to meet current Korean objectives. There is no question, however, that this closer relationship with the United States is due to a combination of circumstances rather than to the Viet Nam venture alone. Active support of U.S. policy in Viet Nam by a weak and unstable Korean government would not have had much significance. But Korea was meanwhile registering almost phenomenal economic growth—a 9.6 per cent annual average increase in real GNP from 1963 through 1966; over 13 per cent growth in 1966 alone—and a higher level of political stability than it had known for several years. Thus the United States could count on a more respectable ally in this politically stable and economically growing noncommunist Asian country.

Third, Korea has realized substantial economic benefits from Viet Nam. Contrary to some journalistic reports, these have not been the basis of the recent economic spurt; that had started earlier and was well under way by 1965 when Viet Nam earnings were just beginning to be significant. Nor—since they are largely capital transfers—do they account greatly for the gains in in-



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dustrial output after 1965. Nevertheless, Viet Nam earnings have become considerable in recent years. In 1966, exports of both goods and services to Viet Nam were $36 million or 8 per cent of the total for that year. Remittances were another $23 million, nearly one-fourth of private transfer receipts. In 1967 these sources more than doubled to reach a combined total of $135 million, or nearly 20 per cent of all Korean foreign exchange receipts.[47] Not only does this represent a substantial advantage, but the psychological effect on Korea has been beneficial.

Fourth, internally, despite recurring uneasiness, the commitment to Viet Nam produced no serious political divisions. Instead it gave outlet to long pent-up feelings of restlessness, national pride, patriotism and, within the military, desire for a gratifying use of Korea's military power. These reactions, however, could be vulnerable to serious discouragement over the course or outcome of the war. Strong disappointment over a possibly ambiguous settlement, with its implications for Korea's security planning and foreign policy—even where desires for change exist—could lead to a difficult and perhaps turbulent period in the re-examination of long-standing basic tenets. Further serious incidents along the border with North Korea, that could be attributed directly or indirectly to Viet Nam, could stir resentment at the failure of the Seoul government to strengthen the nation's security. As yet these prospects, though more disquieting now than in recent years, have not entirely altered the basic mood of satisfaction which the involvement in Viet Nam has created.

Fifth, Korea's role in Viet Nam has in all likelihood contributed in some measure to the increase in violence and the new crisis along the long quiescent if tense border with North Korea. It is still too early to evaluate the full implications of this effect. On the basis of the disposition of forces between North and South Korea, it seems illogical—if not impossible or improbable—that North Korea would wish to launch a major attack on the South.[48] But this situation is potentially damaging. Should South Korea, in responding to the threat, be led down the path of political division and new military autocracy, or should it be forced to curtail the economic growth and widespread participation in its benefits that

[47] *New York Times,* January 19, 1968, p. 6; Bank of Korea, *Monthly Statistical Review,* February 1968, p. 99.

[48] See comparative strength analysis by the Institute for Strategic Studies, quoted in *Korea Times,* January 26, 1968.



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contributed so much to the growth of internal confidence and political cohesion in 1966-1967, the losses resulting from the Viet Nam involvement would greatly outweigh the gains.

In addition to this high-risk factor, the results of the Korean involvement as they affect the United States are mixed. The agreements made in connection with Korean support in Viet Nam did not impose extraordinary financial costs. The military aid agreed upon helped to fulfill on a somewhat earlier schedule what have long been U.S. objectives for Korean forces. The $100 million worth of military aid promised in the aftermath of the *Pueblo* incident plugged gaps in Korea's defenses that had opened up after some five years of declining U.S. military aid levels. The assistance, together with the cost of maintaining Korean troops and their equipment in Viet Nam, involved far less than the cost of outfitting two additional U.S. divisions for Viet Nam.

Moreover, the United States did not alter in these negotiations its emphasis on Korea's self-help and increasing independence in economic development. The U.S. plan for phasing out grants of economic aid to Korea by the early 1970's, in line with growing Korean export capacity, was not only maintained, but adopted by the Seoul government in 1966 as one of its own major objectives in the Second Five Year Plan. Additionally, the commitments providing greater opportunities to Koreans to sell to U.S. programs in Viet Nam involved no new U.S. expenditures but only a diversion of these where feasible to Korean sources.

The United States gained in return a large element of military support and a much welcomed Asian presence in Viet Nam. Korea also proved to be an unexpectedly vigorous ally in Asian diplomacy. It obtained from ASPAC—of which Japan is a member—a stronger statement on Viet Nam than many had thought possible,[49] and in two trips to Southeast Asia in 1966, President Park did much to solidify the opinion of those nations already largely supporting U.S. policy.

On the other side of the balance sheet, the partnership with Korea, like any alliance, restricts U.S. freedom of action on Viet Nam. Korea remains critical of any U.S. action that appears to deviate from what it believes to be the real objective of the war, i.e., "expelling Communist aggression from South Vietnam."[50] A compromise settlement—especially in the wake of the *Pueblo* in-

[49]Rhee Seung-huhn, "Achievements of the ASPAC Ministerial Meeting in Seoul," *Koreana Quarterly*, Autumn 1966, p. 18.
[50]President Park, quoted in *Korea Times*, April 17, 1968.



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cident—would produce fresh demands upon the United States for additional guarantees of Korean security.

In conclusion, for both Korea and the United States, participation in the Viet Nam conflict is accelerating the changes in their relationship that were already inherent in Korea's growing economic strength and gradually evolving outlook on foreign policy. How smoothly and rapidly this more interdependent relationship will develop will depend very much on the future course of the Viet Nam war and, in its aftermath, on the abilities of the leaders of both nations to adjust to each other's changing national interests.



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# THE MILITARY'S IDEOLOGICAL CHALLENGE TO CIVILIAN AUTHORITY IN POST-WORLD WAR II FRANCE

*by Ronald J. Stupak*

WHY did the French Army, which once took pride in being above politics, gradually become so deeply involved in political action—especially since the end of the Second World War—as to be found by 1958 openly antagonistic to the political leadership of the Fourth Republic and largely instrumental in effecting a profound change in the French governmental structure? This article will seek to answer this basic question and examine, more broadly, a major problem of French civil-military relations, namely, the evolution of a comprehensive political ideology by the French Army which openly challenged the civilian, democratic political ethic of both the Fourth and Fifth Republics. The nature and ramifications of this ideological confrontation will be probed in the light of the environment of postwar France, including the interrelationships of such factors as colonial defeats, weak civilian governments, and the communist threat. In addition, we will look at the military elements which did not join the "ideological militants" in the hope of discerning some of the factors that helped to create a balancing force within the professional officer corps. And finally, the patterns of French economic, political and social responses will be scrutinized in order to demonstrate why this challenge to French democracy did not succeed.

The adjustment in civil-military relations will then be analyzed to determine the probability of such a confrontation arising in France's immediate future, or in that of other democratic industrial societies. The description and analysis of this ideological confrontation between the civilians and the Army in France is of significance to all advanced industrial nations because it demonstrates under what conditions the professional military ethic can be galvanized into a political instrument that attempts to be the arbiter of the political values of the whole society. Hence, any enlightenment on the French problem may help other nations at a corresponding stage of development to perceive under what



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circumstances a similar ideological challenge from the military professionals might erupt. In addition, the manner in which the de Gaulle government has attempted to neutralize this threat may serve as a model adaptable to other nations.

## Historical Background of French Civil-Military Relations

The ideological challenge by the French Army to the constituted civilian authorities in the post-World War II era was no sudden eruption. The tendency since 1870 has been for the French Army to intrude more and more into the political decision-making process. The relationship between civilians and military has been characterized by a series of invasions by each side into what the other considers to be its autonomous sphere of action. Therefore, several major historical incidents and social-psychological phenomena should be examined in order to discern the trends that led to the postwar confrontation.

Prior to 1870 the French Army was truly nonpolitical. It was the neutral agent of the government and obeyed the orders of its constitutional chief.[1] However, the Army had amassed a superiority complex dating back to the Napoleonic victories. With civilian support, it continued to focus the many-sided talents of the French nation on conquest and military glory. This preoccupation with conquest led to a psychological problem for the Army since it was never again able to repeat the great victories of the Napoleonic era.[2]

As the years passed and the Army experienced a continuous pattern of defeats and empty victories, it began to acquire an inferiority complex and to formulate a metaphysics of military conflict serving to explain its defeats in 1870, 1940 and 1954. The basic causes of its humiliations were seen to be that the politicians had "stabbed it in the back" on the home front, and that the liberal, democratic political environment in France had become weak, corrupt and decadent.[3]

During these years of continuous disappointments, however, the Army found professional pride in military victories in Indochina and particularly in North Africa. In these areas it found an outlet for its nationalist ambitions in conquest, administration, and the

[1]Guy Chapman, "The French Army and Politics," in Michael Howard, editor, *Soldiers and Governments* (London: Eyre Spottiswoodie, 1957), pp. 56-57.
[2]John Terraine, "The Army in Modern France," *History Today*, November 1961, p. 734; "Fall of the Dinosaurs," *The Economist*, April 29, 1961, p. 419.
[3]Paul-Marie de la Gorce, *The French Army: A Military-Political History* (New York: George Braziller, 1963), pp. 400-432.



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extension of French *grandeur*. Since actual combat was relatively rare, it was principally occupied in administrative duties, supervision of territories, construction and engineering, and pacification. Hence, the Army acquired psychological, paternalistic and political interests in the French Empire.[4] When the decolonialization process began to decimate the French Empire after World War II, the Army viewed this as an institutional affront to its heroic past.

The Dreyfus Affair in the 1890's brought into question the relationship of a democratic state to its army. Senior army officers resented civilian prying into the administration of the Army and demanded the right to make their own rules and to manage their own affairs. In essence, "the proposition that Army justice and civilian justice were two separate things whose standards were not interchangeable was upheld with the passion of hysteria."[5] Thus, the attempt by civilians to thrust liberal democratic values into the military sphere set loose a chain of civil-military tensions that have had permanent repercussions.

First, the Army began to espouse even more strongly its conservative principles of honor, courage and duty against the crass, decadent values of republican France. Second, suspicion about the Army's desire to enter the political arena forced the politicians to keep the military under close supervision. Third, civilian republicans made a determined effort to break down the tight, isolated professionalism of the Army by insuring the promotion of republican-minded officers. Fourth, the efforts of civilians to interject democratic values into the Army caused the professional military to turn in upon itself, resulting in its greater isolation from civilian life and in a purge of officers suspected of being susceptible to republican values.[6]

These problems arising from the Dreyfus Affair produced a weakened Army, a dissatisfied officer corps, political interference in professional military matters, hysterical civilian suspicions of the military's political ambitions, and substantial military isolation from civilian influences.

Related to the tensions of the Dreyfus Affair was the wide cleavage between the socialist workers and the French Army which developed because liberal republican governments, over the years, had used the Army for such internal security functions as crushing

[4]Terraine, *op. cit.*, p. 735.
[5]*Ibid.*, p. 738.
[6]De la Gorce, *op. cit.*, pp. 48-61.



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the Paris Commune of 1870 and the general strikes of the early 1900's. To the socialists, the French Army became identified as the repressive symbol of capitalism, while, to the Army, the socialists with their internationalist slogans became identified as the subverters of the French national will. As time passed and the socialists became more powerful in the French governmental structure, the French Army became firmly convinced that the republican politicians were traitors to the "true" national heritage of France.[7]

Many of these tensions between the civilians and the military were submerged in the struggle for survival in World War I. However, during the interwar period this cohesion was shattered by several factors: Disillusionment with the war made French intellectuals critical of war and military life in general. In the flush of victory civilians tended to forget about the Army and this, in turn, produced a renewed sense of isolation and uselessness among the military. Many high-ranking officers lapsed into a complacency and strategic rigidity that disgusted junior officers. Then, as the economic and political dislocations of the 1930's unfolded, many French Army officers began to exhibit fascist tendencies. Moreover, the rise of revolutionary communism in the international sphere and of the Popular Front on the national level made the French military bitterly hostile to the French working class and to the French Republic; "Loyalty to France but not to the Republic" became the motto of an officer corps which viewed itself as the embodiment of the true national will of France.[8] Hence, during the 1930's the traditional, professional habit of obedience to constituted civilian authority began to erode.

It was also during the 1930's that Charles de Gaulle and others began to question the defensive strategy of the Army General Staff. De Gaulle opted for an offensive strategy based on mobile, armored divisions.[9] Consequently, when the Germans swept easily into France in 1940, many junior officers acquired a distaste for defensive tactics and a distrust of their general officers.

As the catastrophe of 1940 reached its climax, General Petain made the political decision to sign an armistice with Nazi Germany. The politicians accepted Petain's leadership "without demur, [and] indeed gladly threw their responsibility on to his

[7]Edward Behr, "The French Army as a Political and Social Factor," *International Affairs,* October 1959, p. 438; de la Gorce, *op. cit.,* pp. 123-124, 137.
[8]De la Gorce, *op. cit.,* pp. 180-252; Behr, *op. cit.,* p. 439.
[9]Charles de Gaulle, *The Army of the Future* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1941), p. 79.



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shoulders."[10] In the face of external pressures, the politicians showed themselves weak and hesitant; even worse, they allowed the military to make the final political decision calling for an armistice.[11]

The collapse of the Third Republic in 1940 may have been predictable. What was not predictable was the phenomenon that accompanied the collapse: the appearance on foreign soil of an almost unknown general who, in defiance of the constituted authority of the nation, proclaimed that France had lost a battle but might yet bring honor to its national heritage by winning the war. The rebirth of the French national will personally embodied in General de Gaulle was founded on an act of military insubordination—the venerable Petain was not only his military superior but also Head of State—and it set Frenchmen against Frenchmen.[12]

The crisis of conscience this deed posed for all who wore the uniform of a French officer was traumatic. Many junior officers debated in their minds whose orders they should obey, Petain's or de Gaulle's. "Where does duty lie?," became a moral matter for the individual soldier to decide.[13] The echo of 1940 was to ring clear years later in the Generals' Revolt in Algeria in April 1961.

## The Ideological Challenge to Civilian Authority in Postwar France

At the end of the war, the French Army was divided and frustrated, yet fortified by the belief that the politicians had betrayed it in 1940. Most officers based their future actions on three conclusions. First, the 1940 defeat was caused by the incompetence of a General Staff still fighting World War I; hence, a new strategy had to be constructed. Second, had the government chosen to escape to Africa in order to continue the war, it could have saved the Army and the independence of the country. This theory, expounded by General de Gaulle, pointed up the vital need to hold North Africa, without which there could be no defense of France or Western Europe: were the tricolor to be lowered in Algeria, the red flag would soon fly in Paris.[14] Third, a

[10]Chapman, *op. cit.*, p. 69.
[11]Richard D. Challener, "The Third Republic and the Generals: The Gravediggers," in Harry L. Coles, editor, *Total War and Cold War* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1963), p. 104.
[12]Terraine, *op. cit.*, p. 740.
[13]Chapman, *op. cit.*, p. 70.
[14]Jacques Soustelle, "France Looks at Her Alliances," *Foreign Affairs,* October 1956, p. 129.



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good Frenchman must be prepared to disobey the government if it once again appears that corrupt politicians are on the verge of abandoning the empire or the national heritage.[15] Before the Army was able to formulate a new doctrine to reunite the fragmented military, however, a rash of national and international tensions brought it into open conflict with the civilians.

Immediately after the war, the Army saw itself faced with two immediate dangers—the Communist Party in France and the communist Ho Chi Minh in Indochina. These challenges were seen as the culmination of a long series of episodes which, since the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the Popular Front of the 1930's, had pushed the Army into direct opposition to international communism.

When the Army went off to fight communist guerrillas in Indochina, it found that the war was being fought increasingly against well-armed and well-trained fanatical nationalists. For over seven years, it fought this dirty, politicalized war in a climate of general indifference or even open hostility on the part of the civilians in metropolitan France. This unfortunate situation arose for several reasons: (1) Since the French expeditionary force was confined to regulars, the nation was not seriously involved.[16] (2) Since in the latter stages U.S. aid paid the cost of the war, there was not even the sense of financial involvement for most Frenchmen. (3) The politicians of the Fourth Republic seemed neither capable of defining, nor willing to define, the ultimate objectives of the war. (4) Certain sections of the Left carried their anti-militarism to great lengths, such as extending guarantees to blood donors that plasma would not be used for wounded soldiers "suppressing the nationalists" in Indochina.[17]

The Army, which every year for almost nine years suffered casualties among its officers equal to the size of the graduating class from St. Cyr (the West Point of France), felt isolated and neglected.[18] This sense of alienation cemented the Regular Army officers into a band of brothers separated from the French nation as a whole. Thus, after the defeat at Dien Bien Phu, the colonial officers swore that it had been caused by the communists,

[15]David Schoenbrun, "De Gaulle Faces an Anguished Army," *New York Times Magazine,* February 14, 1960, p. 90.

[16]Behr, *op. cit.,* p. 44. Note some of the articles being written on the growing professionalism of U.S. military personnel in the Viet Nam struggle: e.g., Robert Lee Sherrod, "Notes on a Monstrous War," *Life,* January 27, 1967, pp. 20-29.

[17]"France Francaise," *The Spectator,* April 28, 1961, p. 587.

[18]Schoenbrun, *op. cit.,* p. 92.



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the Leftists, and corrupt politicians in Paris.[19] Again the Army had been "stabbed in the back." In effect, army officers emerged from this traumatic defeat with three fixed ideas: resentment against the civilian government in Paris which had betrayed the true national will; a crude conception of a world in permanent struggle between Christian good and communist evil; and an admiration for communist techniques coupled with an intense hatred for communist ideology.[20] The Indochinese conflict left the French Army imbued with a sense of neglect, of failure, and most importantly, of mission.

In the postwar years, the Army became disgusted with the repeated collapse of French cabinets and the inability of a democratic, parliamentary republic to design a consistent policy in colonial affairs. The civilian leaders of the Fourth Republic were not able to cope with the military mystique because they lacked clear-cut objectives of their own.[21] In addition, the Army, observing the almost total indifference of the French people to the demise of the Fourth Republic in 1958, came to believe that it had better qualifications and a better right to define the policy of France than did the political authorities in Paris.

This weakness of the civilian governments and the inexorable decolonialization process in the postwar period had caused France to give up Madagascar, Morocco, Tunisia, and the Indochinese states. At this point, the Army had had its fill of the fumbling, compromise and complexity of international politics. It wanted and needed certainty and simplicity. Furthermore, since it began to equate colonial nationalism with communism, it felt sure that the Fourth Republic had sacrificed these lost segments of the French Empire to totalitarian domination.[22]

The French Army was also influenced in its actions by the French nation's close ties to the United States. Humiliated by France's dependence, it felt that Washington had actively contributed to its defeat in Indochina so that the United States itself could establish a foothold there. It also believed that the United States had forced France to accept German rearmament; that the United States had tried to obliterate the French officer corps by

[19]Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., *De Gaulle and the French Army* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1964), pp. 22-23.
[20]"The French Army," *The Economist*, January 30, 1960, pp. 432-433.
[21]"France's Frustrated Army," *The Economist*, February 22, 1958, p. 675.
[22]Raoul Girardet, "Civil and Military Power in the Fourth Republic," in Samuel P. Huntington, editor, *Changing Patterns of Military Politics* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), pp. 129-130.



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forcing France to integrate its military forces into the European Defense Community; and that the United States was anti-French in UN colonial debates while being overly complacent in its dealings with Egypt and the Arab League. When France was forced to withdraw from Suez in 1956, French Army officers were convinced that the French politicians were at the mercy of U.S. pressures.

On the other hand, the army officers' relations with U.S. military personnel in NATO seemed to have caused them to misinterpret completely U.S. intentions and policies toward France, communism, and international affairs in general. Thus, whether encouraged by the Central Intelligence Agency or not, General Challe, leader of the Generals' Revolt of April 1961, appeared convinced that a number of American interests would be advanced by a French victory in Algeria. His reasoning seemed to go as follows: Since the United States opposed communism, wished to get France back into effective NATO membership, and wanted to recapture its international prestige after the abortive invasion of Cuba, American leaders would necessarily have to back the French generals in their efforts to save Algeria from communist domination and in their parallel efforts to remove the major stumbling block to the attainment of this objective and an integrated NATO—General Charles de Gaulle.[23]

As the disappointments mounted in the postwar period and the politicalization of the Army became more widespread, the military became more fragmented. To make it even worse, this new fragmentation was superimposed upon the Vichy-de Gaulle split. The junior officers, especially the "hard bitten colonels," distrusted and disliked the "politicians' soldiers" who, as high ranking officers, owed their position and promotion to influential political groups and party programs.[24]

In addition, three distinct groups began to appear in the military officer corps and further splintered the professional military body. These groups were designated the *armée traditionelle,* which continued to obey all constituted authority; the *armée des techniciens,* which showed increasing interest in both a stable political system and a modernization of the armed forces that would include a French independent nuclear force; and the *armée militante,* which had been doing the actual fighting in the

[23]Furniss, *op. cit.,* pp. 54-55; also see Andrew Tully, *CIA: The Inside Story* (New York: Crest Books, 1963), pp. 43-54.

[24]David Thompson, "The French Army in Revolt," *The Nation,* June 21, 1958, p. 556.



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colonial wars along "conventional patterns" and had been losing approximately 300 officers in action each year since 1945.[25]

The *armée militante,* composed of officers who were defending their nation's empire in Indochina and Algeria, found that the nation had deserted them. Feeling isolated from fellow army officers and other branches of the service, they began to think of themselves as an "elite within an elite." The camaraderie these colonels and captains developed in fighting the colonial wars far from Paris gave them a feeling of purity and power since they had not been tainted by corrupt politicians. In essence, the hierarchical command structure of the professional military came under challenge from an informal political nucleus of army officers who had served as leaders of the Foreign Legion and the paratroopers in Indochina and Algeria.[26] It was this colonial elite that arose as the prime mover in the threats to the democratic political ethic in 1958 and 1961. In looking for a moral justification for the type of war it had been sent to fight, this group formulated an ideology that became the starting point in the politicalization of the Army's cadres.

General de Gaulle added fuel to this fire of discontent. He expressed his contempt for politicians, political parties and the parliamentary system with such violence that he undermined the army officers' respect for any republican state. Furthermore, he explained his actions of 1940 in the following manner: Petain was the legal head of the French government; however, he was not the legitimate heir of the French national will. De Gaulle, while not the legal head of the French government, nevertheless was the legitimate embodiment of the French national heritage; hence, he had the right to lead the French nation and the duty to disobey the "illegitimate" Petain.[27] This doctrine, in effect, twisted the minds and tore the consciences of a whole generation of French officers.

Ultimately, Algeria became the issue upon which all the abovementioned perplexities intersected. The persistence of the political and military deadlock in Algeria had gradually come to dominate the French political arena at the expense of every other problem. So weak were the institutions of the Fourth Republic

[25]Walter Kerr, "The French Army in Trouble," *Foreign Affairs,* October 1961, p. 742.
[26]Jean Planchais, "The French Army: A Close-Up," *New York Times Magazine,* February 18, 1962, p. 109; Paul Johnson, "The Colonels' Conspiracy," *New Statesman,* July 5, 1958, p. 4.
[27]Schoenbrun, *op. cit.,* pp. 90-94.



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that the Army by 1958 had begun to assume nearly full power in Algeria. With its wealth of manpower, it supplied teachers, doctors and builders for its "experiment in social engineering."[28]

Meanwhile, fear that the Army would become the arbiter in all political crises forced the Fourth Republic to continue its "blind alley" policy in Algeria. The consequence was that the Army took full control of the situation, became convinced that it could govern a country more effectively than could the civilians, and saw its work in Algeria as a humanitarian effort against totalitarian, communist domination—an undertaking that could not be abandoned by orders from weak politicians. Thus, Algeria became an "absolute" which the Army felt it could not surrender. This was passionately expressed by General Zeller at his trial after the Generals' Revolt of 1961:

> France has need of Algeria. Without her . . . France faces, on the one hand, a political decline in the European and Atlantic framework, a menace on the south shore of the Mediterranean, a loss of economic advantages. Algeria wishes still . . . (at this point, General Zeller became faint and could not continue).[29]

Service in Algeria not only gave the Army a sense of power and a fortified sense of mission, it also brought to a head all the tensions that had troubled civil-military relations in France since the end of the Second World War. Appropriately then, it was from Algeria that the French Army unleashed its ideological challenges of May 13, 1958 and April 22, 1961.

## The *Armée Militante's* Comprehensive Ideological Doctrine

Following the debacle of 1940 and the rescue of France by the Anglo-American invasion force, the colonial combat in Indochina and Algeria served to reinforce traditional military views regarding the decadence of the society at home. The colonial army's isolation and alienation was particularly dangerous because of the other ideas accompanying it. "The Army believed that it epitomized the best national virtues. It simultaneously believed that it represented the nation."[30] It was convinced that its colonial mission was vital and that military failures were the consequence of political and social defects in the French democratic system. Driven to the conclusion that French society had to be reshaped, it became thoroughly politicalized.

[28]Furniss, *op. cit.*, p. 23.
[29]*Le Proces des Generaux Challe et Zeller* (Paris: Nouvelles Editions Latines, 1961), p. 50. (My translation.)
[30]Furniss, *op. cit.*, p. 2.



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As colonial officers began to analyze the French defeat in Indochina, they became more and more certain that they had been "stabbed in the back." Moreover, the lessons from Southeast Asia reinforced their sense of mission in Algeria: it was their duty to save the West from the evils of communism. This dedication was strengthened by a comprehensive ideological construct known as "revolutionary warfare."

The exponents of this doctrine took many of their principles from the communist literature of Lenin and Mao Tse-tung.[31] Roger Trinquier has described the basic foundation of this construct: "Warfare is now an interlocking system of actions—political, economic, psychological, military—that aims at the overthrow of the established authority in a country and its replacement by another regime."[32] Thus, the colonial struggles were seen as only a segment of the permanent conflict with the communists. And since war had been transformed from an occasional physical confrontation to a permanent war of ideas, the character of the military man must change also: he must be able to expound and put into practice a coherent strategic doctrine. Moreover, in this "total war," according to the *armée militante,* the political system of France had to be reconstructed in order to withstand the thrusts of international communist subversion.

Because of the lack of stable political leadership in Paris during the chaotic years of the Fourth Republic, the French military had to make many political decisions at every level, especially in Algeria. Therefore, it took the opportunity to apply its "revolutionary war" concepts in Algeria, employing terror, torture, and the building of "parallel hierarchies" in order to defeat the FLN.[33] The military became confident that it could enter into the political system of the French nation and restructure it.[34] Increasingly, the young officers came to favor a type of national socialism that would impose equity, clarity and decisiveness of policy through efficient technical means rather than political bargaining.[35] The militants in the Army eventually concluded that the Army should dominate not only Algeria, but also Paris.

The doctrine of "revolutionary war" contained the following

[31]J.R. Tournoux, "A Proletarian Army," *The Reporter,* February 18, 1960, pp. 19-20.
[32]Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare* (New York: Praeger, 1962), p. 6.
[33]*Ibid.* This is the theme of the entire book.
[34]Furniss, *op. cit.,* p. 36.
[35]George A. Kelly, "Algeria, the Army, and the Fifth Republic (1959-1961): A Scenario of Civil-Military Conflict," *Political Science Quarterly,* September 1964, p. 349.



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postulates: First, the West and Christianity were seen to be locked in a permanent struggle against international communism directed by the Soviet Union. The Marxist-Leninist concept sees conflict as a permanent state and believes that it will remain so until the advent of a classless society. To this end, the communists wage war in all domains of man's activity, the spiritual, the intellectual and the material.[36]

This leads logically to the second tenet—universal war. War is universal because the communist conspiracy has agents spread throughout the world; wherever there is a communist agent, the revolutionary war is already being fought. Furthermore, since the communists use many indirect tactics, such as infiltration, subversion and propaganda, as well as direct assaults on weak positions, the West, under French direction, must be prepared to repulse the communists on every level. To accomplish this, the Army must have the absolute support of the civilian population.

Third, the Army adjudged any tactic to be operational if it allowed the Christian West to repel the evils of communism. This led it to undertake terror, propaganda and torture in Algeria to suppress the Moslems in order to save the country from communist domination. Since the growth of nationalism in an underdeveloped country, in whatever form or context, could lead, in the Army's twisted outlook, to that country becoming a communist satellite, any means could be justified to prevent such a catastrophe from occurring.

Fourth, since the Army saw itself as the embodiment of the national will, it believed that any persons or groups disagreeing with its ideological interpretation of the national and international scenes were necessarily traitors or communist agents. It felt that it had to have the power to make its voice heard at all levels, to carry out its national defense mission, and to look after the nation's destiny.

Fifth, many officers who were imbued with the concept of "revolutionary war" believed that the whole French political system had to be reshaped in order to give consistency and coherence to the French response. This threat to the French democratic tradition was clearly expressed by Colonel Lacheroy during a speech to the Ecole Militaire soon after the fall of the Fourth Republic in May 1958: "General de Gaulle has not un-

[36]Tournoux, *op. cit.*, p. 20. For an in-depth analysis of the doctrine of "revolutionary war," consult the *Revue de Défense Nationale* (1955 to 1959) for articles by Colonel Lacheroy, Major Hogard and Colonel Nemo.



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derstood the significance of the 13 May Revolution. Nor have the French. It destroyed the system—the system none of us wants anymore. . . ."[37]

When the Fourth Republic fell due to military pressures, the army militants were ready with their own program: First, Algeria, as an "absolute" and not just another issue in France's spectrum of international problems, had to remain French in order to provide concrete proof that the Army could rule efficiently and that it could win in an ideological conflict with the communists. The Army also continued to see Algeria as the key to the defense of Western Europe. If the communists controlled it, they would be able to infiltrate Europe through its soft underbelly in the Middle East and North Africa.

Second, the distinguished military records of colonial officers placed them in key staff assignments or in command of such crack units as the paratroops. In this way, the concepts of "revolutionary war" came to be taught at the military schools and in basic training programs for recruits. The Army unleashed a political and strategic indoctrination program among air force and army officers, conscripts, and senior civil servants in the defense ministry. It attempted to inculcate the values of order, duty and discipline into the Frenchman's mind in preference to the democratic values of individualism and freedom.

Third, even though the majority of army officers had no intention of assuming complete power in France, they nevertheless demanded the right to influence the formulation of governmental policy. An interesting distinction was drawn between "petty politics," in which the Army would be neutral, and "grand politics," which were to be formulated only in conjunction with the Army. Of course, the Army itself was to determine what constituted "grand politics." Thus, the Army demanded a "blanket veto" over policy formulations on almost every level.[38]

Fourth, in articles and other papers written after the events of May 13, 1958, army officers denounced the old notion of passive obedience. They asserted that they could no longer abide by the traditional concept of the Army as a blind, inert tool in the hands of a corrupt government or by the principles of complete nonintervention in politics. As Girardet intimates, the Army came to believe that obedience was revocable and conditional.[39] Hence,

[37]Quoted in Johnson, *op. cit.*, p. 4.
[38]Bernard E. Brown, "The Army and Politics in France," *The Journal of Politics*, May 1961, p. 276.
[39]Girardet, *op. cit.*, pp. 142-143.



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it began to act as if, on the political plane, it had a veto power over the life and death of each government.

Fifth, the ideological doctrine of "revolutionary war" was formulated under the direction of six or seven colonels, all of whom had seen continuous service in Indochina and Algeria. Their experiences had bred in them an irreconcilable antipathy toward democratic institutions and politically-appointed generals. Since they constituted a tightly-knit informal organization within the Army, they broke down the formal chain of command structure within the military hierarchy.[40]

Finally, the militant theoreticians sought acceptance for their ideological doctrine in order to justify their existence. They feared that there would be little place for the colonial fighters in the French Army of the future, for it likely would be a nuclear army. Darsie Gillie claims that there was "significant symbolism" in the explosion of the last French experimental bombs in the Sahara, in the midst of the 1961 mutiny against the Fifth Republic.[41]

The colonial militants of the French Army clearly had launched a direct ideological attack against the democratic ethic and political systems of the Fourth and Fifth Republics.

## The Military "Balancers"

The ideological challenge of the *armée militante* met resistance within the military establishment.[42] Despite the number of officers who paid tribute to the rebellious generals at their trials following the abortive April 1961 coup,[43] there were fragmented military elements which, along with nonmilitary forces, helped to save the French political system.

The behavior of the Air Force has been cited as one of the major reasons why the revolt of April 1961 failed. The Air Force was much less restive than the army militants. Much more democratically recruited than the Army, it suffered less from social and intellectual inbreeding. And because it was not so closely involved in the Algerian operations, fewer of its officers were frustrated or ideologically indoctrinated. Indeed, thanks to de Gaulle's enthusiasm for an independent nuclear striking force, it had an organizational stake in helping to preserve the Fifth Republic.

[40]Johnson, *op. cit.*, pp. 4-5.
[41]Darsie Gillie, "The General and the Generals," *The Spectator,* April 29, 1961, p. 589.
[42]Kelly, *op. cit.*, p. 357.
[43]Maurice Garcon, editor, *Le Proces D'Edmond Jouhaud* (Paris: Editions Albin Michel, 1962), *passim.*



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The Navy, little inclined to disobey General de Gaulle, tended to represent the traditionalist elements in the military. Generally conservative, naval officers (who had shown just as little inclination to disobey Marshal Petain) stressed the principles of obedience, duty, and noninvolvement in politics.[44] They supported de Gaulle because he was the legally constituted authority of the French government.

Long before the Generals' Revolt of 1961, disputes had arisen in the military between the growing school of nuclear strategists (e.g., Generals Charles Ailleret and Paul Stehlin) and the Algerian "revolutionary war" specialists, who competed over resources, strategies and political preferences.[45] In effect a split developed between the *armée des techniciens* and the *armée militante*. Since General de Gaulle was the fervent ally of the nuclear strategists, they formed the core of the government's support in April 1961. The military Gaullists, though relatively small in number, had been continuous admirers of the General from the days of Liberation. When the Fifth Republic was threatened, this group allied itself with civilian groups to protect the established order.[46]

The concept of "reflective" or conditional obedience formulated by the "revolutionary war" exponents affected other segments of the military. "Conditionalist" officers did not automatically carry out the tasks assigned to them by the leaders of the April 1961 revolt.[47] *Attentisme* (wait-and-see-ism) penetrated the military hierarchies in Algeria and metropolitan France; they wanted to wait and see how the revolt was progressing before taking action. During their pause, de Gaulle was able to take the offensive, and the *attentisme* group switched to de Gaulle's side.

Conscripts, who made up about two-thirds of the French soldiers in Algeria during the first half of 1961, had little in common with the regulars. They did not share the frustrations or the passions of the officers who had been fighting and losing campaigns for twenty years. Since the draftees represented a broad segment of French opinion and since most Frenchmen were becoming disgusted with the Army's actions in Algeria, it was not surprising that the conscripts obeyed civilian leaders at home rather than their military officers.[48] Their compliance with de Gaulle's call of April 20, 1961, ordering them to disobey

[44]Planchais, *op. cit.*, p. 109.
[45]Kelly, *op. cit.*, p. 345.
[46]*Ibid.*, p. 350.
[47]*Ibid.*, pp. 358-359.
[48]Kerr, *op. cit.*, p. 94.



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rebellious officers, was a key factor in preventing the latter from accomplishing their mission.

Even the "unity of the Army" proposition, which the militants stressed as crucial to their ability to move swiftly in overthrowing the civilian government, began to work against them. As soon as some units obeyed de Gaulle's orders, turning from passivity to pro-government actions, the "unity of the Army" factor began to work in favor of the government instead of the generals. The fact that "the Army doesn't fire on the Army" was accepted by all segments of the military establishment, thus creating an action vacuum.[49] De Gaulle was then able to take the initiative and fill the vacuum on his terms.

There were other reasons why certain military officers refused to take an active part in the 1961 revolt: They believed that the revolt was poorly planned; the Foreign Legion should not have been used in what should have been strictly a French affair; the Army was being used simply as an instrument to protect the interests of the French settlers in Algeria; French Algeria was clearly such a hopeless cause that it was not worth jeopardizing the existence of the military establishment for; the leaders of the revolt had the objective of disrupting the French political system and not just winning in Algeria. Finally, certain segments of the military were jealous of, as well as displeased with, the prestige and power possessed by the informal clique of colonial officers.[50]

Thus, for diverse reasons and interests, fragmented segments within the military establishment coalesced long enough and at the right time to prevent a small elite within the Army from seizing power.

### Civilian Resistance to the *Armée Militante*

When the challenge of April 1961 exploded, civilian leaders refused to sit back apathetically and watch the Fifth Republic crumble. On the day of the April revolt, trade unionists, businessmen, editors and columnists, and members of parliament quickly threw their support to President de Gaulle and the democratic political system. Volunteers gathered at the Ministry of the Interior, and the government hastily enrolled the most reliable elements into a militia to defend Paris against the threatened paratroop drop.[51]

[49]"Charles and the Kingmakers," *The Economist,* April 29, 1961, p. 452.
[50]Kerr, *op. cit.,* p. 93; Kelly, *op. cit.,* p. 358; de la Gorce, *op. cit.,* p. 545.
[51]Edmond Taylor, "The Rebellion that Failed," *The Reporter,* May 11, 1961, p. 18; Gillie, *op. cit.,* p. 589.



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However, long before this crisis erupted General de Gaulle had laid the foundation for a quick and decisive response. His leadership was essential to the defense of civilian government. The General did not want to isolate the Army from the decision-making process since he had a high place for it in his conception of the state. It was to be an obedient army, a disciplined instrument of governmental policy. Therefore, after April 1958 he sought to fashion this instrument circumspectly, by persuasion and gradual maneuver, seeking to avoid a clash, in order to establish his authority and the stability of the Fifth Republic. When the 1961 revolt erupted, he was able to castigate the generals in Algeria as despicable insurgents while making quick decisions which prepared metropolitan France for their thrust. Through his efforts to assimilate the Army into the governmental process and to strengthen the civilian governmental institutions, especially the executive, de Gaulle emerged as the key reason for the collapse of the militants' ideological challenge.

Furthermore, the excesses of the French Army in Algeria assailed the conscience of the French people; they were appalled at the Army's techniques in fighting the war.[52] Two major opinion-making groups—the intellectuals and religious leaders—reacted by launching a direct attack on the militants' ideological construct, sense of mission, and moral justification for their actions in Algeria.

The protest of the intellectuals was an open "declaration of war" denouncing the Army's ideological explanations for the atrocities it was committing. The intellectuals' major contentions were contained in a manifesto entitled "Declaration of the Right of Refusing to Serve in the Algerian War," signed by 121 writers, artists and university teachers and issued in August 1960. It read in part as follows:

> It is a protest on the part of men whose honor and whose clear conception of truth have been affronted. . . . What is citizenship if, under certain circumstances, it becomes shameful submission? Are there not cases where the refusal to serve is a sacred duty, where "treason" means a courageous respect for what is free? And when, according to the will of those who use it as an instrument of racial or ideological domination, the army declares itself in overt or hidden revolt against democratic institutions, does not revolt against the army take on another meaning?[53]

This "Manifesto of the 121" was widely circulated. It helped to increase desertions from the Army; awakened many people to the

[52]Furniss, *op. cit.*, p. 32.
[53]Quoted in Joseph Barry, "The Moral Crisis," *Commentary*, January 1961, p. 23.



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moral battle being waged between "fascism" and democracy; gave the Army reason to dread the intellectuals' influence; and helped to bring pressures on General de Gaulle to end the Algerian war by negotiation.[54]

Also, a group of Catholic priests serving in Algeria wrote a collective letter to their superiors in France protesting the torture of Moslem suspects by young, susceptible conscripts and warning that the war was corrupting the souls of young French recruits. This was followed by a decree in which a college of bishops, archbishops and cardinals condemned the use of torture by the French Army and encouraged disobedience on the part of those ordered to perform such inhuman outrages. A congress of Protestant clergymen announced their support of conscientious objectors.[55] By these and similar actions, churchmen and intellectuals scored the militants' ideology and stirred the democratic conscience of French citizens.

Three other factors helped the Fifth Republic to withstand the military's assault: First, the Constitution of the Fifth Republic had strengthened the executive at the expense of parliament. Thus, in April 1961 de Gaulle in the National Assembly was able to invoke "the almost unlimited powers the new constitution bestows upon the president in a national emergency" under the provisions of Article 16.[56] De Gaulle gave his order countermanding those of the rebellious officers as a "directive from the President in his role as commander in chief."[57] Thus, the constitutionally strengthened Fifth Republic allowed President de Gaulle to act with supreme authority against the *armée militante*.

Second, the communists remained quiescent during the early years of the Fifth Republic, making it impossible for the Army to scare the French people into calling for its assistance in preventing a communist takeover.

Third, the United States and France's other allies firmly supported de Gaulle against the rebellious generals. This disrupted the insurgent generals' strategy since they had expected the support of the United States in the Algerian venture. It also tended to reinforce the legitimacy of de Gaulle and his government.

Most civilian groups were not willing to see the Fifth Republic go the way of the Fourth Republic; they were unwilling to entrust the Republic's future to the generals in Algeria.

[54] *Ibid.*, pp. 24-27.
[55] *Ibid.*, p. 24; also see Furniss, *op. cit.*, p. 112.
[56] Taylor, *op. cit.*, p. 18.
[57] *Ibid.*, p. 19.



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## How De Gaulle Blunted the Military Challenge

When General de Gaulle came to power in 1958, he instituted procedures designed to weaken the political power of the Army's militants and to channel the activities of the military establishment toward the goals of governmental policy. Basically, he attempted to create a countervailing military doctrine more closely coordinated with his philosophical conception of France's national destiny and used this doctrine to integrate military officers more fully into a modernization program for France and for the armed forces.

He first sought to weaken the militants' strength in Algeria and to destroy the Army's "veto" over France's constitutional decision-making process. In an effort to break down the separateness of the politically undisciplined paratroop units which considered themselves an army apart, an elite within the military elite, he issued the same camouflaged fatigues and colorful berets to all units serving in Algeria and assigned more conscripts to the paratroop units.[58] He had loyal commanders pushed forward into key command and staff positions, especially among pilots, tank specialists and technicians who would be enthusiastic about modernization plans. In this connection, de Gaulle's distaste for military integration within NATO was in part a psychological tactic, since he was sure that a national force obsessed for years with colonial warfare and convinced of its patriotic mission in Algeria could not simply be brought back to Western Europe and turned into a "stateless" army.[59]

As mentioned earlier, the Constitution of the Fifth Republic had strengthened the executive office of the Presidency (Articles 15 and 16) to insure the stability of the regime and presidential direction of civil-military relations.[60] On February 20, 1960 de Gaulle ordered civilian authorities to take over from the Army "the attributions which are its normal prerogative" in the governing of the Algerian departments.[61]

Also important among General de Gaulle's initial efforts to weaken the militants were his abolition of the psychological bureau in Algeria and the decentralization of all psychological war services; and his positive attempts to limit the scope of the psychological war specialists by inducing them to comply with new

[58]Planchais, *op. cit.*, p. 109.
[59]"In Search of Status," *The Economist*, February 6, 1960, pp. 531-532.
[60]Taylor, *op. cit.*, pp. 18-19.
[61]Kelly, *op. cit.*, pp. 355-356.



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definitions.[62] In taking this latter step, he gave evidence that he recognized the importance and role of psychological warfare but desired to keep it within precise boundaries.

Yet in his earliest actions de Gaulle clearly attempted to avoid both a massive purge of the officer corps and a direct confrontation with the ideological militants. Rather, he tried to move cautiously in order to rally the support of the Army and civilians around his conception of the nation's *grandeur* and his vision of France's future.

In the wake of the Generals' Revolt, de Gaulle proceeded to accelerate the pace and magnitude of his efforts to make the Army more obedient to governmental policy. He severed the "Algerian albatross" from the Fifth Republic's neck; restructured the judiciary to include such organizations as the Court of State Security in order to expedite the process of trying and sentencing insurgent officers; instituted a long-term punishment system to control all future rebellious actions against the state; and began to identify the military more closely with the nation in matters of educating the youth and formulating the strategic nuclear doctrines for national defense.[63] He restructured the military commands and their missions, and reassigned the major part of the Army to metropolitan France in order to reduce its isolation from the homeland and assist French officers to find their place once more in French society.[64] In addition, under the Fifth Republic conscripts came to constitute about 75 per cent of the Army's manpower, apparently to ensure that a wholly professional defense force did not once again become the instrument for a powerful minority in the Army or on the political Right.[65]

De Gaulle's two major strategies for closing the gap between the nation and the Army were the *force de frappe* and the Gaullist vision of France's renewed greatness. The French President was determined to equip his military forces with their own nuclear deterrent and appropriate means of delivery. The *force de frappe* and the modernization it entailed were viewed by de Gaulle as the best way not only to rebuild and remodel the French Army but also to fracture the hold the ideological militants had on the military chain of command.[66]

At the same time, de Gaulle began to exert more French in-

[62]*Ibid.*, pp. 353-354, 356.
[63]Général d'Armée le Puloch, "Avenir de l'Armée de Terre," *Revue de Défense Nationale*, June 1964, pp. 947-960.
[64]Kerr, *op. cit.*, p. 93.
[65]"The French Army," *Survival*, March-April 1964, pp. 67-68.
[66]Furniss, *op. cit.*, *passim.*



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dependence from alleged U.S. domination, while increasing France's role as the leader in the construction of a new, powerful Europe. By offering the professional military man a sufficiently dazzling prospect of new vistas of power and prestige in France and Europe, he hoped to take his mind off the colonial defeats.[67]

Over the past ten years, the military officer has acquired a material interest in the new military doctrine, a psychological outlet in the renewed national mission of extending France's *grandeur* throughout the world, and a professional respect for the stability and efficiency identified with the political system of the Fifth Republic. Thus, de Gaulle's major achievement has been to give the military a sense of status and direction within a civilian-controlled government, and an opportunity to act as that government's pillar and guardian.

### On the Future of French Civil-Military Relations

French civil-military relations today rest on two tenuous factors: the life expectancy of Charles de Gaulle and the degree of integration of the military in the French modernization process.

De Gaulle's leadership is crucial to the pattern of future civil-military relations for several reasons: First, he is the only person who can reinforce the stability and legitimacy of the Fifth Republic. The longer he lives and rules, the more widespread will be the acceptance by civilians and military professionals of the executive, military and judicial adjustments made under its aegis. Second, if de Gaulle can produce enough benefits for the French people under the banner of the Fifth Republic both in national and international affairs, he stands a better chance of transferring his personal triumphs to the Republic's institutional structure, thereby giving it a solid basis for long-term legitimacy and rendering unpopular any forceful move to overthrow it. Since de Gaulle has identified the Army so closely with the nation, any triumphs of the Fifth Republic would redound to the credit of the military. Third, as long as de Gaulle lives, he will pour large resources into his *force de frappe,* thus strengthening it as the basis for a civilian-controlled military doctrine and linking the military's future with it. Fourth, he has reserved a high position for the military in his conception of the French State. If he is able to remain for some time at the head of state, he may be able to narrow the gap between the nation and the Army.

During the next decade, the French government will try to

[67]Pierre Rouside, "La France et l'O.T.A.N.," *Revue de Défense Nationale,* May 1964, pp. 802-815.



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complete the process of integrating the military establishment into French society and committing it fully to modernization so that the Army acquires both a psychological and a material interest in the continuation of the institutional structure of the Fifth Republic. This must be accomplished in such a manner, however, that the military does not become the directing force of the whole process.

There are other means that could be taken to ensure a more stable balance in French civil-military relations: the cultivation of a countervailing civilian bureaucracy to fill the power vacuum surrounding de Gaulle; the development of political leadership able to command national and international respect after de Gaulle is gone; and the more rapid transfer of de Gaulle's personal prestige to the institutions of the government. The civilian leadership of France must provide wise and firm political direction of the affairs of state; otherwise, a politicalized Army is likely once again to challenge a weak, vacillating political system.

## On Civil-Military Relations in Other Democratic Industrial Societies

The French experience since World War II has relevance to the civil-military relations of many advanced, democratic industrial societies. Since the primary challenge between nations in the present era seems to be less in direct military confrontations and more in a continuous ideological battle for the minds of men between "communism" and "democracy," military establishments in democracies may feel that they must play a larger role in the policymaking process. Military officers may seek to displace the politicians and civilian statesmen whom they accuse of losing the struggle or of being ignorant of the total ideological war unleashed by international communism.

The elimination of "final" military solutions due to the nuclear "balance of terror" may cause the military in democratic states to become impatient with limited war stalemates of the Korean type and protracted, inconclusive guerrilla conflicts of the Viet Nam type. The military's perception of civilian unwillingness to use "full" military force to "win" may lead the military to intervene in the political process in order to inject a "win-philosophy" and greater patriotism and discipline into the nation. Moreover, the impact of "internationalism," as exemplified by NATO, the Common Market and the United Nations, may eventually force military establishments to bring greater political pressure to bear in



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order to protect the nation-state's identity and to head off any state policies that might diminish their professional prerogatives and position.

In recent years the line between strategic and political questions has become increasingly ambiguous, a fact that has led to thrusts and counterthrusts on the part of civilians and the military into what each considers to be its autonomous sphere. Imbalances in the civil-military equilibrium will have to be constantly readjusted. An excellent example of this ambiguity is the debate that took place before the Test Ban Treaty was ratified by the United States in 1963. It was extremely difficult to separate the treaty's political aspects from its military ones. Hence, some military men sounded like politicians, while certain politicians sounded like military strategists.

Since the end of World War II, most democratic countries have not been able to forge a military doctrine that could find full support from their military establishments. This state of affairs has automatically made military officers part of the political policymaking process and has led to political battles over the strategic doctrines of, and the resource allocations to, the various military services. These officers, in uniform and in retirement, have sought to impose their views regarding military strategy and doctrine and even domestic policy on civilian leaders, quite often through "client" congressmen. There has also been direct competition from the military establishment vis-à-vis civilian agencies for prestigious assignments—for example, in U.S. foreign aid missions.

The military's penchant for such values as efficiency, stability and predictability will no doubt continue to conflict with the democratic values of open discussion, freedom and individualism. This conflict will become dangerous if a parliamentary political system fails to function properly, for the military may enter the political arena to give direction and stability to the govenment. If social reforms come with revolutionary speed, the military may again feel it has to bring this "unstable process" to a halt in order to ensure a more orderly transformation of society. Thus, it appears that a democratic system wishing to avoid military intervention or takeover must have at the minimum a combination of a strong executive structure, a tradition of military subordination to civilian leaders, and a capable, professional civilian bureaucracy which can provide the nation with stability and direction.



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# *Reviews*

## Postwar British Defense Policy*

*by Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.*

Postwar British foreign policy is a study in the adjustment of international commitments to reduced national capabilities. In contrast to other major European powers, all of which experienced defeat in World War II, Britain, despite her straitened national circumstances, strove as one of the victors to maintain a worldwide presence if on a reduced scale. Notwithstanding periodic balance of payments crises and domestic sector demands upon limited funds, successive governments, Labour and Conservative, devoted to defense a greater percentage of GNP than did other European governments.

In his book, *Defense of the Realm,* Richard Rosecrance traces the evolution of British military doctrine and defense policy since World War II, with special emphasis on the period between 1945 and 1957. He examines the efforts of the British government to evolve a strategic doctrine responsive to the complex security problems facing it. British policymakers had the difficult task of framing a strategy designed to safeguard residual interests in Europe, the Middle East, Africa and Asia, while at the same time providing a nuclear deterrent for the protection of Britain herself.

It is the author's contention that until the Suez crisis of 1956 Britain enjoyed considerable success in evolving a military posture appropriate to the attainment of her foreign policy goals. Although she found it necessary to pare her defense commitments, she nevertheless was able in the decade after World War II not only to provide a military capability that included nuclear, conventional and counter-insurgency forces, but also to exercise a major influence in international diplomacy.

It is fashionable, from the vantage point of 1968, to criticize postwar British foreign policy for having failed to give priority to European integration and for having attempted to do too much with too little. Although it is easy in retrospect to condemn such policies, Rosecrance has resisted such temptation. He suggests, instead, that British policymakers enjoyed remarkable success before the Suez crisis in paring overseas commitments while retaining global interests and an impressive military establishment. Advantaging herself of the benefits of the wartime nuclear partnership with the United States, Britain built her own deterrent and delivery systems. In certain advanced technologies, especially aircraft, she was in the vanguard of R & D. In addition, Britain fought a successful coun-

**Defense of the Realm: British Strategy in the Nuclear Epoch.* By R. N. Rosecrance. New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1968. 308 pp. $7.50.



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terinsurgency action in Malaya, while maintaining large conventional armies. As Rosecrance writes: "In several respects the postwar apogee of British defense policy was reached in 1954-55. Global deterrent forces were coming into the British arsenal; despite cold war conflicts in Malaya, Kenya and Cyprus, British responsibilities were being effectively discharged. There was no evidence that a reduced list of commitments might not be fulfilled with the resources available. Though doctrines of nuclear deterrence inevitably impinged upon cold and limited war forces, Britain did not discard them. She moved increasingly toward a nuclear strategy and economized conventional forces where she might, but still did not place all of her eggs in the strategic basket." (p. 192.)

Only in the 1960's, in the face of severe economic crises and a growing recognition that British resources were no longer commensurate with worldwide commitments, did Britain opt for a role as a power with essentially regional, European interests. In fact, not until the 1970's will Britain have completed the transformation in foreign policy interests that other major West European powers have already undergone. With the withdrawal of the British military presence from the former bastions of empire, Western Europe, with the exception of Portugal, will have become Europe-centered both in foreign policy and military commitments for the first time since the beginning of the age of European overseas expansion.

In the decade after World War II, Rosecrance contends, Britain not only maintained her "special relationship" with the United States, but enjoyed a considerable measure of diplomatic independence. She took the initiative in the formation of a joint European response to the U.S. offer of Marshall Plan aid. Foreign Secretary Bevin played a major role in the diplomacy leading to the Brussels Pact, which, as Rosecrance reminds the reader, the British leader correctly envisaged as the forerunner of NATO. In the early 1950's, despite the "special relationship," British policy did not always accord with that of the United States. In contrast to U.S. policy, Britain extended diplomatic recognition to Communist China and attempted, during the Korean conflict, to exert a restraining influence on Washington. In 1954 the British advised the United States against intervening militarily in the Indochina war and played a major role in the Geneva Conference.

Although the failure of the European Defense Community in 1954 is attributable in part to the unwillingness of Britain to join and thus to quiet French fears about German rearmament, the British government took the lead in proposing and negotiating an alternative. Eden succeeded in reviving and modifying the Brussels Pact so that Germany could be rearmed and admitted to NATO without French opposition. Moreover, Churchill and Eden were in-



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strumental in arranging the Geneva summit conference of 1955. Finally, because of her "special relationship," Rosecrance points out, "continental states were quick to believe that the United States had to be approached through Britain, and that American responses to continental entreaties were partly dependent upon advice from Whitehall." (p. 233.) In sum, Britain enjoyed her greatest influence in world affairs "when the link with the United States was buttressed by political autonomy and a tradition of military success." (p. 248.)

Quite properly, Rosecrance views the Suez crisis as a watershed in Britain's postwar history, and as "perhaps the most crucial national setback in modern British history." (p. 233.) After the failure at Suez, Britain never regained the lost image of military success and diplomatic ingenuity she had so long enjoyed. Rosecrance describes the breakdown of Anglo-American communications at the time of Suez, as well as the harassing tactics undertaken by the United States. These included the penetration of British carrier defenses by U.S. aircraft and the surveillance of British naval operations by U.S. submarines. "On at least one occasion an American ship appeared off the bow of a British carrier as it was landing its planes. The U.S. fleet was presumably under orders to offer peaceful obstruction to the invasion force." (p. 229.) Such actions were similar to those the U.S. Navy faces today in the same waters from the rapidly growing Soviet fleet. It was U.S. strategy, according to the author, "to delay British resort to force, hoping that the longer action could be postponed the less likely it would be undertaken." (p. 230.)

In the face of Soviet threats "to crush the [British and French] aggressors through the use of force," Britain was unable to receive explicit assurances of U.S. support. The United States confined its reply to a statement that it would "respect its obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization." (pp. 230-231.) Finally, U.S. opposition to the Suez invasion took the form of economic sanctions. According to Rosecrance, "the greatest pressure on the pound stemmed from speculation in New York, and even the Federal Reserve Bank was involved in unloading sterling at a discount. These pressures cost the Bank of England $300 million on November 5; over even a short period such 'dumping' would have forced devaluation." (p. 232.) Such tactics bear great resemblance to the pressures France has allegedly in recent years, and especially at the time of the November 1967 devaluation of sterling, mounted against the dollar. The resulting speculation has evoked U.S. criticism, even though the U.S. economy is far more able to withstand such economic pressure than was Britain's at the time of Suez.

Although the Suez crisis fundamentally altered Britain's role in world politics, the British government adjusted only slowly to a changed international environment. British interest shifted eventually



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from a preoccupation with Commonwealth problems and the "special relationship" to the European integration movement, but Britain attempted in the latter half of the 1950's to retain the options of an earlier period. Far from concluding that the "special relationship" no longer existed, she undertook to strengthen Anglo-American ties and refused until 1961 to apply for Common Market membership. After the Suez crisis, Rosecrance contends, the Anglo-American alliance "was no longer one of equals." Yet, it is doubtful whether even in the decade after World War II, the "special relationship" was one of equals, notwithstanding the impressive British contribution to Western defense and the skillful diplomacy to which the author alludes.

According to Rosecrance, British military strategy underwent few major innovations after 1957. In fact, "the major landmarks of the past ten years have been cancellations of weapons projects and the growing enfeeblement of cold war forces." (p. 250.) Undoubtedly, he reaches his conclusion about the lack of British strategic innovation as a result of his earlier analysis of British strategy in the decade after World War II. From that period can be traced the major changes introduced after 1956. Even in the early 1950's Britain was placing increased reliance on nuclear forces, rather than conventional armies, and continued to pare military commitments outside Europe.

The period since Suez, as Rosecrance points out, has been characterized by a growing British dependence in military technology on the United States. The cancellation in 1960 of the development of the British ground-to-ground missile, the Blue Streak, the failures of the British aircraft industry and the development of an "Atlantic technological imbalance" have served to reduce drastically Britain's independence in world affairs.

The author devotes a considerable portion of his study to an examination of British strategic doctrine and policy as they relate to the development of nuclear weapons. British policymakers favored the development of an independent nuclear force because it might enhance Britain's status as a Great Power and guard against a range of contingencies in which Britain might stand alone against a major adversary. As he suggests: "A basic U.S. reversion to isolation was still possible; concrete frictions were dividing Britain and America around the globe." (p. 15.) The United States might become so preoccupied with problems elsewhere in the world that Britain would need a nuclear capability to provide for its own security and to protect interests outside Europe.

By 1952, when Britain decided to develop advanced delivery systems, there was another reason for possessing nuclear weapons. Since a war of attrition might be fought after an initial nuclear exchange, it was necessary for Britain to have the means of destroying Soviet submarine bases. Such targets did not have high priority in U.S.



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calculations. Given the Soviet potential for blockading Britain in protracted warfare, a British nuclear force was deemed essential.

The use of the British force as a triggering device for U.S. nuclear weapons, the author asserts, has not provided an important rationale for Britain's atom status. Although Britain strove in the early postwar period to assure her security by implicating the United States in European defenses, in contrast to later French policy, she sought to do so by means of an entangling alliance, namely NATO, rather than by asserting military independence from the United States. For most of the postwar period Britain has assumed that her nuclear capabilities would be used in concert with those of the United States. This presumed identity of interest, not always confirmed by events, helps to explain the British willingness, in contrast to the attitude of France, to rely if necessary upon weapons systems developed in the United States. In fact, British policy, as Rosecrance suggests, "invalidates the oft-asserted French dictum that in a world of nuclear deterrence and vulnerability, no state will rely on allies in a crisis. Britain has frequently done so, sometimes to her discomfiture, but generally to her benefit." (p. 1.)

Yet Britain was never prepared to rely exclusively on the United States for defense. At the time she decided to develop a nuclear capability, she faced no specific enemy, and the British program later "was carried to fruition in the context of an already powerful nuclear alliance with the United States." (p. 22.) On the basis of the British experience as described by Rosecrance, the prospects for the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, even if the nuclear powers extend guarantees to the nuclear have-nots, may be remote, especially in cases where nonnuclear powers, in contrast to Britain at the end of World War II, face specific opponents.

The increasing cost of R & D, together with the advances in military technology both in the United States and the Soviet Union, diminish the credibility of the British nuclear force. As Rosecrance properly concludes, the Soviet deployment of ABM capabilities, together with the building of larger offensive forces, will reduce the prospect that a British nuclear force can inflict "unacceptable damage" on the Soviet Union. Given her growing technological dependence on the United States, "Britain may have got the worst of both possible worlds: a 'deterrent' which is neither independent nor a deterrent." (p. 263.)

Although Rosecrance does not devote major attention to the nuclear options available to Britain, he suggests that in signing the 1962 Nassau Agreement, by which she obtained Polaris missiles for a new generation nuclear force, Britain contributed to de Gaulle's decision to veto her Common Market application. Should Britain succeed over the next several years in gaining EEC membership, he concludes, British participation in the European Community will have



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the effect of reducing European interest in national deterrents, while reinforcing the "Atlantic orientation" of Western Europe. Since the British deterrent is heavily dependent on infusions of U.S. technology, "the lesson drawn may be that the best of European national forces is still not good enough. This precept may reduce the incentive to further proliferation." (p. 259.)

This contention raises several problems. First, the British deterrent of the 1970's is not likely to be the best in Western Europe. Instead, France will be the leading nuclear power of Western Europe and the French experience, rather than that of Britain, may prove instructive. Whatever the condition of her nuclear force, Britain will possess an important technological base which, depending on her policy toward proliferation, could be utilized in the development of a broader European nuclear force. Thus the failure of national forces, as Rosecrance suggests, could reinforce the European commitment to Atlantic solutions for defense. Linked to a rising tide of "Europeanism," however, the failure of national deterrents could contribute to renewed interest in European political and military integration motivated by a desire to assert European control over defense and to escape from U.S. hegemony.

In other sectors, Rosecrance sees the reorientation of British foreign policy and military strategy toward Europe. Because his book was completed before the acceleration in the British withdrawal from positions east of Suez, announced in January 1968, several of his statements have already been overtaken by events. Even so astute an observer as he did not anticipate the sweeping nature of the Wilson Government's decision to pare British defense commitments—to cancel the purchase of F-111 aircraft from the United States or to end the British military presence in Kuwait and Bahrein. Elsewhere in the book (p. 62), in a discussion of the British decision to end aid to Greece and Turkey, the author writes that in March 1947 "under pressure from the Chancellor of the Exchequer, it was decided that Britain could no longer sustain economic and military commitments" to these countries. Actually, the British decision was taken earlier, and was communicated to the United States on February 24. The U.S. program of aid for Greece and Turkey, the Truman Doctrine, was announced in President Truman's address to Congress on March 12.

This is a lucid analysis of the evolution of British defense policy. The author has placed into a needed new perspective Britain's contribution to postwar Western security as well as the policy choices that have contributed to the contemporary problems which face Britain. "Before both world wars," Rosecrance concludes, "Britain was too neutral and lost influence in the system; after World War II, Britain was too committed and lost influence in the system." (p. 293.) Britain's future foreign policy will be determined by her ability to find a *via media* between



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the two poles of overcommitment and undercommitment. Similar policy choices are likely to face other countries, including the United States.

## Bidault and the "Wind of History"*

*by Amaury de Riencourt*

*Resistance*, Georges Bidault's political autobiography, is an angry book, and also a pathetic one—not so much because it is written by one of France's leading postwar statesmen, who until June 1968 had been living for many years in unhappy exile, as because of the strange aura of unreality that emanates from this self-pitying narrative. It is pathetic also because it is poorly written, at least as it appears in translation, and wretchedly organized, but primarily because of the personality of the author. Its subjectivity is irritating: time and again, we hear about the ingratitude of former friends in high positions who refused to extend a helping hand when Bidault had fallen from power and become an outlaw in his own land. Time and again, even when he was Prime Minister or Minister of Foreign Affairs, he complains that no one kept him informed—as if it had not been his own duty and responsibility to keep himself informed. In tone, the book is tiresomely petulant; Bidault's judgments on personalities and issues are far too extreme, and in many instances credibility is stretched to the breaking point—as, for instance, when he claims that during the siege of Dien Bien Phu Secretary of State Dulles had offered France two atom bombs!

Reading this overlong piece of work, one undergoes the strange experience of looking at the panorama of the two postwar decades through a distorting lens—everything seems out of focus and out of shape, shrunken and flattened out. It is not so much a matter of agreeing or disagreeing with views and judgments and theories about what happened and why things happened the way they did; even the most absurd opinions can be presented and defended brilliantly. Rather, it is the disconcerting experience of looking at this historical panorama through the soul of an honest, rather naive, moderately intelligent man who lacked strength of character and was ill-equipped to handle the responsibilities that fate — and ambition — bestowed upon him.

At the same time, we have to bear in mind that the book was written by a man living in reduced circumstances in exile (he honestly informs us, at one point, that he wrote it to make money rather than from a desire to unburden himself), a man hounded from place to place and from country to country, who wrote without the assistance of any sources, references, notes, documents or books. Thus there is a certain freshness about it: what he has to say pours out of his soul, and what pours out is rather grim.

In the first part of the book,

**Resistance: The Political Autobiography of Georges Bidault.* Translated from the French by Marianne Sinclair. New York: Praeger, 1967. 348 pp. $6.95.



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we are treated to a portrait of Charles de Gaulle painted with big, broad brush-strokes, and the resulting half-finished picture resembles a caricature of Machiavelli by Picasso. "There are only two ways of having any influence on de Gaulle. The first is to deal with matters that do not interest him much, so long as you are clever about it and start no trouble. The second is to produce arguments in favor of a course he has already chosen, to read his character and then tell him what he wants to hear. You *can* influence the man, but only in the direction he wants to go." (p. 28.)

Another time, Bidault tells us that for de Gaulle, "men do not exist as individuals but only as members of a hierarchy." (p. 56.) Or again, that "basically, de Gaulle is impulsive. He thinks things over for ages, leaves them aside, goes back to them, and then decides that there is plenty of time, that 'France will bury us all,' and finds any excuse not to make up his mind. Then he comes to an abrupt decision and moves as fast as lightning or the plague when he gets going. At this point, he does not meditate or beat about the bush. He puts his decision into effect immediately. For this sudden mood of his is based on one great life-force, anger." (p. 90.)

But better, and even more sinister, portraits have been drawn recently (*La Tragédie du Général*, by J. R. Tournoux), and Bidault's brush-strokes are not really necessary. A more positive contribution to history is his description of de Gaulle's arrival in liberated France in 1944 and the mismanagement and remarkable lack of preparation of his administrative teams—with particular reference to de Gaulle's extraordinary decision to appoint Bidault as his Foreign Minister, mostly because, as leader of the "Resistance," Bidault had spent the whole war in France, no longer knew anything about the outside world, and, therefore, would not have any personal ideas on how to conduct France's foreign policy that might clash with de Gaulle's. As Bidault states it, "The least informed man seemed to have been chosen in both cases" (p. 60), the second case being that of Adrien Tixier, an international civil servant who had been outside France for four years and became Minister of the Interior! But ambition got the better of Bidault and he took over the Quai d'Orsay.

The burden of the rest of this autobiography is not the history of the postwar world, but his personal misfortunes in connection with the war in Algeria and decolonization. His explanation for de Gaulle's ideas on this topic sounds quite plausible, absurd as it may seem at first glance. De Gaulle was viscerally a colonialist of the first order and wanted to re-establish the French colonial empire to its full extent after World War II. But, skilled in the art of exploiting the inevitable, he began to change his mind in the mid-1950's. ". . . de Gaulle did not begin to flirt with the idea of decolonization until he became bored with staying at Colombey and began associating with certain types of



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people." (p. 101.) Although Bidault makes no reference to it, it is quite probable that de Gaulle began to see, soon enough, the inevitability of Algerian independence as well as the inability of the Fourth Republic to face up to it, and, simultaneously, the opportunity presented by the intractable war for his own return to power.

Unable himself to sense the direction in which the world was moving, Bidault heaps contempt on de Gaulle and all others who trim their sails to suit the prevailing wind. He sums up his philosophy of history by stating that "if anything can ever be proved in history, it is that the 'wind of history' changes direction all the time." (p. 244.) The "wind of history" did not change course soon enough to spare Bidault; it blew him out of France when he refused to recognize the inevitability of Algeria's coming independence. However much one may sympathize with the sufferings of those involved, the melancholy thought comes to mind that Algerian statehood could have arrived much sooner, with far less bloodshed and ill-feelings all around, if political leaders such as Georges Bidault had understood the reality of the situation and sensed in time the direction in which the "wind of history" was blowing.

## The Austrian Episode: A Lingering Enigma*

*by Gerhard Mally*

Dr. William B. Bader, a former Princeton University professor and now a Foreign Service Officer, has combined scholarly analysis, a sound understanding of *Realpolitik,* and a thorough knowledge of Austria to produce an excellent study of *Austria Between East and West, 1945-1955.* His book places emphasis on the complex nature of the East-West competition over Austria and the country's determined struggle for independence. In the concluding section he dwells on the most intriguing aspect of the outcome, namely, the "lingering enigma" of the Soviet withdrawal from Austria in 1955, which marked the first and thus far the only time the Red Army has retreated from occupied territory. Using all available sources, such as the official Proceedings of the Allied Commission for Austria, the Dulles Papers, studies by Adolf Schaerf, Gordon B. Shephard, Heinrich Siegler and Gerald Stourzh, as well as interviews with former Chancellor Figl, Bader succeeds in clarifying many nuances related to the Soviet withdrawal. Yet despite his effort speculation on this issue is likely to continue until the West can gain access to the "Molotov Papers" explaining the Soviet *volte face* in 1955.

At the beginning of the book the author reviews the Anschluss era and describes the events leading to the liberation of Austria from the Nazi forces. He points out that although all four Allied Powers were the official "liberators," the Soviet authorities—being in physical control of Vienna—installed

**Austria Between East and West, 1945-1955.* By William B. Bader. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1966. 250 pp. $7.50.



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"their" government under Karl Renner, an Austrian socialist. Quoting former President Schaerf, he notes facetiously that "most people, upon seeing Renner on the street, followed by two Russian soldiers carrying automatic weapons, thought he was a Russian prisoner—an impression that the Western Allies initially extended to the whole Renner government." (p. 22.) Indeed, Western suspicions that the Soviets were trying to create a new satellite regime were more than justified, particularly since a communist was appointed Minister of the Interior, the most crucial position involving control over all internal security forces. Fortunately this Kremlin plan did not materialize—in stark contrast to the events leading to the Prague coup in 1948.

In analyzing Soviet policy, Bader identifies several of Stalin's obvious mistakes, committed apparently because of poor intelligence. First, there was the question of the recognition of the Renner government by the Western allies. After the Soviet representative in the Allied Council had repeatedly pressed for the extension of the provisional government's authority to all of Austria, he eventually achieved a "Pyrrhic victory" when the Western powers recognized the Renner government "subject to the condition of a free election." To the surprise of the West, Stalin agreed to hold free elections throughout Austria — apparently convinced that the Communist Party would win. This was undoubtedly a costly Soviet blunder and illustrated how little the Soviets understood the political character of the Austrian people. As Bader explains, "the image of the raping and looting Russian was decidedly clearer than that of the Russian 'liberator.'" (p. 48.) Or, as Karl Renner once remarked: "Stalin had made only two mistakes in Austria—he showed the Russians Austria, and the Austrians the Russians." The elections of November 1945 dealt a devastating defeat to the Communist Party, which got merely 5 per cent of the popular vote; the conservative People's Party won 50 per cent of the votes, followed by the Socialists with 45 per cent.

Bader points out another momentous mistake, namely, the Soviets' abandonment of their veto right in the Allied Council, a decision that gave the new Austrian coalition government under Chancellor Figl considerable freedom of action. In the light of following events, this Soviet miscalculation (for which there seems to be no reasonable explanation) turned out to be a hallmark in the history of the Cold War: in 1947, the Austrian government, over the violent protests of the Kremlin, signed a bilateral agreement with the United States and joined the Marshall Plan, a courageous step making Austria a *de facto* ally of the West.

The fact that the Soviets (grudgingly) adhered to the Second Control Agreement containing the "unanimous disapproval principle" leads Bader to suggest that, "although many Western political analysts contend that the Soviet Union has little regard for



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legal procedure and no respect for signed agreements, in Austria at least this was not the case." (p. 75.) On this point I firmly disagree. There were many violations of law and order by the Soviet Army. And the author himself concedes on the same page that "kidnappings were a common means of retaliation on the part of the Russians." It is useful to remember a dictum laid down by A. Y. Vyshinsky which sets the tone for Soviet diplomacy: "International law is what serves the national interest of the USSR." A totalitarian regime by definition applies the concept of using all means to achieve the desired end. Current overt Soviet pressure on Austria, designed to prevent an agreement with the European Economic Community, illustrates this point.

In another chapter Bader examines the enormously complex problem of "German assets" in Austria and the whole question of reparations. Commenting on the Soviet determination to impose upon Austria the burden of reparations, he argues that "to demand reparations of the Austrians would make a mockery of the Moscow Declaration, which clearly specified that Austria would be considered a liberated country." (p. 32.) On this question, the American representative stated that "The United States government is opposed to the exaction of reparations from Austria. . . ."

There is no doubt that the Soviets were eager to exploit the economic advantages offered by Austria's occupation status, their prime target being oil. This became rapidly apparent when they (unsuccessfully) pressed for a joint-stock petroleum company, patterned after the exploitation arrangements secured from Rumania. Notwithstanding Western opposition, the Kremlin systematically confiscated all German properties (as defined by the Soviets) in eastern Austria, and two-thirds of Austrian oil production thereby came under Soviet control. To illustrate the dimension of this operation Bader states that "the cost to the Austrian economy of this . . . pirating of an important natural resource has been enormous ($225,000,000 and ten million tons of crude oil after 1955)." (p. 122.) The resentment of the Austrian people was aptly expressed by the editor of the independent newspaper *Die Presse*, Ernst Molden, who commented that "in spite of the Moscow Conference and a vast array of other statements, 'this liberated state,' this 'first victim of Fascist aggression,' is burdened with unofficial reparations, the extent of which cannot be measured." (p. 118.)

To cover this oil deficit and support the economic infrastructure, Austria was forced to import large quantities of fuel and the Austrian people had to depend wholly on U.S. aid through ERP and UNRRA. Given the dichotomy between the negative Soviet policy of reparations and the positive American policy of economic aid, it was not surprising that Austria became increasingly pro-Western. This consequence, together with the manifest inability of the Communist



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Party to gain power, may have prompted the Soviets finally to agree to an Austrian settlement. The author has made an admirable effort to gather all relevant data and offer all possible explanations for the signing of the Austrian State Treaty by Molotov on May 15, 1955, which ended a marathon of 379 exasperating Four Power meetings on the Austrian question.

In order to understand the Austrian brand of "neutrality," one has to examine the important "Moscow Memorandum" of April 1955 that opened the door for the May treaty. Signed by the Soviet authorities and an Austrian government delegation, the document confirms that Austria will not join military alliances; will permit no foreign bases on her territory; and is obligated to practice permanent, armed neutrality of the type maintained by Switzerland. This memorandum is not part of the State Treaty, and the law defining Austria's neutral status was passed after the treaty had been signed. Thus, Austrian neutrality is of a voluntary nature—as opposed to "neutralization," which implies a forcible imposition of a neutral status by other powers (e.g., Belgium in 1831). To be sure, the author's following point is well taken: "Although Austrians may argue that their acceptance of neutrality was indeed 'voluntary,' the record indicates that there was at least a compelling *sine qua non* on the Soviet side." (p. 205.)

The speculation about possible Soviet motives for granting Austria independence is of considerable interest to all students of international relations. The author presents five sophisticated arguments in which he delineates the causes of Soviet behavior as he sees them. Three of these are worth mentioning here: First, in the eyes of realistic communist leaders Austria was simply not "ripe for socialism" and could not be peacefully assimilated into the communist camp. Therefore in giving up Austria the Soviets were in fact giving up very little—it was clearly a hopelessly barren ground for communism. Second, from the geopolitical and strategic point of view, Austria constituted no obstacle to future Soviet military operations (the Red Army still stands fifty miles east of Vienna), while the logistical problems for NATO were obvious—the neutral belt consisting of Austria and Switzerland cuts the lines of communication between Italy and Germany. And third, an actual concession vis-à-vis the West and a conciliatory gesture toward Austria (independence for neutrality) could serve as a model solution for the principal Soviet concern, namely, Germany (reunification for neutralization).

In conclusion, one might add that the favorable outcome of the Austrian episode attests to the determination and mettle of the Austrian people, who, supported by the United States, Britain and France, fought patiently for their country's freedom and independence. Moreover, in this struggle between democracy and communism, Austria chose the Western way of life and constitutes to-



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day—together with such other "neutrals" as Sweden and Switzerland—a genuine member of the Free World.

## The Diplomacy of Violence*

*by Curtin Winsor, Jr.*

Thomas Schelling's study, *Arms and Influence,* published two years ago, has been widely acclaimed as one of the finest analyses of the military tools of modern diplomacy. He defines it as the study of how countries can and do use their capacity to inflict harm and destruction as a tool to influence the diplomatic process. He identifies the forms in which this "diplomacy of violence" manifests itself, evaluates them and suggests steps to minimize their misuse.

Professor Schelling defines traditional diplomacy as "the act of international bargaining based upon an assumption of some common interest, where compromise might be reached." The use of force, on the other hand, is seen to be related to the measure of a nation's strength and ability to achieve objectives without resort to bargaining or accommodation. He contends that modern diplomacy relies on the threat of force, the use of the real or imagined power of a nation to inflict injury on or to coerce another in order to attain diplomatic objectives by accommodation. Diplomacy by coercion or the threat of damage requires that conflicting national interests not be absolutely opposed, for this form of coercion must be supported by the capacity to make a bargain, "to arrange for the opposition to be better off doing what we want and worse off not doing what we want—when he takes our threats into account." (p. 4.)

Schelling tells us that advances of technology have outmoded the use of brute force due to the natural human aversion to utter spoil, save where desperation makes it the only hope for national survival. Modern military strategy thus can no longer be regarded as the science of achieving victory on the battlefield, for the whole world is a potential battlefield and the stakes are too high. Contemporary strategy has become the art of cultivating credible power by diplomatic coercion and military deterrence.

The author views modern military planning as being essentially concerned with an enemy's capabilities and not merely his intentions. In order to reinforce national intentions with credible capabilities, it has become necessary for a modern nation to develop the art of commitment, such as the tactic of taking a position from which it cannot retreat without conflict and the unwanted use of force—the creation of risk—often termed brinkmanship. Schelling offers the example of the U.S. position on Berlin as representative of this tactic.

He observes that the new diplomacy also involves the manipulation of risk, whereby a nation may

**Arms and Influence.* By Thomas C. Schelling. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966. 293 pp. $7.50.

(The views expressed in this review are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.)



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at will adjust its credibility to circumstances by maneuver—in and out of "corners." The value of credibility was illustrated by the Cuban missile crisis, during which the risks taken in calling a Soviet bluff were clearly events of considerable diplomatic importance.

In the nuclear age, with its wide range of risks, the objectives of warfare as expressed through the "new" diplomacy have evolved into a dualism. On the one hand, a nation may opt for a variation Counterforce strategy which directs potential nuclear warfare against an enemy's armed forces but not his cities (these can later be used as hostages for negotiations and insured enemy restraint). The crucial objective of a Counterforce attack is the destruction of an enemy's retaliatory capability, so that he cannot respond by attacking the initiator's cities or armed forces.

The other variation of this strategy is the "no cities" option, which requires an enemy to refrain from attacking cities in return for the sparing of his cities and millions of human lives. The crucial difference between these theories, says Schelling, is that Counterforce deters by eliminating enemy attack capability, while a "no cities" option aims at total deterrence. In a sense one could argue that Counterforce aims at forceful disarmament, which requires decisive superiority against an enemy. However, achievement of a second-strike capability and rapid response from solid-fuel, protected missiles (Minuteman and Polaris) seem to negate the Counterforce issue as Schelling presents it.

The new diplomacy is thus seen as the confrontation of violence with violence—including the capability, either before or during warfare, to destroy cities as a tool for negotiation. Undestroyed targets and available weapons capable of hitting them are together potential bargaining assets. However, the weapons have bargaining value only if they can be fully controlled. This fact and the reduced response times of modern warfare make the capacity for mid-course negotiation of primary interest to Professor Schelling, who argues for the continuance of communication between adversaries even after nuclear war has begun in order to maximize prospects of survival. The irrational emotions and cataclysmic forces set moving by any form of atomic exchange would in my view negate much of Schelling's well developed logic. It would seem distressingly unlikely that a war of nuclear dimensions could be stopped after an exchange of "glancing blows."

Schelling ascribes the term "cumbersome inevitability" to the European war machines of 1914, and warns that we may be susceptible today to the same pathology. He argues that passive defense (i.e., fallout shelters) might be necessary, but might boost commitments to national mobilization and put pressure on an adversary's decision-makers to act with fatal haste. He points out that there are two modes of potential instability confronting the practitioners of a diplomacy of violence. The first



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arises from the speed, initiative and surprise accompanying the outbreak of war. The other arises from the possibility that alert and mobilization procedures might become irreversible, imposing time pressures on the decision-makers and risking conflict at the normally unacceptable levels of destruction characteristic of modern weaponry.

Schelling does attempt to produce answers for the problems raised in his book. However, the answers are necessarily general for lack of precedent. He defines the crucial element required to control the modern arms race as an effective communications system among rival nations. The forerunner of such a development is the "hot line" that links Moscow and Washington with teletypes. Beyond this, he advocates a system whereby arms developments and deployments can be communicated among adversaries in such a way as to avoid the misunderstandings that occurred during the so-called missile gap of 1959-1961. In this way, we could "manage" the arms races of the future. Actions must be able to generate predictable reactions, and it is argued that U.S. security interests must favor a policy which enables us to gauge and, up to a point, to determine the precise courses of military deployments undertaken by an adversary. Such communication might be achieved by allowing the "opposition to overhear" the scope of our own long-range plans. However, the essence of the Schelling recommendations is to establish the necessary diplomatic dialogue to replace what are today two monologues of diminishing effectiveness.

The waning of the ideological fervor that characterized the past decade of relationships among the major powers has not brought with it a concomitant improvement in political understanding and agreements. Some recent developments at the technical level have had constructive but limited political overtones, such as the cooperation of the United States and the USSR in drafting an acceptable nonproliferation treaty, and the recent agreement to discuss limitations on delivery vehicles for nuclear warheads. The fact remains, however, that the background factors of mutual distrust, political misunderstanding, and conflicts of national interest have not diminished; a serious gulf at the top political level remains and stimulates the continued growth of ever-costlier weapons systems.

Although some of Schelling's examples and postulated problems are founded on out-of-date information (e.g., his concern with regard to mobilization procedures and the military peril from surprise attack), his diagnosis is essentially a sound one. He has gone to the heart of the overriding factor in the twenty-two-year-old confrontation between the United States and the USSR. The ever-costlier arms race testifies to the fact that national and ideological monologues, though diminishing, still predominate. Until national interests can be articulated in dialogue form, the problems of the diplomacy of violence will remain with us and possibly continue to grow.



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This book is unquestionably a significant and thoughtful refinement of concepts bearing on the conduct of modern diplomacy. It is ably written, thoroughly documented with historical precedents, effectively organized, and provides the groundwork for steps that could be taken to make our planet a safer place on which to live.

## Foreign Assistance Programs and Trade Policies*

*by Willard Barber*

If one agrees that the goods and services sent to the allies in World War I (symbolized by the unpaid war debts) should be recognized as foreign aid, then the United States has completed a half-century of experimentation with foreign assistance. It may be that our task is only half completed, that we may well be engaged in providing foreign assistance for another half-century. The American public and Congress would probably be appalled if a top government official made such a suggestion, yet this has been the clear and plain intent of successive administrations in Washington, and was most dramatically stated by President Kennedy in his inaugural address: "To those people in the huts and villages of half the globe struggling to break the bonds of mass misery, we pledge our best efforts to help them help themselves for whatever period is required."

Aside from the long-term prospects of foreign assistance, other disturbing facts and implications intrude upon our minds. To Americans, it is shocking that France, the country that for two decades has ranked first in the receipt of U.S. military aid alone and first in the receipt of total U.S. aid, economic and military, should be so hostile, ungrateful and uncooperative toward the United States. The American public was equally distressed to learn that two of the combatants in the Six Day War in 1967, Israel and Jordan, ranked first and second, respectively, on per capita basis, as recipients of U.S. economic assistance during the period 1945-1965.

On the other hand, in a speech on November 29, 1967, Secretary Rusk announced with "satisfaction and joy" that "direct economic aid to Iran under our Foreign Assistance Act will end tomorrow." To the wary, and to those aware of the varied channels through which American resources reach alien shores, it would come as no surprise to learn that new loans for Iran were being readied by the Export Import Bank, Public Law 480 (Food for Peace) programs continue in Iran, some items of military equipment are still sent

**Technical Assistance in Theory and Practice: The Case of Iran.* By Jahangir Amuzegar. New York: Praeger, 1966. 275 pp. $15.00.

*U.S. and U.S.S.R. Aid to Developing Countries: A Comparative Study of India, Turkey, and the U.A.R.* By Leo Tansky. New York: Praeger, 1967. 193 pp. $15.00.

*Economic Policies Toward Less Developed Countries.* By Harry G. Johnson. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1967. 279 pp. $6.75.

*International Financial Aid.* By Wolfgang G. Friedmann, George Kalmanoff and Robert F. Meagher. New York: Columbia University Press, 1966. 498 pp. $13.75.



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to Iran, the Peace Corps remains there, and U.S. contributions to international conduits, such as the World Bank and the CENTO organization, find their way via educational, technical and fiscal programs into the Iranian economy. Even more provocative than a full statement of the facts would be the answer to the question: Why terminate AID activities to Iran at this time? Could it be that the decision was reached in order to conform to the Congressional limitation that only forty countries could qualify for economic assistance? Why was Iran cut off instead of other countries? Was a controlling factor Iran's barter agreements with the USSR more than a year earlier which provided for the exploitation of Iran's natural gas reserves? Was it due to reported Iranian negotiations for Soviet military hardware? Will we ever know? Are Iranian oil exports, now at the $600 million a year level, responsible?

Dr. Amuzegar's *Technical Assistance in Theory and Practice: The Case of Iran* does not view the American foreign aid program in his native country with satisfaction or joy. Educated in law at the University of Tehran and in economics at UCLA, a former member of the Iranian Parliament, Cabinet, and Development Bank's Directorate, the author obviously writes from a wealth of knowledge and experience. In his evaluation, "The universal identification of Point IV with a cold war scheme, designed, financed and administered by a Big Power, made the program unacceptable to some, suspect to many, and insufficiently appreciated by most people in Iran." (p. 253.) He writes that too many projects in too short a time resulted in waste; coordination with other development efforts was lacking; many institutions or practices advanced by the Americans, such as rural cooperatives, program budgeting and informality in employer-employee relationships, were in direct contrast to Iranian tradition; there was a lack of continuity of programs or of personnel—all this contributed to misunderstanding, inefficiency and suspicion. Specific examples in agriculture, education, government administration and other areas are cited, and he offers constructive suggestions: for instance, the host country must really *want* the technical assistance, selection of congenial and appropriate personnel is a fundamental, planning and timing should avoid a stop-go syndrome.

A broader canvas is painted by Leo Tansky, a U.S. government economist since 1952 and holder of graduate degrees from Columbia and American Universities. His treatment is comparative throughout, as is indicated in the title of his work, *U.S. and U.S.S.R. Aid to Developing Countries: A Comparative Study of India, Turkey, and the U.A.R.* He observes that after years of denouncing foreign aid as an instrument of imperialism, the Soviets in the mid-1950's decided to embark on a program of their own. Tansky sets forth his definition of economic aid: it "consists of those resources which enable an aid-receiving country to



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increase its imports of goods and services without immediately increasing the burden on its current account or foreign-exchange reserves." (p. vii.) It is by no means clear that the author's definition is apt in describing Soviet foreign aid, which is, as he says, dispensed within the framework of long-term, interest-bearing credits. Probably by emphasizing the phrase, "without immediately increasing the burden," it is possible to encompass barter agreements and long-term commercial credits as "aid." American assistance has traditionally been made up of a much greater proportion of grants.

Soviet credits usually call for repayment in twelve years, with interest of 2.5 per cent. The purchase of machinery and materials, plus the costs of the services of Soviet technicians and the training of local personnel, are covered by the credits. Industrial facilities and associated technical services form the bulk of Soviet projects, with accent on hydroelectric, irrigation and transportation facilities. Important receiving countries are Ceylon, Afghanistan, Guinea, Iraq, Indonesia, Syria, Yemen, India and the United Arab Republic. Hospitals were built in Burma, Cambodia and Nepal. During the 1960's Soviet technicians sent abroad numbered approximately 10,000, and an even greater number of technical trainees received training within the USSR. (Tansky's data and his conclusions appear to ignore USSR aid programs for Communist China.)

The author cites Soviet authorities to confirm his own view that a chief objective of Soviet aid is to restrict world markets from the spheres of the capitalist countries in the hope of pre-empting them. Inasmuch as Soviet aid involves barter and sales of goods for credits, an examination of the prices received and paid would seem to be in order. Tansky omits these, despite the fact that they loom large in the determination of the real benefits to the trading partners. The low price for Polish coal exports to the USSR, for example, was an item of high priority in the Khrushchev-Gomulka confrontation in 1956; the low price for Cuban sugar and the high prices and dubious durability of satellite-produced machinery and vehicles imported in exchange, caused severe strains in Soviet-Cuban relations in the 1960's.

A chapter devoted to Turkey discusses that country's reliance on U.S. economic assistance. The chapter on India distinguishes between the patterns of aid furnished over the years by the United States and the USSR: America offered large amounts of food and grain, whereas the Soviets concentrated on steel mills and heavy industry. The author shows how Soviet aid became predominant in the United Arab Republic, especially after the U.S., U.K. and World Bank rejections of the Aswan Dam loan requests. In each country—Turkey, India and Egypt—the role of outside aid in the various five- and seven-year plans was of crucial importance. Particularly in the case of Egypt, the arrangements with the Soviets meant



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a revolutionary shift in trade orientation, exemplified by Egypt's cotton exports to communist countries.

Tansky faults the United States for waste and for distortion arising from the use of aid as a weapon in the Cold War. Soviet aid, he concludes, enabled Moscow to gain entrance into areas in which it previously had little influence, in such diverse directions as the Mediterranean, Africa and Cuba. But the Soviets also had to bear the onus of their close association with now deposed pro-Soviet leaders, such as Ben Bella, Kassem, Nkrumah and Sukarno, as well as the shortcomings of Castro. Both Amuzegar and Tansky write of events, and cite sources of data from government reports (in some instances unpublished), which would normally not be available to research scholars. While the comparisons and contrasts drawn by Tansky are enlightening, his treatment of many subjects and institutions is sketchy and simplistic. His style is light, Amuzegar's is somber.

Professor Harry G. Johnson, of the University of Chicago and the London School of Economics staffs, is a Canadian economist whose volume, *Economic Policies Toward Less Developed Countries*, received in its early stages the benefit of scrutiny by specialists gathered together by The Brookings Institution. The book is a closely reasoned, sophisticated exposition of the various obstacles—in industrial and undeveloped countries alike—that hinder economic development. Johnson considers private foreign investment as well as public assistance. Above all, he shows with logic and empirical analysis the significance of trade, and surveys international commodity agreements and methods of stabilizing and increasing export earnings. Arrangements to provide preferential treatment for less developed countries can be of considerable encouragement to them. But thus far the unsuccessful efforts to achieve benefits for exports of manufactures from underdeveloped countries through the General Agreement for Trade and Tariffs (GATT) have been discouraging. Johnson takes aim on this target, for he believes the real issue to be protectionism versus free trade. Whereas government spokesmen are likely to couch their proposals in free trade terms, they are actually bargaining for the most advantageous forms of protection. "Most of the serious criticisms that can be leveled against the present system of international trading relationships (the GATT system) are criticisms, not of the trade-liberalizing intentions and objectives of that system, but of the ways in which its operating rules and methods have been warped to serve protectionist ends." (p. 241.)

Johnson objectively explores all aspects of international trade as it affects the economic growth process, but does not permit himself to be carried away by his preoccupation with the single factor of trade. For there are big differences "attributable to technological levels, accumulated capital, educational levels, economies



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of scale and specialization and division of labor . . . only a small fraction being assignable to differences in the gains derived from international trade." (p. 65.) And so he concludes that "for the short run an increase in the supply of foreign aid would be more effective in supplying external resources for development than would the opening of trade opportunities." (p. 245.) The contributions that trade policy changes could make in the *long run,* however, could be very large. He would prefer to make these changes through existing institutions rather than by working out a series of international commodity agreements, and, by the same token, he does not advocate new currency proposals. As a first step, he recommends that the United States permit the entry of exports from undeveloped countries without higher tariff rates or more restrictive quotas than those already prevailing. As this recommendation would relate to existing cotton textile arrangements, Johnson seems to minimize the opposition that might be mounted by Southern votes in Congress, their strength compounded by the committee chairmanships that cotton states representatives have secured during the more than three decades of Democratic Congressional majorities. Protectionist trade policies can erode the benefits that come from investment and grant aid supplied by industrialized countries. When aid is tied to local purchases, its helpful impact is reduced. In the case of the United States, such a policy can cut the amount of aid actually available by as much as 20 per cent, for the cost of "buying American" is generally that much greater. But to expect the American Congress to give way on tied loans or grants would be wishful thinking and would not even meet with the approval of the Executive Department. In recent years, AID Directors Bell and Gaud, as well as President Johnson, have pointed with pride to the constantly rising percentage (now approaching 80 per cent) of aid appropriations that are expended within this country.

A product of five years' research sponsored by Columbia University, *International Financial Aid* by Friedmann, Kalmanoff and Meagher is notable for its accuracy, breadth, and the pertinent and practical recommendations advanced. The volume is packed with statistics showing the magnitude, sources and categories of aid, with chronological and geographical variations. The glossary of terms and the names of many international bodies engaged in aid activities are valuable. The case studies illuminate economic principles and management techniques. World Bank loans for railways in Colombia, steel plants in India, highway programs in Thailand, and the Dead Sea Works (potash production) are described in detail, and the insights of trained economists, managers and observers are used throughout. Aid programs in Chile, Greece, Senegal, Sudan, Turkey, Thailand and East Africa receive careful scrutiny. The authors stress the remarkable variety of purposes, processes and resources



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employed in these differing surroundings. The volume is a splendid compendium of information on projects and programs, and national, bilateral and multilateral organizations. The World Bank family of institutions receives thorough coverage, and the authors award these institutions high marks for performance.

With thirty-six statistical tables, and a lengthy bibliography and index, this volume approaches the nature of a reference work. Chapter VI entitled "Principal Policy Issues" discusses, for example, a whole catalogue of problems: national planning, motivation of donor states, measures of coordination, technical and capital assistance, hard and soft loans, regional development agencies, and includes an evaluation of new proposals for the international administration of economic assistance. The conclusions in the final chapter are sometimes unnecessarily dogmatic but always instructive: Aid "must either continue to grow at an accelerating rate or it will fail." (p. 457.) Due to current trends in population growth, the gap between rich and poor countries is widening. Due to the increasing burden of past loans now coming due, gross aid must be increased to keep the net inflow to underdeveloped countries constant. Although one-half of U.S. aid in the past has been from food surpluses, this may not be true in the years ahead. In the donor nations a "public education effort" is recommended, and in the receiving nations major self-help endeavors are required. The recommendation for an untying of aid is one of several on which Johnson and the three authors of this book are in agreement. Several of the conclusions and recommendations are cast in terms of exhortation and urgency.

Although the methodologies employed, the examples cited, and the projects, programs and institutions examined in these four treatments offer an unusually comprehensive view of assistance policy, the gaps, nonetheless, are real. There is scarce mention of the economic effects of military assistance, of defense support, of budgetary support, of surplus property disposal (aside from Public Law 480), of the work of the Peace Corps, or of educational, philanthropic and religious organizations operating in the private sector. Private investment is given scant attention. Population growth is mentioned but its impact is not fully developed. Johnson argues most brilliantly for the trade factor in aid; Amuzegar is the most informative about the sociological and political reverberations felt within a traditional society; Tansky describes Soviet aid policy; and Friedmann, Kalmanoff and Meagher offer the most complete coverage, objective for the most part, though somewhat dogmatic in conclusion.



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# *Books Received*

NOTE—By special arrangement with the Foreign Policy Association, readers of ORBIS may obtain from the FPA's Book Center any books listed below published in the United States (except paperbacks) at the publisher's regular list price. Post free for domestic orders only. Send orders with check or money order to Desk O, World Affairs Book Center, 345 East 46th Street, New York, N.Y. 10017. (This arrangement also applies to books reviewed in ORBIS.)

## I. POLITICS, HISTORY, ECONOMICS

**City and Nation in the Developing World.** By Associates of the American Universities Field Staff. New York: American Universities Field Staff, 1968. 256 pp. $6.50. Five case studies examine in detail the important aspects of social change in selected cities and nations: a town in North Afghanistan, Singapore, Morocco, Lima and Brazil.

**Dmitrii Miliutin and the Reform Era in Russia.** By Forrestt A. Miller. Nashville, Tenn.: Vanderbilt University Press, 1968. 246 pp. $7.50. In 1861, the year in which the serfs were emancipated, Dmitrii Miliutin was appointed Minister of War by Tsar Alexander II. In his 21 years at this post, he undertook a series of reforms that helped to turn Russia's outmoded and backward military system into a more efficient organization. Among his accomplishments were the decentralization of army administration, the streamlining of military courts, improvements in the lot of the ordinary soldier, and enactment of the Universal Military Conscription Statute of 1874, which made all classes liable for military service. The author, an Associate Professor of History at Vanderbilt University, provides an account of these sweeping changes and of how Miliutin overcame the resistance of the conservative nobility and the deviousness of the Tsar to effect them.

**Freedom and Authority in the West.** Edited and with a Foreword by George N. Shuster. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967. 199 pp. $8.50. A collection of papers by participants from church, state and the world of scholarship at a conference at Notre Dame on "The Condition of Western Man: The Problem of Freedom and Authority." Contributors include Hans Buchheim, Julius Cardinal Dopfner, Matthew A. Fitzsimons, Wilhelm Geiger, Ferdinand Hermens, Hans Maier, John Courtney Murray, Marshall Smelser and Michael Schmaus.

**Friedrich Engels: His Contributions to Political Theory.** By Fritz Nova. New York: Philosophical Library, 1967. 115 pp. $4.50. In this "political biography" of the man who, with Karl Marx, developed the theory of communism, Professor Nova, who is chairman of the Political Science Department at Villanova University, attempts to differentiate Engels' theoretical contributions from those of Marx and thus demonstrate that "Engels rates a far more distinguished place among the founders of the political theory of socialism than previous literature has accorded him." Much of the analysis deals with Engels' approach to such critical issues as Hegelianism, dialectics, socialism, anarchism, Darwinism, revisionism and democracy.

**History of the Cold War: From the October Revolution to the Korean War, 1917-1950.** By Andre Fontaine. Translated from the French by D. D. Paige. New York: Pantheon Books, 1968. 432 pp. $10.00. Fontaine views such events as



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the West's intervention in the Russian Revolution of 1917, Russia's withdrawal from the First World War and the consequent deterioration of relations between her and the West while she tried to compete with and surpass the capitalist states, as of crucial importance in attempting to show that the Cold War has been a reality for 50 years, although it did not break through the surface until 1946. He believes that only the threat of a nuclear conflict has deterred the major powers from war and brought them to a point of coexistence. A second volume is planned to review events since the Korean War.

**Illiteracy: A World Problem.** By Sir Charles Jeffries. New York: Praeger, 1967. 204 pp. $5.00. The fact that one billion of the world's inhabitants cannot read or write has created a vast problem for modernizing societies. Drawing upon his wide experience in this area as former Deputy Under-Secretary of State in the Colonial Office of Great Britain, the author presents a "world map of illiteracy," concentrates on several specific literacy campaigns that have been undertaken, and concludes with an evaluation of the social, economic and political implications of this issue for future generations.

**International Politics Since 1945.** By Peter Calvocoressi. New York: Praeger, 1968. 480 pp. $7.50. In this account the well-known Professor of International Relations at the University of Sussex, England, endeavors to clarify the major problems at issue among the great powers following World War II—among them those relating to Germany, China, and attempts to organize for peace in the United Nations and other agencies of world order. He also traces the crucial events that shaped the turbulent history of the postwar era: the Yugoslav secession, the Hungarian revolution, Suez, Cyprus, the Korean War, the Congo, and the Cuban missile crisis.

**Justice in Jerusalem.** By Gideon Hausner. New York: Schocken Books, 1968. 528 pp. $2.95 (paper). As the newly appointed Attorney General of Israel, the author was responsible for preparing and conducting the prosecution's case when, in 1961, Adolf Eichmann was brought to trial in Jerusalem for his crimes against the Jews. He now reviews his role as prosecuting attorney, his soul searching in determining the form of the indictment, the agonizing history of Nazi persecutions as it emerged in pre-trial research and in courtroom proceedings, and the pressures of public opinion both outside and within Israel from the time of Eichmann's carefully planned capture to his conviction and execution.

**The Meaning of Limited War.** By Robert McClintock. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967. 239 pp. $5.00. An American ambassador with a generation of experience in the Foreign Service studies the nature of limited war by analyzing its various forms in Greece, Korea, the Middle East, India and Viet Nam, and in doing so provides many personal accounts of the diplomacy surrounding these conflicts. He points out that under *pax ballistica* limited wars may plague us for the remainder of the century, and that in any of the six categories marked by outside intervention they could have limitless consequences. To prevent their escalation we must understand their lessons: as explicit instruments of foreign policy with political objectives, they represent a diplomacy of force which must be controlled by the force of diplomacy.

**Political Handbook and Atlas of the World, 1968.** Edited by Walter H. Mallory. New York: Simon and Schuster, for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1968. 366 pp. $10.00. Brought to date as of January 1, 1968, this 41st annual edition of the *Political Handbook* is a fund of political data on each of the world's 134 nations: the composition of governments, programs and leaders of major political parties, editors and political affiliations of leading newspapers and periodicals, and synopses of recent political events. It also contains a section



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on the organization, functions and personnel of the United Nations and associated international agencies, and a 32-page color map supplement.

**The Russo-Chinese War.** By George Alexander Lensen. Tallahassee, Fla.: The Diplomatic Press, 1967. 315 pp. $15.00. The Boxer Rebellion of 1900 was not confined to Peking. In the northern Chinese province of Manchuria, fanatical Boxers, aided by regulars of the Imperial Army, waged a brief but bloody full-scale war against the Russian workers and soldiers who were building the Manchurian branch of the Trans-Siberian railroad. Professor Lensen, who teaches history at Florida State University, has reconstructed the events of these tumultuous months from the diaries, memoirs and official reports of the Russian participants and woven them into a detailed narrative.

**Statesmen and Statecraft of the Modern West.** Edited by Gerald N. Grob. Barre, Mass.: Barre Publishers, 1967. 290 pp. $7.50. This collection of readings edited by a Professor of American History at Clark University contains essays on Russian, French, British, German, American and Canadian foreign policy, the episodes ranging from the 18th century to the present. Each contribution is a revelation of the problems and dilemmas of statecraft in the modern world.

**Twenty Years of Crisis: The Cold War Era.** Edited by Young Hum Kim. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968. 297 pp. $3.95 (paper). Designed as a supplementary reader for college courses in international politics, contemporary history and Soviet and American foreign policy, this collection of both primary and secondary source materials covers every major development in Cold War politics from Churchill's "Iron Curtain" speech to excerpts from the U.S. White Paper on the Viet Nam war. The readings are grouped in three periods of East-West relations, each introduced by the editor: (1) the end of World War II to Korea; (2) the death of Stalin to the Congo; (3) the Cuban missile crisis to the present.

## II. United States

**The American System of Government.** By Ernest S. Griffith. New York: Praeger, 1965. 179 pp. $5.00 ($1.95, paper). This introductory textbook describes and analyzes all major aspects of the national, state and local governments, the election and procedures of Congress, the Presidency, the sources of public policy, political parties, the judiciary, the instruments of international policy, and the problems of defense in the nuclear age.

**The Image Candidates: American Politics in the Age of Television.** By Gene Wyckoff. New York: Macmillan, 1968. 274 pp. $6.95. A former television adviser to Henry Cabot Lodge, Richard Nixon and Nelson Rockefeller argues that a candidate's appearance and demeanor seem to provide viewers with the most substantial clues to his character. He offers a case study of the 1961 New York mayoralty campaign between Robert F. Wagner and Arthur Levitt to demonstrate the power of "image building" in influencing unwitting voters, and concludes with proposals for new legislation to control and improve the use of political television.

**The Papers of John C. Calhoun, Volume III, 1818-1819.** Edited by W. Edwin Hemphill. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1967. 772 pp. $10.00. The Calhoun of these pages is a brilliant young Secretary of War demonstrating the soundness of new policies he had formulated for the administration of the War Department. During this period he oversaw preparations for the Missouri Expedition, the expansion of veterans' benefits, and the development of an enlightened attitude toward Indians; was involved in the delicate situation precipitated by Andrew Jackson's conduct of the Seminole War; functioned briefly



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as Acting Secretary of the Navy, and, for a few weeks in the summer of 1818, as Acting President of the United States.

**The Political Beliefs of Americans: A Study of Public Opinion.** By Lloyd A. Free and Hadley Cantril. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1968. 239 pp. $10.00. Besides attempting to answer the question why Americans voted as they did in the 1964 Presidential election, the authors chart what they conceive to be the mainstream of current political thought in the country on important national and international issues. Their analysis is based on data derived from interviews with over 3,000 people, in "samples" representing national cross sections of the adult population obtained by the Gallup Poll during the 1964 political campaign.

**Politics Battle Plan.** By Herbert M. Baus and William B. Ross. New York: Macmillan, 1968. 399 pp. $7.95. Two public relations specialists, who were called "The Kingmakers" by the *Saturday Evening Post,* describe how to plan, organize, finance and conduct a successful political campaign. They furnish numerous contemporary examples of good and bad campaign strategies, covering most of the newsmaking candidates at the national and local level. They also provide a penetrating analysis of how lobbies work and suggest ways to put over bond issues and to work effectively for or against proposed legislative measures.

**Republican Papers.** Edited and Introduced by Representative Melvin R. Laird. New York: Praeger, 1968. 500 pp. $7.95. A collection of 29 papers setting forth the ideas and proposals of Republican Party congressmen and leading scholars and experts on the domestic crisis in the United States today. Essays treat such topics as strengthening the federal system; crime in America; poverty, welfare and jobs; civil rights; social security; budgetary problems, and monetary reform.

**Waist Deep in the Big Muddy.** By Richard H. Rovere. Boston: Little, Brown, 1968. 116 pp. $4.50. Personal reflections by the well-known correspondent of the *New Yorker* dwell on such topics as how the United States came to be a world power concerned with political affairs in far-flung places; how American attitudes and beliefs have changed in the post-World War II era; and the implications of neo-isolationism for American domestic life as well as America's position in the international community.

### III. Western Europe and the Atlantic Community

**Coexistence: Communism and its Practice in Bologna, 1945-1965.** By Robert H. Evans. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967. 225 pp. $7.95. In this study of the Bolognese operations of the Italian Communist Party, Professor Evans examines what he calls a stabilized communist party. He believes that the Italian party, in responding to domestic pressures, has assumed many of the characteristics of the old social democratic movements, and that the future may hold the need for a more dynamic Left than the present conciliatory communist regime represents.

**The Conspiracy Against Hitler in the Twilight War.** By Harold C. Deutsch. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1968. 394 pp. $8.95. Utilizing primary source materials and interviews, Professor Deutsch offers much new information about the German resistance movement. He presents the first detailed account in English of the German anti-Nazi plot of September 1939-May 1940, a conspiracy that included the services of Pope Pius XII as an intermediary.



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**France, De Gaulle, and Europe: The Policy of the Fourth and Fifth Republics Toward the Continent.** By Simon Serfaty. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968. 177 pp. $6.95. Stressing the continuity and consistency that characterize French policy toward the Continent in both the Fourth and Fifth Republics, Professor Serfaty sees the differences between the two regimes lying primarily in the state of mind with which they approached their problems in Europe. He believes that France in 1958, as in 1945, was preoccupied with security which meant the containment of Germany. For both regimes, all else with regard to Europe was secondary in importance.

**The Future of Germany.** By Karl Jaspers. Translated and edited by E. B. Ashton. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967. 173 pp. $4.95. In examining the past 20 years as they have affected the German political and intellectual scene, the German philosopher and psychiatrist, Karl Jaspers, tries to arouse his countrymen to the fact that they must assume the risks of controlling their own political fate. He points out the dangers he believes are inherent in the present system of German democracy, asserting that in 1945 Germans wished to build on the idea of freedom "to organize ourselves in a democracy under a republican form of government. We failed. We are regressing farther and farther."

**Italy.** By Muriel Grindrod. New York: Praeger, 1968. 260 pp. $7.00. Taking into account the country's eventful past, Miss Grindrod analyzes Italy's growth into a modern republic, with emphasis on the postwar years in which the political framework and economy have been greatly strengthened. She describes the political parties, their policies and their quarrels, as well as the important role played by such Italian politicians as Alcide De Gasperi, Palmiro Togliatti, Aldo Moro and Amintore Fanfani. In addition, she deals with the Italian educational system, the position of women in Italian society, relations between Church and State, and the problems posed by Sicily and Sardinia.

**The Obstructed Path: French Social Thought in the Years of Desperation, 1930-1960.** By H. S. Hughes. New York: Harper & Row, 1968. 304 pp. $6.95. In *Consciousness and Society,* Dr. Hughes, Professor of History at Harvard University, traced major tendencies of European social thought between 1890 and 1930. In this second volume of an intended trilogy, dealing with the attempts of modern French intellectuals to rethink the values of their culture, he endeavors to bridge philosophy, literature and social science, and to show the relation of French thought to comparable thought in Germany, Britain and the United States. He discusses the writings of the social historians Bloch and Febvre; the Catholic philosophers Maritain and Marcel; the proponents of heroism, Martin du Gard, Barnanos, Saint-Exupery, Malraux and de Gaulle; the Marxist phenomenologists, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty; and Camus, Teilhard de Chardin and Levi-Strauss.

**Portugal and Africa, 1815-1910: A Study in Uneconomic Imperialism.** By R. J. Hammond. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1966. 384 pp. $8.50. Portugal established her colonies in Africa over 500 years ago and, despite the drive of African nationalism, still retains them. In this penetrating account written for the Food Research Institute of Stanford University, Dr. Hammond analyzes how Portugal consolidated her rule in Angola and Mozambique and defended their territorial integrity and internal structure from the imperialist ambitions and humanitarian zeal of the larger, more powerful European nations, notably Great Britain. He concludes that her lack of power and resources was compensated for by the skill of her colonial administrators.



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**A Question of Slavery: Labour Policies in Portuguese Africa and the British Protest, 1850-1920.** By James Duffy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967. 240 pp. $4.95. Despite well-intentioned legislation designed in Lisbon to eradicate the practice, a kind of slavery persisted in the Portuguese African colonies into the 20th century. Professor Duffy of Brandeis University, an expert on Portuguese Africa, draws upon both Lisbon and London sources in examining the dilemma African slave labor posed for Portugal and the bitter controversy it aroused among humanitarian groups in Great Britain.

**The Spanish Press, 1470-1966.** By Henry F. Schulte. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1968. 280 pp. $6.95. A former news bureau chief in Madrid combines scholarly research, a newsman's instinct and a wealth of firsthand information in detailing the development of Spain's Fourth Estate through five centuries of stormy history to the "moment of truth" reached under Franco's new "liberal" Press and Print Law of 1966. He has concentrated on the periodical press, primarily newspapers, "because, in the political sense, they are the key medium of mass communications; and because, unlike . . . [radio and television], they carry the burden of history," interacting with other parts of Spain's political-social order and between government and populace. The predominant role of censorship in the Franco era receives special attention.

**West German Aid to Developing Nations.** By Jack L. Knusel. New York: Praeger, 1968. 232 pp. $12.50. In this study of the relation between German foreign aid and the German economy, the author finds that although West Germany's aid program is relatively small, it is technically competent, and encourages private enterprise and initiative. Comparing it to that of France, Britain and the United States, he asserts that Germany is capable of granting a greater amount of aid to spur development efforts.

## IV. Communist Bloc

**The Bridge and the Abyss: The Troubled Friendship of Maxim Gorky and V.I. Lenin.** By Bertram D. Wolfe. New York: Praeger, for the Hoover Institution, 1967. 180 pp. $5.95. Despite their opposite viewpoints on man and society, Gorky and Lenin maintained a tenuous, stormy friendship from 1907 through the darkest years of the Russian Revolution. The author paints a vivid picture not only of these two protagonists but also of the troubled times in which they lived. He describes the truce they struck in 1918: Lenin would help Gorky to preserve Russian culture and the livelihoods of the intellectuals; Gorky was to use his great literary gifts to further the "world revolution." Eventually, when the uneasy partnership between revolutionary and poet collapsed, Lenin was to conclude: "Friendship is friendship and duty duty." Clearly, each held duty—one to revolution, the other to man and his culture—the higher calling.

**Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Union.** Edited by Eric Goldhagen. New York: Praeger, 1968. 351 pp. $8.75. The Director of the Philip W. Lown Institute of East European Jewish Studies at Brandeis University has compiled a series of papers delivered by a group of scholars to that Institute on the nationalities problem in the Soviet Union. The contributors analyze various aspects of Soviet policy toward ethnic minorities and examine the degree to which these groups have succeeded in preserving their national identities under Soviet rule. Their findings suggest that Soviet policy, while it has achieved economic advances, has been arbitrary and even discriminatory in its effort to Russify the peoples of the USSR, but that, despite Moscow's pressures, the national consciousness of the minorities survives.



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**A Geography of China.** By T. R. Tregear. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1965. 342 pp. $2.95 (paper). Believing that present changes taking place in the People's Republic of China must be understood against the historical and geographical background, the author has portrayed China's geographical growth and its interaction with human activity and institutions.

**History of the International. Volume II: 1914-1943.** By Julius Braunthal. New York: Praeger, 1967. 596 pp. $17.50. In this second volume of his monumental history of the Socialist International, the author traces the development of the movement from the outbreak of World War I, through the Spartacus uprising in Berlin, the rise of fascism in Italy and Germany, the clash of ideologies on the battlefields of Spain, to its dissolution in 1943. Noting the recurrent rift between Social Democracy and Bolshevism which dominated the period, he concludes that a united international labor movement might have withstood the rise of fascism in the 1930's.

**Ich Sah die Revolutionare.** By George Popoff. Bern: Verlag Schweizerisches Ostinstitut, 1967. 174 pp. n.p. The author, born in Russia and now living in Rome as a journalist, writes with candor and authority of his experiences in the tumultuous years of the Russian Revolution and his encounters with Lenin and the Bolshevik leaders. Beginning his personal narrative with the murder of Rasputin, he portrays the men who led the Revolution and provides an engrossing "behind-the-scenes" account of the momentous upheaval that has shaped history for the last half-century.

**The Origin of Forced Labor in the Soviet State: 1917-1921. Documents and Materials.** By James Bunyan. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, in cooperation with the Hoover Institution, 1967. 276 pp. $10.00. In the early days of the Revolution, Soviet labor policy was shaped by the utopian Marxist slogans, "workers' control of industry" and "trade union management of production." By 1921, after the gradual introduction of measures of labor compulsion, first applying to the bourgeoisie and later covering the entire proletariat, the communist leaders had evolved a system of labor regimentation as cruel and oppressive as any devised in modern history. In providing a detailed narrative of this evolution the author makes frequent use of a large number of primary documents: official records and reports, party resolutions, memoirs of participants, and the daily press.

**Regional Distribution of Soviet Industrial Manpower: 1940-1960.** By Emilo J. Stanley. New York: Praeger, 1968. 208 pp. $15.00. The Project Director of the Computer-Assisted Education Curriculum Program at the University of California at Irvine has collected material from over 100 statistical handbooks published after 1957 on the USSR and its individual republics, and processed the data by computer. The result is the first detailed amassing in one volume of recent official information on Soviet industrial employment, its regional distribution, its breakdown by major industries, and the changes that have taken place in the period from 1940 to 1960.

**Soviet Foreign Policy.** By Jan F. Triska and David D. Finley. New York: Macmillan, 1968. 518 pp. $9.95. Instead of attempting to present a synthesis of interpretations of Soviet foreign policy or to impose consensus where none exists, the authors of this text raise questions about Soviet foreign policy that the student who has understood the course of historical events should ask himself. They then seek to answer some of these questions by empirical inquiry based on such modes as the use of history, the legal analysis of institutions, and functional and content analysis. A complete bibliography and several useful appendices are included.



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**Soviet Foreign Policy: 1928-1934. Documents and Materials. Volume II.** By Xenia Joukoff Eudin and Robert M. Slusser. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1967. 421 pp. $9.50. In comparison with Western governments, the Soviet Union has published very few documents from its state archives. Outside the USSR, only the Hoover Institution at Stanford University possesses a comprehensive collection of such materials. Mrs. Eudin and Mr. Slusser have selected the most important items from this collection and have translated and edited them to make up this volume. They have prefaced their work with a brief narrative summary of the major developments of the period.

## V. Middle East and Africa

**Against the World: Attitudes of White South Africa.** By Douglas Brown. New York: Doubleday, 1968. 253 pp. $4.95. An interesting account of South Africa's history and peoples. The author explores how Boer and English relations evolved; how and why South Africa ventured into its racial policy; and the impact of the Rhodesian crisis on South Africa.

**The Arab-Israeli Dilemma.** By Fred J. Khouri. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1968. 436 pp. $10.00. In this thorough, well-documented study, Professor Khouri of Villanova University has not only traced the complicated history of Arab-Israeli relations, but has attempted to isolate facts from partisan propaganda. Based on a wide variety of official sources as well as personal interviews with heads of Middle Eastern states, his work concludes that future progress in the area will first require a series of partial solutions to improve the political atmosphere. To serve this end he outlines a gradual approach guided by mutual cooperation with UN agencies and quiet diplomacy.

**Britain and Africa.** By Kenneth Kirkwood. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1965. 235 pp. $5.00. After demonstrating the importance of the different social, economic and political forces operative in Africa, the author examines three zones of the contemporary sub-Saharan region: South-Central or Southern Africa, West Africa and Eastern or East-Central Africa. His final chapter is devoted to a consideration of the major international associations of which Britain is a member and with which she operates increasingly in African affairs. Kirkwood believes ethnic considerations remain particularly important to Africans; at the same time he believes the extent of significant intercommunications influencing their political and social affairs has been underestimated.

**A Land Full of People: Life in Kenya Today.** By John S. Roberts. New York: Praeger, 1967. 240 pp. $6.50. As the title suggests, although this book covers the formal political and social institutions of Kenya, emphasis is on the views and reactions of its people. Writing with insight and a good deal of admiration for the Kenyans, the author examines the breakdown of racial prejudice, the effects of tribalism, industrialization and education, Kenya's place in the Cold War, and many other aspects of the changing society of what he considers is "Africa's most pragmatic country."

**Malawi: A Political and Economic History.** By John G. Pike. New York: Praeger, 1968. 248 pp. $6.50. Following a description of the topography, climate, vegetation and demography of Malawi, the author reviews the precolonial history of this east-central African republic, its colonial history as the British Protectorate of Nyasaland, the movement toward the Central African Federation, and Malawi's eventual attainment of independence in 1964. He then assesses the economic prospects of the country as well as the political consequences flowing from its economic status.



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**Nigeria.** By Walter Schwarz. New York: Praeger, 1968. 328 pp. $7.50. A well-rounded account of Nigerian politics and society. The author traces Nigerian history from the prehistoric "nok" culture to the emergence of modern nationalism, paying particular attention to the role of such leaders as Dr. Azikiwe, Chief Awolowo, the Sardauna of Sokoto and Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa and the coups of 1966 following the election crises of 1964 and 1966. He also assesses the problems faced by the regimes of General Ironsi and General Gowon which led to the outbreak of tribal war in 1967.

**The Role of Labor in African Nation-Building.** Edited by Willard A. Beling. New York: Praeger, 1968. 204 pp. $15.00. Based on a symposium dedicated to the theme of labor in post-independent Africa, this book analyzes the political and economic role of labor in African nation-building. It treats such questions as the following: How does the role of organized labor in Africa differ from the role of labor in the West? What has been the effect of organized labor in Africa on the development of democratic institutions? To what extent has communism made inroads into African labor movements?

**The Separated People: A Look at Contemporary South Africa.** By E. J. Kahn, Jr. New York: W. W. Norton, 1968. 276 pp. $5.95. The material contained in this book, which appeared originally in the *New Yorker*, was gathered by the author during three months in South Africa at the end of 1966. He describes in vivid detail the country and its national character. From his portrait emerges the view of South Africa as a land convinced that its policy of *apartheid* is right and above reproach. He believes an understanding of this opinion is vital for those dealing with the issues pertaining to South Africa in such institutions as the United Nations.

**The Southern Sudan: Background to Conflict.** By Mohamed Omer Beshir. New York: Praeger, 1968. 192 pp. $7.50. Deploring the general ignorance that characterizes opinions both within the Sudan and abroad concerning that country's political problems, the author has undertaken to set forth the sources of the troubled relationship between the North and South. He believes the continuation of the Sudan's role as a meeting place and bridge between Arab and Negro Africa depends on the manner in which it solves the problem of the South. It is his hope that the national Parliament will adopt a regional structure for the country as a means of resolving the Southern issue.

**Tshombe.** By Anthony Bouscaren. New York: Twin Circle Publishing Company, 1967. 154 pp. $.95 (paper). Dr. Bouscaren, Professor of Political Science at Le Moyne College, reviews the strife-ridden career of Moise Tshombe and the explosiveness of Congolese politics since independence: the part Tshombe played in Katanga's secession, his short term as Prime Minister of the "reunited" Congo, his ouster, and his abduction from Spain and imprisonment in Algeria in 1967. The book includes an introduction by Reverend Daniel Lyons, S. J., and a statement on the Congo crisis by Senator Thomas J. Dodd.

### VI. East Asia and the Pacific

**India, India.** By Lisa Hobbs. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967. 216 pp. $4.95. Drawing upon her experiences and impressions in recent travels throughout India, Mrs. Hobbs, who is currently on the staff of the San Francisco *Examiner*, presents a personal report of this vast, teeming, problem-ridden nation. Writing from a journalist's viewpoint, she examines with insight and compassion the enormous obstacles India will have to surmount in order to survive as a democracy: the rampant population growth, the stranglehold of religion and caste, government corruption, and, above all, the crushing burden of immense poverty. The picture



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she paints of the future is not a bright one. Remembering the lessons of her visit to China, she fears the present democratic system in India will not be able to overcome these problems in time.

**India's Political System.** By Richard L. Park. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967. 116 pp. $4.95 ($1.95, paper). A Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan provides an objective, up-to-date description and analysis of the functioning and performance of the Indian political system, giving special attention to the ways in which Indian politics are shaped by social situations, values, history and economics. His book, complete with numerous charts and statistics, conforms in format and theoretical approach with other volumes in the Comparative Asian Governments Series.

**India's Policy in the United Nations.** By T. Ramakrishna Reddy. Cranbury, N.J.: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1968. 164 pp. $6.50. Central to India's policy in the United Nations from 1946 to 1966 on such issues as colonialism, the nature of the secretariat, the formation of peacekeeping forces, the amending of the Charter and the financing of activities, the author finds, are her desire for recognition as an important nation and her desire to increase her prestige within the UN. The impact on India's UN policy of her need for economic assistance and the influence of political idealism on her national policy are also assessed.

**The Secret Search for Peace in Vietnam.** By David Kraslow and Stuart H. Loory. New York: Random House, 1968. 247 pp. $5.95. Two newspapermen assess the public record of U.S. diplomacy against the private record in order to determine the extent to which the United States may be responsible for the delay in reaching a Viet Nam peace. They relate how the first breakthrough leading to the Paris meetings was achieved, and reveal the key roles in peace efforts—official and unofficial—played by men of prominence throughout the world.

**The Steel Industry of India.** By William A. Johnson. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966. 340 pp. $7.50. This detailed study of the ambitious expansion of one industry in one country was conceived as a means of promoting a better understanding of industrial growth and economic planning in developing areas. The author, an economist at The RAND Corporation, is concerned with whether the expansion of the industry has been justified by demand, whether it has been done judiciously, whether India possesses a comparative advantage in the production of steel, and what hurdles will have to be overcome if rapid growth of the industry is to be achieved.

**Vietnam: How We Got In, How To Get Out.** By David Schoenbrun. New York: Atheneum, 1968. 214 pp. $5.00 ($2.95, paper). A well-known correspondent presents in book form the views he gives at lectures concerning U.S. policy toward Viet Nam. He believes "that the war in Vietnam was ill-conceived from the start, that it is an unjust war that violates basic American traditions, principles and our most cherished cultural heritage."

## VII. Latin America

**The Alliance for Progress and Latin American Development Prospects: A Five Year Review, 1961-1965.** By the Departments of Economic Affairs and Social Affairs of the Pan American Union (General Secretariat of the Organization of American States). Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967. 213 pp. $6.00. This economic survey of Latin America by the OAS is problem-oriented and highly valuable to the specialist. It reviews the national economic situations, including sectoral development and structural change, unemployment, industrial



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development, agricultural development and the trends in commodity exports, and, more generally, discusses attempts to mobilize human resources, confront urban problems and promote agricultural reform.

**Haiti and the Dominican Republic.** By Rayford W. Logan. New York: Oxford University Press, 1968. 220 pp. $6.00. Written by an Emeritus Professor of History at Howard University who is an authority on the subject, this is the first comparative study of the two nations that together occupy the Caribbean island of Hispaniola. The author devotes the major part of the book to the history of the two countries from their colonial origins to the present. He goes on to analyze and compare economic, cultural and social developments and includes a description of religion and voodoo.

**A Strategy for Research on Social Policy: The Politics of Change in Venezuela. Volume I.** Edited by Frank Bonilla and José A. Silva Michelena. Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1967. 384 pp. $15.00. Product of a collaborative effort by members of the Centro de Estudios del Desarrollo of the Universidad Central de Venezuela and the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, this volume is part of a long-term research project focusing on ways to determine the relative social cost of alternative strategies of development. It features studies of conflict and consensus, elite structure, and numerical experimentation with a political model, done with methodological sophistication and emphasis on the degree to which political realism and social feasibility influence the success of plans for economic development.

**The Unwritten Alliance: Rio-Branco and Brazilian-American Relations.** By E. Bradford Burns. New York: Columbia University Press, 1966. 305 pp. $6.95. During the tenure of the Baron of Rio-Branco as Foreign Minister of Brazil (1902-1912), relations between his country and the United States reached a high-water mark of cordiality, attaining to a kind of unwritten alliance in 1906. The author's illuminating biography of this imaginative Brazilian diplomat, focused on the years as Foreign Minister, suggests that Rio-Branco encouraged Brazilian-American friendship to achieve his prime foreign policy goals. He was successful in this, for Washington provided the moral support that helped Brazil to settle boundary disputes to her territorial advantage and assert her diplomatic leadership over South America.



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# *Monographs and Reports Received*

*Cyprus: The Law and Politics of Civil Strife.* By Linda B. Miller. Cambridge: Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, Occasional Papers in International Affairs, No. 19, June 1968. 97 pp. $2.50.

*East and West Pakistan: A Problem in the Political Economy of Regional Planning.* By Md. Anisur Rahman. Cambridge: Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, Occasional Papers in International Affairs, No. 20, July 1968. 38 pp. $2.00.

*Fifty Years of Soviet Foreign Policy.* By Herbert S. Dinerstein. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, for the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, Studies in International Affairs, No. 6, 1968. 73 pp. $1.95.

*Japan: Economic Survey.* Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, July 1968. 54 pp. 80 cents.

*Norway: Economic Survey.* Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, June 1968. 40 pp. 80 cents.

*Toward Improved Social and Economic Measurement.* New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 48th Annual Report, June 1968. 110 pp. n.p.

*Transformation of Mao-Lin Faction's Tactical Line for Power Seizure.* By Hwang Tien-chien. Taipei: Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League, May 1968. 94 pp. 80 cents.

*Turkey: Economic Survey.* Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, July 1968. 54 pp. 80 cents.

*United States-Japanese Political Relations: The Critical Issues Affecting Asia's Future.* By Robert E. Ward, Warren S. Hunsberger, Frank N. Trager, Richard L. Walker and others. Washington: Georgetown University, The Center for Strategic Studies, Special Report Series, No. 7, May 1968. 104 pp. $2.00.

*The U.S. and Foreign Trade.* New York: Foreign Policy Association, Intercom, May-June 1968. 88 pp. $1.00.

*Vietnam: Matters for the Agenda.* By Harry Ashmore, David Schoenbrun and others. Santa Barbara: The Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, A Center Occasional Paper, June 1968. 64 pp. $1.00.

*The World Population Crisis: What It Is and Where to Get Information About It.* New York: Foreign Policy Association, Intercom, July-August 1968. 56 pp. $1.00.



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